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LAND, LABOUR AND CATTLE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ZULULAND, C. 1930-1950

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



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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis grew out of research I conducted on the land and people of Zululand during 1990-91 when I was at the University of Natal in Durban completing an M.A. I would like to thank the faculty, particularly Paul Maylam who first suggested a study of twentieth century Zululand to me and Philip Warhurst who supervised my M.A., and also fellow students of the Department of History at Natal for support and advice on my research.

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in the text and citations:

AA	*African Affairs.*
AE	*American Ethnologist.*
AEH	*African Economic History.*
AHS	African History Seminar series, *SOAS. (qv)*
AS	*African Studies Journal.*
ASR	*African Studies Review .*
CAAS	Canadian Association of African Studies.
CAD	Central Archives Depot, Pretoria.
CJSA	*Canadian Journal of African Studies.*
CRCSA	Canadian Research Consortium on Southern Africa.
DAJ	Union of South Africa, *Department of Agriculture Journal.*
FSA	*Farming in South Africa.*
GES	Union Department of Health, Pretoria.
GNLB	Government Native Labour Bureau, Pretoria.
ICS SSA	Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, Collected Seminar Papers, The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries.
IESHR	*Indian Economic and Social History Review.*
IJAHS	*International Journal of African Historical Studies.*
ILO	International Labour Organisation.
ILR	*International Labour Review Journal.*
ISJ	*International Sugar Journal.*
JAL	*Journal of African Law.*
JSAS	*Journal of Southern African Studies.*
JAH	*Journal of African History.*
JNZH	*Journal of Natal and Zulu History.*
JUS	Department of Justice, Pretoria.
KCAL	Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban.
LDE-N	Union Department of [White] Lands, Natal Section, Pretoria.
MJSA	*Medical Journal of South Africa.*
NAD	Native Affairs Department, Natal.
NAP	*Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg.*
NAU	Natal Agriculture Union.
NCP	*Natal Colonial Papers.*
NEC	Report of Evidence of the Native Economic Commission, 1930-32.
NFLC	Native Farm Labour Committee, Report of Evidence, 1937-39, CAD K-356, Boxes 1-5.

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

NNAC	Natal Native Affairs Commission, Report of Evidence, (Pietermaritzburg, 1908).
NRC	Native Recruiting Corporation, Johannesburg.
NTS	Native Affairs Department Files, Pretoria.
OJVSAI	*Onderstepoort Journal of Veterinary Science and Animal Industry.*
PEA	Portuguese East Africa(n), [Mozambique].
SAHJ	*South African Historical Journal.*
SAIRR	*South African Institute of Race Relations.*
SAIMR	South African Institute for Medical Research Publications.
SAJE	*South African Journal of Economics.*
SAJEH	*South African Journal of Economic History.*
SAJS	*South African Journal of Science.*
SANAC	South African Native Affairs Commission, Report of Evidence, (Cape Town, 1905), Vol.s 1-3.
SAP	South African Police.
SASJ	*South African Sugar Journal.*
SEPC	U.G. 32-'46, *Report of the Social and Economic Planning Council, No. 9, The Native Reserves and their place in the Union of South Africa,* (Pretoria, 1946).
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
TEBA	The Employment Bureau of Africa, Ulundi office.
U.G.	Union Government of South Africa publications.
ZCC	Zululand Chamber of Commerce.
ZFLC	Zululand Farm Labour Committee.
ZFU	Zululand Farmers' Union.
ZPU	Zululand Planters' Union.

OFFICIALS

CNC	Chief Native Commissioner, Natal.
DNC	District Native Commissioner, Zululand.
NC	Native Commissioner and Magistrate, Natal and Zululand.
SNA	Secretary of Native Affairs, Union Government.

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INTRODUCTION

Rural transformations form a crucial part of the story of developing capitalism in the political economy of industrialising South Africa.[1] This thesis examines such transformations in the establishment of a rural reserve for Africans within a segregated and class divided society in Zululand. In the first half of the twentieth century, Zulu leaders and state segregationists re-moulded significant legacies from the pre-colonial past in order to dominate the people and the economy of the reserves.[2] Zululand, therefore, provides a valuable focus for a study of the racial and class cleavage between Africans and whites; and of the stark contrasts not only between the strength and resilience of pre-colonial African states and the fragmented and overcrowded twentieth century reserves but also between commercialising white farmers and the mass of impoverished Zulu.[3]

Rural society in Zululand, however, was not simply unevenly bifurcated between Africans and whites. White interests were often divided between the component parts of the state at local and national levels and between the various fractions of capital.[4] At the same time white rule and the penetration of capitalism intensified the extant differentiation in Zulu society between chiefs and headmen and commoners and between older men and women and younger men.[5] Moreover, mission-educated `progressives' and the conservative ruling elite often had contending interests as did Zulu leaders and the state.[6] Patterns of alliance and

conflict varied with different times and at different places, often with ambiguous results. More importantly, Africans played a vital part in shaping both state policy in the reserves and the relationship of whites outside them to Zulu society.[7] This thesis attempts to understand the complexity and diversity of the local political economy and social stratification based as it was on the intersection of class and race.[8]

GEOGRAPHY, CLIMATE AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Zululand can be divided into three main geographical zones: southern, interior and northern (see map).[9] The climate is generally sub-tropical, with dry cool winters and wet hot summers. Rain normally falls heavily between November and March and lightly between April and October. Pre-colonial human settlement, agricultural and pastoral production adapted to these conditions. Normally, Africans tilled the land and planted maize, corn, sorghum and a variety of beans and pumpkins just before the summer rains. There are often two growing seasons in coastal areas of the north. Harvesting and the clearing of bush for cultivation usually takes place from February to May. Zulu herdsmen moved cattle across the various regions seasonally in order to gain access to the best grazing.

The southern coastal plain is approximately twenty miles wide, extending from the Thukela river north to the Mfolozi river, and is traversed by a series of rivers and streams which provide well-watered valleys and flood plains. There

are relatively fertile, though sandy, soils with a limited capacity for holding moisture in the Eshowe, Mtunzini and Lower Umfolozi (Empangeni) districts. Regular, plentiful rains, averaging over 40 inches a year ensure that, unless drought strikes, people can farm intensively. This coastal area has a nearly sub-tropical climate with hot, humid, wet summers and temperate dry winters. Before white colonization, Zulu settlement of this area was limited due to the prevalence of malaria and cattle diseases.[10]

The interior zone is comprised of the Nquthu, Nkandhla, Entonjaneni (Melmoth), Nongoma, and Mahlabatini districts. The uneven terrain consists of low river valleys, thorn and bushveld plains, and steep, rugged hills. The lower plains provide `sweetveld' and mixed grasses for summer cattle grazing and the upland areas provide `sourveld' for winter grazing. As Guy has argued, the Zulu maintained these grazing areas only through continued intervention to prevent the encroachment of dense bush and tree growth. The zone is well-watered, receiving 30 to 40 inches of rain a year, and provides a range of fine grazing areas. It is relatively free from endemic cattle and human diseases. Frost occasionally settles on the high hills during the relatively cool winters, but the long warm summers provide good growing seasons. The Zulu concentrated their settlement in this area in order to make use of the fertile soil and, prior to white settlement, the wide range of good pastures.

In the Ingwavuma and Ubombo districts of northern Zululand the low-lying coastal plain has sandy soils and the vegetation is mostly thornveld and sub-tropical palms. This region suffers from very dry winters and very hot summers. It experiences drought far more often than the southern and interior zones. Zulu settlement here was generally sparse except along the relatively fertile Pongola river flood plain and the well-watered lower portions of the Lebombo mountains. Cultivation is difficult, and Africans relied on food supplements from abundant local sources such as fish and on trade in palm wine produced from the *ilala* plant.

ZULULAND AROUND THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

In the nineteenth century, Zululand was one of the last and most powerful of the pre-colonial South African kingdoms.[11] In 1879, the British imperial and Natal colonial military conquest of the Zulu set the scene for the more intensive capitalist penetration of the region than previous the trading based on pre-capitalist production had allowed.[12] Well before 1879, however, Natal colonists had developed interests in the land, labour and resources of Zululand. Although there is considerable debate over the timing and relative impact of environment, demography and trade in Zulu state formation and the `mfecane' or Zulu diaspora of the early nineteenth century, the Zulu had established a cohesive political system by the late 1860s and Natal settlers had undoubtedly developed economic and trade links with it well before 1900.[13]

By the twentieth century Zululand had already been shaped by a long process of interaction with whites which had reduced the customary area of Zulu occupation and limited their expansion.[14] By 1879, the core of the Zulu kingdom lay north of the Thukela river. Before the Anglo-Zulu War, the Zulu king, Cetshwayo kaMpande (1826-1884), claimed Zululand's western boundary extended along the Umzinyati (Buffalo) river to the Drakensburg mountains and from there deep into the Transvaal.[15] The British fixed the western border in 1879 as part of the ultimatum they presented to the Zulu which led to the war.[16] To the north the Zulu were now also hemmed in by the African polities of the Swazi and Maputa, although by the 1820s, the Zulu had established their hegemony in the region and had subordinated the Maputa into a tributary relationship.[17]

During the 1880s, the British reconstructed the territory and African society within it through indirect administration and by establishing loyal `aliens' in the region.[18] Mercenaries in the war against the Zulu, the `white' chief John Dunn (1835-1895) and chief Hlubi of the Tlokoa, settled in Eshowe and Nquthu to act as a buffer against any recrudescence of Zulu power. These chiefs and their imported followers altered the regional economy by monopolising trade routes, embracing elements of `civilising' mission Christianity, and advancing `progressive' farming and cattle trading.[19] African settlers, attracted by these developments, increased the population density in the area substantially.

In 1883, as a result of British policy which sought to undermine Zulu cohesion by encouraging factional conflict, a devastating civil war erupted. During the war, the young Zulu king, Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo (c.1868-1913), offered Afrikaner mercenaries from the Transvaal an unspecified part of Zululand in exchange for their support against his rival, chief Zibhebu of the Mandlakazi. This contravened the Zulu custom which was supposed to prevent rulers from alienating land held in trust for the people.[20]

Having crushed the Mandlakazi, the Afrikaners established the New Republic (ceded to Natal in 1902 following the Anglo-Boer war) on fertile grazing lands in central and western Zululand and expanded their settlement into the `Proviso B' area of Entonjaneni, in the heart of Zululand, and hundreds of African families were forced off the land.[21] Those that remained were subjected to rent and labour dues. Moreover, the settlers restricted Zulu seasonal grazing movements. Although the royal family and their followers, the Usuthu, were victorious in battle, tensions between them and the Mandlakazi continued into the twentieth century.

The majority of Zulu families on white farms in these northern Natal districts endured irksome labour tenancy agreements and a few may have found opportunities to farm and keep stock on favourable terms for a time. As Beinart and Delius argue, African tenants managed to avoid the worst exactions of landlords.[22] The uneven development of capitalist agriculture in these upland areas allowed some

tenants to keep substantial cattle-herds and to farm intensively after they rendered their three to six month labour service. Others refused to work for their landlords and paid cash rents before travelling to the urban areas to earn wages from white employers.[23] During the 1920s, however, white farmers expanded their cultivation, increased their cattle holdings, and exploited their labour more ruthlessly. With the powers available to them under the 1913 Natives Land Act, which segregated the ownership of land in favour of whites, and under the Masters and Servants legislation, they evicted thousands of African tenants from their farms, forcing them into the reserves.[24]

At the turn of the century, the Zulu political economy was based on customary agriculture organised in basic productive units or homesteads, on the trade of ivory and skins, and on migrant wage labour.[25] While the colonial Natal state, which annexed Zululand in 1897, sought to maintain certain continuities with the pre-capitalist system of chiefly land control and homestead production, a critical difference with the past was, as Guy argues, the diversion of African `surplus' labour from the confines of the old Zulu kingdom into the wider developing capitalist economy.[26] Following the conquest, young Zulu men, especially from the southern districts, increasingly left the territory in search of wage labour. They sought cash to purchase cattle needed for *lobola* (bridewealth) and to buy a range of goods now used in the homestead, including ploughs and hoes for cultivation, cloth and some basic food staples.[27] In 1903, the advent of local rail transport

improved the movement of men and goods into and out of Zululand and reduced the cost of store-bought food which helped alleviate periodic food shortages.[28]

Natal imposed a variant of indirect rule on the Zulu and governed through chiefs who were under the control of local magistrates (native commissioners [NCs], under the Native Affairs Department [NAD] from 1910).[29] The new government sought to cover the cost of administration and drive young Zulu men into wage labour through the imposition of taxes, first a 14s. hut-tax in 1888 and then, in 1905, a decidedly unpopular poll tax on all males not liable for the hut-tax. These were an added burden to homestead productivity as some families struggled to meet the high tax rates through the sale of agricultural produce. Moreover, chiefs, male homestead heads and officials ensured their continued control over the male youth through the collection of taxes and by controlling labour migrancy.[30]

Homestead production, nevertheless, remained the mainstay of the Zulu economy. Family subsistence and accumulation were based on cultivation and cattle-keeping.[31] Cattle were a productive and reproducing form of storeable wealth. There was a gendered division of labour activities, with men working in animal husbandry and related activities such as ploughing, and women providing food through agricultural work.[32] To a large degree, male migrant labour was predicated on female capacity to maintain homesteads.[33] Patriarchal control of homesteads and of the division of labour also related to access to land. Male household heads

strictly controlled the allocation of arable plots to wives while chiefs and their deputies controlled settlement on a district basis.[34]

Although African settlement varied regionally, most communities in the south and interior were congested because of settler land expropriations in the 1880s and 1890s. Thus, as demographic pressures increased, the Zulu were forced to use all available land for cultivation by 1900.[35] Arable land was scarce in Nquthu, Nkandhla, Melmoth and Eshowe and they used hillsides for cultivation and grazing since they avoided lower valleys due to the prevalence of malaria or tsetse fly.[36] Moreover, leading members of the royal family and men of status controlled the better pastures in the upland areas of the interior districts for their own cattle, thereby denying commoners more arable or grazing land.[37]

In 1896-1897, the devastating stock disease rinderpest wiped out over 80 per cent of Zulu cattle.[38] Until herds recovered in the 1910s, most families were without draught oxen, and even `progressive' farmers, reverted to hoe cultivation.[39] In 1902, southerners, especially the mission-educated, owned more ploughs, with one to every ten families than northerners, who owned only one for every 24 families. Because of their heavy cattle losses, some southerners hired draught oxen from neighbouring white farmers, and paid for ploughing services out of the sale of produce, but they did so increasingly with cash earned from migrant labour.[40]

Re-stocking after cattle epizootics was an uneven process. In the congested districts of Nquthu and Nkandhla people tended to restock with less costly goats and sheep. While these animals reproduced more rapidly, Africans did not consider them as valuable as cattle.[41] The less fertile northern districts provided for rapidly increasing herds. In Nongoma, Mahlabatini and the north, grazing was more widely available and land was in less demand for controlled agriculture than in the south. This was due, in part, to the less favourable climate, and in part because chiefs had better control over the less densely populated land there and could therefore provide their cattle with larger pastures. Moreover, the terrain and uneven capitalist penetration shaped local responses to restocking. Hlubi's people in Nquthu, for example, accumulated sheep, which were well-suited to the hilly area, in order to take advantage of the trade with white farmers and the local market for wool.[42]

METHODOLOGY AND THEMES

Although there are a number of important studies concerned with the foundations of society in twentieth century Zululand, much remains undone.[43] Recent work in particular has considered the construction of Zulu ethnicity and nationalism and their relation to the state during the early twentieth century.[44] These works are, however, largely concerned with political developments, and less with a detailed examination of the material basis of Zulu society in the reserves. They have tended to conflate the

experience of African tenants in the white-farming districts of northern Natal with that of Africans in the reserves.[45] As they suggest, circumstances differed markedly between the white farms and the reserves and this thesis therefore concentrates on the latter.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Natal segregationists, seeking to overcome the problems of industrialising society, changed their earlier perception of Zululand as a threatening military kingdom and turned to contributing to the African construction a distinctly conservative Zulu nationalism.[46] The M.P. for Zululand and leading sugar-planter, George Heaton Nicholls, was a major proponent of segregation, especially for Natal-Zululand. His `adaptionist' policy aimed, in part, to lessen the competition between planters and urban industry for Zulu labour by advocating the `retribalisation' of Africans under a strong, conservative Zulu paramount in the reserves in the hopes of increasing the state's control of the forces of change in the capitalist context.[47] It is, therefore, important to examine the material underpinnings of reserve society, especially as they related to chiefly rule, in order to understand how capitalism developed in an increasingly differentiated society and in what ways segregation developed in Natal.[48]

This thesis could not have been written without the work of earlier scholars on rural South Africa in the late nineteenth century. Studies of rural polities torn asunder by imperial armies, colonial conquest and alien rule enable

an understanding of the continuities and contrasts between the precolonial political economy controlled by Africans and that dominated by the white state and capital.[49] Equally important are those works which examine rural history and the transformation of African society in the twentieth century.[50] Beinart, Bradford and Bundy, for example, present a nuanced theoretical approach to the patterns of dominance and struggle in the countryside with an emphasis on `Africanist' historiography in an effort to recapture the history of local people in the wider scope of rural transformations and these were useful for this study.[51] While Bradford and Bundy's studies raise important questions about the conflicts between white farmers and Africans over land and resources which are relevant to Zululand, Beinart and Bundy's findings about the nature of stratification and conflict in rural South Africa are confirmed in many aspects of the Zulu case study.[52] In Zululand, however, a detailed examination of the ruling strata of African society has shown important differences from Pondoland and the Eastern Cape in the way chiefs and headmen dominated the local economy.

There is a need, however, for more local histories of rural communities during the first half of the twentieth century.[53] In order to understand the nature of rural change, South African historians need to overcome what often appears as a polarised history in which cohesive pre-colonial societies are conquered and then undermined by capitalism only to emerge much later as impoverished labour reserves. Detailed accounts of the 1930s and 1940s, as the

effects of developing segregation policy were felt all over rural South Africa, are particularly sparse. Without this foundation, research on the 1950s and 1960s, the era of formal apartheid, for which archive material is now available, will be distorted. Moreover, more attention should be paid to the dynamics of the implantation of capitalism in the countryside.[54] Only then will we have a more complete picture of the forces and conflicts that have shaped contemporary South Africa.[55]

The 1930s and 1940s were chosen as the focus of study because this was a time of crisis in rural South Africa. The combined impact of world-wide depression and environmental collapse during repeated severe droughts prompted an intensified state intervention which sharpened the conflict between Africans and the state as well as between contending groups in Zululand. Moreover, as the white state consolidated its power, and supported commercialising white farmers, who had come to dominate much of the countryside by the 1920s, a variety of conflicts smouldered in the reserves, ready to erupt.[56]

With the exception of the 1906 Bambatha rebellion, the timing of widespread resistance to the state in Zululand was perhaps somewhat later, and less forceful, than in other rural areas such as the Transkei and the Orange Free State.[57] In Zululand conservative chiefs, assisted by the state, largely prevented wide-scale opposition to their rule. Resistance was fragmented in Zululand, and popular movements such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers

Union (ICU) made few inroads into the reserves in the 1920s.[58] Nevertheless, the serious tensions between the state and Africans, refracted through chiefs and local officials, had emerged by 1930.

During the 1930s and 1940s the state developed new policies in an attempt to respond to African discontent and it defined its efforts through the ideology of conservation and `development'. These efforts, however, exacerbated existing tensions in rural society. The state's interventions in order to rebuild the reserves and prevent environmental degradation were, as Beinart has shown, more than a means of underpinning a migrant labour force through improved agriculture.[59] The ideas, which officials developed and implemented, often brutally, as `betterment' programmes in the 1940s, comprised an ambiguous mix of paternal concern for impoverished Africans, the desire to inculcate `primitive' cultivators with `progressive' techniques, and the official imperative to manage production in the reserves while defusing African opposition.[60]

Between 1930 and 1950, these concerns intensified as `liberal' segregationists sought ways to provide a stable home for a `contented' African peasantry in the reserves. Following from the findings of the 1930-1932 Native Economic Commission (NEC), Senator Edgar Brookes, the noted Natal `liberal' academic, headed the Union Government's Social and Economic Planning Council (SEPC) which considered ways of overcoming the rapidly deteriorating

reserve economies.[61] The council's efforts, as with those of the later Tomlinson Commission, which also made proposals for the `socio-economic development' of reserve areas were in vain, however, since the state was not prepared to incur the expense of improving African areas.[62]

Central aspects of change were common to Zululand and other parts of South Africa, especially the Transkei.[63] There was an increased reliance on entrenched patterns of labour migrancy. For many Zulu in the reserves, subsistence agriculture declined and eventually collapsed, forcing them to turn to the wider market for food. The state, both at local and national levels, intensified its control of people and their land. Mission-education imbued a growing number of Africans with the idea of `progressive civilisation' and its concomitant technology. And, there were further changes in consciousness: in the way Zulu perceived themselves in relation to chiefs, the state and other Africans.

The creation and perception of ethnicity are recurrent themes in the thesis. Officials and the Africans in Zululand repeatedly referred to `differences' between `the Zulu' and other Africans. Officials compared politics and government in Zululand and the Transkei, often in derisory fashion, in order to motivate the Zulu to accept state policy. Similarly, labour recruiters, white farmers and their allied agents in government, differentiated between groups of Africans to rationalise employment practices or to force them into particular types of employment.

Moreover, the Zulu distinguished between themselves and other workers in order to defend their interests against those competing against them for wages and resources.[64]

The idiom used was that of `traditionalism' yet there was an essential modernity in `traditionalism' which, in the case of the Zulu, allowed people to shape social practices to maintain continuity of form but with a changed substance.[65] The Zulu patriarchy often appealed to invented `tradition' to assert their hegemony over women and commoners and to control relations of production. As Beinart and Bundy have argued for the Transkei, so in Zululand, the use of `defensive traditionalism' by chiefs was a crucial feature of regional politics.[66] Chiefs often managed to gain popular support in part because they tried to defend their followers against the demands of state and capital by harking back to an idealised `glorious' and `independent' Zulu past. The development of a unique Natal-Zululand brand of `Zulu' nationalism fed into wider inventions of `tribal' identities in South Africa.[67] Paradoxically, at the same time, Zulu chiefs and members of the royal family were increasingly used in the state's attempts to implement policy and to defuse rural struggles.[68]

The following chapters attempt to explore the political economy of Zululand. In the spirit of Gluckman's *Analysis of a Social Situation* and Marks's *The Ambiguities of Dependence*, the thesis focuses on specific episodes of change in Zululand in order to consider conflict and

cohesion in African society.[69] These `typical' situations are specific to the local processes which shaped Zululand, and yet are also related to the wider history of southern Africa. They also resonate with features of change throughout Africa.

The first chapter considers the delimitation and expropriation of African land. By looking at the state's development of a series of fragmented African reserves it attempts to show how the burgeoning Zulu population, already congested in the southern and central areas by white settlement, faced further crowding as sugar-cane farmers moved into Zululand. At the turn of the century, the Zulu in this area numbered over 200,000. Between 1921 and 1946, the African reserve population rose from 255,000 to nearly 400,000. This large increase was, in part, due to the massive number of African evictions from white farms in southern Zululand and neighbouring northern Natal.[70]

As important for the political economy in Zululand, however, was the state's policy of segregated land settlement. The government privileged white commercial farming over African agriculture by providing whites with dramatically better financial and infrastructural support. Although there was some debate in official circles about the need to develop `progressive' African farmers in the rural areas, the exigencies of indirect rule and white concerns about the possibly explosive nature of African society suffering severe impoverishment undermined this.[71] Moreover, Natal settlers had `hungry eyes' for the fertile

coastal belt in Zululand. The advent of commercial sugar farming in Zululand fuelled their desire to wrest as much productive land away from the Zulu as possible. As one official noted in 1914:

> Twenty years ago, one was looked upon as a madman to go down to the Umfolozi [Mfolozi river] during the summer months, and to-day people are growing sugar cane there.[72]

The state, therefore, sacrificed most safeguards towards African land, and particularly towards individual tenure which might have supported the independent peasantry envisaged under the 1913 Natives Land Act, by allowing Natal settlers to gain control of most of the productive land in Zululand.[73]

Constraints on African land-holding had profound implications for the way in which white agriculture developed and African subsistence production declined.[74] The forces of the state, commercial agriculture and chiefly rule all subordinated individual African production. Not only did sugar-cane farming make intensive use of all the available land outside the reserves in the south; chiefs also worked to prevent their followers from gaining a stake on land outside their control. Thus, it was only a few members of the ruling class and their agents who managed to accumulate wealth and status through production in the reserves.

The next chapter on chiefly authority argues that with the support of the central government in Pretoria, a re-

constituted African ruling class consolidated its hold over the land and resources in the reserves. However, the Usuthu (supporter of the hereditary royal family) leaders, Solomon kaDinuzulu (1913-1933) and his brother Arthur Edward Mshiyeni kaDinuzulu (1933-1948), the sons of Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, the first Zulu king to live under colonial rule, only partially resurrected the institution of the Zulu monarchy.[75] They were limited, on the one hand, by distortions caused by South African segregation which did not, and could not accommodate complete territorial, political or economic autonomy. On the other hand, they were constrained by their ambiguous position between the demands of state and capital and the those of their followers. Commoners and `progressives' increasingly distanced themselves from the ruling elite as Solomon, Mshiyeni and their fellow chiefs embraced power derived from the state more openly.

Chiefly authority in Zululand was, however, in flux. Zulu kings and chiefs were, by custom and practice, supposed to order the subsistence economy through a redistributive rationale which bound them to their followers through reciprocal obligations.[76] Formal and informal white capitalist penetration fundamentally altered these features of chiefly authority by first destroying the cohesion of the Zulu state under an Usuthu monarch and then incorporating atomised and competing chiefdoms into a colonist-dominated Natal in 1897.[77] The number of chiefdoms in Zululand fluctuated over time. While the pre-conquest kingdom was comprised of roughly 26 interdependent

chiefdoms under king Cetshwayo, the British settlement of 1879 removed disloyal chiefs and reconstituted the remains of the old kingdom under 13 appointed chiefs. Natal colonialism further eroded hereditary chiefly authority by reducing the old kingdom to three districts in 1883.[78] Although the `Bambatha rebellion' in 1906, to some extent, moderated the Natal administration's approach to African affairs, many officials remained wary of royal chiefly power in Zululand. Moreover, none of the expropriated land was restored to chiefs.[79] Thereafter, appointed chiefs struggled to win popular support and many hereditary chiefs struggled to balance their quest for official recognition with the desire to maintain mass appeal.

It is not entirely accurate to characterise all chiefs as homogeneously conservative. Not only did they often take up contradictory positions, depending upon the timing and context of change, but they also left room for other leaders to manoeuvre in the interstices of their followers divided loyalties.[80] There were political, economic and ideological aspects to this struggle of `minor' players to capture popular support.[81] This examination of the contests for chiefly authority attempts to show how those men with less `official' power came to dominate local politics.

Although the story of agricultural production and the African peasantry in Natal and Zululand is largely one of decline, the story of the cattle economy in Zululand is one of remarkable resilience.[82] There was a veritable `population explosion' from natural increase in the cattle

herds in the Zululand reserves. In 1895, prior to intensive white settlement, there were estimated to be about 200,000 African-owned cattle in Zululand. In 1898, following the devastation of rinderpest, the Zulu were said to have fewer than 60,000 cattle. Over the next twenty years the herds recovered and reached their pre-rinderpest level by 1921. Thereafter, the Zulu concentrated shrewdly on increasing their wealth in cattle with dramatic results and the herds `exploded' to about 700,000 cattle.[83]

Guy has argued that:

> It seems impossible that the pre-colonial peoples of south-eastern Africa could have established a long term ecological equilibrium with their environment; a society without scientific knowledge of plant life or the means to control grazing and cattle movements by fencing or to store and pump water, could avert pasture deprivation.[84]

It seems clear, however, that the Zulu overcame their apparent lack of `scientific knowledge', the `inevitable' degeneration of pastures, and even greater constraints on herd increases. In the context of further reductions of grazing land and stricter controls on the movement of cattle in the twentieth century than before, Zulu herdsmen managed their cattle well, often demonstrating practical wisdom that can be considered `indigenous science'.[85]

Although the introduction of modern stock-disease prevention, which was principally aimed at maintaining white-owned herds, undoubtedly played an important part in the herd recovery, it also served to accelerate the

patterns of differential ownership of cattle because Veterinary Department measures for disease control came with a cash cost. Moreover, cattle-owners adapted the production and exchange of cattle to concentrate the herds in their own hands and to exploit a rapidly commercialising market.

The chapter on labour focuses on created and perceived identities in the Zulu work-force and their relation to sugar-cane farming. Both the state and Africans had a stake in the `ethnic specialisation' of labour. The Zulu used ethnicity to try and secure relatively better paid jobs on the South African gold mines or in other urban areas. More importantly for the Zululand farmers, they used it to avoid the worst exactions of poorly-paid work on sugar farms where appalling conditions prevailed.[86] The story of Zulu labour migration and its wider implications, however, have not been considered here in depth. This is, in part, because the thesis concentrates on the relatively unexplored features of work on commercialising `industrial' sugar-cane farms, and in part because important aspects of Zulu labour migration to the urban areas have been covered by Atkins, Hemson and Jeeves.[87]

The uneven development of capitalist agriculture in South Africa was crucial for labour relations in the countryside, and this was particularly true for the Zululand sugar plantations.[88] Sugar was a significant product for South Africa's drive toward agricultural self-sufficiency, and the largely self-regulating sugar industry enjoyed

considerable state support with little official scrutiny.[89] The powerful Zululand sugar-planters' lobby presented a formidable and united front against the forces of change and improvement in the sugar industry. Although the lobby attempted to align its demands for state support with those of the least competitive of its members, the new, under-capitalised farmers struggled to develop and compete with established farmers and urban industries for African labour.

The Zulu were especially resistant to both state and farmers' efforts to direct them into agrarian labour. The sugar planters were, therefore, forced to turn to the same strategies, and face the same problems, of a migrant labour system as the mines.[90] This chapter, therefore, considers questions relevant to the wider historiographical debate over the nature of segregation and labour migrancy: What opportunities were there for wage employment in the countryside? To what degree did capitalist agriculture transform the labour market in the reserves? Could rural employment have stemmed the tide of Africans flowing into the cities?[91] In addition, the chapter attempts to re-capture some of the complexity and diversity of the communities in and around the sugar plantations adjacent to the reserves where migrants and residents interacted.[92]

The crisis caused by drought, depression and agricultural decline in the 1930s is considered in the next two chapters. During the 1930s, because of extreme want in Zululand, the state and NAD officials finally challenged

the claim made by urban industry, and particularly the sugar planters, that Africans could be paid low wages since they met subsistence needs from reserve production. Thus, the meagreness of reserve agriculture was laid bare. African producers suffered from the reduced availability of land, unequal state support for white agriculture and unfair competition from sugar planters. While some well-placed Zulu in the reserves profitably exploited the few market opportunities, there were tensions over land between these `progressive' producers and conservative chiefs on the one hand, and between un-competitive whites struggling to compete on world markets and Africans on the other.

The repeated droughts of the 1930s and 1940s caused severe food shortages in the reserves and finally put paid to the `myth' of reserve subsistence.[93] If it were not for state intervention and the market in food, possibly thousands would have died from starvation. Yet various groups of Africans had differential access to food. Although the threat of famine loomed large for most reserve residents, the dynamics of social stratification, and the effects of capitalist development meant some wealthier Zulu had greater `entitlements' to food.

The entitlement approach to famine, as articulated by Sen and briefly stated here, argues that during famine people exchange a number of different endowments or services that they own or control for access to food. If their control of these entitlements, such as cultivable land, wage labour, or the production of goods to sell or trade, changes, then

their entitlement to food also changes.[94] Thus, a wage labourer who loses his or her job cannot command the same entitlement to food through purchase as before. Similarly, a cultivator who loses land can no longer produce either food to eat or other products to exchange for food. These entitlements are shaped by local factors in the political economy and depend on legal and social relations. In the Zululand case, they also often depended on conditions imposed by the state and capital. For the purposes of the chapter on famine, it was the overall loss of entitlements to land or jobs, and a decline in the value of wage entitlements, which made the majority of Zulu susceptible to food shortages. Thus, the position of commoner Zulu contrasted with the ability of wealthier chiefs and whites to maintain their entitlements to food without incurring the massive debts faced by commoners.

The most important and, it would seem, under-researched aspect of food supplies in the reserves was the developing white dominated market for food in rural South Africa.[95] The commoditisation of food by large, well-capitalised agricultural concerns and white store-keepers shaped the relative levels of food entitlement for the Zulu. By the 1930s, government-stipended chiefs, wage labourers and women running homesteads had differing access to food according to the cash or produce they controlled. Thus there were gender and generational differences in entitlements since people's access to food during a famine was determined more by cash inputs which were controlled predominantly by male household heads and less on

agricultural inputs or gathering which were controlled by women.[96]

In Zululand, as with famines or the threat of famine elsewhere, subsistence was not necessarily undermined by overall food shortages, but rather by problems of supply, delivery and unequal access.[97] Indeed, overall food production in South Africa, particularly of maize which was a staple food for the Zulu, rose while Africans struggled to find enough to eat. The component parts of the state reacted in an ambiguous fashion to food shortages in the reserves. While, on the one hand, local NAD officials tried to improve Africans' access to increased food supplies, on the other hand, the Pretoria regime attempted to increase its control in the reserves by providing work-relief schemes and by mobilising labour.

State intervention and `betterment' schemes were the result of increasing official concern about the `impending collapse' of agricultural and pastoral production in the reserves.[98] From the 1930s, governments throughout Africa tried to increase food production and improve existing `primitive' cultivation and cattle management in order to stabilise local economies for increasingly impoverished Africans.[99] Against the background of rising tensions in the urban areas and concerns about the impact of industrialisation on `traditional' African society, the South African state convened the 1930-1932 Native Economic Commission (NEC) to consider how to lead Africans towards

`civilisation' and a viable segregated political economy.[100]

Although the commission made important recommendations for bringing Africans above an established `poverty line' and for their protection from famine, the state never implemented the proposals which envisaged a huge expenditure of funds to save the reserves from ruin.[101] Instead, the NAD followed a new remit: to apply current `scientific' ideas to existing patterns of production, particularly through extensive measures for cattle improvement and intensified management of the reserves, especially in light of the `evils' of African `overstocking' and perceived soil degradation. The Zulu, however, steadfastly resisted these efforts to control the remaining elements of reserve production.

The problems of `betterment' bring the discussion back to the issue of land holding and the nature of segregation. As the NAD sought to increase the capacity of the reserves to meet African subsistence, it returned to the idea of developing a class of `progressive' African farmers; peasants who would grow food efficiently and provide for fellow reserve residents. Central to this, however, was the creation of individual plot-holders who would have an incentive to produce food and would not be undermined by `retrogressive' chiefly authority and communal land tenure. This approach was contradictory to the maintenance of chiefly authority, based as it was on chiefs control of communally held land. Since the South African state was

committed to rule through the chiefs and an ideology of segregation by the 1930s, and it viewed Zululand as a model territory for the practical application of these policies, it is not surprising that local officials never succeeded in supporting individual `master farmers'.[102] Instead, the picture which emerges is of the consolidation and enhancement of chiefly wealth and power in contrast to the impoverishment of commoners within the reserves and the acceleration of white production and increased power outside the reserves.

[1] See W. Beinart and C. Bundy, *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa. Politics & Popular Movements in the Transkei & Eastern Cape, 1890-1930* (London, 1987); W. Beinart, P. Delius and S. Trapido, (eds.), *Putting a Plough to the Ground. Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850-1930* (Johannesburg, 1986), T. Keegan, *Rural Transformations in Industrialising South Africa: The Southern Highveld to 1914* (London, 1987) and the collection of works in S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture and Consciousness, 1870-1930* (London, 1982).

[2] The importance of these legacies has been explored by W. Beinart, *The Political Economy of Pondoland, 1869-1930* (Cambridge, 1982); `Chieftancy and the Concept of Articulation: South Africa circa 1900-1950', in W. Beinart and S. Dubow, *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa* (London, 1995), pp. 176-188; S Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa. Class, Nationalism and the State in Twentieth Century Natal* (Johannesburg, 1986), and the essays in L. Vail, *The Creation of Tribalism in South Africa* (London, 1989).

[3] The `dominant cleavage' theory was put forward by M. Gluckman in *Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand*, Rhodes-Livingston Papers, No. 28 (Oxford, 1968).

[4] For an examination of these complexities in a region which had both similarities and contrasts with Zululand, and was crucial for my theoretical approach, see Beinart, *Pondoland.*

[5] Commoners refers to the broad rural underclass comprised of disparate elements in Zulu society; people: who were neither chiefs, headmen [*induna*: see below ch. on chiefly authority] or employees of the state, nor mission-educated or aspiring `petty bourgeois'. See N. Cope, `The Zulu Royal Family under the South African Government, 1910-1933: Solomon KaDinuzulu, Inkatha and Zulu Nationalism' Ph.D. Natal, 1985 (now published as *To Bind a Nation* [Pietermaritzburg, 1994]), pp. 243-244. For similar transformations see P. Delius, *The Land Belongs To Us. The Pedi Polity, the Boers and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Transvaal* (London, 1983).

[6] See the essays in Marks, *Ambiguities.*

[7] For the importance of re-considering Africans as the `dominated' class and their role in shaping the contours of the South African political economy see Marks, *Ambiguities*, p. 8.

[8] For a wider exploration of these `intersections', see

Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-08 disturbances in Natal* (Oxford, 1970), ch. 5 and H. Wolpe, *Race Class and the Apartheid State* (London, 1988), pp. 55-56, 110.

[9] The following discussion is based on: U.G. Nos. 8-25, *Official Year Books of the Union of South Africa* (Pretoria, 1927-1945), U.G. *Reports on the Agricultural and Pastoral Production of the Union*, 1918-1948 (Pretoria, 1919-1950); H. Curson, `Meteorological Conditions and the Seasonal Prevalence of Nagana in Zululand', *SAJS*, Vol. 24, 1927, pp. 377-381; J. Guy, `Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka and the Zulu kingdom', in S. Marks and A. Atmore, *Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa* (London, 1980), pp. 102-119, p. 104; C. Ballard `From Sovereignty to Subjection: The Political Economy of Zululand, 1880-1906', in J. Simensen, *Norwegian Missionaries in African History*, Vol. 1, South Africa, 1845-1906 (Oslo, 1985) pp. 56-100. For the specifics of the geography, climate and vegetation of this region see for example, J. Acocks, *Veld Types of South Africa* (Pretoria, 1953); E. Brookes and N. Hurwitz, *Natal Regional Survey, Vol. 7, The Native Reserves of Natal* (Pietermaritzburg, 1987), pp. 17-21, 44-48; Thorington-Smith, Rosenburg and McCrystal Consultants, *Towards a Plan for KwaZulu* (Ulundi, 1978), pp. 2-6, 30-32 and The Association For Rural Advancement, (AFRA) *Special Report No. 6, Maputaland: Conservation and Removals* (Pietermaritzburg, 1990).

[10] See below chs. on land and cattle.

[11] See Marks, *Ambiguities*, pp. 5-6; *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 10, J. Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884* (London, 1979), p. 18, Ballard `Sovereignty'.

[12] For the prosecution of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and the colonial pressures for the dismantling of the Zulu kingdom in order to remove the `threat' of African resistance and open up the territory for whites, see for example J. Laband *Fight us in the Open: The Anglo-Zulu War through Zulu Eyes* (Pietermaritzburg, 1985), J. Laband and P. Thompson, `The Reduction of Zululand, 1878-1904', in A. Duminy and B. Guest, *Natal and Zululand From Earliest Times to 1910* (Pietermaritzburg, 1989), pp. 193-232, A. Duminy and C. Ballard, (eds.) *The Anglo-Zulu War: new perspectives* (Pietermaritzburg, 1981). For the Zulu perspective see for example C. de B. Webb and J. Wright (eds.), *A Zulu King Speaks: Statement made by Cetshwayo kaMpande on the History and Customs of his People* (Pietermaritzburg, 1978), pp. 20-29, 46-56. For a survey of the vast literature on the war see J. Laband and P. Thompson, *A Field Guide to the War in Zululand and the Defence of Natal, 1879* (Pietermaritzburg, 1983).

[13] There is not space here to engage in the nuances of the

debate sparked by J. Cobbing's unpublished reassessments of the `mfecane' and particularly of J. Omer-Cooper's *The Zulu Aftermath* (London, 1966) stemming from the preliminary work of S. Marks, `The Traditions of the Natal `Nguni': a second look at the work of A.T. Bryant', in L. Thompson (ed.), *African Societies in Southern Africa* (London, 1969), ch. 6. See Cobbing's `The Case Against the Mfecane', seminar paper presented to the African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1984. For a useful analysis of the debate see J. Wright and C. Hamilton, `Traditions and Transformations: The Phongola-Mzimkhulu region in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries' in Duminy and Guest, *Natal and Zululand,* pp. 49-82. For the purposes of this thesis the important works establishing the links between the Zulu and Natal are D. Hedges, `Trade and politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries' Ph.D. London, 1978, P. Bonner, *Kings, commoners and concessionaires: the evolution and dissolution of the nineteenth century Swazi state* (Johannesburg, 1983) and C. Ballard, `The role of trade and hunter-traders in the political economy of Natal and Zululand, 1824-1880', *AEH*, Vol. 10, 1981, pp. 3-21.

[14] See Guy, *Destruction*, pp. 8-10, Omer-Cooper, *Aftermath*, ch. 2. and P. Colenbrander, `The Zulu Kingdom, 1828-79', in Duminy and Guest, *Natal and Zululand*, pp. 83-115.

[15] Webb and Wright, *A Zulu King* p. 49.

[16] For the Maputa people [also Mabhudu] see Hedges, `Trade and Politics', pp. 133-141. For the Swazi and relations with the Zulu see Bonner, *Kings* and for the boundary dispute with the Transvaal see S. Munro,`The Zululand Transvaal Boundary Dispute, 1854-1879', B.A. Hons. thesis Natal, 1980.

[17] See P. Maylam, *A History of the African Peoples of South Africa: from the Early Iron Age to the 1970s* (Cape Town, 1986), pp. 29-32.

[18] See Guy, `Reconstruction' and *Destruction*, pp. 165-171, C. Ballard,`Sir Garnet Wolseley and John Dunn: the architects and agents of the Ulundi Settlement', in Duminy and Ballard *The Anglo-Zulu War*, pp. 120-147 and A. MacKinnon, `The Impact of European Land Delimitations and Expropriations on Zululand, 1880-1920', M.A. thesis Natal, 1991, pp. 28-42.

[19] See my `Impact', pp. 28-32, C. Ballard, *John Dunn The White Chief of Zululand* (Johannesburg, 1985) and E. Unterhalter, `Religion, Ideology and Social Change in the Nquthu District of Zululand, 1879-1910' Ph.D. London, 1981.

[20] For Dinuzulu's contravention of the most fundamental tenet of Zulu society (that the king held the land for the people), see C. de B. Webb B. and J Wright, (eds.) *The*

James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring People, Vol.4 (Pietermaritzburg and Durban, 1987), pp. 311- 315 and E. Krige, *The Social System of the Zulus* (Pietermaritzburg, 1950), ch. 8.

[21] This is a brutally condensed account of events leading to the loss of land in which British intervention prevented the republicans from gaining access to the Indian ocean through the offer of land in `Proviso B'. See my `Impact', pp. 49-59.

[22] See W. Beinart and P. Delius, `Introduction' to Beinart, Delius and Trapido, *Putting a Plough*, p. 44 and T. Keegan, `White Settlement and Black Subjugation on the South African Highveld: the Tlokoa heartland in the north eastern Orange Free State, ca. 1850-1914', pp. 218-258, p. 247 in the above volume.

[23] See the *Report of the Natal Native Affairs Commission Evidence, 1906-07* (Pietermaritzburg, 1908), pp. 780-789, and Cope, `Royal Family', p. 201, 233.

[24] See ibid, p. 221-223, 234. For an assessment of the powers under this legislation see M. Lacey, *Working for Boroko. The origins of a coercive labour system in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1981), chs. 2 and 3; H. Rogers, *Native Administration in the Union of South Africa, 2nd Edition* (Pretoria, 1949), pp. 124-128 and H. Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom. The ICU in Rural South Africa, 1924-1930* (London, 1987), pp. 23-34, 53-54.

[25] See J. Guy, `The Destruction and Reconstruction of Zulu Society' in Marks and Rathbone, *Industrialisation*, pp. 167-194 and Ballard, `Sovereignty'.

[26] Ibid, p. 167. For the annexation see below ch. one.

[27] See below ch. on cattle.

[28] See Unterhalter, `Religion', p. 32.

[29] For the `Shepstone system' see D. Welsh *The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845-1910* (Cape Town, 1973) and for its application to Zululand see S. Marks, `Natal, the Zulu royal family and the ideology of segregation', *JSAS*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1978, pp. 172-191. The Administrative District of Zululand under the Natal NAD was governed by Natal Act No. 1 of 1909 and included all the `Native' districts of Zululand, but excluded the areas of intensive white settlement: Empangeni, Eshowe and Mtunzini. These were administered by Department of Justice magistrates until they were transferred to the NAD in 1927, under the Native Affairs Administrative Act of that year, in order to achieve uniformity in administration under the principles of segregation. See Rogers *Administration*, p. 5

and S. Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-1936* (Oxford 1989), p. 127.

[30] Guy, `Reconstruction', p. 178.

[31] See J.Guy, `Production and Exchange in the Zulu Kingdom', in J. Peires, (ed.), *Before and After Shaka. Papers in Nguni History* (Grahamstown, 1981), pp. 33-49.

[32] See J. Guy, `Gender oppression in Southern Africa's precapitalist societies' in C. Walker (ed.), *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945* (Cape Town, 1990), pp. 31-57.

[33] It seems to me that male migrants also played an important part in maintaining homestead production since they regularly returned to plough the land and plant during the spring but see for example C. Walker, `Gender and the Development of the Migrant Labour System C. 1850-1930', in Walker, *Women and Gender*, pp. 168-196 and for an insightful analysis of the historiography relating to women in South African studies see B. Bozzoli, `Marxism, Feminism and South African Studies', in Beinart and Dubow, *Segregation*, pp. 118-144 (this is reprinted from *JSAS*, Vol. 9, 1989).

[34] See my `Impact', pp. 3-4.

[35] Ibid, pp. 114-121. For an assessment of African farming techniques and their underlying `scientific' merit see P. Richards, *Indigenous Agricultural Revolution Ecology and Food Production in West Africa* (London, 1985) and for the specifics of the Zulu homestead economy see Guy, `Production', pp. 33-49.

[36] See below ch. on cattle for the impact of the tsetse fly. For the areas of fly and malaria infestation see NAP, map collection, M3/32, L.M. Altern's survey of Zululand in 1900 and M4175, malarial zones. Jeff Guy has left a note on this map that it is probably based on ZA, Vol. 23, R396/97, 31 Jan. 1897. Unfortunately due to the fragile nature of these maps they are not available for copying. For approximate areas of the fly zone and population densities see map and statistical appendix.

[37] See Guy, `Ecological', p. 109 and *Destruction*, p. 33.

[38] See below ch. on cattle; C. van Onselen, `Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa, 1896-97', *JAH*, Vol. 13, 1972, pp. 473-488 and C. Ballard, `The Repercussions of Rinderpest: Cattle Plague and Peasant Decline in Colonial Natal', *IJAHS*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1986, pp. 421-450.

[39] See Natal Colonial Papers, NAD *Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1902* (Pietermaritzburg, 1903), p. 42.

[40] Ibid, p. 33.

[41] Hunter argued that, under similar conditions in Pondoland, goats became the poor man's cattle and served the same social functions. See M. Hunter, *Reactions to Conquest: Effects of Contact with Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa* (London, 1936), p. 71.

[42] Many of the people in Nquthu had been evicted from white farms adjacent to the reserves where sheep farming was the main form of stock keeping. The Hlubi arrived in the area in the late 1880s from the Tlokoa area and had previous experience sheep herding. See J. Laband and P. Thompson, `The Reduction of Zululand' in Duminy and Guest, *Natal and Zululand*, p. 205.

[43] The social anthropologist Gluckman's pioneering work *Analysis* provides useful insights but is ahistorical. S. Marks has made a major contribution to the study of Natal and Zululand in a number of important works. See especially: *Reluctant Rebellion*, `Class, ideology and the Bambatha rebellion', in D. Crummey, Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa (London, 1986), pp. 351-372, *Ambiguities* and `Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Ethnic Consciousness', in Vail *Creation*, pp. 215-240. Although Guy's `Reconstruction' is concerned with the late nineteenth century in Zululand, it points the way forward. A. Jeeves is currently undertaking important research on the Zululand sugar industry.

[44] See Cope, `Royal Family and P. la Hausse `Ethnicity and History in the Careers of two Zulu Nationalists: Petros Lamula (c. 1881-1948) and Lymon Maling (1889- c. 1936), Ph.D. Witwatersrand, 1993.

[45] See Cope `Royal Family', pp. 154, 223-224, 238-242 and la Hausse, `Ethnicity', pp. 286-288, 300-302.

[46] See Dubow, *Racial*, pp. 8, 122-130 and Marks *Ambiguities*, pp. 11, 38-40.

[47] This argument is elaborated in Cope `Royal Family', pp. 312-314, 426-428. For Nicholls see below and Marks, *Ambiguities*, pp. 21, fn. no. 18, p. 133.

[48] Around the turn of the century, over 240,000 Zulu lived in the reserves directly under the rule of chiefs and members of the royal family. The royal family's principal homesteads were located in the reserves in Nongoma and Mahlabatini.

[49] Some of the best revisionist works which have an `Africanist' approach are: Marks, *Rebellion;* P. Bonner, *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires: The evolution and dissolution of the nineteenth century Swazi State* (Cambridge, 1983); J. Crush, *The Struggle For Swazi Labour, 1890-1920* (Kingston and Montreal, 1987), Delius, *The Land*

Belongs To Us and Guy, *Destruction*.

[50] C. Bundy's pioneering *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* (London, 1979) and Bradford's *A Taste* remain important contributions to this still under-researched field.

[51] See Beinart, *Pondoland*, Bradford, *A Taste* and Bundy, *Peasantry*.

[52] I refer here specifically to Beinart's *Pondoland* and Beinart and Bundy's *Hidden Struggles*.

[53] Two notable exceptions which trace change from conquest through the era of developing segregation are Beinart's *Pondoland* and C. Murray, *Black Mountain. Land, Class and Power in the Eastern Orange Free State, 1880s to 1980s* (Edinburgh and London, 1992).

[54] See B. Freund, `Rural Struggles and Transformations', review article in *SAHJ*, Vol. 19, 1987, pp. 167-173.

[55] A way forward has been laid out in Beinart and Bundy's *Hidden Struggles* which is an important exception to my comment.

[56] See for example, H. Bradford, `Getting Away With Murder. "Mealie Kings", the state and foreigners in the eastern Transvaal, c. 1918-1950', in P. Bonner, P Delius, and D. Posel (eds.), *Apartheid's Genesis, 1935-1962* (Braamfontein, 1993), pp. 96-125; *A Taste* pp. 21-30 and M. Morris, `The Development of Capitalism in South African agriculture: class struggle in the countryside', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 5, 1976, pp. 292-343.

[57] Bundy tends to fragment the links between popular rural resistance and intensive state intervention in the Transkei dating the former in the 1920s, somewhat earlier than in Zululand, and the latter only from 1945. See his `Land and liberation: popular rural protest and the national liberation movements in South Africa, 1920-1960', in S. Marks and S. Trapido, *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa* (London, 1987), pp. 254-285. For the rising tensions between Africans and the state in the 1920s see Marks and Trapido's `Introduction' in the above, pp. 11, 34-40. Similarly, Colin Murray suggests that tensions in the Free State erupted only in the 1950s. See his *Black Mountain*, ch. 5.

[58] For the ICU in rural Natal and their brief rise to prominence see in opposition to chiefs see Bradford, *A Taste*, pp. 95-104, 186-200.

[59] W. Beinart, `Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development: a Southern African Exploration, 1900-1960', *JSAS* Vol. 11, No. 1, 1984, pp. 52-83, p. 53. For a

comparison with East Africa see, D. Anderson `Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought: the Colonial State and soil conservation in East Africa during the 1930s', *AA*, Vol. 83, No. 332, 1984, pp. 321-343.

[60] See below ch. on `betterment'.

[61] See for example U.G. 32-`46, *Social and Economic Planning Council Report No. 9; The Native Reserves and their Place in the Union of South Africa* [SEPC] (Pretoria, 1946). For the NEC and its recommendations see U.G. 22-`32, *Report of the Native Economic Commission, 1930-1932*, (Pretoria, 1932) and below in this thesis. For the general background to these issues and Brookes see below ch. one and Dubow, *Racial*.

[62] For Tomlinson see U.G. 61-`55, *Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa* (Pretoria, 1955), L. Platzky and C. Walker, *The Surplus People. Forced removals in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1985) and J. and E. Krige, `The Tomlinson Report and the Lovedu' SAIRR, *Race Relations Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1956, pp. 12-25.

[63] See Beinart, *Pondoland* and Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, p. 2.

[64] See below, chs. on chiefs and labour, W. Beinart, `Worker Consciousness, Ethnic Particularism and Nationalism: The experience of a South African Migrant, 1930-1960' in Marks and Trapido, *The Politics of Race*, pp. 286-309 and Vail, `Introduction' to *Creation*.

[65] See below chs. on cattle and chiefs and H. MacMillan's' fascinating `Return to Malungwana Drift- Max Gluckman, the Zulu Nation and the Common Society', *AA*, Vol. 94, No. 374, 1995, pp. 39-65, p. 57.

[66] See Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, p. 12

[67] See Cope, `Royal Family', p. 12; la Hausse, `Ethnicity', pp. 18, 388-390; T. Ranger, `The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 211-262 and P. Skalnik and E. Boonzaier, `Tribe as Colonial Category', in E. Boonzaier and J. Sharp, *South African Keywords: The Uses and Abuses of Political Concepts* (Johannesburg, 1988), pp. 68-78.

[68] Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, p. 11-12.

[69] See Gluckman, *Analysis*, p. 26, Marks, *Ambiguities* and for the context of Gluckman's work and the difficulties he faced see MacMillan, `Malungwana', pp. 39-44.

[70] See M. Alsop, *Natal Regional Survey, Vol. 2 The*

Population of Natal (Oxford, 1952), pp. 12, 113-114 and T. Fair, *Natal Regional Survey, Vol. 3: The Distribution of Population in Natal* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 42-48.

[71] These debates are explored throughout the thesis but see also U.G. 22-`14, *Report of Evidence of the Natives Land Commission* (Pretoria, 1914), U.G. 26-`16, *Report of the Natives Land Commission* and U.G. 19-`16, *Report of the Natives Land Commission Laid Before Parliament* (Pretoria, 1916).

[72] U.G. 22-`14, p. 479.

[73] For the effect of the Act in Natal see Bundy, *Peasantry*, pp. 101-121, 127 U.G. 34-`18, *Report of the Local Natal Natives Land Committee* (Pretoria, 1918).

[74] For an analysis of similar developments in the Orange Free State see W. Beinart, `Settler Accumulation in East Griqualand from the Demise of the Griqua to the Natives Land Act', in Beinart, Delius and Trapido, *Putting a Plough*, pp. 259-310.

[75] For the background to Solomon and Dinuzulu see Cope, `Royal Family' and C. Binns, *Dinuzulu: The death of the house of Shaka* (London, 1968). For another example of the reconstruction of a monarchy see D. Cannadine, `The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the "Invention of Tradition" c. 1820-1977', in Hobsbawm and Ranger, *Invention*, pp. 101-164.

[76] See Cope, `Royal Family', p. 450 and Krige, *Social System*, ch. 2.

[77] Following their defeat in 1879, the Zulu were subjected to a disastrous political settlement which unleashed the competing forces of the Usuthu and Mandlakazi factions and led to a civil war. For a full discussion of this period see Guy, *Destruction*.

[78] For a discussion of this see Ibid and J. Laband and P. Thompson, `The Reduction of Zululand, 1878-1904', in Duminy and Guest, *Natal and Zululand*, pp. 193-232.

[79] Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp 354-56.

[80] See I. Evans `The Native Affairs Department and the Reserves in the 1940s and 1950s', in R. Cohen, Y. Methien and A. Zegeye, (eds.), *Repression and Resistance: Insider Accounts of Apartheid* (London, 1990), pp. 17-51, p. 23.

[81] These aspects have been considered in the important works of Cope, `Royal Family'; la Hausse, `Ethnicity'; and Bradford, *A Taste*, but they do not focus on the impact of economic change in the reserves.

[82] See Bundy, *Peasantry*, ch. 5, C. Simkins, `Agricultural Production in the African Reserves of South Africa, 1918-1969', *JSAS*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1981, pp. 264-266 and J. Iliffe, *The African Poor: a history* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 123-126.

[83] See below, ch. on cattle. The figures for African-owned cattle are based on C.O. 472/5-472/7, *Territory of Zululand Blue Books, 1893-1896* and NCP, 8/1/13/2/8, *Colony of Natal Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1898* (Pietermaritzburg, 1899) and NCP 8/1/13/2/9, *Colony of Natal Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1899-1901* (Pietermaritzburg, 1902).

[84] See Guy, *Destruction*, p. 9.

[85] For the relative merits of African agricultural and pastoral practices compared with `modern science' see P. Richards, *Indigenous Agricultural Revolution. Ecology and Food Production in West Africa* (London, 1985); D. Anderson and R. Grove, `Introduction' to *Conservation in Africa. People, policies and practice* (Cambridge, 1987); D. Anderson, `Cultivating pastoralists: ecology and economy among the Il Chamus of Baringo, 1840-1980', in D. Johnson, and D. Anderson, (eds.), *The Ecology of Survival: Case Studies From Northeast African History* (London, 1988), pp. 241-260.

[86] See Beinart, `Worker consciousness' and for the sugar farms see his `Transkeian migrant workers and youth labour on the Natal sugar estates, 1918-1940', *JAH*, Vol. 32, 1991, pp. 41-63.

[87] See D. Hemson's insightful `Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: Dock Workers of Durban' Ph.D. Warwick, 1979 and the works by Atkins, Crush, Jeeves and van Onselen cited below in the ch. on labour.

[88] See for example Morris, `Capitalism'; Keegan, *Rural*, pp. 18-22, 138 and `Crisis and Catharsis in the Development of Capitalism in South Africa' *AA*, Vol. 84, No. 336, 1985, pp. 371-398.

[89] See A. Jeeves, `The Zululand Sugar Planters, The Gold Mines and the Scramble for Labour in South-East Africa, 1906-1940', seminar paper delivered to the CAAS conference, Toronto, May 1991 and U.G. 22-`22, *Report of the Sugar Enquiry Commission* (Pretoria, 1922).

[90] See Jeeves, `Zululand Planters', p. 2.

[91] These questions were first raised in H. Wolpe's seminal article `Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 1 No. 4, 1972, pp. 425-456. See also G. Arrighi, `Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia', *Journal of Development*

Studies, Vol. 6, 1970, pp. 197-234 and H. MacMillan's analysis of these questions as they pertain to Zambia in `The Historiography of Transition on the Zambian Copperbelt - Another View', *JSAS*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1993, pp. 681-712.

92 See Beinart and Delius, `Introduction' to Beinart, Delius and Trapido, *Putting a Plough*, p. 15.

93 This term is used in J. Yawitch, *Betterment. The Myth of Homeland Agriculture*, SAIRR (Johannesburg, 1982).

94 This is a condensed account of Sen's theory which will be elaborated in the chs. on agriculture and famine, but see A. Sen, *Poverty and Famines. An essay on entitlement and deprivation* (Oxford, 1981), especially ch. 5.

95 T. Keegan has explored some of this in `Seasonality, Markets and pricing: The South African Maize Trade in the Early Twentieth Century', ICS *SSA* Seminar, Vol. 10, 1981, pp. 56-64 and `Crisis'.

96 See M. Vaughan *The Story of An African Famine. Gender and Famine in Twentieth Century Malawi* (London, 1987), p. 102-116 and J. Dreze and A. Sen (eds.), *The Political Economy of Hunger*, Vol.s 1-4, (Oxford, 1990-1992), Vol. 1, pp 10-18.

97 Sen, *Famines*, p. 1.

98 An important starting point for any analysis of this is the special issue of *JSAS* on colonial conservation edited by W. Beinart, including his `Introduction: The Politics of Colonial Conservation' to that issue: Vol. 15 No. 2, 1989, pp. 143-162 and his `Soil'.

99 See for example K. Hart *The Political Economy of West African Agriculture* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 111-114, 132 and G. Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective* (Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 25-26.

100 See U.G. 22-`32 *Report of the Native Economic Commission, 1930-32* (Pretoria, 1932), p. 3.

101 Wolpe comments on this in `Capitalism' p. 440.

102 See below ch. on betterment and Bundy, *Peasantry*, pp. 242-243 and G. Kitching *Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite Bourgeoisie, 1905-1970* (New Haven, 1980), pp. 315-330.

CHAPTER ONE

THE DELIMITATION AND EXPROPRIATION OF ZULULAND

In August 1902, the Joint Imperial-Colonial Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission commenced segregating African and white lands north of the Thukela River and relegated African people to a series of reserves.[1] For over twenty years before the delimitation, Natal colonists had looked to the valuable grazing lands, fertile coastal plains and potential mineral resources in Zululand for their expansion. Having won responsible government in 1893, white Natalians pressured the British imperial government, the conqueror-cum-guardian of the Zulu, to open the British colony of Zululand to white settlement.[2] Imperial authorities believed that handing Zululand over to Natal was the most expedient means of maintaining British strategic interests in the region and a way to get Natal support for their scheme for federating South Africa.[3]

With imperial acquiescence, the Governor Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, passed the Natal Act for the annexation of Zululand (No. 37 of 1897), which provided the colonial government with access to land, control of resources and the right to define the development of road and rail networks in Zululand. Together these tied the Zulu to a pattern of migrant labour.[4] The Act also set up a delimitation commission to define white and African land-holding in the territory. More importantly, it allowed Natal to control the delimitation commission; the limited deference to imperial `humanitarian' concerns for the Zulu

was the provision of one `imperial' representative. Africans could only hope that the British would guarantee a judicious land settlement.[5] The Colonial Office gave the commission a cryptic and often ambiguous remit, which specified that it find sufficient reserve land for the Zulu with `liberal allowance for the existing population' and for its natural increase in years to come', leaving the remaining land for white settlement.[6] These instructions made no reference as to what area this might constitute, except for the provision of a 10,000 acre reserve for the descendants of the late government-appointed `White Chief of Zululand', John Dunn.[7]

Sir John Dartnell, a Pietermaritzburg surveyor, represented imperial Britain on the commission. Charles Saunders, Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner for Zululand from 1897, and later knighted for his service, represented the Natal Government. By 1910, Saunders was also a large land owner and prominent Zululand sugar farmer influential in shaping Natal land policy in Zululand.[8] Considering Natal government pressure to alienate the whole of Zululand for white settlement, Dartnell and Saunders managed to delimit relatively substantial reserves for Africans.[9] The constraints imposed by Natal, however, forced the fragmentation of Zululand into disparate reserves, which prevented Africans from developing land outside set areas of communal tenure and `tribal' chiefly control.

Although Marks considered him an `able and impartial administrator of the paternalist stamp' Saunders, by far

the more prominent and influential member of the two-person commission, was an ambiguous figure.[10] Publicly, he championed the cause of `traditional' African rights to the land and the development of the reserves as a colonial moral duty.[11] This did not prevent him and Dartnell from frequently acquiescing to settler demands for land in Zululand. From 1902 until 1904, the commission made an extensive tour and survey of the country, collecting written and oral evidence from white settlers; yet it merely informed Africans of its objectives, and pointed out areas delimited for their occupation, without listening to any evidence from them.[12]

Saunders and Dartnell had a biased approach to the delimitation, based loosely on precedents set by Sir Theophilus Shepstone for the creation of `tribal' reserves in Natal, and which favoured the entrenchment of settler rights to land both inside and outside the reserved areas.[13] Natal, under its Prime Minister, G.M. Sutton, had an overriding influence over the commission's activities and like most Natal governments of the time, its policies were based on an ideology of segregation which sought to further settler accumulation at the expense of Africans.[14] Sutton felt he had to secure control of fertile land in Zululand in order to maintain crucial political support from potential settlers and especially the burgeoning sugar farmer's lobby.[15]

The delimitation commission operated in a jurisdictional twilight. Although British officials had some influence,

Natal had an advantage in familiarity with, and proximity to, Zululand. Moreover, the colonial office chose not to exercise its power to prevent Natal from making land grants to whites, and it left the commission's instructions purposely vague to allow local officials to circumvent metropolitan humanitarian pressure.[16] Initially, the commission was to delimit only the coastal belt until the British issued further instructions. Imperial officials wanted to gauge the effect of the work on the Zulu and to prevent any African resistance.[17] Effectively, Natal pre-empted on-going colonial office approval of the delimitation by urging the commission to complete its work without delay and the whole of Zululand was carved up by white surveyors rapidly.[18]

In order to provide for the `development' of Zululand the commission allowed for white settlement of the best land wherever possible. Saunders and Dartnell allocated for whites a huge extent of the well-watered coastal belt along the proposed rail-line from the Thukela River, Zululand's natural southern boundary, north to Somkele in what became the heart of the sugar cane belt.[19] Along the coast they threw open the most fertile land available around St. Lucia Bay and on the banks of the Mhlathuze River. In many instances, they mis-represented African population densities by including in the total area reserved for Africans portions of districts, especially in Mtunzini, which were uninhabitable due to malaria.[20]

The commission felt it was impossible to remove entire communities from land they had occupied for generations without causing great disruption. Saunders noted that distinct pledges had been given to the Zulu that their land would not be taken away by the British Government. He argued these pledges were `... known and remembered well [by the Zulu]; they were given publicly and that is why if we break faith with these people, it will be a fatal thing'.[21] Thus the commissioners claimed that they could not conscientiously succumb to settler pressure for the expropriation of land necessary for African survival:

> ...we have been met on all sides by [whites] who appear to be labouring under the impression that all the Commission was required to do was indiscriminately throw open the whole of the lands suitable for European occupation, irrespective of the interests of the Natives occupying those lands... It is also noticeable that in all the published criticisms of the settlement, not a voice appears to have been raised in the Natives' interest.[22]

On the contrary, white Natalians criticised the commission vociferously. In a special editorial, the *Natal Witness* argued that whites were `fighting for' the worst land in Zululand while a large proportion of the best land was left to Africans.[23] The commissioners responded by pointing out that only a small portion of Zululand was considered suitable for whites; the rest of the country was rugged, broken and riddled with malaria and stock diseases. They also reminded the public that the best portion of Zululand's farming and grazing land had already been alienated to Afrikaners in Vryheid and `Proviso B' in the 1880s.[24] According to Saunders: `...those who are under the

impression, as many appear to be that [Zululand] consists throughout of undulating plains suitable for European occupation are sadly mistaken'.[25] Nevertheless, despite resisting their excessive demands, the commission accommodated much of the settler desire for land.

Natal also put considerable pressure on Saunders and Dartnell to hasten the delimitation after the delays caused by the Anglo-Boer War.[26] They, therefore, recommended that white occupation commence while the rest of the country was delimited, not only to placate agitated Natalians, but also to prepare Africans gradually for white settlement. They argued that it would be to the advantage of Africans throughout Zululand if they experienced, `by degrees', the impact of delimitation, `... which they will probably not thoroughly grasp until European occupation commences'.[27]

The commissioners made every effort to accommodate white farming interests, often at the expense of Africans. Assuming that no African would develop an interest in intensive farming, they opened up those lands for white settlement which they felt were best suited to commercial farming. They often adjusted the reserves by curtailing African occupation of open level ground and adding land they considered more appropriate for African cultivation. The areas substituted were `...broken and not so well adapted to European occupation, but better suited to Native wants and mode of life, [with] sufficient grazing ground on the hills and good garden land in the valleys'.[28]

Saunders and Dartnell allocated reserves on fertile land in areas of dense African settlement only as a necessity. Thus, Saunders defended the fairly generous reserve allocation for Chief Ngwanasi's people around Kosi Bay on the grounds that a large settled community had resided there for generations and had come under British rule voluntarily.[29] He believed, however, that settlers would acquire the land with British approval at a later time.[30] In the lower-lying areas of Ingwavuma and Ubombo the soil was sandy and arid except on the Pongola river flood plain. They, therefore, delimited a wide strip of land on either side of the river for white settlement, thereby preventing Africans from expanding their grazing land or settlement on the coast.[31]

An even more contentious issue which foreshadowed the later Natives' Land Act (No. 27 of 1913) was the hotly debated proposal that Africans be allowed to purchase land outside the reserves. In the event land purchase was to be racially exclusive: only whites were allowed to buy free-hold land in areas delimited for them and Africans could not purchase land in Zululand at all. Natal also controlled the form of tenancy on white-owned land (see below) which pre-dated the 1913 Act, but which had the same effect of supporting emerging white commercial agriculture while subordinating the African peasantry.[32] In Zululand this policy was not, as Bundy has argued for Natal, to extinguish a vibrant share-cropping peasantry (which barely existed at the turn of the century) but to prevent an African peasantry from developing on land sought by whites.[33]

After districts were delimited, chiefs and *induna* petitioned the commission for permission to purchase land adjoining their apportioned reserves.[34] Before his appointment as commissioner, Saunders had felt that Africans should be encouraged to become freehold owners of their land and that some portion of Zululand should be set aside for Africans to acquire individual title on the same basis as in the Glen Grey area in the Cape.[35] This belief was consistent with later NAD policy to promote `progressive' African development outside the reserves.[36] Saunders argued that Africans wished to buy land for a number of reasons including a reverence for particular burial sites or family land, to maintain access to wood and wild game for food, and population increase. Many Africans, especially chiefs, simply wanted outright title so that their land could not be interfered with.[37] As in Natal it was likely that, if allowed, Africans in Zululand would purchase land on a communal or syndicate basis to overcome rising prices.[38] Natal, however, prohibited the Zulu from purchasing land on either a communal or an individual basis.

In September 1903, the commission reported that the Zulu were concerned about the possible influx of Indians into the territory:

> They [Zulu] trusted that the land being thrown open would be occupied by Europeans and not people of other coloured races; that if they were to be deprived of their tribal lands for the benefit of the latter, they should feel compelled to protest most strongly.[39]

The commissioners suggested that the Zulu meant specifically the Indians who had settled and farmed intensively in coastal Natal. Whatever the possible Zulu prejudice, there was a strong settler prejudice against Indians. From the 1890s, Natal tried to prevent Indians, who often competed with white traders, from settling in Zululand by prohibiting their residence there unless they were employed by whites as servants.[40] Moreover, local officials could refuse to grant Indians the right the purchase land without giving a reason, thereby avoiding a delicate racial issue.[41]

More important than the alleged African aversion to Indian settlement was the Natal Prime Minister's view that the occupation of land in Zululand by whites and Africans `...side by side on equal terms [was] most disadvantageous to the settlement of the country'.[42] This view coincided with developing national policy aimed at territorial segregation articulated by the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905, (SANAC).[43] As Legassick has argued, in its drive for a unified national `native' policy, white South Africa considered segregation a means of `disentangling' Africans and whites which Union leaders perceived to be degrading and an encumbrance to the progress of both races. This was especially so in Natal.[44]

Yet Zululand complicated this policy since it set the precedent for further `entanglements' through the local control of land segregation and settler alienation of African land; this contrasted with the protectorate model

in which African regions were incorporated intact.[45] As the staunch federalist Lionel Curtis argued, if `...more Zululands are to be handed over to more Natals', it would make a `mess' of national policy.[46] Natal, however, had no intention of governing Zululand without access to land there, or of allowing Africans to purchase land there, even from willing whites.

In this area the commission succumbed to Natal pressure and retreated from its original defence of African rights to purchase land, using the Indian `menace' as their excuse:

> As it is of paramount importance to the Natives that people of Asiatic extraction should be very strictly precluded from acquiring land... and if the only possible means of ensuring this will be to restrict Natives in a similar manner, we think that it is in the interest of the Natives that they should suffer to that extent....[47]

Although Indian settlement could have been prevented in other ways, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alfred Lyttelton, permitted the prohibition of African purchase because the commission was strongly against Indian settlement and it was a convenient justification for preventing African land-purchase.[48] Thereafter, in support of white traders and store-keepers, the Natal and Union Governments assiduously prevented Indians from gaining any foothold in Zululand.[49]

Saunders soon had second thoughts on this issue. By 1904, when he gave evidence to the SANAC, which set down new proposals for rigid territorial segregation, many of which were later incorporated in the 1913 Land Act, he stated:

> I say that the Native is a British subject, and that the land which we pledged ourselves we would not take away we are taking away and allowing Europeans to buy. Why should not the Natives have the same right to buy their own land as Europeans?.[50]

Saunders already knew the answer to his question, since the government of Natal had already decided that the issue of African land purchase would not in any way be contingent on the findings of the SANAC.[51]

Settlers criticised the small area of land thrown open for whites in the productive high-lands of Zululand's interior. The commissioners, possibly concerned about provoking a hostile reaction from Africans, -although, as Marks has shown, in this they failed- maintained their position on the issue of large reserve allocations in southern Zululand.[52] They argued there was no justification for the wholesale removal of Africans from the densely populated districts of Nquthu and Nkandhla which were so congested by 1903 that some African families were already moving onto white-owned farms in the Transvaal where they paid rents of up to £5 on top of a 14s. hut tax.[53] The commissioners also pointed out that the Natal government had encouraged many loyal Africans, including chief Hlubi of Basutoland and his followers, to settle in these districts as a buffer between the colony and the Zulu Kingdom; to remove them would be an injustice.[54]

The Natal Prime Minister was far from content with the commission's findings. Contradicting his own earlier

argument that the juxtaposition of white and African settlement would be disadvantageous, he proclaimed:

> The delimitation of such large continuous areas of the country, practically unbroken by European settlement, cannot but mitigate against the development of the land... whereas a fair proportion of European occupation would form a direct civilizing agency towards uplifting the tribes.[55]

Clearly, Sutton was prepared to employ any expedient to gain more land for white Natalians.

The commissioners, however, were aware of the firm imperial conviction that chiefly authority should be maintained on the land. The powerful chief Somkele of Hlabisa, for example, was saved from `extinction' when his lands, which were part of the proposed area for white development of the St. Lucia coal fields, were included in the reserves.[56] Moreover, Natal provided chief Siteku with land in `Proviso B' at a cost of £3,000 in order to preserve his integrity as a member of the Zulu royal family and in the hopes of preventing an Usuthu uprising in the area.[57] In the long term, however, the state was unable to ensure political support from the chiefs by providing them with land because the government never made enough land available.[58] From the 1920s through the 1940s, most chiefs and leading members of the royal family remained frustrated in their repeated calls on the government for more land.[59]

By the end of its deliberations in 1904, the commission had dramatically reduced the area of land for African occupation, although the effect varied regionally. Africans

were relegated to 21 reserves ranging in size from 640,000 acres of poorly-watered, sandy land in Ubombo to only 10,000 acres of densely populated, though relatively fertile, land in Mtunzini. Few of the reserves were contiguous, and this restricted African mobility and grazing since people were isolated by corridors of white-owned farm land. Of the 3,881,991 acres delimited for Africans, only 1,429,000 acres were set aside in the most densely-populated districts of Nquthu, Nkandhla, Mtunzini, Entonjaneni (Melmoth) and Eshowe.[60] The commissioners delimited 2,452,991 acres for the rest of the Zulu, roughly 80,000 out of 200,000 people, leaving the 2,100 white settlers with a total of 2,769,114 acres.[61] These figures are, however, somewhat misleading and were misrepresented by the commission's report. Although the commissioners suggested that each Zulu man and woman was allocated over 17 acres, there was considerable regional variation. For example, in Ubombo the average amount of land per capita was reduced from 41 to 25 acres and in Eshowe from 14 to 12.5 acres.[62] In addition, in Hlabisa, the commission, under pressure from conservationists, excluded Africans from the large Mkuzi game reserve and left them with only low malarial valleys.[63]

As we have seen, the commissioners tended to treat the Zulu as un-differentiated subsistence farmers. There were, however, a substantial number of mission-educated Christian Africans [*amakholwa; kholwa*] who were trying to participate in the new political economy. They believed that `progress' and the `civilising' virtues of Christianity needed to

triumph over `tribalism', and they had established a series of mission communities in southern Zululand in the 1860s and 1870s. The *kholwa* had erected substantial `European-style' homes, sent their children to mission schools and farmed the land intensively.[64] Yet the commission allowed them few land rights despite petitions from white missionaries and *kholwa* leaders.[65] The Natal government was hostile to the *kholwa* and to their hopes of gaining individual rights.[66] It granted specific title outside the reserves to only two of the 37 missions in Zululand, and approximately 200 *kholwa* families in Eshowe were left under the jurisdiction of reserve chiefs.[67]

Outside mission stations, Christian Africans suffered from the anti-*kholwa* bias of the Natal authorities and the predilections of local officials for chiefly control. Despite their pleas to be allowed to buy land outside the reserves this was refused. Officials treated all Africans as `uncivilised', regardless of their `progress' or their ability to purchase land. For example, the NAD refused William Washington Ndhlovu, a *kholwa* exempted from Natal's codified `Native' law, and later influential in local politics, (see below) permission to sell permanent buildings he had erected on land outside the delimited Eshowe mission to the new white owner.[68] Unlike Zulu huts, these building were of mortar and stone and immovable. Yet, the commission had previously recommended that Africans who built European-style houses and employed `superior' techniques in cultivation should be entitled to fair compensation for their improvements.[69] Saunders, in his

capacity as CNC, contradicted his findings as a land commissioner by refusing to allow Ndhlovu to sell his buildings, arguing that `He knew any expense he incurred in improvements he incurred at his own risk.'[70]

Moreover, all *kholwa* on reserve or open lands were subject to chiefly authority.[71] Local officials believed Africans who sought individual land tenure were subversive of chiefly authority, and a threat to orderly administration. To ensure chiefly control, Saunders, in his capacity as CNC, circumvented the Natal rule that *kholwa* monogamists living in European-style houses be exempt from hut-tax. He ordered that *kholwa* remaining on land outside the reserves be charged a sum equivalent to the hut-tax, to be collected by chiefs at the same time and in the same manner as the regular tax.[72] The object of the rent was not simply to generate more income: the new rent-tax was a means of bolstering the chiefly authority necessary for indirect rule.

There was one exception to restrictions for individual land tenure outside the reserves and this was at the Impapala American Zulu Mission in Eshowe.[73] The Impapala lands were occupied by *kholwa* who had emigrated to the area from Natal in 1886.[74] The delimitation made no provision for this community of seventy families since their settlement conflicted with schemes for white sugar-cane farms. Saunders argued that these people had `settled here entirely for their own personal gain', and although the state granted them permission to build substantial homes

and churches, he believed that this could `hardly be taken in any sense to have constituted [a] mission station'.[75]

The community at Impapala was, however, relatively well educated and drew attention to its plight. In 1905, G.H. Hulett, an Eshowe farmer of the wealthy Hulett sugar family, took up their cause in order to develop an African sugar cane-growing scheme and petitioned Natal to give them secure individual title to the land.[76] In 1907, an editorial in the African paper *Ilanga Lase Natal* focussed on the Impapala community and quoted its leader Mdhlolongwana Shandu.

> We have from time to time advised that there must be no repetition of sacrificing one's self by the shedding of blood: we again say that ye, our people, put down your weapons, look for money, and hoard it up... because money is power. It is money which will secure for you many of your rights. It will bring about the sub-division of the Reserves into individual holdings, also your obtaining licences for trade, also the permission to purchase land.[77]

Recognizing the great loss that these people would suffer if their lands were sold, the Governor, Sir Mathew Nathan, arranged for the purchase of the land in 1909, sub-divided it into thirty-acre plots and issued the *kholwa* occupants 21-year leases. The Trust was to recover the costs of survey and purchase through lease revenues from the residents.[78] By 1918, however, most Impapala residents struggled to cover the combined costs of rent and fees, which averaged £4. 16s. a year.[79] Within a few years, close to half were in arrears and many were slipping from the ranks of those who could live off the land. By 1928, when

the NAD had already considered resettling the lots with `alien natives... of the right class [who would] by their example do more to further the interests of civilisation than years of persuasion by Europeans', 28 tenants had to abandon their homes and move into the reserves.[80] A subsequent petition by the remaining lot-holders to reduce the rents and get freehold title was turned down and the community collapsed.[81]

In addition to farms, the commission granted whites further rights in the reserves as store-keepers and squatters. Of the 89 store sites in Zululand at the time of the delimitation, 64 fell within African reserves, many in Nquthu and Nkandhla and the commission granted them all extended leases.[82] Initially, store-keepers in more remote areas could not rely entirely on trade with Africans. C.E. Pearse, a trader in Mahlabatini, argued, for example, that he needed a large grazing area and land to cultivate since `The trade with Natives in these out of the way places, without the assistance of cattle running and mealie grounds, is not sufficient to maintain a family in the way they should live before the Natives.'[83] Following delimitation, store-keepers flooded the reserves to take advantage of generous store site leases. In 1911 alone, the state approved 29 new 100 acre store leases for the reserves.[84] Subsequently, store-keepers made substantial profits by selling food to Africans suffering from rapidly declining reserve agriculture.

Friction between Africans and the store-keepers ensued almost immediately as the latter converted their holdings into small farms and encroached on African gardens and grazing areas. Natal's Governor had to issue instructions that Africans were to have complete rights to graze and cultivate land outside the store sites and that the cattle allowances for whites did not allow them to graze herds on African land. He felt that to restrict African cultivation around the stores would `... convey to the Native mind that he was debarred from all cultivation' and that this would be contrary to African welfare.[85]

WHITE SETTLEMENT

For the first time since the 1850s, Natal had more open land for whites than was immediately needed.[86] From 1907 to 1910, the colony established eight white settlement schemes which alienated nearly 200,000 highly productive acres of land from African use.[87] White sugar-cane farmers moved into the coastal portions of Eshowe and Mtunzini apace, forcing the removal of hundreds of African families. Settler stock farmers in the inland districts of Nkandhla and Nquthu made less intensive use of their new land, only gradually expanding cultivation on small plots and therefore ejected or re-located Africans on a piecemeal basis. Most Africans expelled from white farms moved onto un-leased Crown land or into adjacent reserves increasing pressure on the land.[88]

In order to discourage absentee land holding and to prevent the bottling-up of African labour, their leases prohibited whites from charging cash rents to any African tenants who remained on their farms.[89] Foreshadowing similar provisions in the 1913 Land Act, the government also sought to prevent share-cropping arrangements, but as with the operation of the Act on the highveld, many under-capitalised farmers ignored the rules and charged rents ranging from £1-4, and a few carried on share-cropping.[90] On many farms, labour tenancy was standard and whites often imposed cash fees on their tenants before allowing them to take migrant labour contracts.[91] These arrangements, however, were short-lived, and after the passage of the 1913 Act and as sugar-cane farmers made more intensive use of the land in the 1920s, few Africans remained on white farms in Zululand. By the 1930s labour tenancy in Zululand was limited as was rent tenancy which was concentrated mainly in the small white stock-farming communities of Entonjaneni and Nkandhla.92 Many poor white farmers were against anti-squatting legislation however. It was only in the 1930s that the state was able to force farmers to compete with the mines and urban industry for `free' wage labour under the provisions of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936.[93] The 1936 Act was intended to `finally' segregate land (see below) and ended any possibility of Zulu individual tenure by forcing Africans into a variant of communal tenure. This made it more difficult for them to engage in `progressive' farming.[94] In 1927, the SNA, J.S. Allison, argued that the removal of Zulu into the reserves should be done on a `tribal' basis to ensure chiefly authority and

> The first to go should be those natives living on private farms; but here we are arrayed against the solid mass of Natal opinion [ie. white farmers who wanted to hold African labour], and we may have to wait till the squatting provisions of the Natives' Land Bill [ie. the 1936 Act] become law and begin to operate.[95]

This faced reserve chiefs with a crisis on two levels. On one level, it was increasingly difficult for hereditary chiefs to provide their followers with suitable and sufficient garden or grazing land. Thus, chief Nkomo of Eshowe, a long-standing hereditary chief, complained to the state that his landed `inheritance' had been given out to Africans who were not his relatives and that he was unable to apportion it to his sons.[96] He claimed that, at a time of land shortages, this new policy discouraged his people from accumulating property when they knew it might be given to others.[97] Chief Zimema of Eshowe, who was not granted official status by the government in post-rebellion Zululand, stated that he

> could not obtain any money to pay taxes- even in a time of scarcity he could not obtain any food for his children... he had no place in which he could act as chief similar to those who were below his rank. The Government had made it possible for people who were below him to make something by virtue of the position of chief which they hold.[98]

In the overcrowded southern reserves, appointed chiefs filled their wards with loyal followers, often from the surrounding white farms or Natal. In contrast, `loyal' chiefs appointed in the wake of the Bambatha rebellion, had considerable power to favour loyal followers in land settlement.

On another level, both hereditary and appointed chiefs lost authority over followers who remained on white-owned farms. In Melmoth, where whites had settled since the mid-1880s, chief Siteku found it increasingly difficult to order out followers for work on Natal government road-works under the *isibhalo* system.[99] His *induna* (headman, see below ch. on chiefs), Mlonyeni, observed that `As soon as the Chief was about to call out boys they immediately ran off to a farm; the white man then interfered and set the Chief's order at defiance.'[100] As these young men struggled to avoid the extraction of their labour by the state, they also denied their chiefs the value of their labour to supply tribute and taxes, thereby increasing the burden of cash procurement on women, children and older men. As Cope has argued, this emerging class of independent male youth, the *abaqhafi* (a pejorative term for those who drink heavily), challenged the power of the state and the chiefs over labour and revenue.[101]

At the age of 74, Makondo KaNdhlovu expressed great dissatisfaction with the competing demands on Africans which he felt contributed to the unravelling of Zulu society.

> We cut away wild forests for sugar plantations and towns; we dig your roads.... We are made to live on farms and pay rent, and we are imprisoned if we cannot pay.... Where is that government or king which owns no land? Why are individuals able to oust government subjects from the soil? Why are we put to trouble with respect to farms with [their] numerous regulations..? Let that land which is government land appear and let us black people build and dwell thereon and enjoy some rest. The Natives belong to one ruler; they may not be owned by everyone and anyone.[102]

Zululand Districts, c. 1930



THE ZULULAND `TRUST'

The restrictive system of African land occupation laid down by the 1904 delimitation commission pre-dated later national land policies.[103] After Union, the land question loomed large on the white `national' government's agenda, yet little changed in Zululand: the principles of Natal's brand of segregation in the reserves were set in the Zululand Native Trust in a deed of grant on 6 April 1909.[104] This specified that all reserve and un-alienated crown lands were vested in a board of trustees, replacing the Zulu King as sole authority over the land, with the Natal governor acting as principal trustee for the British government. The trust was later transferred to the executive office of the Governor-General of the Union under the 1913 Act and then incorporated into the Natives Land and Trust Act in 1936.[105]

State trustees now controlled land use and occupation in the reserves and on the adjacent crown lands where many Africans still resided.[106] Officials could admit or eject Africans from the land, or allow whites into the reserves, although in practice they left chiefs in control. Moreover, they could alter or re-define reserve boundaries and chief's `tribal wards', a practice which altered the basis of communalism and which was confirmed in the 1936 Act.[107] Through the trust, Natal gained wide-ranging powers, ostensibly construed for the betterment of Africans, to alienate even more land for white use including rights to

land for roads, railways, and irrigation, all material resources and rights to create outspans for white-owned cattle.[108] None of these rights, however, required it to compensate Africans.[109]

THE RESERVES AND `NATIONAL' LAND POLICY

Between 1914 and 1918, the Pretoria government convened the Native Lands Commission (Beaumont Commission, 1916) and the Natal Natives' Land Committee (Evans-Chapman Committee, 1918) to re-consider the land issue, *inter alia* in Zululand.[110] Under the relatively enlightened chairmanship of Sir William Beaumont, the Native Lands Commission enquired into what areas of land should be added to the existing reserves.[111] In 1918, the Evans-Chapman Natal Natives' Land Committee, chaired by the Natal writer and segregationist Maurice Evans, considered Beaumont's findings and tabled a dissident report.[112] As part of the effort to implement the 1913 Natives' Land Act, these bodies represented two opposing ideologies related to the land issue.

On the one hand, the `liberal' Beaumont commission advocated the protection of Africans through secure, communally-held reserves. While, as Wolpe and Lacey have argued, this approach partly arose out of the desire of mining capital to maintain the reserves, the policy was more complex.[113] Dubow has shown how the development of segregation can be seen as a more generalised state response to the problems of industrialising South Africa,

and the legislation implemented between 1913 and 1936 was intended to deal with the perceived political threat posed by Africans without a stake in land.[114] On the other hand, the Natal committee represented the interests of white farmers like the highveld maize growers described by Keegan. The `progressive' and better capitalised sugar planters in Zululand supported both the enforcement of those sections of the Act that released labour, and strict limits on any extensions to the reserves which included potential white farms.[115]

In addition to confirming the Zululand reserves demarcated in 1904 and the 1913 scheduled additions, Beaumont recommended a substantial increase in land for the Zulu. Dissenting from his fellow commissioners, he argued that Africans should not be prevented from purchasing land outside the reserves in Zululand in terms of the 1913 Act because this was against Britain's intentions and Zulu understandings, and some scope was needed for `progressive' African farmers.[116] Beaumont also contended that the reserves should be enlarged to accommodate the present African population and those yet to come in through evictions and natural increase. He recommended additional areas for the reserves on the basis of existing development and settlement patterns.[117] Where the Beaumont commission scheduled substantially larger reserve areas in northern Zululand, however, they found very little extra land for Africans in the south: just over 15,000 acres within Zululand proper, held by a few mission-educated families such as the Kuzwayos in Melmoth.[118]

The Union government only allowed the Beaumont commission not to consider for inclusion in the reserves land already communally occupied by Africans.[119] Africans and concerned whites stressed to the Beaumont commission the importance of confirming the existing reserves and the urgency of finding additional land wherever possible, but especially in the congested southern districts.[120] Saunders was remarkably critical of the 1913 Land Act and any possible further alienation of African land. He believed, that the enforcement of the Act in relation to rent tenants on white farms would mean `the removal of [Africans] wholesale and that would lead to a native convulsion.' He somewhat belatedly regretted that, while a delimitation commissioner, he had given Africans the impression that they would be able to purchase land outside the reserves.

> If I had been aware of this restriction [which, as has been established, he was] I personally should not have agreed to the quantity of land being thrown open to European occupation that we did.[121]

Following the 1906-08 Bambatha Rebellion, local officials tried to prevent increased immigration into the reserves, and to rectify white misconceptions about the availability of land in Zululand. The new CNC, R.H. Addison, supported Saunders's view and felt that there was no need to enforce the 1913 Act in Zululand since labour tenancy agreements established on the majority of white farms were still in operation, and sufficient labour was available to whites.[122] Many whites were able to raise African rents, knowing that Africans would hesitate to leave rent tenancy

arrangements since, under the 1913 act, they could only go onto other farms as labour tenants.[123]

Africans were primarily concerned with the loss of their land to white farmers, and with finding extra land outside the reserves. Harkening back to the pledges repeatedly made to the Zulu by British officials, chief Nkantini stated: `Having been conquered we are the Government's fowls and we look to the Government to give us a piece of land.'[124] Chief Ngokowana from Mtunzini, where a large area of African land had been taken up by white sugar farmers, argued, `There is no land left. The whole of the coast has been taken up by farmers. I do not know where all my people can go to.'[125] There was also a distinct concern about the terms of tenancy. Hoye, a *kholwa* African from Eshowe, asserted,

> All the land is now owned by Europeans, but we are not complaining about that. What troubles us is that we will not be permitted to rent land from white people... If natives are all to go together in one place there will not be sufficient room.[126]

Africans on reserve and crown land in the north expressed similar fears over the threat of white expansion and consequent congestion in the reserves.[127]

Beaumont argued that while the area scheduled for 250,000 Africans under the 1913 act amounted to 3,887,100 acres the actual area of land they occupied was 4,525,747 acres and that an effort should be made to address this problem.[128] Over 42,000 Africans lived outside the reserves on land they had occupied for generations and of these only 9,581

were on private farms owned and occupied by whites. Despite strong settler protests, Beaumont managed to add 298,000 acres to the scheduled reserves bringing the total recommended area up to 4,185,600 acres while still leaving 2,465,505 acres for 4,000 whites.[129]

These additions were, however, recommended areas only and not immediately included in areas for African occupation. Despite Sir William's dissent and the relatively small area added by his commission, Natal whites were outraged, and white farmers in Zululand railed against his recommendations. The Zululand Planters' Union, led by George Heaton Nicholls, was the most vociferous critic. It condemned Beaumont for not having enquired north of the Mfolozi River and for not considering potential sugar-cane land adequately.[130] Claiming that £11 million could be generated from the open lands in Zululand, the union complained of `the danger of allowing an asset equal in importance to that of the Witwatersrand itself, to be thrown away'.[131] Saunders, now a Melmoth farmer, once again contradicted his earlier views, suggesting that too much land was being added to the reserves. Referring once more to the delimitation he stated, `in my opinion we allowed the natives enough land... We delimited on a liberal scale, and we thought we delimited sufficient'.[132] The general consensus among whites who gave evidence was that the reserves were more than adequate for `inefficient' African cultivators.

The Evans-Chapman committee laid down far stricter conditions than Beaumont and based its findings only on what it considered actual `beneficial African occupation'.[133] Although directed by Pretoria to provide for the needs of expanding African communities over the next ten years, the committee argued that African pastoralism could be restricted and closer settlement effected.[134] It was concerned to exclude Africans from areas of possible sugar-cane farming or with irrigation potential. Its enquiry was far more comprehensive than Beaumont's, but it was obviously biased towards Natal settler interests. In contrast to Beaumont's enquiry, only seven Africans were consulted by the Natal committee and their views were muted because they were only questioned about specific blocks of land or the farms they resided on.[135]

The Natal committee considerably pared down Beaumont's recommendations. It argued that no land should be restored to Africans in the Ingwavuma-Ubombo region because of its agricultural potential, although two white store-keepers were the only settlers in this arid region.[136] Nor did it allow for the addition of any land in the highly desirable southern districts. The total area of 3,840,341 acres recommended as additions to existing reserves in Natal and Zululand by Beaumont in 1916 was reduced by the Natal committee to 934,340 acres; less than 200,000 acres of this were scheduled as additions to the area of 3,887,100 acres of reserves in Zululand.[137] According to the NAD, this left close to 1,300 African huts, containing an average of 3.3

people each, on crown land which could be thrown open to whites.[138]

Evans and Chapman made a concerted effort to dispel white liberal and Zulu concerns that Africans from other parts of the country would be moved into Zululand, arguing that the Prime Minister, Louis Botha, had stated that no such policy existed.[139] In effect, however, they contradicted this by not recommending the addition of any reserve land in the neighbouring northern Natal districts of Ngotshe, Vryheid and Babanango. They argued that there was no need for scheduled land in those districts since they were contiguous to large Zululand reserves in Nongoma and Mahlabatini and that those reserves were delimited in full anticipation of African refugees moving in from Natal.[140] The only suggestion that the Evans-Chapman committee made to alleviate African congestion on the land was to withdraw the prohibition on African rent-tenancies, perhaps in the hope that under-capitalised whites who needed an immediate income from the land could get established.[141]

The most telling blow for Africans in Zululand came in 1918 when Edward Dower, the `liberal' Secretary for Native Affairs, stated that the government was prepared to consider African applications to purchase land outside the reserves only in areas recommended by both Beaumont and Evans-Chapman.[142] This was undoubtedly a sign of the pressure on a weak and fragmented NAD to accept reduced reserves in order to provide more land for commercialising white agriculture.[143] Nevertheless, Dower and the NAD

embraced the provisions of the 1913 land act which provided `progressive' Africans with the right to buy individual plots outside the reserves.[144]

The Natal committee, however, preferred to substitute `neutral' areas, where Africans and whites would compete for land purchase, in place of Beaumont's additions to the reserves; yet no `neutral' areas were included in Zululand. This meant, in effect, that absolutely no land was available for African purchase in Zululand after 1918.[145] In 1927, when chief Ngobese of Nquthu proposed instituting a `tribal' levy to purchase farms which adjoined his overcrowded ward, the CNC, C. Wheelwright, refused on the grounds that the land did not fall within a `Native' area. Moreover, Wheelwright argued, under the proposed Natives' Land Act amendment bill the need to find accommodation for Africans evicted from white farms was more pressing than providing additional land for Africans already `fully located' in the reserves.[146] Indeed, the trickle of families ejected from Vryheid and Babanango in the 1910s became a torrent from what chief Mgixo of Nongoma called a `yawning crack which empties forth human beings' during the 1920s and 1930s.147

By 1920, the incorporation of additional land into the reserves was controlled by the Union Parliament Senate Select Committee on `waste lands', which primarily dealt with land that whites were not prepared to settle.[148] In 1920, only 21 mission school sites were added to the reserves and these provided no land for cultivation, cattle

grazing or African habitation. The Select Committee simply continued the government policy of favouring whites by providing new settlers with 100-acre store sites in the reserves, thus further expropriating African land.[149] Although many whites acknowledged the inadequacy of the reserves and almost every African protested against it, no additional land was provided for already congested communities. After 1920, the Zululand reserves remained fixed as isolated blocks of crowded and poor land where conditions for subsistence deteriorated steadily until the 1930s when crisis struck.

All that saved Africans was their tenacity and ability to survive on marginal land. Through the 1920s, white settlers in northern Zululand experienced a series of ignominious failures in experimental cotton- and cattle-farming and left the region.[150] The government settled returned soldiers along the Pongola River in Ubombo, and supported irrigation for cotton farms in Hlabisa in the early 1920s, on land the Beaumont had recommended for inclusion in the reserves.[151] The NAD was forced to remove over 250 African families from these settlement areas and close to 1,100 people reluctantly moved into adjacent reserves between 1922 and 1928.[152] African `squatters', however, remained on most of the crown land in northern Zululand, through the 1920s and early 1930s.[153]

Although most whites either refused to move into these arid low-veldt areas or abandoned their lots after only a few years, Africans were still ordered to make room for further

white settlement. Paradoxically, in 1935, just before the implementation of the Native Trust and Land Act, A.J. Turton, NC at Mahlabatini, informed Africans along the Pongola River of what he later called the `shocking theft' of their land to prepare them for white settlement.[154] Somewhat fortuitously for African `squatters', however, the tide of white settlement and government land policy was turning. In 1937, Heaton Nicholls, in his capacity as Native Affairs Commissioner, recommended that the crown lands of northern Zululand, on which whites could no longer make a living, revert back to Africans.[155] Nicholls argued there was a need for

> ... an effective economic development of the whole of this Northern Zululand area under a system of native peasant production. The growth of a contented native peasantry means the maintenance of the necessary native labour for the mines upon which South Africa depends for its existence.[156]

As he saw it, one aim of segregation was to guarantee a rural political economy which could sustain the long-term reproduction of migrant labour. The alternative would be a costly and politically volatile African work-force settled in the urban areas.[157] He therefore urged the government to abandon the `unprofitable and impolitic enterprise' of white settlement and replace them, not with reserve Africans suffering congestion, but with `detribalised' Africans who were crowding the urban areas and threatening class and social upheaval.[158] Nevertheless, African peasant settlement schemes remained unfulfilled, but in 1950 some 200,000 acres of land in Ingwavuma and Ubombo reverted back to the trust giving some security to `squatters'.[159] Over a million acres of former African land recommended by the

Beaumont Commission had still to be returned to Africans in Natal and Zululand.

Although Africans did not feel the full impact of the land lost immediately, they could not use land outside the reserves, and were restricted to land use and occupation on a communal basis under chiefly authority. It appears that the delimitation Commission could not have reserved as much land for Africans as they did without sacrificing African development outside the reserves. Pressure from Natal and the pro-settler bias kept the delimitation, and Africans, in check. If Africans attempted to break free of the communal society and chiefly control, they were restricted by the state. As Saunders argued, `To free such people from all tribal control would be fraught with dangerous consequences'.[160]

These conditions set the stage for a few chiefs and wealthier Zulu to augment their wealth and power with state support. The majority of the Zulu in the reserves, however, were increasingly overcrowded, impoverished, and forced to rely on migrant wage labour as reserve agriculture declined with the rise of white sugar-cane farming. Thereafter, crisis struck and state efforts to shore-up the crumbling reserves failed to improve conditions for Africans. Land shortages remained a severe obstacle to development for the Zulu except for chiefs who, with state support, overcame constraints on accumulation in the reserves by exploiting their control over land and cattle. As will be argued below, chiefly authority in the reserves was the mainstay

of the white administration, and the state's support of chiefs and communal land control accelerated social stratification in Zulu society.

[1] The joint commission, provided for under Act No. 37 of 1897 for the `Annexation to the Colony of Natal of the Territory of Zululand', issued a comprehensive report on the land settlement of Zululand in 1905. It is an extremely detailed and useful document. See NAP, Natal Colonial Papers (NCP), Vol. 8/3/65, *Report of the Joint Imperial and Colonial Commissioners: Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission, 1902-1904* (*ZLDC*) (Pietermaritzburg, 1905). The following discussion is based on my `The impact' but see also, A.J. Christopher, `A note on the opening of Zululand to European Settlement', *Historia*, Vol. 16, 1975, pp. 201-208 and his Ph.D., `Natal a Study in Colonial Land Settlement', University of Natal, 1969, T. Davenport, `The Fragmentation of Zululand, 1879-1918', *Reality*, Sept. 1979, pp. 12-15, Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, ch. 4, Laband and Thompson, `The Reduction of Zululand', pp. 233-248, C. Ballard, `Sovereignty', pp.90-93, no author, `Beginnings of the Natal Sugar Industry: The Opening of Zululand', *SASJ*, Vol. 33, April 1949, pp. 157-163. For the impact of the delimitation on specific areas and communities in Zululand see C. Ballard, `The Dunn Reserve, 1895-1948; A Case Study of Segregation and Underdevelopment in a Reserved Land Category', University of Natal, collected seminar papers, Department of History workshop, `Natal and the Union, 1909-1939' and Unterhalter, `Religion', ch. 2.

[2] For the negotiations over the annexation see NCP, Zululand Government House files (ZGH), 785, 1894, British Colonial Office, Confidential Print (C.O.), 427/26/3993, Memo on the annexation of Zululand, 20 Feb. 1894 and Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp. 101-104.

[3] C.O. 427/26/3993, Governor to Secretary of State, 12 April 1894 and ZGH, 778, Z 623/97, Governor's report, 8 Oct. 1897.

[4] For the role of white commercial agriculture in shaping settlement patterns see G. Pirie, `Railways and Labour Migration to the Rand Mines: Constraints and significance', *JSAS*, Vol 19, No. 4, Dec. 1993, pp. 713-730 and P. Richardson, `The Natal Sugar Industry in the Nineteenth Century', in Beinart, Delius and Trapido, *Putting a Plough*, pp. 129-175.

[5] The Zulu repeatedly applied to British authorities for protection of their land. See below and Marks, *Ambiguities*, pp. 11-12 and pp. 15-41.

[6] *ZLDC*, pp. iv, 11.

[7] Ibid, pp. v, 6. For Dunn's unique role and his remarkable legacy see Ballard, *John Dunn.*

[8] See the *Natal Almanac and Registry, 1905* (Pietermaritzburg, 1906), pp. 712 and 833-834. In 1904, due

to an illness, Dartnell was replaced by R.H. Beachcroft another Natal surveyor. See ZLDC, p. vii.

[9] See my, `The impact', ch. II and NCP, Zululand Government House Files (ZGH), Vol. 779, Z 8/1898, Governor to Natal SNA, 7 Jan 1898 and NAP, Secretary For Native Affairs, minute papers and original correspondence (SNA), Vol. 1/1/282, Z 419/98, SNA's report on Zululand, 24 Aug. 1898, and the Zululand Archives (ZA), Vol. 23, undated memo by the Governor of Natal, W. Hely- Hutchinson, probably 1902.

[10] Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 108.

[11] For a discussion of African rights to the land see variously, King Cetshwayo's comments on land in C. de B. Webb and J.B. Wright, (eds.), *A Zulu King Speaks*, letter to Sir H. Robinson, 29 March 1881, p. 49, 86, 90-91, Webb and Wright, *James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 2, statements of Mayinga Ka Mbekhuzana and others on African land rights, pp. 257-259, Vol. 3, Statements of Mjobo Ka Dumela, p. 141 and Vol. 4, Statements of Ndukwana Ka Mbengwana, pp. 311-315. For the Colonial view see for example the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Colony of Natal, *Blue Book on Native Affairs*, 1902, p. 2, the Zululand Native Trust Deed of grant contained in LDE, Vol 719, 8388, 6 April 1909 and K. Roberts-Wray, *Commonwealth and Colonial Law* (London, 1966), pp. 105-107.

[12] See *ZLDC*, pp. 2-3.

[13] See British Colonial Office, Confidential Print (C.O.), Vol. 179, 212/21864, 7 June 1900 and D. Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation. Native Policy in Natal, 1854-1910* (Cape Town, 1973), pp. 20-22, 54, and A. Atmore and S. Marks, `The Imperial Factor in South Africa in the Nineteenth Century: Towards a Reassessment', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 3, 1974, pp. 1-20.

[14] For Sutton's background as a Natal Midlands farmer see B. Guest, `Towards Responsible Government, 1879-93', in Duminy and Guest, *Natal and Zululand*, pp. 233-248, pp. 242-243. See also J. Lambert, `African Purchases of Crown Lands in Natal, 1880-1903', *SAJEH*, Vol. 3 No. 1, March 1988, pp. 45-60, pp. 57-58 and H. Slater, `Land Labour and Capital in Natal: The Natal Land and Colonisation Company, 1860-1948', *JAH*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1975, pp. 257-283, p. 265.

[15] See Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp. 126-128 and A. Duminy, `Towards Union, 1900-1910', in Duminy and Guest, *Natal and Zululand*, pp. 402-427.

[16] C.O. 179, 212/21864 Saunder's Report, 7 June 1900 and C.O. 879/86/764, No. 343, Governor of Natal to Secretary of State, 14 March 1904. See also Davenport, `Fragmentation', T. Davenport and K. Hunt, *The Right to the Land* (Cape Town, 1974), p. 29 and E. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, *A History of*

Natal, Second Edition (Pietermaritzburg, 1987), p. 186.

[17] *ZLDC*, Prime Minister to Commission, 7 Aug. 1902, p. vi-vii.

[18] Ibid, and see Davenport, `Fragmentation', p. 14.

[19] *ZLDC*, p. 5.

[20] See *ZLDC*, p. 269 and for unhealthy areas see ZA, Vol 23, R396/97, report on Zululand lands, 31 Jan. 1897.

[21] *Report of Evidence of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905*,(SANAC) Vol. 3 (Cape Town, 1905), p. 768.

[22] *ZLDC*, p. 46. For an example of whites' criticisms of the delimitation see *The Natal Witness*, article entitled `The Delimitation of Zululand', 25 Jan. 1905, a copy of which can be found in SNA, Vol. 1/1/316, No. 4-27.

[23] See article cited above.

[24] For this loss of land see for example J. Guy, Destruction', pp. 181-185, my `The Impact, pp. 42-60, Laband and Thompson, `The Reduction', p. 204 and S. Munro, `The Zululand-Transvaal Boundary Dispute, 1854-1879' B.A. Honours thesis Natal, 1980.

[25] *ZLDC*, p. 44.

[26] *ZLDC*, p v and see C.O. 179, 212/21864, Saunders Report, 7 June 1900.

[27] *ZLDC*, p. 6.

[28] Ibid.

[29] For the `Maputans' under British rule, see my, `The Impact', pp. 114-123 and P.R. Warhurst, `Britain and the partition of Maputaland, 1857-1987' in University of Natal Conference papers, `Natal and Zululand History', Vol. 3, pp. 1-28 and P. Harries, `History, Ethnicity and the Ingwavuma Land Deal: The Zulu Northern Frontier in the Nineteenth Century', *JNZH*, Vol. 6, 1983, pp. 1-27 and his `Labour Migration from Mozambique to South Africa', Ph.D. London, 1983, ch. 2, which is now published as *Work, Culture and Identity. Migrant Labourers in Mozambique and South Africa, c. 1860-1910* (Johannesburg, 1994).

[30] See *ZLDC*, p. 12. Kosi Bay had previously been considered by both the Boers and the British as a possible naval port. See D. Schreuder, *The Scramble for Southern Africa, 1877-1895* (Cambridge, 1980) p. 76-78 and R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, Second Edition (London, 1983), pp. 215-216.

[31] *ZLDC*, pp. 11-12.

[32] The literature on the act is vast. For this point see for example, C. Bundy, *Rise and Fall*, pp. 89-115, 241-243, Lacey *Boroko*, pp. 121-141, Keegan, *Rural Transformations*, pp. 2-3, 43-48, 110, 178-182; `Crisis' pp. 371-399 and `The Sharecropping economy, African Class formation and the 1913 Natives' Land Act in the highveld maize belt.', in Marks and Rathbone, *Industrialisation*, pp. 195-211, Murray, *Black Mountain*, pp. 112-120.

[33] For this effect on the highveld see Keegan, `Sharecropping' and *Rural Transformations*, pp. 18-21. For Natal's drive to contain African peasants on African-owned land see V. Harris, `Black-owned land and White farmers and the state in Northern Natal, 1910-1936', *JNZH*, Vol. 10, 1987, pp. 51-76, p.52 and Lambert, `African purchases', pp. 48-52 and Slater, `Land, Labour'. For the relative absence of a share-cropping peasantry in Zululand see Bundy, *Rise and Fall*, fn. No. 1, p. 192.

[34] *ZLDC*, pp. 12, 15, 33.

[35] C.O. 179, 212/21864, Saunders Report, 7 June 1900.

[36] See Dubow, *Racial*, p. 42.

[37] *SANAC*, Vol. 3, Saunders' evidence, p. 758.

[38] Ibid, and see J. Lambert, `African Purchases'. Verne Harris has argued that Africans purchased land individually in northern Natal only after 1910 when they were better capitalised. See his `Black-owned land, White Farms and the State in Northern Natal, 1910-1936', *JNZH*, Vol. 10, 1987, pp. 51-76 and `Land, Labour and Ideology: Government land Policy and the Relations between Africans and Whites on the Land in northern Natal, 1910-1936', M.A. Thesis Natal, 1984, pp. 45-48.

[39] *ZLDC*, p. 13. There is not scope in the thesis to consider Dunn's descendants adequately, but there were tensions between these mixed-race people and the Zulu over land and between them and the state over their initial classification as `Native'. See Ballard, *John Dunn*, CNC 42A, N2/8/3 (27), NTS 7775, 98/335, and for the Nunns, a similar family, see 1/NGA, 3/3/2/9, 2/60.

[40] See ZGH Vol. 768, Z319/96, Governor to Secretary of State 12 March 1896. In 1904, Natal was instructed not to proscribe Indians *eo nominee* from buying land in Zululand. This was due to M.K. Gandhi's agitation for Indian rights in Zululand. See C.O. 879, 86/764, No. 43, Secretary of State to Governor, 14 March 1904. For Gandhi's support of the Indian cause in Zululand see ZGH, Vol. 768, Z238, Gandhi to Governor, 10 Jan. 1896 and 7 Feb. 1896 and M.

Swan, [Tayal], *Gandhi: The South African experience* (London, 1985), pp. 40-41, 88-90. For further discussion of Indians in Natal and Zululand see below, chapter on labour and J. Beall and M. North-Coombes, `The 1913 Disturbances in Natal: The Social and Economic Background to "Passive Resistance"', *JNZH*, Vol. 6, 1983, pp. 48-81.

41 C.O. 879, 86/764, enclosure 1 in No. 36, C.M. Sutton to Secretary of State, 15 Oct. 1903.

42 Ibid.

43 For the importance of the SANAC (1903-1905) in shaping segregation policy and the links to the 1913 act see M. Legassick, `British Hegemony and the Origins of segregation in South Africa, 1901-14', in Beinart and Dubow, *Segregation*, pp. 43-59.

44 Ibid, p. 53.

45 See I. Edwards, *Protectorates or Native Reserves? A political and constitutional survey of the High Commission Territories in South Africa* (London, 1956), pp. 10-12.

46 Legassick quoting Curtis in `British Hegemony' p. 55.

47 C.O. 879, 86/764, enclosure 1 in No. 40, Saunders to Governor, 16 June 1904. For later Union arguments in reverse, to restrict Africans on land outside the reserves because Indians could not get rights, see U. Mesthrie, `Indian Responses in Natal to Non-European Unity Moves, 1927-1945', *JNZH*, Vol. 12, 1989, pp. 73-89, pp. 81-82.

48 Ibid, No. 41, Lyttelton to Acting Governor Bale, 14 March 1904.

49 See for example CAD, Department of Native Affairs Files (NTS), Vol. 2706, 12/301, CNC to SNA, 6 Feb. 1924, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs to F.S. Malan, Minister of Mines and Industries, 30 Oct. 1924, Killie Campbell Africana Library (KCAL), Files of the Natal Agricultural Union (NAU), KCM, 30034, resolutions of 27 April 1932. See ch. 6 on famine for a further discussion of racial exclusivity in rural trading and NTS 2706, 12/301, Sun Life Assurance Co. to SNA, 30 Oct. 1934 and CNC Campbell to SNA, 19 May 1948.

50 *SANAC*, Vol. 3, p. 772. The date of Saunders' evidence was 25 May 1904, the decision of the Lands Delimitation Commission to restrict Indian and African land rights in Zululand was 16 Jan. 1904, some 5 months before the above evidence. For the political background to the elaboration of segregationist policy see Dubow, *Racial*, pp. 29-50.

51 See C.O. 879, 86/764, No. 44, 29 March 1904, minute of Natal Ministers on the Land Delimitation.

[52] See Marks, *Rebellion*, especially ch. 4.

[53] See *ZLDC*, pp. 32-34 and *Natal Witness*, 25 Jan. 1905.

[54] *ZLDC*, p. 34. For these African settlers and colonial manipulation of southern Zululand settlement as a bulwark against the Zulu see Guy, *Destruction*, pp. 101-122.

[55] C.O. 879, 86/764, No. 53, Sutton to Governor, 16 Sept. 1904.

[56] See *ZLDC*, pp. 34-35.

[57] Natal bought the farm `Goedetrouw' in 1894 for Siteku and his people owing to congestion in Mahlabatini. See SNA 1/1/428, 1063/09, minute by J. Stuart, of the Stuart Archive fame, 21 June 1910 and *ZLDC*, p. 283. H.O. Samuelson, Natal's Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, believed the purchase had been a political measure. See *SANAC*, Vol. 3 p. 139.

[58] See Bradford, *A Taste* pp. 95-107.

[59] See for example Union of South Africa, *Record of Evidence before the Native Economic Commission* (NEC) 1930-32 [I have used a microfilm copy of evidence supplied by the University of the Witwatersrand held at SOAS, University of London], evidence of Chief Solomon KaDinuZulu, pp. 6551-6552 and Union of South Africa, *Record of Evidence before the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa*, [Tomlinson], 1952 held at CAD, K-20 [the K series contains unpublished commission reports and evidence], Vol. 33, evidence of chief Mshiyeni KaDinuzulu, pp. 2065-2067.

[60] The total area of Zululand was estimated at 6,651,105 acres. The total population in 1905 was approximately 200,000 people with an estimated 20,000 men outside at work. The five most densely populated districts held 140,000 people. See Appendix and SNA Vol. 1/1/471, 2762/1910, report on Zululand, 12 Sept. 1908.

[61] Statistics compiled by the author from, U.G. 7-'19, *Report of the Native Affairs Department for 1919* and Lacey, *Boroko*, p. 381.

[62] The Commission collectivised the density figures into areas for the coastal, middle and upper belts of Zululand. This did not accurately reflect the varying densities in each district. See *ZLDC*, pp. 268-270.

[63] For the history surrounding the game reserve issue in Zululand see below, ch. on the cattle economy and F. Vaughan-Kirby, Chief Game Conservator for Zululand, `Game and Game Preservation in Zululand', *South African Journal of Science*, Vol. 18, March 1916, pp. 203-207, Zululand Game

Reserve Conservator `Report of the Conservator for 1935', Journal of the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire, Part 30, Jan. 1937, pp.88-93 and Brookes, `Playing the Game. The Struggle for Wildlife Protection in Zululand, 1910-1930', M.A. Thesis, Queen's, Kingston, 1990, pp. 68-83. For the wider issues relating to colonial conservation see especially W. Beinart, `Introduction: The Politics of Colonial Conservation' in a special issue of JSAS, Vol. 15, no.2, Jan, 1989, pp.143-162 and Anderson and Grove, *Conservation*, pp. 10-12

64 For the establishment of the Eshowe mission station (1852) and the Entumeni mission station (1859) under Norwegian missionary Hans Schreuder see ZLDC, pp. 16-30 and for the development of Christian African communities see N. Etherington's fascinating *Preachers, Peasants and Politics in Southeast Africa, 1835-1880: African Christian Communities in Natal, Pondoland and Zululand* (London, 1978), pp. 72-80, 110-112 and E. Brookes, *A Century of Missions in Natal and Zululand* (Durban, 1936).

65 See for example *ZLDC*, pp. 16-18 and *SANAC*, evidence of H.E. Colenso, pp. 401-404 and Rev. D.A. Bryant, pp. 805-814.

66 Natal's Master of the Supreme Court, H.C. Koch, stated that Christian Africans exempted from codified law in Zululand `gave us endless trouble. They came in as a sort of advanced guard for certain classes of missions... and they wanted the right to possess land. They made a charge against me that I would not allow them to worship God because I would not grant them land'. See *SANAC*, Vol. 3, p. 126.

67 *ZLDC*, p. 38.

68 See NCP, Resident Magistrates Files, Eshowe (RM ESH), Vol. 3/2/5, E966/03, Boast to CNC, 17 Nov. 1903. For more details on Ndhlovu's remarkable career see below and Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 46-48. For the Natal code of `native' law see Rogers, *Native Administration*, pp. 201-212 and Dubow, *Racial*, pp. 111-118.

69 See *ZLDC*, p. 41.

70 RM ESH, Vol. 3/2/5, E966/03, Saunders' minute, 21 Dec. 1903.

71 Ibid, E562/04, Saunders to all RMs, 21 Jan. 1904.

72 Ibid.

73 For a brief discussion of the American Zulu Mission see J. Smith, *Zulu Crusade. The Salvation Army in Natal and Zululand* (London, 1945), pp. 98-101. For other missions twentieth century Zululand see for example B. Sundkler,

Zulu Zion (Uppsala, New York, 1976), Lee, A.W., *Once Dark Country. Recollections and Reflections of a South African Bishop* (London, 1949). J Comaroff and J Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution. Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa, Vol. 1 (Chicago, 1991).

[74] LDE 719, 8388, memorandum on the Impapala lands, 1 Feb. 1911.

[75] SNA 1/1/368, Saunders minute, 11 July 1905.

[76] Ibid and see, U.G. 22-'14, *Report of Evidence of the Natives Land Commission* (Pretoria, 1914) p. 484, CNC 102A N2/2/2 (9), 74/1 file on Impapala lands and see below, ch. on `betterment' for the failure of these lots.

[77] `The People of Mpapala have been deprived of their holdings', article in *Ilanga Lase Natal*, 10 May 1907, in SNA 1/1/368, 1375/07.

[78] LDE 719, 8388, Secretary for lands to Acting SNA, 2 Sept. 1911.

[79] See CNC 102A N2/2/2 (9), 74/1, CNC to NC Eshowe, 5 March 1918 and outstanding revenues for Impapala, 1916-18.

[80] Ibid, See NC, Eshowe to CNC, 28 April 1919 and Rodseth to CNC, 30 May 1928.

[81] Ibid, petition of E. Mtetwa, M Shandu and N. Ngema, 13 June 1928 and reply of CNC, 16 June 1928.

[82] ZLDC, p. 46.

[83] Ibid, p. 247.

[84] CAD, LDE, Vol. 719, 8388, minute by H. Burton, Min. of Lands, 1 June 1911.

[85] C.O. 879/86/764, No. 77, Governor McCallum to CNC, 20 May 1905. Other significant resrictions on African land use and access to natural resources included strict Crown Forest regulations which prevented the Zulu from using local forest products. For a further discussion of these issues see Beinart, `East Griqualand', pp. 288-289; CNC 143/1913, 1786/13, SNA to Chief Conservator of Forests, 9 Feb. 1914 and Chief Conservator to SNA, 18 Sept. 1914 and NCP, *Magisterial Reports*, 1902 (Pietermaritzburg, 1903), Report of the Forest Ranger, p. 36. See also RM Mtunzini, Vol. 3/3/3, DD 300/1903, RM to CNC, 12 Sept. 1903 and the ZLDC, pp. 38-46. For further discussion of forestry and conservation issues in Zululand see the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA), *Special Report No. 6, Maputaland*: Conservation and Removals, (Pietermaritzburg, 1990).

[86] See ZLCD, pp. 38-45 and Christopher, `The Opening', p.

211.

87 See Christopher, `Natal', pp. 150-155.

88 See for example RM, MEL, Vol. 3/2/10, PB856/1907, Magistrate to Secretary of Lands, 20 Sept. 1907, RM ESH, Vol. 3/2/5, NAD report on African removals, 27 Feb. 1906. For the impact on Africans see my `The Impact', pp. 177-182 and evidence before the *Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1906-07* (Pietermaritzburg, 1908) [*NNAC*] of Chiefs Mayime, Msutu, Maweni and Gadeleni of Nquthu, pp. 864-867; Chiefs Siswana and Sitshitshili of Nkandhla, pp. 868-872; Chiefs Nkantini and Dumezweni of Melmoth, pp. 872-877.

89 See Christopher, `Natal' p. 188.

90 See for example NNAC, evidence of Maqiyana, p. 874. For the nature of tenancy and the persistence of tenancy arrangements which favoured under-capitalised farmers see Keegan, `Sharecropping' and Lacy, *Boroko*, pp. 125-133

91 See NNAC, evidence of Ngandeni, p. 887 and Webb and Wright, *James Stuart*, Vol. 1, p. 251.

92 African tenants on white-owned farms in Zululand numbered approximately 15,000 in 1911 and 12,000 in 1946, both small fractions of the region's total population. See U.G. 42-55 *Report of the NAD for 1911* (Pretoria, 1955), p. 113 The majority of agricultural labourers living on white farms were paid a wage only and received no rights to land. They were classified as inhabiting industrial compound in the 1951 census and numbered close to 23,000 in 1946. See R. Smith, `Native Farm Labour in Natal', *SAJE*, Vol. 9, 1941, pp. 154-175.

93 See Dubow, *Racial*, p. 52.

94 See Murray, *Black*, p. 125, Davenport and Hunt, *The Right*, p. 98, and T. Davenport `Can Sacred Cows be Culled?. A historical review of land policy in South Africa with some questions about the future', *Development Southern Africa*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1987, pp. 388-400, p. 394.

95 CNC 85A, N1/1/4, (X), part I, Allison to CNC, 14 Nov. 1927.

96 *NNAC*, evidence of Nkomo, p. 888. This ran counter to the pre-colonial custom of succession and inheritance. See E.J. Krige, *The Social System of the Zulus* (Pietermaritzburg, 1950), pp. 180-181.

97 *NNAC*, p. 889.

98 Ibid, evidence of *Induna* Mgidhlana, p. 895.

99 For a discussion of this forced labour system which was

only loosely based on pre-colonial elements of chiefly labour extraction see Marks, *Rebellion*, pp. 43-45, 132-133, Guy, `Destruction and reconstruction', and Unterhalter, `Religion', p. 386, For another southern African equivalent see C. van Onselen, *Chibaro, African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933* (London, 1976), p. 99.

100 *NNAC*, p. 873. See also evidence of chief Nakantini, p. 873.

101 Cope, `Royal Family', p. 58.

102 Webb and Wright, *The James Stuart Archive*, Vol. 3, p. 155.

103 The land issue in South Africa is central to race relations and the impoverishment of Africans and much has been written on it. For the state's land policy for Africans and its relation to Natal-Zululand see variously, H. Bradford, *A Taste*, pp. 23-34, 55-59, Brookes and Hurwitz, *Reserves of Natal*, Davenport, `Sacred Cows', 388-400, Bundy, *Rise and Fall*, ch. 4 and conclusion, Dubow, *Racial* pp. 92-117, Lacey, *Boroko*, pp. 56-60, 80-85, M. Legassick, `Capitalist Roots of Apartheid', Review article in *JAH*, Vol. 25 No. 3, 1984, pp. 356-359, P. Wickens, `The Native Land Act of 1913: A Cautionary Essay on Simple Explanations of Complex Change', *SAJE*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1981, pp. 105-119, and Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa, Vol. 4, Natal (Cape Town, 1983), pp. 17-35. For contemporary views see for example, M. Evans of the Evans-Chapman Commission, `Natives in Natal in Relation to the Land', *Report of the South African Association for the Advancement of Science*, Vol 15, 1918, pp. 235-246.

104 See LDE, 719, 8388, copy of the Trust, 6 April 1909 and 1 June 1911 and see SNA 1/1/428, 1063/09, draft of Governor-General's powers for the Trust, 25 June 1910. The sovereign rights of the Governor-General over Zululand land and chiefs was a protective legacy of the Imperial factor, and pre-dated, by 11 years the powers specified in the Native Affairs Amendment Acts. For the development of segregated reserves in Natal see Welsh, *The Roots*, pp. 8-10, 88-101.

105 See SNA 1/1428, 1063/09, Deed of Grant, 25 June 1910 and see copies of later incorporations in LDE 719, 8388, 10 Sept. 1912 and 28 June 1936.

106 As of 1924, approximately 15,000 Africans lived on crown land in Hlabisa and Ingwavuma still un-alienated by whites. See CNC files, second series (A), Vol. 40A, N10/1/2 (X), hut tax return for 1924. Figures are based on huts containing an average of three people each. For more general impressions of the land issue see C.O. 879/115, 1024 Sir Rider Haggard's letter to Lewis Harcourt, M.P., on

his tour through Zululand and Rhodesia, 1 June 1914.

[107] See Davenport, `Sacred Cows' p. 393 and Legassick, `Capitalist Roots', p. 358.

[108] LDE, 719, 8388, copy of the Trust, 1 June 1911 and see SNA 1/1/428, 1063/09, draft of Governor-General's powers for the Trust, 25 June 1910.

[109] Ibid.

[110] See U.G. 22-'14, *Report of Evidence of the Natives Land Commission* (Pretoria, 1914) U.G. 19-'16, *Report of the Natives Land Commission* [Beaumont Commission] (Pretoria, 1916), U.G. 34-'18, *Report of Evidence of the Natal Natives Land Committee, 1918* (Pretoria, 1918) and U.G. 35-'18 the *Report of the Natal Natives Land Committee* (Pretoria, 1918). Most of the secondary sources consider the Beaumont Commission's findings to have been fairly generous compared with the later local committees. See for example, The Surplus People Project, *Forced Removals*, Vol. 4, pp. 29,34, Beinart, `East Griqualand' pp. 298-301, Lacey, *Boroko*, p. 381 and C. Tatz, *Shadow and Substance in South Africa; A Study of Land and Franchise Policies Affecting Africans, 1910-1960* (Pietermaritzburg, 1962), pp. 14-18.

[111] U.G. 19-'16, pp. i-v.

[112] See U.G. 34-'18, *Report of the Local Natal Natives Land Committee* (Pretoria, 1918). In fact there were two Natal Committees, one chaired by M. Evans and T. Chapman and the second under G. MacKenzie. Mackenzie's Committee edited the Evans-Chapman report of evidence and submitted a final report in 1918. Un-edited versions of the Natal evidence can be found in LDE 719, 8388 and Union Government SNA file II/5/5, correspondence on the Natives Land Act, 18 Oct. 1917. For Evans views and background see his *The Native Problem in Natal* (Durban, 1906), *Black and White in South East Africa. A study in Sociology*, second edition (London, 1916) and `Natives in Natal'. See also Marks, *Ambiguities*, p. 4.

[113] See H. Wolpe `Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid', Economy and Society, Nov 1972, Vol 1, No. 4. pp. 425-456 and Lacey, *Boroko*, pp. 126-133.

[114] Dubow, *Racial*, pp. 52, 88. For the wider implications of this in a comparative framework see J. Cell, *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 14-23.

[115] Keegan, `Sharecropping', p. 204.

[116] U.G. 19-`16, Beaumont's separate dissenting report, pp.

41-42.

[117] Ibid, pp. 22-23, 39-41.

[118] See Ibid and Lacey, *Boroko*, p. 381 and U.G. 19-'16, p. 41.

[119] U.G. 19-'16, pp. 1-4.

[120] See for example U.G. 22-'14, pp. 422-495.

[121] Ibid, pp. 476-477.

[122] Ibid, p. 479.

[123] See for example U.G. 35-'18, p. 106.

[124] Ibid, p. 488.

[125] Ibid, pp. 488-489.

[126] Ibid, p. 490.

[127] Ibid, pp. 492-494, 496.

[128] U.G. 26-'16, p. 25. Africans in Zululand occupied 519,272 acres of crown land, 15,180 acres of trust acquired farms and 9,472 acres on mission reserves. The African population of the reserves was estimated at 214,010 and those outside the reserves at 42,130.

[129] Ibid, p. 42.

[130] U.G. 34-'18, Report of the ZPU, p. 263-270.

[131] Ibid, p. 269.

[132] Ibid, p. 279.

[133] See U.G. 34-'18, pp. 1-6.

[134] Ibid.

[135] See U.G. 35-'18, evidence of Mbiya Kuzwayo and chiefs Nkantini, Sinxi, Dumezweni, Sijulu and Nqodi which spans only pages, pp. 108-112.

[136] See U.G. 35-'18, p. 113 and SNA II/5/5, C.E. Dent, written evidence to the Committee, 7 Sept. 1918.

[137] The statistics in the report are extremely confusing as large tracts were scheduled for additions in collectivised areas covering both Natal and Zululand. The figures appear to show that 124,828 acres were set for Ingwavuma-Ubombo and 169,781 acres in Melmoth, Nkandhla and Eshowe and only 9,000 acres adjacent to the township at Nquthu. These are

estimates based on the Committee's recommendations of land not to be included in African areas, thus no extra land was set for the southern districts. See U.G. 35-'19, U.G. 19-'16 and Lacey, *Boroko*, p. 381.

138 CNC Vol. 266, 2140/16, CNC estimates of 5 Jan. 1917, 16 Jan. 1917, 2 June 1917 and 22 Dec. 1917.

139 U.G. 34-'18, p. 15.

140 Ibid, p. 17.

141 Ibid, p. 19.

142 See for example RM Eshowe, 3/4/3/1, circular 825/13, 24 July 1918. For Dower's approach see Dubow, *Racial*, pp. 80, 96.

143 See Dubow, *Racial*, pp. 61, 88, Lacey, *Boroko*, pp. 126-128 and see Beinart, *Pondoland*, p. 6.

144 SNA II/5/5, SNA to CNC 12 Oct. 1917 and see Dubow, *Racial*, p. 88.

145 See SNA II/5/5 SNA to CNC 18 Oct. 1918 and Brookes and Hurwitz, *The Native Reserves*, p. 12.

146 1/NQU, 1/1/5/30, 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/2, CNC to NC, 13 Dec. 1927.

147 Marks first made this point in *Ambiguities*, p. 94 and see NEC, evidence of Mgixo, p. 1686 The flood of refugees continued into the late 1940s. See evidence of R. Ashton, NC, Nongoma before the Tomlinson Commission, p. 4610 and H. Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom*, p.105.

148 See S.C. 10-1920, Union Government, House of Assembly, Senate Select Committee on `Waste Lands', Report on Native Areas for 1920, p. iv.

149 Ibid, pp. 10, 12, 32, 56 and 57.

150 See, *SASJ*, Vol. 3, Nov. 1919, p. 875, no author, `Zululand To-Day', *The Sun and Agriculture Journal of South Africa*, Vol. 17, 1926, pp. 881-883 Brookes, `Playing the Game', LDE-N 37A 307/11, Annual Report of the Inspector of White Lands for Zululand, 1936/37.

151 See NTS 3279 1343/307 Copy of Report of the Native Affairs Commission on the Natives Trust and Land Act in Natal and Zululand, 23 March 1937.

152 Ibid, CNC to NC Hlabisa 18 March 1921. See also NC Hlabisa to NC Mahlabatini, 8 Dec. 1921 and 10 June 1925.

153 See CNC 108A N7/9/2, 94/4, CNC's report to the NEC, 30

Aug. 1932.

154 See 1/MBT, NC's files and correspondence for Mahlabatini, 3/3/3/8, N7/8/12, 94/4, NC to CNC, 2 Feb. 1935, and `The Rape of Tongaland', article in the *Natal Mercury*, 18 May 1982, quoted in The Surplus People, *Forced Removals*, pp. 91-92 For Heaton Nicholls and the compromise of extended African rights to land in exchange for the loss of the limited franchise for Cape Africans see his autobiography, *South Africa in My Time* (London, 1961), Marks, *Ambiguities*, pp. 41-42, 132-133, Dubow, *Racial*, p. 165-171, and below in this thesis.

155 NTS 3279 1343/307 Copy of Report of the Native Affairs Commissioners, Heaton Nicholls and W.R. Collins, on the Natives Trust and Land Act in Natal and Zululand, 23 March 1937.

156 Ibid, p. 10.

157 See Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 427-429. For the wider debates over labour reproduction at this time see Wolpe, `Capitalism' and Murray, *Black Mountain*, pp. 125-128.

158 NTS 3279 1343/307, NAC report, 23 March 1937 and see Dubow, *Racial*, pp. 52-53.

159 NTS 3279 1343/307, SNA to CNC, 14 Nov. 1949.

160 *ZLDC*, p. 46.

CHAPTER TWO

CHIEFLY AUTHORITY

Although chiefly authority in modern Zululand has been characterised as inherently `conservative', a closer examination of chiefs and *induna* reveals a varied group of men with a nuanced and complex range of responses to the often contending economic and administrative forces dominating life in Zululand.[1] The erosion of chiefly authority was uneven and contradictory. On the one hand, many chiefs in Zululand suffered the loss of legitimate customary power and prestige in the eyes of their people during the process of their co-option by the white administration since `A chief is a chief by the people'.[2] On the other hand, however, chiefs and *induna* (`tribal' headmen, chiefs' officials)3 benefited from the material advantages of chieftaincy both as a product of their continued customary role in society and their role as paid civil servants in the white administration. In broad terms, while the chiefly elite of Zululand aligned themselves with the forces of the state and capital and rejected the alternative trajectory of resistance afforded by maintaining popular political support, the *induna* carved out an important role in the local political economy, independent of chiefs.

This chapter focuses on social stratification in the unravelling of `traditional' chiefly authority, and changing African politics in a racially and class divided society.[4] After a discussion of the background to chiefly

authority the chapter deals with the role that the state assigned to chiefs in the white administration, chiefs' administrative powers, local councils and segregation, radical' politics and chiefly control of land, and the rise of the *induna*.

THE BACKGROUND TO CHIEFLY AUTHORITY

Distinctions should be made about the nature of the state at the local and central levels as it related to the reconstruction of chiefly authority in Zululand. As Beinart has pointed out, the state needs to be disaggregated if the conflicting interventions of its component parts are to be understood.[5] In this way the actions of local officials can be seen, if not in diametric opposition to the main thrust of state policy, at least on occasion to undermine particular efforts to shore up chiefly authority. Although after 1910, the Natal Native Affairs Department (NAD) underwent a protracted transfer of power to the Department of Native Affairs in Pretoria, it still retained a large degree of local autonomy in dealing with African affairs. While in theory, the NAD sought to harness chiefly authority to the administration, in practice it was unable to render chiefs more accountable to the state. Nevertheless, the state relied on chiefs at the most fundamental levels of its administration. This reliance developed, in part, because chiefs still retained a certain degree of popular legitimacy and, in part, because of the white desire to prevent an educated class of aspiring African petty bourgeoisie from threatening their hegemony.[6]

An important theme in the recent studies of the complex nature of African politics during this period is the drive by African leaders, both `radical' and conservative to operate in the same ideological space through the appropriation of a reconstituted Zulu nationalism.[7] During the 1920s, conditions in Natal and Zululand facilitated the rapid spread among rural labourers and squatters of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Natal (the ICU *Yase* Natal, hereafter ICU), under A.W.G. Champion's leadership.[8] The ICU's popular support came from the mass of oppressed tenants being driven from white farms where they competed with expanding white agriculture and stock herding.

The ICU vied with lesser rural movements such as M. L. Maling's Abaqulusi Land Union (named after a faction of fiercely loyal supporters of the Zulu monarchy) which drew its support from landless chiefs in northern Natal and members of a discontented *kholwa* elite.[9] These popular political organizations also drew support from impoverished homesteaders who realised the inability of chiefs to provide them with sufficient land or represent their grievances over state intrusions in the rural areas. Though the ICU made some inroads in Zululand, the convergence of interests between the state and the chiefs to stem the tide of `radical' disaffection which threatened their rule ensured it had a limited formal presence in the reserves.[10] The rejection of the ICU and embrace of state support by Zulu chiefs meant they refused to take up the vital role that commoners accorded them.[11]

In contrast to the mass support for these `radical' organizations, *Inkatha kaZulu* mobilised support from the conservative Natal African intelligentsia and royalist chiefs in order to bolster Zulu nationalism, provide funding for the deeply indebted Zulu king, Solomon KaDinuzulu, and press for state recognition of his `paramountcy'.[12] The conservative *Hamba Kahle* (to go safely) politics of *Inkatha* appealed to chiefs particularly in the areas of least capitalist penetration in the reserves.[13] Here, too, however, the nature of local authority needs to be disaggregated. Chiefs can not be simply characterised as either loyal to the government or staunch resisters on the side of the rank and file.[14] Within Zululand, chiefs shifted from oppositional positions in relation to the state to collaborationist strategies aligned with powerful settler interests and particularly G.N. Heaton Nicholls and the parliamentary segregationists.[15]

CHIEFS AND THE ADMINISTRATION

During the first decades after 1900, the state relied heavily on chiefs in Zululand. As the NAD attempted to legitimize an increasing number of administrative practices through the use of chiefs, it was disposed to accept applications for official chieftancies from men who could claim hereditary status and who could provide a counterbalance to the royal house because Natal still perceived it as a threat to its hegemony in the region. By 1917, `indirect rule' accommodated no fewer than 91

recognised and acting chiefs over 85 groups in Zululand.[16] The rise in the number of chiefdoms, combined with a correspondingly large increase in the number of *induna,* precipitated wide-spread civil strife and administrative chaos as competing factions vied for control of the land(see below).

The NAD, however, attempted to prepare chiefs to run a modern administration. The Zulu National Training Institute (ZNTI), conceived in 1918 by the CNC, C.A. Wheelwright, and with the support of prime Minister Botha as a `civil service college for chiefs', was a prime example of the convergence of the interests of the state and chiefs and was intended to help chiefs bridge the gap between insufficiencies of `tribal rule' and the exigencies of modern Zululand.[17] Initially the NAD enlisted the aid of the Anglican Church of the Province of South Africa to develop the school along lines acceptable to the administration.[18] The church offered Rev. L.E. Oscroft as principal for the school it hoped to control.[19] When the ZNTI opened in 1920, however, it was under the direct control of the NAD, possibly to lessen the influence of the missionaries, as part of the state's commitment to developing segregation.

The curriculum of the Institute was directed specifically at chiefs' and *induna's* sons, to develop their leadership skills for future incorporation in the white administration. The importance of the school to the NAD was reflected in the large proportion of its budget devoted to

construction and operating costs.[20] By 1930, it boasted 66 students, a carpentry shop and garden plots. All of this was designed to encourage `progressive' leadership skills among the chiefs of the future and their obedience to the white government. The re-fashioning of chiefly authority, however, was insufficient to counteract the challenge to chiefs' authority from the mission-educated youth of Zululand and from urbanised Africans.

Solomon himself recognized the need to educate the chiefs to keep abreast of modern developments. He believed that the ZNTI was an excellent institution and `...the best weapon that the authorities could possibly have placed in our hands'. However, he also felt that the school placed too much stress on academic `book learning' and not enough on practical learning and developing farming skills.[21] These skills, he hoped, would enable the chiefs to address those in opposition to the tribal system by educating chiefs to deal with the same fundamental issues that `progressive' Africans used to threaten their authority.[22] Thus, modern education was utilised as a tactic to shore up the `traditional' authority of the chiefs. In a contrived letter of thanks from the pupils of the Institute to the SNA in 1930, some of the elements of indirect rule were clearly laid out.

> We are being taught obedience and loyalty to the Laws of the Government... When we leave here we shall with all our strength try to rule our people in ways which will please the Government, to put down rebellion, superstition and other useless things... The government found us killing one another, but it reconciled us and taught us to live as friends.[23]

In broader terms, however, chiefs proved resistant to formal education in agricultural or academic skills. Both these forms of training threatened the underpinnings of chiefly authority at different levels. At one level, intensive agriculture undermined chiefly control of land; at another, western education, so closely associated with Christian missions, threatened to divorce chiefs from their role as religious and spiritual leaders at a time when they were struggling to re-capture the ideological elements of Zulu culture.[24] Indeed, western education had had little impact on the chiefly class and, as of 1939, only five chiefs in Zululand could both read and write in Zulu or English and formal education for chiefs was not increasing.[25]

Part of the reason why chiefs did not receive academic education was because of a shift in the government's policy for the reserves. Following the drought of the early 1930s, the NAD was convinced of the rapid deterioration of the reserve economy and was committed to improving African rural areas. At a native commissioners conference in 1936, the SNA, D. Smit, advocated re-directing the meagre NAD budget of £1 million to improving African agricultural production to meet subsistence needs (see chapter on `Betterment').[26] A central proposal of this new programme was to train all classes of Africans in agriculture. For the Zululand chiefs this meant that specialised leadership training would no longer be provided and, following trends in colonial policy in British East Africa, their sons would be educated along with the children of commoners.[27] In

Zululand this new policy was signalled by the closure of the ZNTI and the establishment of the Vuma and Tokazi agricultural demonstration farms for all classes in Zulu society at Eshowe and Nongoma, respectively, in 1935.[28] Moreover, the NAD located these new training sites away from the royal kraal at Mahashini in order to lessen the influence of the monarch over the chiefs' sons.[29]

Despite such egalitarian gestures, however, the practice of protecting hereditary chiefly authority in the administration continued. Although, in 1946, the post-war Social and Economic Planning Council (SEPC), railed against the hindrance to progress presented by chiefs, and recommended they be given more `progressive education', they maintained that `It would be impracticable to exclude from chieftanship the rightful heir in order to promote someone who was more educated or efficient.'[30]

To a certain extent, the legacy of a pre-colonial chiefly status within Zulu society translated into *de facto* recognition by the state for hereditary chiefs. Following the appointment of Wheelwright as CNC in 1916, the central government openly expressed its willingness to accept the Zulu royal family's role in Zululand.[31] Moreover, certain hereditary chiefs of high standing in pre-colonial Zulu society received substantial cash stipends, though the NAD could and, in the case of Solomon, did punitively cut the stipends for alleged disloyalty.[32] Solomon was paid £500 per annum, chief Manzolwandhle Zulu got £250, chief Nkantini Zulu of the Melmoth district was accorded £60 and

Ngwanase Tembe of the separate Maputan kingdom received £100.[33] In contrast, and as a testament to the greater powers of Zululand chiefs as perceived by the NAD, no chief in Natal received more than £45.[34]

During the 1920s, however, commoner disaffection with appointed chiefs led the NAD to make concerted efforts to refine and reconstruct chiefly authority. Though a largely unresolved issue, the amalgamation of existing `tribes' was one strategy whereby the state attempted to manufacture legitimacy. During the later 1920s and into the 1930s, a number of Zululand chieftaincies were collapsed in areas where their followers resided on lands taken up by whites. The SNA directed Natal's CNC, Wheelwright, to depose petty chiefs who had no hereditary status and who were appointed without recourse to `recognised tribal custom' if they moved into the reserves from white lands.[35] Wheelwright replied that such a policy would undermine the valuable administrative `custom' of allowing all the chiefs to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction whether they were hereditary or appointed.[36] Nevertheless, the number of Zululand chiefs was reduced from a 1920 peak of 100 down to 67 recognised men scheduled for government stipends in 1937 in order to give them the appearance of greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people.[37]

It is significant that, quite apart from these stipends, chiefs had new sources of income and, by the 1920s, a number of powerful Zulu chiefs no longer relied entirely on pre-colonial forms of material support. Indeed, most who

could drew money from wage labourers on the Rand or the Natal coal mines.[38] Although the accumulation and sale of cattle was an important source of wealth for some chiefs of status especially in times of economic stress, those who drew substantial stipends from the state were less dependent on pre-capitalist relations of production in the reserves than lesser chiefs and *induna* who relied on agricultural and pastoral production to maintain their wealth and status. [39]

Patriarchal status, however, did not ensure a monopoly over re-fashioned tribute collections. Both Solomon and his successor as regent, his brother Arthur Edward Mshiyeni KaDinuzulu, were at pains to prevent lesser members of the royal family and assorted impostors from drawing on cash tribute. David, Solomon's brother, eclipsed from life in the royal homestead, spent most of his time in Durban and Johannesburg claiming money as the true heir to his father Dinuzulu.[40] Similarly, Mshiyeni's half-brothers Ntontoza and Isaac supported themselves entirely from cash and cattle collections in Natal during the 1930s when Africans tended to identify with the perceived stability of the monarchy during a period of economic stress in the rural areas.[41] It was, moreover, perhaps fitting that after all of Solomon's philandering Lilian Zulu, though no relation to the royal family, should pose as his widow to collect tribute.[42] The important point here, as Shula Marks has argued, was the fact that chiefs of status could still extract cash tributes in a context where their formal

powers were apparently diminishing and they were being increasingly marginalised by the state.[43]

By the later 1930s, however, the Natal NAD no longer believed in the maintenance of a hierarchical system of chiefs in Zululand. In 1937, the CNC hoped to remedy `an anomalous state of affairs' by providing stipends to the lesser Zululand chiefs, who, unlike their Natal contemporaries, had never received money from the state and had been for `many years... languishing in the wilderness'.[44] A new schedule of stipends was drawn up, based not on hereditary status or royal affiliations, but on a more equitable graduated scale of remuneration according to the number of tax-payers in a chief's ward. The intention of the new schedule was to counteract the accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of a few chiefs of status.[45] There is, however, no direct evidence that chiefs attempted to enlarge the membership of their ward in order to take advantage of increased stipends, although they remained intent on expanding their control over land which could have had the same effect (see below).[46]

The intention of the stipends was unequivocally stated by the CNC:

> For the first time in our history Zululand Chiefs are all brought within the fold of *Government paid servants* [my emphasis]. That is a notable pledge of the goodwill of the Department, which will afford the Zulu Chiefs much satisfaction.[47]

The importance of affording chiefs material gain was not lost on the CNC. At least part of the intention of the new system was to lessen the temptations of corruption, for which Solomon had become notorious, and to put a stop to the excessive fines imposed by chiefs.[48] Indeed, the few chiefs who received substantial stipends were known for their decadent lifestyles and their inability to live within their budgets, although these were probably more effects of the payments, rather than their cause. Chief Manzolwandhle Zulu, for example, having reached the staggering weight of 326 lbs. in 1933, requested an increase in his stipend for taxi fares to attend official meetings although he owned a car.[49]

Chiefs welcomed the proposed stipends claiming that they were no longer able to support themselves on court fines or the extraction of tribute.[50] There was, moreover, an underlying tension in chiefs' reliance on the very visible and often punitive collection of fines since many were ultimately enforced for white, and not Zulu, social ends. Furthermore, some chiefs abused their judicial powers indiscriminately by exacting fines for contrived or imaginary offences. According to one magistrate, in such cases the fines `found their way into the capacious pockets of the chiefs' and people knew they were `...the victims of thinly veiled extortion'.[51]

In 1936, such excesses led the state to set limits on fines which further constrained chiefs. By proclamation No. 73 of that year, the government tried to limit chiefs' fines to

£5 for offences committed in the reserves by followers and to £2 for those committed outside them.[52] This £3 difference was probably made in an attempt to lessen the centrifugal forces caused by white land control and urban employment which were driving Africans outside the reserves further from chiefly control. By the late 1940s, in an effort to avoid association with the unpopular state some chiefs argued that commoners' fines should be paid directly to white officials.[53] Generally, however, the imposition of fines remained a financial mainstay of chiefly authority.

Unwilling to grant official recognition to the Zulu monarchy, (owing partly to Natal objections and partly to Solomon's unstable character) however, the state had recourse to what Marks has termed the `manufacture of consent'.[54] It attempted to maintain the hegemony, which their agents, the chiefs were rapidly losing, by holding its own grand *indaba* (large gathering or affair in which policies could be `discussed') to bolster chiefly authority, albeit in a racially subordinated position.

During Smit's tour of Zululand in 1935, a number of `loyal' chiefs were awarded with the (British) King's Silver Jubilee Medal in recognition of their long years of service to the state. The ancient chief Zimema Mnguni of Mtunzini, though ostensibly pleased to receive the award, questioned Smit, `Does this medal really come from the King? Does it not come from Pretoria?'[55] Zimema's enquiry revealed the distinction in Africans' minds between the Union government and their former conquerors-cum-guardians, the British

imperial government. Many Zulus grasped at reconstructed notions of Victorian `liberal' protection, still embodied, in the office of the Governor-General and the image of British monarchy. On occasion, this captured the imagination of commoners and supplanted the Zulu monarch as the defender of African interests.[56] The tensions between the opposed interests of the state and the Zulu labouring class as refracted through Solomon, and later Mshiyeni were, however, evidence of the growing divide between chiefs and commoners.

LOCAL COUNCILS AND SEGREGATION

Considering the incompatibility of limited representative councils with chiefly authoritarian structures it is not surprising that Zululand, the model region for segregationists, should have posed such a challenge to the state for the implementation of the local council system. Mooted throughout the 1920s, proposals for the implementation of local Advisory Boards under the Native Affairs Act, No. 23 of 1920, and later district and local councils under the Native Administration Act No. 38 of 1927, highlighted the tensions between Zululand chiefs and the state's desire to restructure the administrative framework of the reserves. Here, too, contradictions in the thrust of policy had the potential to undermine chiefly authority at a time when chiefs were all too aware of the threat posed by more popular radical organizations like the ICU.[57]

Part of the problem with the state's attempt to introduce councils centred on the fragmented nature of politics in Zululand. As in Pondoland, royalist chiefs and the paramount in Zululand struggled to gain official recognition of their elevated status.[58] Hereditary chiefs faced the constant threat that they would be removed, and perhaps more importantly, that their lineal rule would be truncated. They would not willingly accept a variant of local government in which popular democratic sentiment could dilute, or even undermine established chiefly authority. Moreover, chiefs were suspicious of the proposed councils since some NCs welcomed the idea of `native advisory boards' as a means of sidelining irksome chiefs into `ex officio' positions.[59] Contrary to the state's preferred policy of establishing a single central council in which all chiefs could be incorporated, the Natal administration favoured local district councils, also envisaged under the 1920 Act. This had the advantage, from Natal's point of view, of preventing any accretion of authority by Solomon.

Although Wheelwright deferred to the Pretoria segregationists by `keeping an eye on' the fledgling *Inkatha* movement with a view to incorporating it and Solomon wholesale into the administration as an advisory council, events conspired against this.[60] Solomon's drunken descent, and more importantly his financial venality, persuaded the Natal authorities to reject a general council in which his leadership `... with control over a revenue of

£35,000 a year provided by the taxation scheme would be disastrous'.[61]

Given rising rural African disaffection and the threat of the ICU, local officials had the justification they wanted to establish an adapted form of council system which would embody the convergence of interests of local white capital and the Zulu chiefs.[62] Solomon had, after all, publicly denounced the ICU, although he also distanced himself from the state by stating that he found `fault with the authorities for allowing this wickedness to go on'.[63] Along with members of Natal's conservative African intelligentsia, he appeared willing to conform to the desires of state and capital to stamp out radical politics.[64]

Natal hostility to the idea of a *de facto* Zulu paramount controlling a general council continued into the 1930s. In 1929, the recently appointed CNC, T.W.C Norton, maintained Wheelwright's objections to Solomon and a general council. Norton felt that there was a great risk of `a certain person [i.e. Solomon] gathering the reins of authority into his own hands if a general council were formed'. He argued that, contrary to Heaton Nicholls' view, Solomon would not serve as a bulwark against the spread of communism and the ICU since radicals could easily control an official `Paramount' who was so deeply embarrassed financially.[65]

In contrast, Heaton Nicholls was firmly convinced that the forces of `democratic radicalism' could best be thwarted

with the institutionalisation of a `tribal council'. As he stated with reference to the role that the regent Mshiyeni could play in such a council,

> The safety of the Government lies in the fact that the tribal council, in contradistinction to the Bunga [the Transkeian Territories General Council], consists of hereditary chiefs whose position ultimately depends upon their loyalty to the Government... whereas in the Bunga, the members are all elected and seek to strengthen their position amongst the electorate in the approved democratic style by adopting an aggressive attitude towards the Magistrates and the Government.[66]

Nevertheless, Natal pressed for limited local democratic councils in all Zululand districts in order to check the potential centralisation of power in Solomon's hands. In 1929, the NAD arranged for Solomon and other leading Zulu chiefs to travel to Umtata to see the Transkei Bunga at work.[67] Despite growing popular support for the councils among commoners, Solomon and the chiefs, as well as John Dube, celebrated Natal elder statesman, editor of *Ilanga Lase Natal* and, by then, increasingly conservative, and an ardent supporter of *Inkatha*, all rejected the concept of the Bunga's elected officials out of hand.[68]

The state, however, ensured the chiefs were under no false assumptions about their purely consultative role in the administration. In 1932, the Minister of Native Affairs, E.G. Jansen, warned chiefs in Natal and Zululand that there was no point in them putting forward propositions that they knew could not be accepted by the government since whites held an overriding interest in African affairs. He

pointedly remarked that `... this being a constitutional country after all, the final say rests with Europeans'.[69] Although the exercise of the Umtata trip was repeated in 1933, just prior to Mshiyeni's installation as regent over the Usuthu, the NAD seemed no closer to convincing Zululand chiefs or Pretoria to make way for elected officials.[70] Indeed, Mshiyeni was never to preside over a council, either at the local level in his home district of Nongoma, or at the regional level for all of Zululand. Instead, in 1937, he was appointed to an advisory position as African nominee to the powerless Natives Representative Council.[71]

Through the early 1940s, Mshiyeni maintained close ties with the Natal African intelligentsia who were developing Zulu ethnic nationalism through the newly founded Zulu Cultural Society (an off-shoot of the Natal Bantu Teachers Association and aligned with *Inkatha*'s earlier philosophy).[72] In 1937, he was encouraged by H.C. Lugg, Natal's CNC, to accept nomination as patron of the society in order to foster the `... wholesome traditions, customs and rules of etiquette' of Zulu culture.[73] Still acutely aware of the Natal hostility to Zulu aspirations for recognition of the monarchy, the society couched its activities in purely cultural terms while steadily lobbying the central government to elevate Mshiyeni's status. In a letter to the CNC, the society's secretary C.J. Mpanza, foreshadowing the resurrected *Inkatha* under chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, explained that the `...matter [Mshiyeni's role as patron] is not at all being treated as politics, but purely from a Zulu cultural point of view'.[74]

Mshiyeni was eventually elevated to the status of `Acting Paramount Chief of the Zulu'. He served in that role until 1948, when he lost a bitter and government manipulated dispute to Cyprian for the `official' succession in which the SNA intimated to royal advisers that the state was more `comfortable' with the successor who was `...a younger man, better able to serve the interests of the government'.[75]

The key tension underlying the introduction of local councils was that chiefs feared any form of democratic institution which would undermine their authority while the Natal administration and the settlers were concerned that a central council would give power to the royal family. Nevertheless, the state hoped to use chiefs and the council to implement improvement schemes in the reserves. Chiefs, however, were hostile to the programme of `progress' and development set out in the state's reserve policy which threatened to undermine their control of land.[76]

Part of Solomon's professed objection to the implementation of a council system for Zululand related to the manner in which democratic institutions highlighted the lack of formal education among chiefs.[77] Although E. Braadvedt pointed out at an official meeting that most chiefs were intelligent even if they were not educated, Solomon was thought to be `surprised that the chiefs in the Bunga could read and write and that men whom [he] so despised as so below [the Zulu] were ahead of them'. [78] Solomon could hardly have been reassured by the CNC's attempts to convince him of the virtues of a council.

> I pointed out that when the [Bunga] began it was among the Fingoes who were then as ignorant and conservative as the Zulus are now and I attempted to appeal to his pride of race by suggesting that he would not like to see the Zulus linger so far behind the Cape Natives.[79]

Thus, the state repeatedly tried to play upon perceived, created or real ethnic divisions when governing through the chiefs, believing that this would not only appeal to the Zulu, but facilitate the implementation of reserve policy.[80] As Beinart has argued, chieftaincy provided the final piece of a complex jigsaw of social control which provided the means for bolstering rural attachments and ethnic identities.[81]

ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS AND LEGAL JURISDICTION

Chiefly administration was fine tuned under the Native Affairs Act of 1920 and the Native Administration Act, No. 38 of 1927. This legislation, along with the Native Affairs Amendment Acts (No. 27 of 1926 and No. 15 of 1927), gave clear definition to the segregationist ideal by dividing white and African political and cultural systems.[82] Ironically, the application of this legislative dualism to Zululand eroded the real and symbolic continuities of chiefly authority. There were inherent contradictions in a policy which attempted to establish the supposedly firm pre-colonial discipline in a white-dominated administration. Chiefs now derived their power from the white state and yet were expected to maintain hegemony and legitimacy in African society of their own accord.

Although all Zulu chiefs had the power to try both civil and criminal cases, most crimes of a serious nature, such as stock theft, murder and `faction fights, those involving family relations, such as seduction and adultery, and all crimes involving whites were controlled by the NAD.[83] By contrast, in Natal, proper, only about half -114 of 208- of the chiefs had both civil and criminal jurisdiction. At least one Natal chief hoped chiefs outside Zululand would be granted the same powers since they faced the same challenges to authority.[84]

The state enhanced chiefs' jurisdiction under Government Notice 73 of 1936 in order to cope with the crumbling fabric of patriarchal society. Chiefs were given the power to try a wider range of offences relating to the perceived problems of an unravelling society and threats to the maintenance of the homestead economy including contempt of chiefs and their courts; seduction; abduction of females; adultery; harbouring females from fathers and the improper behaviour of females by wandering or leading an immoral life. As Marks has argued, capital, the state and Zulu patriarchs had a stake in maintaining control over women in the countryside, especially during the 1930s when depression accelerated the movement of independent unmarried women to towns.[85]

Officials still considered women to be the cornerstone of rural agricultural production needed to subsidize the maintenance of migrant labour. They believed chiefly control of women would ensure the return of young men to

the reserve. The designation of women as legal minors under the revised Natal Code of Native Law had the desired effect. One young Zulu teacher, an example of a small but growing number of wage earning women in the 1930s, who had saved £45, complained there was little point in struggling to work outside the homestead since her earnings would be lost to her as she was a legal minor. `It does not belong to me really. If I do not spend it my father will take the lot, or otherwise my [future] husband will later on.' Both her chief and the NC advised her that the money belonged to her `guardian' and she gave it over to her fiance so he could purchase *lobola* cattle for their marriage.[86]

CHIEFS AND RECRUITMENT FOR THE WAR

Chiefs used recruitment drives for African soldiers during the 1940s to attempt to bolster their control over the male labour of Zululand. When the NAD introduced country-wide recruitment campaigns for Africans to enlist in 1940, Mshiyeni demonstrated his `allegiance' to the state by requesting that officials call on Zulu chiefs to fill the ranks of the Native Military Police contingent with their followers.[87]

Chiefs, however, were disappointed in the recruitment meetings which were attended predominantly by women, children, and a few elderly unemployed men. Moreover, they were nervous about losing both prestige and the opportunity to command their young male followers. Zululand chiefs requested that they be empowered by the Government to

`order' and `force' their men out to enlist for the army in accordance with the pre-colonial custom of the kings.[88] Natal's CNC, Lugg, supported the request arguing:

> Our Zulus do not understand such tame methods [as voluntary recruitment] in times of crisis as they do not fit with the Zulu psychology, whereas an order to serve certainly does. [A further advantage Lugg claimed was that] ...The responsibility would be upon the Chiefs and not upon the Government, and would be in keeping with their own recognised custom.[89]

Nevertheless, the Minister of Native Affairs agreed, in principle, to the chiefs' request but no powers of arrest were granted, largely to ensure that enlistment proceeded with a degree of popular consent.[90]

Despite Mshiyeni's claims that, contrary to police reports and the low number of Zulu enlisting particularly from Zululand, all the Zulu were firm in their loyalty to `...the Government and the British Commonwealth' and were willing, as he was, `...to lay down their lives in helping fight against the Germans' the state maintained pressure on him.[91] Officials made veiled threats to him to fulfil the Government's demands for recruits. The NC at Nongoma, anxious that the Zulu not lose an opportunity for national recognition, cautioned Mshiyeni that `We must not waste time otherwise the requirements will be filled from elsewhere'. Similarly, Lugg told him that if his people did not come forward in appreciable numbers, the gap in manpower would have to be filled from `beyond Natal'.[92] Thus, he implied that the Mpondo, so often held up for derisory comparison with the Zulu, would be given the police powers and glory that Mshiyeni desired for the Zulu.

At recruitment meetings, however, many men in the crowds, such as Willie Zulu of the Eshowe mission station and acting chief Silwanetshe Ndhlovu, protested that they were cowards and would not fight without guns against aeroplanes. They claimed they were prepared instead to purchase the weapons of war for cash.[93] Not surprisingly, conservative chiefs considerably tempered their support for recruitment at public meetings. As the NC at Eshowe reported, `Not a single [hereditary] Chief spoke. They hung their heads and never uttered a word [in favour of recruitment]'.[94] In Nkandhla, young men, no doubt aware of the hollow rhetoric of comparison with other ethnic groups, sardonically argued that the government had failed to educate the Zulu and that they were `...ignorant and unfitted to perform work undertaken by other tribes'. If Mshiyeni and the chiefs desired to enlist, they challenged, `they had better do so and leave them alone'.[95]

Chief Mshiyeni, under considerable pressure from the state to provide recruits commensurate with the status he claimed, and suffering the debilitating effects of severe diabetes, was forced into an invidious position. Exhibiting all the ambiguity associated with the Zulu kings, Mshiyeni appealed to commoners in a lengthy article in Dube's newspaper *Ilanga*. He offered those who joined his *Impumalanga* (rising sun) regiment special training in the use of `Big guns, war tanks, armoured vehicles, rifles and motorcycles'.[96] He had, no doubt, attempted to capture the popular imagination with the symbols of military dominance

which had `enthralled audiences' in Pondoland in the 1920s.[97] Moreover, Mshiyeni attempted to link voluntary army service with land, an issue central to Africans in the reserves. He admonished the Zulu that `You can never hope to possess land if you continue to remain cowards.'[98]

On the one hand, Mshiyeni's appeal was strongly condemned by army officials who would not countenance providing African soldiers with arms and for his allowing the `arch agitator of the Union' and former ICU leader, Champion to attend a recruitment drive in Eshowe.[99] On the other hand, Mshiyeni, like Solomon, was rejected by most of the rural rank-and-file, though he still maintained some popularity among Durban workers.[100] Millenarian rumours abounded that Mshiyeni's father, Dinuzulu, was not dead, that a pig had been placed in his coffin, and he had been secreted away by the Germans to later return and oppose white South Africa.[101]

Yet Mshiyeni and other chiefs derived special benefits and material gains from their association with the state's recruitment drive. Colonel E. Stubbs, the Director of Non-European Army Services, complained that Mshiyeni was `...either unable or unwilling to fulfil his grandiloquent promises' of providing `even hundreds let alone thousands of men' despite having been lavishly entertained by the Defence Department and a special military band sent through Nongoma at his request.[102] By 1941, a number of other conservative Zulu chiefs, including prominent members of the Usuthu and Mandhlakazi, applied to the government to

join the ranks of official recruiters. On the basis of their supposed `influence' among the Zulu, Mciteki Zulu and Matole Buthelezi were appointed as recruiters with salaries of £10 a month each in addition to their annual stipends, and were issued uniforms and vouchers for travelling expenses.[103] In November of 1941 alone, Mshiyeni managed to accrue over £31 in expenses and ensured that four of his personal retainers received food, uniforms, and small salaries while attending him at the Eshowe recruiting camp.[104]

Mshiyeni's prestige steadily ebbed through 1942 as he failed to turn out the desired number of recruits from Zululand. Mshiyeni's failed efforts had the effect of reversing some defence force staff opinions of Zulu martial prowess. Thus, after a tour of recruitment centres in 1942, Staff Sergeant R. E. Symons commented that the Natal districts near the lower Drakensberg Mountains

> ...contain quite a number of Natives with basuto [sic] blood in their veins, and being practically outside Mshiyeni's sphere of influence, should prove a good field for recruiting.[105]

Finally, in 1944, Mshiyeni himself expressed fears that a `great opportunity for the Zulu to take their rightful place of glory in the Union' had been lost because of poor recruitment. Privately, however, he confided that, with a drought and famine threatening, it was perhaps not the ideal time to press his people to give up their young men to the war effort.[106]

CHIEFS, RADICAL POLITICS AND THE LAND

The most important issue shaping chiefly authority in twentieth century Zululand was control of land. As Bradford has argued, the success of the ICU in northern Natal was due, largely, to the inability of chiefs on white-owned farms to provide land. `Even Solomon... was defied on a massive scale [and] traditional leaders were being deserted for new men promising farms for the price of a ticket [i.e. membership in the ICU]'.[107] The apportionment of land in the reserves, held under communal tenure for Africans under the 1913 Natives Land Act and the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act, was the only means by which chiefs could ensure loyalty, and therefore control over the productive capacities of the people.[108] In order to maintain their hegemony, within the reserves at least, chiefs favoured loyal followers in allocating land while independent-minded peasants were at a disadvantage. Archdeacon Lee believed that agricultural progress was undermined in Zululand since

> Wherever you find a progressive native who settles down to farm his lands adequately, and gets good crops, you will always find the local native chief will put two or three people around the boundary of this land and they will filch away the land from him...Obviously the thing is for the strong man to drive this man away from the land and to give the chief possession of it.[109]

Similarly, Rev. Oscroft complained that Solomon placed loyal followers all around the ZNTI in order to hem in the cultivated land.[110] In 1935, chief Mshiyeni, despite his missionary-influenced education, objected to proposals for a mission hospital at the ZNTI site, claiming that the

missionaries used aggressive tactics to extend their farming plots and he wanted his gardens back.[111]

The advent of cash-crop farming, whether by whites or Africans, challenged chiefly control over communal land holdings. For chiefs, `progressive' African homesteads meant the development of commercial peasant production, with the profit motive driving people to expand the area under cultivation.[112] This had also been their experience with white farmers in the cane belt along the coast and on the western fringes of Zululand. Large tracts of land alienated by whites left less for distribution to Africans for subsistence purposes. The wave of `progressive' farming by *kholwa* which found support in the state's `betterment' policies in the 1930s threatened to alienate further areas of the reserve from communal occupation, and thus, chiefly authority.

The expulsion of Africans from white-owned farm land also posed a series of challenges to chiefly authority. Population congestion in the reserves rose steadily during the 1920s and 1930s as natural increase combined with a flood of refugees from northern Natal farms.[113] Congestion heightened tensions between competing factions as chiefs attempted to accommodate more people. Although chief Mgixo of Nongoma conceded that he might eventually have to refuse refugees the right to reside in his ward, he felt he was bound to help them as `... after all, we are of them and they are of us...'.[114] Moreover, in some circumstances, it was to the advantage of chiefs to enhance their power by

providing people with land to encourage their loyalty and extend their area of influence and the potential for tribute. Despite attempts by the NAD to wrest control of land apportionment away from chiefs and *induna*, in the late 1940s, Natal's CNC, R.P. Campbell, noted that many aggressive chiefs still placed followers in land disputed by other chiefs; the resulting `faction fights' caused considerable bloodshed and strife.[115]

During periods of social dislocation and economic stress the accommodation of `surplus' people proved a great challenge to chiefs. Faction fights over land were reported to be more intense and numerous during the drought and malaria epidemic of the early 1930s.[116] In 1932, for example, chief Siduna of Eshowe complained to the local NC that armed conflict between his followers and those of a rival chief, Zalaba, over land was a result of Zalaba's ejecting new African settlers and encouraging them to settle in Siduna's crowded ward. In his defence, Zalaba protested that there was no more `fever free' or habitable land in his ward.[117] Moreover, refugees from white-owned farms, radicalised by their bitter experiences, added to discontent in the reserves and, in turn, challenged the chiefs for land reform. And, as the Zulu nationalist politician M.L. Maling noted: `The cry of the evicted tenants was taken up by the Natives who had not been on farms, and in that way the wave of discontent spread.'[118]

With the aid of African political leadership, popular resistance to chiefly control of land did, on occasion,

expose the self-aggrandizing tendencies of chiefs in relation to the land. Although, as suggested above, chiefs did not countenance commercial production among reserve dwellers, when pressured by the state and white farmers, they were not above ensuring their own material benefits from land expropriations. When white sugar farming expanded during the 1920s the Zululand Sugar Milling Company at Empangeni persuaded chief Mncinzeni Cebekhulu to accept a marginally larger area of low-lying, drought prone and tsetse-infested land, already abandoned by white settlers, in exchange for his clan's fertile land adjacent to a stream.[119] Mncinzeni and his *induna* moved into the farm houses left by whites while pressing the NAD for more land for his people.[120] The Chief and *induna* received £126 and between £40 and £60 respectively as a cash compensation for the huts and garden land vacated; however, the rank-and-file refused to recognize the exchange or accept any money.[121]

In 1925, the exchange of land at Empangeni came to the attention of Petros Lamula and Josiah Gumede, the new `radical' leader of the Natal Native Congress who had ousted John Dube as president.[122] In the second half of the 1920s, as the ICU spread into rural Natal under the leadership of A.P. Maduna, mission-educated Lamula, who had founded the United and Independent Zulu National Church of Christ, paved the way for Maduna's ICU in Zululand by publicly drawing attention to repression in the countryside.[123] By 1927, his millenarian message and protests over cattle-dipping and landlessness coincided

with the founding of fledgling ICU branches in southern Zululand.[124]

Lamula levelled a series of criticisms at Mncinzeni in particular, and the Zululand chiefs in general, concerning the alienation of the people's land and warned the chiefs of the rising tide of disaffection among migrant workers in Durban who still claimed a stake in the Zululand reserves.[125] Lamula and Gumede then proposed a meeting with Mncinzeni, who, hoping to assuage his people, did not refuse the offer and he joined his followers at the Norwegian Mission station at Empangeni to discuss the issue.[126] At the gathering Lamula called for African unity over the land issue and Gumede attacked the other district chiefs for refusing to attend. Gumede went on to speak of the changing political circumstances in South Africa and the broken promises of Queen Victoria and the English Natalians.

> This does not speak well of the English... When the last election took place we were all afraid of General Hertzog [the newly elected Prime Minister and leader of the Afrikaner National Party] We thought that many things would happen, and that the Government would be much harder on the Natives. I was surprised to find that the SAP [The English-dominated South African Party whose leading Natal parliamentarian was Heaton Nicholls], the Englishmen, are responsible for the taking of this fertile land... Now my friends let us make friends with the Dutch [the Afrikaners]. Always side with the King that rules.[127]

In November 1925, not long after this meeting, an unspecified number of Mncinzeni's followers left the new location and returned to re-occupy their old sites on land the milling company had not yet cultivated. The squatters

then struggled to re-establish themselves as cane crops hemmed them in and local officials harried them for taxes and dipping fees. Finally, in 1932 at the height of the drought, pressured by the milling company, the chief and the NAD, the recalcitrant homesteaders accepted the meagre compensation offered and removed to the new location.[128] Nowhere in the records of this exchange is there any evidence to suggest that Mncinzeni seriously considered aligning himself with his followers or the nationalist African politicians against the dominant forces of state and capital.

As has been argued above, the ICU faced formidable obstacles in Zululand from the rural aristocracy and the state which both had an interest in suppressing threatening political forces. Chiefs, sugar planters, and local officials moved quickly to condemn and break down any support for the ICU in the reserves. Solomon's public denunciation of the ICU combined with white repression and beatings of African farm workers and state proscription of ICU leaders effectively snuffed out the ICU in the reserves by the end of the 1920s. It had, in any case, internal reasons for its demise by then.[129]

CHIEFS VS HEADMEN

An important part of the transforming Zulu political culture was the interposition of *induna* in the new administration.[130] Beginning in the 1920s, the Natal NAD exacerbated the growing trend in administrative `leap-

frogging' and shifting alliances in Zululand by enhancing the powers of *induna*. NCs, hostile towards aristocratic chiefly authority, often circumvented chiefs altogether by using *induna*. Just as chiefs often appealed beyond local officials to the higher authority of the Secretary of Native Affairs, or even the exalted, though ultimately hollow, authority of imperial officials, commoners and *induna* disregarded chiefs and appealed to local officials.[131] As Wilfred Ngobese, a `native constable' and `unofficial' *induna* (see below) who worked to undermine the authority of the appointed chief Isaac Molife in Nquthu, stated, `How can we "hlonipa" [custom of showing respect and deference to `tribal leaders'] the chiefs if they do not "hlonipa" the Native Commissioners?'[132]

In 1925 there were only seven *induna*, mostly loyal to their chiefs, in Zululand with the authority to try civil and criminal cases. By 1936, however, local officials relied heavily on these petty officials and most chiefs' wards had at least two or three officially `recognised' *induna* who could try cases.[133] In the ensuing struggle between local officials and chiefs for control of *induna* as intermediaries between the administration and the people, the forces of state power and social change tipped the balance in favour of the *induna*.[134] *Induna* could challenge chiefly authority in a variety of ways. A chief who accepted government policy uncritically left room for an *induna* to gain popular support. A chief's absence from the district and his neglect of popular interests also bred contempt for him in the eyes of followers. Moreover, the

more people and the greater the process of individualisation in a chief's ward, the more susceptible he was to the ursurpation of his authority by an independent *induna*.

While the larger political forces at work in Zululand focussed attention on the role of chiefs and the royal family, behind the scenes *induna* went about the business of local administration. Often their contradictory relations with local officials had far greater impact on the day-to-day lives of Africans than the more sweeping, bolder gestures of nationalist-minded African political leaders. Inevitably, after the tumult of a grand *indaba*, after the land deals were done, and after pledges and largely empty promises were made by chiefs, kings, and white officials, it was the *induna* who had to contend with people on the ground, to move them and apportion land, to collect tax, and often, though not coincidentally, secure for themselves an improved footing in the political economy.

During the drought and depression of the 1930s, increasing numbers of `aristocratic' chiefs set off for the urban areas and the Rand mines to augment their incomes through `tribal' subscriptions. Chief Matole Buthelezi of Mahlabatini, for example, was absent on `tribal collection tours' in the Melmoth wattle plantations and Dundee coal mines for over four months a year between 1931 and 1934.[135] Such was the extent of these extended collection tours and the disruption they caused to the work-place that the South African Chamber of Mines called on the NAD to cease issuing

chiefs with outward passes to the Rand.[136] That the Depression made African employment in urban areas all the more tenuous during this period no doubt ensured that migrant workers continued to contribute money as a form of insurance for a place in the reserves. For the majority of Africans in the reserves, however, the vacuum of local leadership and control caused by chiefs' neglect was often filled by enterprising *induna*.

By 1935, some NCs, such as E. Braatvedt of Nongoma, railed against the repeated absences of the chiefs. Probably responding to the *de facto* role that many *induna* had assumed, he recommended that various *induna* and `tribal deputies' be entitled to charge for the `chiefly services' such as land allocation that they performed, albeit at lower rates than chiefs.[137] With the advent of administrative reform under a proclamation in 1936, which threatened to further entrench chiefly control of communally held land, local officials advocated doing away chiefs altogether. They recommended replacing chiefs with paid `headmen' who, they hoped, would be more responsive to administrative demands and, because of their education, better able to cope with the increasingly complex nature of rural politics.[138]

Mission-educated *induna*, whether acting in an official capacity, or simply exploiting new niches in the political economy as unofficial *induna* or *abanumzana* (household-heads, some of which owed their position as important community leaders to heredity and seniority. see below),

played a crucial role in re-configuring reserve communities. As la Hausse has shown, in some instances, aspiring leaders combined their literacy with a grasp of popular culture and consciousness to exploit commoners for cash and cattle.[139] However, these same skills also proved invaluable to local officials. A certain command of English and a tacit acceptance of state policy in the reserves allowed some *kholwa induna* to appear `with the confidence of an individual well-versed in the ways of the coloniser' and act as mediators of, if not outright propagandists for chiefly authority.[140]

As chiefs were discredited in the eyes of commoners for their less ambiguous embrace of powers derived from the white state, many *induna* increasingly represented the interests of commoners and manoeuvred in the interstices of divided loyalties.[141] *Induna* were responsible for the day-to-day implementation of NAD policy in the reserves. They were seen at the dipping tanks, the magistracy, and as constables at local jails. They were, moreover, faction leaders at beer drinks, weddings, and inevitably at the forefront of agitation for expanded territory or protests against reserve regulations and laws, often without the knowledge of their chiefs.[142] *Induna* were not simply a homogeneous strata of lesser `tribal officials'. There were those who gained official recognition through allegiance to chiefs, and others who achieved popular support, for a time, by opposing the ruling elite. Among this group, moreover, were many unfulfilled heirs to chieftaincy and

others who aspired to chieftaincy through alliance with the local native commissioners.

Through the later 1920s and early 1930s, the affairs of the Usuthu in Nongoma were handled mostly by Gilbert Zulu, uncle to Mshiyeni and adviser to Solomon. Solomon, who tried only three civil cases in Nongoma between 1930 and 1932, frustrated the administration of the NC, E.N. Braadvedt, with a decadent lifestyle and long absences from home.[143] In 1932, he sought a remedy to Solomon's dereliction by conferring the power to try civil cases on Gilbert and two other prominent *induna*. Solomon's neglect of local affairs while he sought financial support outside the reserves proved troublesome for his successor.[144] Gilbert rose in power and prominence during the 1930s to the point where Mshiyeni was forced to strike back. Aware of the NC's antagonism, and that the NAD was unlikely to remove an efficient and important official *induna* from office, Mshiyeni resorted to accepted Zulu custom by `smelling out' Gilbert and his accomplice, Madwanguluka Shandu, as *abathakati* (witches).[145] Both men were eventually driven from the district, not by the force of the state, but by a social mechanism still regulated by chiefly authority.[146]

Other Zululand chiefs could no longer command such control over custom. In the southern districts, where the forces of individualisation were strongest, alliances between the new *induna* and the native commissioners often completely undermined the chiefs.[147] In Nquthu for example, chief

Molife, son of the appointed chief Hlubi, ran foul of local officials for resistance to soil reclamation and `betterment' schemes (see below chapter on `Betterment'). Despite considerable support from the NAD in Pretoria, Molife was eventually suspended as chief, possibly for perpetuating the popular myth that he had forced the removal of NC, F.W. Ahrens, because he disregarded chiefly authority.[148] Although Molife's opposition to reserve policy no doubt played a part in his replacement by a *kholwa induna*, Madola Miya, a clan elder and staunch supporter of Molife, pointed to other factors:

> Why has the tribe not been informed about its chief? Why has Macalini [i.e. Wellington Buthelezi -the induna selected by the NC] -merely because he owns a butchery- been selected? ...we have all along been hearing that Macalini has aspirations to the position. There is no cessation of meat which is conveyed to the Native Commissioner. Sheep too are driven to him for slaughter.[149]

Although there is no evidence to support Madola's claim, his criticism pointed to an underlying tension between *kholwa induna* and commoners over the accumulation of wealth through the sale of livestock which local officials often facilitated.[150] By the 1930s, one feature of commoner impoverishment which stood in stark contrast to the few wealthier *induna* with large numbers of sheep or cattle, was the control of too few or no livestock to support a family.

There is, moreover, evidence of a maverick group of *induna* who aspired to be leaders by rejecting official sanction from chiefs and the state, preferring to seek their legitimacy in popular support or hereditary status.[151] Throughout the 1920s and into the 1940s chiefs appealed to

local officials for support in subordinating these `unofficial' *induna* (more accurately *umnumzana*, a respected man of standing; community leader with high kinship status)[152] who usurped court duties, collected fines and fees for land allocation, recruited labour for the mines and claimed their position through hereditary status. Chief Bhokwe of the Mandlakazi in Nongoma, described by an official as `...weak, clouded by alcohol, and under the advisement of wholly unsavoury characters who [were] siphoning off the people's cattle for the king', claimed he was falling deep into debt since two powerful *abanumzana* were usurping his right to try civil cases and keeping the fines for themselves.[153] The fact that the NAD cut Bhokwe's stipend from £300 to £175 for failing to follow official orders may also have been a factor in his claimed impecuniosity.

Chiefs and local officials alike were largely powerless to control these men in areas where they enjoyed popular support.[154] Mdumeli, a leading *umnumzana* in chief Biyela Zalaba's ward in Eshowe, refused to attend meetings or carry out the chief's orders and organised `faction fights' at weddings to test the resolve and powers of the appointed chief.[155] An unsuccessful hereditary claimant to the chieftancy of the Biyela ward, Mdumeli had no official recognition or support from the chief. Although he had acted as regent during Zalaba's minority and had some hereditary claim to leadership, Mdumeli was pushed aside when the `rightful heir' (i.e. a man who had some claim to status and, more importantly, was acceptable to the NAD)

Zalaba, came of age. Mdumeli aggressively rallied his commoner supporters to press land claims against neighbouring chiefs with whom Zalaba had made peace. One such chief, Lukulwini Biyela, complained bitterly of Mdumeli's tactics and called on the NC to remove him from the area:

> In such circumstances in the old days, the unsuccessful claimant to a chieftanship was slain. There could be no peace otherwise. Now-a-days a man is killed by being moved where he cannot do harm.[156]

Although Mdumeli was relocated to a ward in Hlabisa, his agitation for land on behalf of impoverished commoners set a precedent for following community leaders.[157]

By the later 1930s, strife mounted between competing factions in the Biyela ward under the newly appointed chief Mhlakaza. The chief's principal *induna*, Mlomonka Sibaya, an NAD constable, wielded considerable official power. He did not, however, have the support of the ward *abanumzana*.[158] At a meeting held to discuss increased violence and `faction fights' eighteen men appeared claiming status as ward leaders, but only ten were officially recognised headmen, and of those the NC, J.P. Rawlinson, considered seven as only `minor *induna*'.[159] Rawlinson complained that too many `unofficial' leaders were vying for power and that `These men [whose fathers were men of standing prior to colonial rule] are under the impression that the post of *Induna* is hereditary.'[160] The *abanumzana* of competing factions, without control of land, persisted in instigating fights at weddings and beer drinks in order to press their

claims for land. Moreover, they did not render any assistance to the official *induna* in tax collections or ward administration. Mshokobezi Makoba, of one dissenting faction, was able to rally over one hundred families behind him to press claims to land and status by invoking a millenarian message based on the Bambatha rebellion and land restoration. It was only through him that the taxes of this group could be collected or that their civil disputes could be settled in a court.[161]

While, officially, *induna* existed only in terms of a fixed ward as defined by a chief, clearly landless men like Makoba were able to maintain popular support and, to some extent, social control over families who lived on land ruled by recognised *induna*. Through the later 1930s and 1940s, local officials struggled in vain to restrain the *abanumzana*. The NCs of Nquthu and Mtunzini repeatedly called on `unofficial' leaders to cease trying civil and petty criminal cases and occasionally charged these men with extortion.[162] Owing to the `...plethora of unofficial *Induna* confusing administrative matters' the NC at Eshowe stressed to his chiefs and their followers that official duties should only be carried out by government appointed *induna* who controlled a fixed sub-ward so that `If a disturbance takes place I will then know on whom to fix the blame.'[163]

By the 1930s, many Zululand chiefs were no longer powerful or `affluent' in the customary pre-colonial sense, but were rather a heavily indebted class of paid civil servants.[164]

Indeed, if a wealthier peasant class was to be found in Zululand, it was not so much among the chiefs who relied on cash stipends and collections of money from migrant workers, but among the mission-educated *induna*.[165]

In general, chiefs were unlikely to undertake cash-crop production on land they held in trust for the people (the most important remaining customary function of chiefs in modern Zululand). `Progressive' official *induna*, however, took advantage of their localised control of land to do so.[166] As Mesach Mkize, an Eshowe school teacher, suggested, `The tribal social organization [embodied in the chiefs] is opposed to a progressive being given more land' for extending cultivation.[167] *Induna*, who survived on more limited remunerations than chiefs, tended to invest their cash surpluses and, in many cases, practical farming knowledge learned on mission reserves or white-owned farms, in cultivating for the market in the reserves where land was more abundant. Dhlumbi Mthetwa, a former *induna* and police pensioner, controlled over 200 acres of land and put his money into maize production for local white sugar farmers in Mtunzini.[168] Similarly, two Nongoma *induna*, Timoti Khumalo (who owned a car) and Mkwintye Mthetwa learned farming skills on white farms in Vryheid, and produced 80 and 200 bags of mealies for sale respectively.[169]

By the end of the 1940s, chiefs in Zululand relied on externally derived support from the state both for their material well being and their political status. Their

ability, to maintain a certain amount of popular support rested largely on their continued control of diminishing communal land in the reserves and their attempts to capture the popular imagination with re-invented Zulu nationalism. Chiefly authority did not however, remain un-contested in the 1930s and 1940s. On the one hand, `radical' African political organisations like the ICU and popular reserve leaders like the *abanumzana* threatened the chiefs' hold over popular mobilisation. On the other, hand a new class of educated but largely frustrated *induna* undermined chiefs and insinuated themselves between the people and the state. As will be argued in the chapters below, however, it was only through an alliance with segregationists and the forces of state and capital that Zulu chiefs secured their control of the reserve political economy, although, for a brief time they did support popular opposition to the state during the 1940s.

[1] See for example, Gluckman, `Analysis' p. 22; Bradford, *A Taste*, pp. 95-97 and Cope, `Royal Family' p. 242. This view is often derived as much from the historical myths surrounding `tradition' as from an examination of chiefly responses to the modern context.

[2] This term is more thoroughly explored in J. Jingoes, *A Chief is a Chief by the People: the Autobiography of Stimela Jason Jingoes* (London, 1975), chp. 7 and D. Reader, *Zulu Tribe in Transition: The Makhanya of Southern Natal* (Manchester, 1966), pp. 254-256.

[3] I prefer the Zulu term, however, it should not be mistaken for the pre-colonial office in the Zulu kingdom. For a full discussion of the role of the *induna* see Reader, *Zulu Tribe*, pp.243-245 and 266-270. For the pre-colonial functions of the *izinduna* see E. Krige, *The Social System of the Zulus* (Pietermaritzburg, 1950) pp. 37-38, 218-220.

[4] For an important de-construction of the terms and concepts surrounding the reconstruction of `tradition' in modern Africa see Ranger, `The Invention' pp. 211-262 and Skalnik and Boonzaier, `Tribe as Colonial Category', pp. 68-78.

[5] Beinart, *Pondoland*, p. 94.

[6] See Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 142-143.

[7] See Cope, `Royal Family', la Hausse, `Ethnicity' and Bradford, *A Taste*. Cope and la Hausse's theses follow on from the seminal work by Shula Marks, `Natal, The Zulu Royal Family and the Ideology of Segregation', JSAS Vol. 4, No. 2, 1978, pp.172-194 and her *Ambiguities*.

[8] For the rise of the ICU from its origins in Cape Town to its spread in rural Natal see C. Kadalie, *My Life and the ICU* (London, 1970), P. Wickens, *The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa* (Cape Town, 1978). For the ICU in Zululand see CNC 108A, N1/15/6, 942 and especially la Hausse,`Ethnicity', pp. 184-198 and Bradford, *A Taste*, pp. 84-91, 101-112. See also F. Rodseth's, (Superintendant of Native Reserves in Zululand), autobiography, *Ndabazabantu*: The Life of a Native Affairs Administrator (Johannesburg, 1984).

[9] Maling's movement was formed in 1926 in the northern Natal districts adjoining Zululand as an alliance between chiefs and the *kholwa* elite whis petitioned the state for more land. See NTS 280, 227/53 petition of `Zululand' chiefs, 1 Sept. 1927. la Hausse, `Ethnicity' pp. 240-242, and Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 249-251.

[10] See Bradford, *A Taste*, pp. 88-104 and maps on pp. 7 and 14.

[11] Cope, `Royal Family', p. 259.

[12] For the the development of *Inkatha* see Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 160-162. The organisation takes its name from the *Inkatha*: a tightly bound grass coil, symbolic of royal power.

[13] See for example the evidence of Oscroft before the South African Native Economic Commission (NEC), p. 1633. I have used a microfilm copy of the evidence at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, which was supplied by the University of Capetown. All page numbers refer to this microfilm which is, unfortunately, incomplete. See also Cope, `Royal Family, p. 242.

[14] See Bradford, *A Taste*, p.95 and E. Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism - Facism - Populism* (London, 1979) p. 156-57. Cope has also reduced the divisions of chiefly alignment in Zululand to those who supported the Government and those who supported the Royal House. See Cope, `Royal Family' p. 65.

[15] George Heaton Nicholls was an influential Zululand sugar farmer with a long history of colonial service who became M.P. for Zululand in 1920 and played a crucial role in Natal Zululand politics representing the sugar lobby and parliamentary segregationsists. See Marks, *Ambiguities*, p. 132, fn. No. 18 and Nicholls autobiography, *South Africa in My Time* (London, 1961).

[16] CNC 40A N10/1/2 (X), list of chiefs for Zululand reserves, 1917. In Basutoland there were `hundreds' of royal family members posing as `sons' of the paramount, Moshweshwe. See below ch. on cattle.

[17] For the background to the *ZNTI* and the influence of the Anglican Church of the Province of South Africa in its formation see Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 120-126, 141-143.

[18] The CPSA hoped to fill the vacuum left by the absence of Harriette Colenso, daughter of the Bishop of Natal and member of a family with a long history of involvement with the Zulu royal family. See Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 124-126. For the Colenso family see J. Guy, *The Heretic: A Study of the Life of John William Colenso, 1814-1883* (Johannesburg, 1983) and for Harriette Colenso see Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp. 18, 24-25, 66.

[19] For the origins of mission societies in Zululand see N. Etherington, *Preachers, Peasants and Politics in Southeast Africa, 1835-1880: African Christian Communities in Natal, Pondoland and Zululand* (London 1978), chp. 4 and la Hausse, `Ethnicity' pp. 6-12. For the Anglican CPSA in Zululand see for example USPG, Copies of letters received from the Zululand Diocese of the Anglican Church, (CLR) Vol 144

1906-1928, USPG, E-series, Reports of the Bishop of Zululand, 1919-1930, A. Lee, *Charles Johnson of Zululand* (London, 1930), and *Once Dark Country Recollections and Reflections of a South African Bishop* (London, 1949).

[20] Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 126-127.

[21] See CNC 92A, N1/9/3 (X), letter from the Rev. S. Similane, a prominent *Inkatha* leader to CNC, 31 March 1931 and NEC, evidence of Solomon, pp. 6555-56. It is not clear that the development of progressive farming was entirely Solomon's idea. Simelane, Solomon's chief adviser was a product of mission-education in Amanzimtoti and instrumental in developing the *Inkatha* collections in the 1920s. For details of his life see la Hausse, `Ethnicity', pp. 96, 122, 123.

[22] NEC, evidence of Solomon, pp. 6557 and 6559.

[23] NEC, translation of a letter from the pupils of the ZNTI to the SNA, 2 May 1930 following the evidence of C. Adams, p. 1683.

[24] Much of this dynamic has been explored in the fascinating work of John and Jean Comaroff. See their `Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa', *AE*, Vol. 13 No.1, 1986, pp. 1-22 and *Of Revelation and Revolution. Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa*, Vol. 1 (Chicago, 1991) pp. 5-15, 102-122. See also P. Rigby, `Pastors and Pastoralists: The Differential Penetration of Christianity Among East African Cattle Herders', *Journal of Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 23, 1981, pp. 96-129.

[25] CNC 100A, N1/1/2 (X) 73/25, report of on education of chiefs sons, Natal and Zululand, 1939.

[26] See CNC 108a, N1/15/5 94/9, comments of D. Smit, NCs' conference, 18 Nov. 1936, p. 2-3.

[27] Ibid, p. 5. Smit was referring to new education policy in Tanganyika.

[28] See U.G. 41-'37, *Report of the NAD for 1935-36*, pp. 51-52.

[29] R.W. Thornton, the Director of Native Agriculture for the NAD felt Solomon maintained an `undue influence' over the pupils by inviting them to his kraal at Mahashini. See NTS 10150, 22/419, Thornton's report on Zululand, 1929, pp. 8-10. For Thornton's role in Zululand see below chps. on agriculture and `betterment'.

[30] Report of the SEPC, p. 65.

[31] See Marks, *Ambiguities*, p. 33

[32] See Marks, *Ambiguities*, p. 19, Cope, `Royal Family', p. 120-125. For Molife see below, chp on betterment and for the reduction of Bhokwe's stipend see CNC 73A, N1/1/3/3 (32) 3, SNA to CNC, 5 Dec. 1933.

[33] CNC 85A N1/1/3 (X), CNC to SNA, 23 Sept. 1933.

[34] See CNC 76A N1/1/3 (X), NC's replies to CNC's circular on chiefs and pay, 31 March, 6 April, 11 April and 14 April, 1925.

[35] Ibid, SNA, J.S. Allison, to CNC, 14 Nov. 1927.

[36] Ibid, CNC to SNA, 4 Dec. 1927.

[37] CNC 85A N1/1/3 (9), list of chiefs scheduled for stipends, 8 Oct. 1937. The amalgamation issue continued to present problems for Zululand into the 1950s. See Major M.L. Liefeldt, Natal's CNC in the 1950s, evidence before the Commission on the Socio-Economic Development of the Native Areas within the Union of South Africa (Tomlinson), SAB, K-20, Tomlinson, 1952, evidence, Vol. 30, p. 1838.

[38] See for example 1/NQU, 1/1/5/30, 3/4/2/1 Inspector of Native labour Dundee to NC, 7 July 1933 and NC to CNC, 4 July 1933, re Chief Manzolwandhle Zulu and for Solomon's better-known collections through *Inkatha*, see Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 175-182.

[39] See the ch on cattle.

[40] See CNC 92A N1/12/6 (1), Magistrate, Eshowe to CNC, 10 May 1920 and Magistrate Babanango to CNC, 23 Aug. 1929.

[41] 1/NGA, 3/3/2/4, 2/13/2, CNC to Attorney General, 11 March 1937.

[42] 1/NGA, 3/3/2/4, 2/13/2 Director of Native Labour to SNA, 22 Dec. 1938.

[43] Marks, *Ambiguities*, p. 110.

[44] CNC 85A N1/1/3 (X) CNC to SNA, 23 Sept. 1933. CNC to SNA, 8 Oct. 1937.

[45] Ibid.

[46] In fact it is not altogether clear how the stipends were eventually paid out and in 1947 some chiefs complained they did not receive their `salaries'. See 1/MTU, 3/4/3/2, 2/16/3A, NC's meeting with chiefs and *induna*, June 1947.

[47] CNC 85A N1/1/3 (X) CNC to SNA, 23 Sept. 1933; CNC to SNA, 8 Oct. 1937. The scale ran from £12 per anum for up to 200 tax-payers to £48 per anum for over 10,000 tax-payers.

This new scale did not affect the original stipends for chiefs of high standing already set by the Government listed above. For some of the tensions felt by chiefs over stipends see Gluckman, *Analysis*, pp. 2-3.

[48] For the financial corruption of the king and Inkatha see chapter on cattle, Cope, `Royal Family', especially pp. 176-178, and la Hausse, `Ethnicity', pp. 324-330.

[49] 1/NQU, 1/1/5/30, 3/4/2/1, NC to CNC, 16 Sept. 1933.

[50] See for example 1/MTU 3/4/3/2, 2/16/3A, NC's meeting with chiefs and *induna*, April 1931.

[51] NEC, written evidence of A. Stanford, p. 6.

[52] See notice in CNC 87A, N1/1/4 (X),7 July 1936.

[53] See 1/MTU, 3/4/3/2, 2/16/3A, statement of Chief Somshoko at NC's meeting with chiefs and *induna*, June 1947.

[54] Marks, *Ambiguities*, pp. 2, 39.

[55] See CNC 105A 1/1/2 (X) 78/4C, re the SNA's trip to Zululand in June 1935 and see the *Natal Mercury*, 13 June 1935, for Zimema's comments.

[56] Beinart and Bundy make a similar point about how Transkeian loyalty to the supposedly benevolent English Queen. See their `Introduction. "Away in the Locations"', in *Hidden Struggles*, pp. 1-45, p.9.

[57] For an excellent discussion of the ICU and its attempt to mobilize around the land and agrarian question in the Transkei see C. Bundy, `Land and Liberation: popular rural protest and the national liberation movements in South Africa, 1920-1960', in S. Marks and S. Trapido, (ed.s), *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa* (London, 1987), pp. 254-285 and for Natal see Bradford, *A Taste*, pp. 95-143.

[58] Beinart, *Pondoland*, pp. 110-112.

[59] See CNC 40A N10/1/2 (X) CNC to SNA, re District Native Advisory Boards, 17 March 1924.

[60] Ibid, Wheelwright to Herbst, 28 Nov. 1924.

[61] Ibid, p. 2.

[62] For an interesting discussion of the wide range of interests involved in Natal African politics see Marks, *Ambiguities*, and R. Haines, `Reflections on African Protest in Natal, 1925-36' University of Natal Collected Seminar Papers: Natal in the Union, 1909-1939, July 1978 (Durban, 1978) for a more localised account see. I.L. Edwards

`Mkumbane Our Home: A History of African Shantytown Society in Cato Manor Farm, 1946-1960', Ph.D., Natal, 1989, ch. 2.

63 See *Ilanga Lase Natal*, 12 Aug. 1927.

64 See CNC 81A N1/1/3 (32) 1, minutes of CNC's meeting with Solomon and see Solomon's article in *Ilanga*, 12 Aug. 1927 and see Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 275-280.

65 See Ibid, CNC to SNA, 5 March 1929 and CNC 81A, N1/1/3 (32), CNC to SNA, 8 Aug. 1930.

66 KCAL, MS NIC, KCM 3303b, undated excerpt on the establishment of a regency for Mshiyeni, probably 1933-34.

67 See CNC 108A N1/15/5, 94/8, NCs' conference, 1929.

68 For popular support of the councils see for example CNC 40A, N10/1/2 (X), letters from NCs at Eshowe and Nquthu, 17 April 1931 and 2 March 1932. For Solomon's and Dube's views see NEC evidence of Solomon, p. 6557 and Cope `Royal Family' pp. 344-345 and p. 533, fn. 24.

69 U.G. 26-'32, *Report of the Native Affairs Commission for 1927-31*, p. 9.

70 See CNC 40A, N10/1/2 (X) minutes of NCs' conference, Durban, Nov. 1933.

71 See CNC 42A, N1/7/2 (X) SNA to Mshiyeni Zulu, 1 Sept. 1937. For a discussion of the NRCs and their reception among African politicians see for example G. Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa. The Evolution of an Ideology* (London, 1978), pp. 40-41, 80-81.

72 The Zulu (Cultural) Society was established in 1936 at a meeting of the Natal Bantu Teachers Association under the leadership of Albert Luthuli, later President of the ANC and author of *Let My People Go* (London, 1962) and subsidised by a grant of £250 from the Pretoria NAD. Executive members included C. J. Mpanza, A.W. Dhlamini and John Dube. Government patrons included P.W. Grobler, Minister of Native Affairs, D.L. Smit, SNA, and H.C. Lugg, CNC for Natal. See NAP, files of the Zulu Society, (ZS) I/1/2/6, CNC to Mpanza, 2 April 1937, Report of innagural meeting, 10 Feb. 1938, ZS II/7 Dhlamini to Mpanza, 5 Jan. 1946. For the Zulu Society and other Zulu nationalist organizations see S. Marks pioneering study `Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness', in L. Vail, *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (London, 1989), pp. 216-219, 225 and her *Ambiguities*, p. 71. See also la Hausse, `Ethnicity', pp. 365-368. la Hausse is perhaps overstating the case when he says that Natal African intellectuals were `actively marginalised' by Mshiyeni.

[73] See 1/NGA, 3/3/2/4, 2/13/3 file on the Zulu Society, C.J. Mpanza, Secretary and Treasurer to CNC, 22 March 1937 and see CNC to NC, 30 March 1937.

[74] See Ibid, Mpanza to NC Braatvedt for the information of the CNC, 22 Aug. 1938 and see Dhlamini to CNC, 12 Sept. 1947. For the cultural origins of Buthelezi's *Inkatha* see, Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a double agenda* (London, 1988), chs. 1 and 2 and R. Southall `Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise', *AA*, Vol. 80, No. 321, 1981, pp. 453-481.

[75] See NTS 248, 78/53/2, SNA to CNC re Zulu regent's succession dispute, 8 Oct. 1945, ZS II/7, (3), Dhlamini to Mpanza, 6 Nov. 1945 (cited in Marks, `Patriotism') and report on the dispute by Mpanza, 10 Nov, 1945.

[76] For an outline on some of the policy issues relating to the education of Africans see U.G. 29-'36, *Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Native Education*. It is worth pointing out that these developments have an uncannily close paralell to current South African politics and chief Buthelezi's attempts to prevent democracy in KwaZulu-Natal.

[77] See CNC 108A N1/15/5, 94/8, minutes of NCs' conference, Durban, May 1929.

[78] Ibid, statements of NC for Nongoma, H. Gerbers, p. 2.

[79] CNC 81A, N1/1/3 (32) 1, CNC to SNA, 13 April 1931.

[80] For other examples of this approach in Natal and Zululand see Marks, `Patriarchy'. For the African contribution to refining Zulu ethnicity see especially la Hausse, `Ethnicity' and see below for the state's use of Zulu ethnicity in attempts to mobilise men for the war effort.

[81] Beinart, `Chieftaincy' p. 179.

[82] For details of the Acts see Rogers, *Native Administration in the Union of South Africa*, (Pretoria, 1949) and W. Stafford, *Native Law as Practised in Natal* (Johannesburg, 1935). For the implications of this legislation in Natal and Zululand see Dubow, *Racial Segregation*, pp. 93-120, Cope, `Royal Family', pp 225-230.

[83] The Zululand Trust of 1909 was incorporated into the South African Natives Trust at Union. See chp. I.

[84] See U.G. 41-'37, *NAD report for 1935-36*, p. 17. Chief Khumalo of Natal lamented his lack of powers in comparison with the Zululand chiefs. See U.G. 26-'32, *Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1927-1931*.

[85] Marks, `Patriotism', pp. 215-240, pp. 225-227.

[86] See NEC, evidence of Archdeacon Lee, pp. 1447-48. For a more detailed discussion of tightening legislative control of African women see Simons, *African Women* and B. Bozzoli, `Marxism, Feminism and South African Studies', in Beinart and Dubow, *Segregation and Apartheid,* pp. 118-144, pp. 125-131.

[87] NTS 9130, 69/363, part II, NC Nongoma to CNC, 24 June 1940.

[88] Ibid, CNC Lugg to SNA Smit, 9 Oct. 1940.

[89] Ibid, part II, Lugg to SNA, 4 Oct. 1940. The request was reinforced by an application from the Zulu Society (see below in this ch) to force men out. See NAP, Zulu Society files, ZS II/1/6, Secretary Mpanza to CNC, re Society resolutions of 10 Sept. 1940.

[90] NTS 9130, 69/363, part II, Confidential dispatch, Smit to Lugg, 31 Oct. 1940.

[91] Ibid, NC Nongoma interview with Mshiyeni, 23 July 1940.

[92] Ibid, Lugg's report to Smit, 4 Sept. 1940.

[93] Ibid, minutes of recruitment meeting at Eshowe, 23 Nov. 1940.

[94] Ibid, NC Eshowe to CNC, 25 Nov. 1940.

[95] Ibid, NC Nkandhla to CNC, 25 Nov. 1940.

[96] Ibid, see *Ilanga Lase Natal*, 8 May 1941 and English translation, 31 May 1941.

[97] See Bradford, *A Taste*, p. 217.

[98] NTS 9130, 69/363, part II, translated copy of Mshiyeni's speech, 31 May 1941.

[99] See NTS 9130 69/363 recruiting Officer Symons to Commanding Officer for the Native Military contingent, 13 Aug 1942, for the quote and for an analysis of Champion's ambiguous character see Marks, *Ambiguities*, pp. 72 ff. and M. Swanson, (ed.) *The Views of Mahlati. Writings of A.W.G. Champion, a Black South African* (Pietermaritzburg, 1983), D. Hemson, `Class', chps. 2 and 3.

[100] According to T. Nuttall in his `Class, Race and Nation: African Politics in Durban, 1929-1949', Ph.D. Oxford, 1991, p. 132, Mshiyeni was a big `draw card' with Durban workers.

[101] See NTS 9130 69/363 recruiting Officer Symons to Commanding Officer for the Native Military contingent, 13

Aug. 1942. For a fascinating discussion of swine, rural millenarianism and the connections with Dinuzulu see Bradford, *A Taste*, pp. 224-228 and for earlier examples of millenarianism in Zululand see Unterhalter, `Religion' pp. 17-18.

[102] NTS 9130, 69/363 part II, Stubbs to Adjutant General Commanding the South African Forces, 19 May 1941.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid, Director of Non-European Army Services to SNA, 19 Aug. 1941 and CNC Lugg to SNA, 30 Sept. 1941.

[105] NTS 9130, 69/363, Part III, Symons to Officer Commanding, Oribi Camp, 13 Aug. 1942.

[106] Ibid, Mpanza to CNC, 20 Dec 1943 and S.A.P. translation of letter reported to be from Mshiyeni to Mpanza, 3 Jan. 1944.

[107] Bradford, *A Taste*, p. 112.

[108] It has been argued that the Acts did act as a guarantee of last resort to protect at least some land for Africans in the face of white settler expansion. See for example, Tatz, *Shadow and Substance*, pp. 14-18 and Platzky and Walker, *The Surplus People*.

[109] NEC, evidence of Lee, pp. 1415-1416.

[110] Ibid, evidence of Oscroft, p. 1652.

[111] Mshiyeni's objections were, in part deflected protests over the new NAD demonstration farm. See CNC 65A, 3/11/3 (32), Mshiyeni to SNA, contained in CNC to SNA, 4 Sept. 1935 and John Dube to CNC, 9 Sept. 1935.

[112] It was not until into the 1930s and 1940s that the trend in commercially oriented African agricultural production was given state support. See below, chapter on betterment and I. Evans, `The Native Affairs Department in the Reserves in the 1940s and 1950s', in R. Cohen, Y. Muthien and A. Zegeye (eds.), *Repression and Resistance: Insider Accounts of Apartheid* (London, 1990), pp. 17-51,' and M. Morris, `State Intervention in the Agricultural Labour Supply, Post 1948', in Wilson, Kooy and Hendrie (eds.), *Farm Labour*, pp. 289-318.

[113] See appendix for population density figures.

[114] NEC, Mgixo's evidence, p. 1684-85.

[115] U.G. 35-'49, *NAD Report for 1947-48*, p. 35. The Natal NAD had, since the 1890s, tried to control land allocation in chiefs wards. See my `The Impact', chp 2 and CNC 109A,

N1/15/5 94/9, NCs' conference in Durban, 15-17 Nov. 1933.

[116] See CNC 73A, N1/1/7 (31) (9), NC Eshowe to CNC, 21 May 1932.

[117] Ibid, statement of Siduna to NC, undated, 1932.

[118] NEC, evidence of Maling taken at Vryheid, p. 1589. For a further discussion of `tribal linkages' across white farms and into the reserves see J. Clegg, `"Ukubuyisa isidumbu"'.

[119] See CNC 38A, N2/7/3 (8), Part I, NC Empangeni to CNC, 1 Nov. 1927.

[120] Ibid.

[121] See CNC 38A, N2/7/3 (8), Part II, CNC to SNA, 16 Nov. 1926.

[122] Ibid, Lamula to the royalist chief Msiyana Mtembu, 21 Aug. 1925 and 31 June 1925. For the NNC see variously T. Nuttall, `Class, Race and Nation', pp. 88-95, A. Cobley, *Class and Consciousness*, Marks, *Ambiguities*, pp. 42-73, and P. Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress in South Africa, 1912-1952* (London, 1970). For Lamula and Gumede's role in the NNC and in the Zululand land problem see la Hausse, `Ethnicity', p. 160.

[123] For a fascinating and detailed account of Lamula's career see la Hausse, `Ethnicity', part I. For similar historical figures and their manipulation of millenial messages see la Hausse, `So who was Elias Kuzwayo? Nationalism, Collaboration and the Picaresque in Natal' in Bonner, Delius and Posel, *Apartheid's Genesis*, pp. 195-228.

[124] For the weak support of the ICU in Zululand see Bradford, *A Taste*, pp. 110-112 and la Hausse, `Ethnicity', pp. 185-188.

[125] See CNC 38A N2/7/3 (8), Part II, Lamula to Msiyana, 21 Aug. 1925.

[126] CNC 38A N2/7/3 (8), Part II, report of the meeting from Det. Constable P. Kearny to S.A.P., 19 Sept. 1925.

[127] Ibid, p. 2 and see the *Natal Mercury*, 21 Nov. 1925 and the *Zululand Times*, 20 Sept. 1925 and Lamula's articles in *Ilanga*, of 17 April 1925 and 2 Oct. 1925. For the political background to the SAP and Hertzog's politics see T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa A Modern History*, Second Edition (Toronto, 1978), pp. 199-217 and Dubow, *Racial Segregation*, chps. 5 and 6.

[128] CNC 38A N2/7/3 (8), Part II, NC, Empangeni to CNC 25

Aug. 1932.

[129] See for example report of an NAD and sugar farmer sponsored *indbaba* in Empangeni, *Zululand Times*, 1 Sept. 1927 and Bradford, *A Taste*, p. 305, fn. No. 64.

[130] Similar trends were evident in Pondoland. See Beinart, *Pondoland*, p. 135 and for the role of *induna* in the legal administrative framework see D. Reader, *Zulu Tribe*, pp. 243-245, 266-270.

[131] For appeals to imperial authority see Marks, *Ambiguities*, p. 69 and 113 and Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, p. 9.

[132] 1/NQU 3/3/1/1, 2/7/2, Ngobese statement to CNC 13 Feb. 1930. Molife was at odds with the local NC. See below chp. on Betterment. For the *hlonipa* custom, which more accurately refers to the deference of younger women to elders, see Krige, *Social System*, pp. 30-31, 154, Marks, `Patriotism', p.226 and Cope, `Royal Family', p. 264.

[133] See CNC 76A, N1/1/3 (X) replies of magistrates to CNC circular between 2 Oct. 1925 and 22 March 1926 and CNC 85A, N1/1/4 (X) status of chiefs and their deputies, undated, 1936.

[134] For a different path that this struggle could follow see Beinart, *Pondoland*, pp. 118-120.

[135] CNC 87A, N1/1/2 (X), Assistant NC, Mahlabatini to CNC, 25 April 1934.

[136] CNC 85A, N1/1/3 (9), CNC circular to all NCs, Natal and Zululand, 14 June 1934.

[137] 1/NGA, 3/3/2/4, 2/13/4, NC responding to CNC circular of 8 Nov. 1935 on chiefs' duties, 12 Nov. 1935.

[138] U.G. 41-'37, *NAD Report on Native Affairs for 1935-36*, p. 79.

[139] P. la Hausse, `So who was Elias Kuzwayo?'. See also the chapters in this thesis on cattle and betterment for the accumulation of wealth through cattle by *kholwa induna*.

[140] Ibid, pp.201, 210. For the appropriation of the `coloniser's mask' see Marks, *Ambiguities*, p. 1.

[141] Evans, `The Native Affairs Department', p. 22.

[142] See for example CNC 91A, N1/9/2 (X) file on `faction fights' and NC Hlabisa to CNC, 24 Feb. 1938; CNC 90A, N1/9/2 (X), CNC to SNA, 1 Feb. 1937 and CNC 85A, N1/1/3 (9), NC Eshowe to CNC, 18 April 1933. See also Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, `Introduction' and Beinart's

chapter, `Conflict in Qumbu' in the same book, pp. 107-137, p. 121.

143 CNC 72A 57/31, NC to CNC, 13 July 1932.

144 For Solomon's lifestyle and philandering see Cope, `Royal Family', Marks, Ambiguities and Reyher, *Zulu Woman*.

145 See 1/NGA, 3/3/2/4, 2/13/9 NC to CNC, 9 June 1936 and 1/NGA, 3/3/2/4, 2/13/10 NC to CNC, 15 April 1939.

146 1/NGA, 3/3/2/5, 2/14/8, NC to CNC, 18 Feb. 1942.

147 Norman Otte, former NC in various Zululand districts stated that, by the 1940s, local officials rarely worried about the abilities of the chiefs since they relied on the *induna*. Oral interview conducted by the author with Mr. Otte.

148 See 1/NQU, 3/4/1/1, 2/7/2, CNC to NC, Ahrens, 6 Jan. 1930, and for the popular claims about Molife driving Ahrens out see 1/NQU, 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/1, CNC to SNA, 13 July 1944 and oral interview conducted by the author with H.C. Zulu in which he confirmed Molife's relations with Ahrens. For Ahrens otherwise distinguished career see his *From Bench to Bench* (Pietermaritzburg, 1948).

149 1/NQU, 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/1, Madola Miya to CNC, 13 Oct. 1944. It is not known if the replacment *induna*, Buthelezi was any relation to the famous Wellington Buthelezi, but he no doubt took the name from his movement. See W. Beinart, `Amafelandawonye (the Die-hards). Popular Protest and Women's Movements in the Herschel District in the 1920s', in Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, pp. 222-269, pp. 251-255.

150 Ibid, NC's repsonse to CNC's query on this issue, 18 Oct. 1944, and see chapters on cattle and `betterment' for increased sales of cattle and tensions over increases in the number of wooled sheep.

151 See for example CNC 90A, N1/9/2 (X), NC Eshowe to CNC, 9 Oct. 1937.

152 For a more detailed discussion of the changing roles of *induna* and *abanumzana* see Reader, *Zulu Tribe*, pp. 243-244, 256-265 and A. Vilikazi, *Zulu Transformations. A Study of the Dynamics of Social Change* (Pietermaritzburg, 1965), pp. 26-27.

153 CNC 73A, N1/1/3/3, (32) 3, NC to CNC, 4 April 1932; SNA to CNC, 5 Dec. 1933 and NC of Nongoma's minutes of meeting held with chiefs and CNC, 29 Oct. 1935.

154 CNC 90A, N1/9/2 (X), minutes of meeting between NC and chiefs and *induna*, Eshowe, 17 Sept. 1937 and NC Mahlabatini

to CNC, 12 Oct. 1942.

155 CNC 85A, N1/1/3 (9), NC Eshowe to CNC, 18 April 1933.

156 Ibid, minutes of district meeting, NC to CNC, 10 May 1933.

157 Ibid, NC Eshowe to NC Hlabisa, 18 July 1933.

158 See CNC 90A, N1/9/2 (X), NC Eshowe to CNC, minutes of district meeting, 27 Sept. 1937.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid, Rawlinson to CNC, 20 Oct. 1937.

161 Ibid.

162 See 1/NQU, 1/1/5/30, minutes of quarterly meetings, 19 Jan. 1938; NC to CNC, 16 April 1940, 1/MTU, 1/2/2/4, 15/336, and NC to CNC, 18 Nov. 1939.

163 CNC 90A, N1/9/2 (X), NC Beale to CNC, 9 Oct. 1941.

164 1/NQU, 3/3/2/1, 2/1/2/1, CNC to SNA, 25 Jan. 1933 re chief Molife and a number of southern Zululand chiefs.

165 Beinart makes the point that chiefs *and* headmen in Pondoland could not be characterised merely as a `wealthier peasantry'. See Beinart, *Pondoland*, p. 129. I would argue that, in Zululand, at least, the *induna* were less likely than chiefs to receive adequate remuneration from fines and collections and instead turned to the land which was accessible to them.

166 See for example NEC, evidence of the headmen Mkwintye and Khumalo, pp. 1704-1707.

167 NEC evidence of Mkize, p. 1910.

168 CNC 90A, N1/9/2(X), S.A.P. Station Commander to District Commandant, Mtunzini, 29 April 1936.

169 NEC, pp. 1704-1707.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CATTLE ECONOMY

The two pillars of the pre-colonial Zululand economy were agriculture and cattle-keeping. In the twentieth century, however, the male Zulu domain of cattle-keeping managed to survive far better than the predominantly female domain of agriculture. Although reserve agriculture remained an integral part of African subsistence, the cattle economy was better able to withstand the onslaught of white commercial farming demands and adapt to the wider capitalist economy than agriculture. As Africans produced progressively less of their food requirements, they managed to increase their herds.[1] Part of the reason for this phenomenon lies in the adaptation of the social relations of accumulation and production of cattle in Zulu society after 1900. As Ferguson has argued for Lesotho, cattle remained a crucial feature of the social system, retaining enormous symbolic value despite, or more probably because of, the unravelling of Zulu society.[2] The social value of cattle, however, was complimentary to the basic productive value of herds for milk and meat and as a reproducing form of storeable wealth.[3]

Another reason is related to the changing composition of Zulu society. Paradoxically, white settlement initially caused an increase in cattle diseases and then provided the infrastructure for disease control which stabilized African cattle production. Moreover, the penetration of capitalism provided a ready outlet for the sale of cattle. Chiefs and

induna who controlled grazing land were well poised to take advantage of the spreading cash economy and their increasing herds of cattle acquired a definite monetary value. Thus, the trend was towards a distinctly unequal distribution of the dramatically increased herds which tended to favour the Zulu ruling class.

In the first half of the twentieth century, despite land loss, drought, East Coast fever and *nagana*, African-owned cattle in Zululand increased more than threefold; the population only increased by twofold. Although cattle disease continued to plague Zululand into the late 1940s, Veterinary Department policies for the containment of African-owned cattle in the reserves and strict enforcement of dipping regulations helped the herds to recover. African-owned cattle numbers in Zululand soared from 250,000 to over 500,000 between 1920 and 1926. By the mid-1940s the number topped 700,000.[4] There were however, dramatic fluctuations in herds in the intervening years. Although they recovered quickly, the herds were decimated by drought and disease in 1931-1932, 1936 and again in the early 1940s. The huge increases, however, can also be accounted for by cattle developing an immunity to disease, the improved grazing conditions and the imbalance in male-female ratios following a drought when fertile cows, which had the best chance of survival, reproduced calves rapidly.[5]

THE ENVIRONMENT AND DISEASE

Local reactions to environmental crises characterised much of Zululand's economic development in the twentieth century. The cattle economy was no exception. Droughts and famines of varying severity struck Zululand in 1912, 1916, 1920, 1930-32, 1935-36 and again in 1946. These had profound implications for the restructuring of African stock-keeping. Cattle suffered from a series of problems related to the droughts. Pastures became dry and of little nutritious value and animals became more susceptible to disease in a weakened condition.

As Guy has argued, because of recurrent drought, it was necessary for Africans in this part of southern Africa to manage herds according to seasonal grazing patterns, and more importantly, the extremely variable nature of soil and rainfall which transformed levels of grazing nutrition over short distances.[6] Equally important in Zululand was the ability of herdsmen to avoid unhealthy low-lying areas which harboured *nagana* (cattle trypanosomiasis or sleeping sickness) infected tsetse flies and the thick *amahlanze* (bushveld) which provided cover for large game hosts of the brown tick, the carrier of East Coast Fever (Theileriasis).[7] Zululand's geography provided sources of water for cattle in the lower river valleys areas during periods of drought. As cattle, already compromised by poor nutrition levels in drought stricken middle and high veld areas, moved into lower areas to access water they were highly susceptible to disease.

Repeated crises either directly or indirectly related to cattle drove Africans to increase their herds whenever possible. Naturally, restocking was of paramount importance immediately following the ravages of disease, and during periods of economic stress. As the only form of capital accumulated in Zulu society, cattle were a crucial buffer against impoverishment. When Africans restocked in the twentieth century, however, flexible grazing patterns were severely limited. At the turn of the century, white officialdom was poised to take advantage of fluctuations in herd size. C. R. Saunders, reporting on Zululand before the delimitation, considered that the huge cattle losses from rinderpest sustained in 1897 presented advantages for the expropriation of African land.

> Having lost nearly all their cattle and consequently requiring less room than they formerly did it may be easier to group the people in more limited areas than they have hitherto been accustomed to.[8]

Africans only gradually experienced the impact of the delimitation and its effect on grazing patterns when white settlement actually took place from 1905 into the 1920s.[9] Nevertheless, extensive and, in Africans' eyes, often vexatious regulations designed to support white stock farming through the prevention of disease were rapidly implemented. By the 1910s The Veterinary Department's restrictions on the movement of cattle and fencing on white farms in the southern districts aggravated the shortage of pasture land by cutting off paths to seasonal grazing.

While there is no question that stock-keeping in congested areas caused erosion, the severity and extent of the problem was greatly exaggerated. World-wide concern about soil erosion and compromised agricultural capacities filtered into official South African circles from the late 1920s. Combined with racial notions of an African inability to maintain the rural areas these ideas prompted an almost paranoid reaction in the NAD and land department.[10] During the 1930s, the NAD continually pointed to the `combined evils' of overstocking and pasture degradation which it believed placed the reserves on the verge of collapse. Officials made every effort to reduce stock numbers.[11] Overstocking, however, has to be related to cattle type, access to, and patterns of seasonal grazing, soil fertility, erosion, geography and climate.[12] The fact that, despite the firm belief in official circles that African-owned cattle were destined to drop in number due to overgrazing, the reserves provided for substantial increases in cattle from the 1910s attests to the imprecise official views of the effects of erosion.

As elsewhere in southern Africa, Zululand's developing links with the wider political economy, including an increase in transport riding and levels of trade in cattle, and the introduction of settler-owned stock, contributed to the potential for increased animal infections.[13] The East Coast Fever epizootic which spread through Zululand from 1904 until 1910, prompted the erection of dipping tanks, usually concentrated on white farms, to protect cattle from the tick-borne disease. The disease was devastating for all

stock farmers, but was particularly so for undercapitalized Africans who could not afford access to the tanks.[14] The disease tended to reinforce the process of stratification as poorer homesteads could ill-afford the high costs of protection. The principal means of controlling the disease applied to Africans prior to the 1920s was a series of quarantine camps and the wholesale slaughtering of infected animals.

Africans suffered twofold from this `stamping out' policy: once through the loss of their cattle and a second time through the measures designed to contain the spread of the fever. The quarantine regulations proved particularly irksome to homesteads. In Entonjaneni (Melmoth), chief Ngobozana felt that the mixing together of all his people's cattle under quarantine, whether infected or not, was a poor method of control as all the cattle then contracted the disease. He argued that

> ...what used to be done in the old days, when disease broke out, was for the herd boys to be carefully warned not to let the cattle mix, and if any intermingling occurred, the boys were severely beaten.[15]

This procedure allowed people to make use of their cattle for the duration of the epizootic. Many chiefs urged that infected cattle should be allowed to remain near the kraals so that the owners could have the advantage of the cow's milk while it was still alive as well as the meat when it died.[16] G. De Kock, Director of Veterinary Services in the Union, later pointed out that Africans who ate the flesh or milk of fever-infected cattle apparently suffered no ill-

effects. He argued that, when starvation threatened, it was better to risk using milk from infected cattle than to have no milk at all.[17]

White fears of cross-infection and perceptions of African-owned cattle as inherently verminous prompted the development of dipping tank facilities in the reserves. In 1914, all cattle in Zululand were, by an extension of the Diseases of Stock Act (No. 18 of 1911), forced to undergo regular baths in an arsenic compound to rid them of ticks. The NAD called upon chiefs to mobilize free labour for the construction of dipping tanks in the southern districts. More importantly, Africans had to bear the brunt of the costs of the scheme.[18] In 1914, the NAD introduced a `dipping levy ' of five shillings on every adult male. The addition of this rate to the established hut-tax caused wide-spread resentment and made tax collections difficult for local officials.[19]

The following year, the Natal Dipping Tanks Advances Act changed the rate to 10s. per kraal, and partially shifted the burden of collection and responsibility for payment to the homestead head.[20] The maintenance of cattle in Zululand had, by the 1920s, acquired a definite cash cost. When applied across the board to all homesteads this further cost strained poorer sections of society as commoners effectively subsidised wealthier large herd owners. A stock inspector in Nquthu complained that he had dipped over seven hundred merino sheep for one man. The approximate cost to the government was £32 and yet the owner only paid

the basic 10s. supplement to the general tax.[21] Nevertheless, dipping did protect stock, but it had a double cost to Africans because of the way it was introduced.

While the NAD identified African over-stocking as a serious drain on water supplies, local officials expressed concern over white settler off-take. During droughts Zululand settlers petitioned the administration to water large numbers of their cattle in the reserves, which further strained tenuous supplies. The NC at Nongoma protested to the veterinary department responsible for issuing permits for white-owned cattle to enter the reserves. `It is a fact that the water supply in the Native Reserve is being threatened by Europeans and the interests of the Natives must come first.'[22]

Indeed, hundreds of whites dipped their cattle in the NAD tanks situated in the reserves, many free of charge. Among those whites dipping free or at partial dipping fee rates were prominent local white government officials including the NC, H.P. Braatvedt, the Rev. Oscroft from the ZNTI, the labour recruiter, J.S. Marwick, and Dr. Haupt, a district surgeon.[23] Moreover, although their claims were never substantiated, chiefs Zombizwe and Siposo, residing near the sugar-cane belts in Swaziland and Eshowe respectively, complained that white farmer irrigation, drawn from rivers which flowed into the reserves, undermined reserve water supplies and drained perennial streams.[24] A somewhat alarmist NC, W. Boast (later CNC), further claimed the

irrigation problem was serious and caused reserve cattle to die or become too emaciated to travel to distant dips because of lack of water.[25]

Although African tax-payers subsidised white dipping, many went without access to dips at all. By the mid-1930s, herds in the border and coastal areas of Ingwavuma were suffering from the combined effects of drought and lack of tanks. The veterinary department created a `cattle-free zone' six miles wide along the border after reported outbreaks of hoof and mouth disease in Mozambique threatened to spread into Zululand.[26] This measure included the closure of tanks and the cessation of planned tank building in the area to discourage Mozambiquans crossing the border to use reserve tanks. In defence of Africans, the local NC pointed out the hardship endured by many people in the area who had paid both the `dipping levy' and the local tax for over fifteen years without receiving any benefit.[27]

Cattle figures given on a district basis do not account for disparities within a district nor do they distinguish between deaths from disease and deaths from lack of grazing. Further difficulties arise in separating the efficacy of scientific approaches to disease control and indigenous responses to the problem.[28] Although the picture is clearer in the case of *nagana* (see below), Africans suggested that `scientific' methods of controlling the fever were less than optimal. Chief Mbata of Mahlabatini pointed out, for example, that tick birds, which helped to keep the cattle free of vermin, had all disappeared since

the introduction of dipping. He urged that dipping be suspended in uninfected areas to encourage the birds to return.[29]

Disease control for the fever was aimed at supporting white stock-farmers and did not always take account of local conditions. The sparse distribution of dipping tanks led to the over-use of limited pathways by cattle. Thus, local officials acknowledged that the dipping program was responsible for severe erosion along the routes to the tanks.[30] Moreover, herds concentrated on white farms often appeared to be responsible for localised outbreaks of the disease.[31] It is possible that as white stock keepers could more easily afford to purchase cattle from further afield than Africans their herds were at greater risk of infection. In any case, European strains of cattle, with no developed immunity, were more susceptible to the fever and whites spent more time transporting cattle along infected roadways which also increased the potential for infection.[32]

While recognizing the overall benefits of the dipping programme, many Africans complained bitterly about its practical application. People objected to the long and arduous treks with their cattle to the tanks, especially in the winter months when diminished grazing weakened animals. Dipping inspectors often ruthlessly enforced the regulations and assessed heavy fines regardless of local

conditions. Wheelwright noted that,

> ...useful revenue is coming to the state through these people not dipping their stock. Practically every court day a large number are run in for failure to dip their stock, and I can assure you that that kind of thing has become rather a severe liability to them.[33]

Moreover, Africans complained that they were forced to dip their cattle every two weeks or less, even in the winter months when the risk of infection was lower or in areas where there had been no infections for years.[34]

Drought exacerbated these conditions because the intervals between dipping were reduced. While more frequent trips to the tanks added considerably to herding work, experimentation with the toxicity of dipping bath compounds occasionally poisoned or weakened animals.[35] In July 1931, Abraham Tshoba of Eshowe complained, for example, that not only were Africans' weakened cattle called to the dips too often but failure to deliver them also led to destruction orders from the local tank supervisor. He claimed that since January of that year 149 head of their cattle had been destroyed for failure to comply with dipping regulations.[36] In Nongoma, one African sheep-owner was so plagued and prosecuted for not having fulfilled his obligations under the scab-dipping regulations that he cut the throats of all his sheep so as to be relieved of his responsibility.[37]

Other African complaints included the arbitrary confiscation of cattle for petty dipping offences and the use of abusive language by white stock inspectors. In

Ubombo, chief Nkomo (cattle in Zulu) took advantage of his official status to intervene in procedures and confiscate cattle himself.[38] The NAD, concerned that resentment of the programme would lead to widespread agitation or boycott, was sensitive to African reactions. It attempted to improve the situation through propaganda and an unsuccessful attempt to take over control of reserve dipping from the Veterinary Department.[39]

Underlying many of the complaints against the programme were serious suspicions about the administration's motives. Africans resented the intrusion of officials into so central an aspect of their lives. They perceived external control of cattle as yet another tactic to undermine homesteads, drive more people out into wage labour and expropriate more African land. In 1933, they were alarmed at the introduction of branding for dipping identification purposes in Mtunzini and flatly refused to subject their cattle to the overly large crown and "R" brand believing it would convey the right of ownership to the government and destroy the hides.[40] Failure to consult the people prior to the planned branding nearly led to open defiance. Violence was only averted after the CNC and Solomon personally visited the area and dozens of arrests were made.[41]

The appearance of new cattle afflictions heightened Africans' suspicions of white involvement. In June 1938, the local NAD agricultural officer cordoned off a large area of Nquthu and destroyed 8826 cattle, 9634 sheep and 1251 goats because of an outbreak of Hoof and Mouth

disease. Although the state paid out £27,000 in compensation, people were understandably shocked at the occurrence of such a dangerous new disease. News of the outbreak and the cull travelled quickly through Zululand and in July, an elderly commoner summed up people's feelings.

> Why is the Government always talking about our cattle? What wrong have our cattle done to the Government? It is strange that this new disease which comes from countries beyond the sea should suddenly break out in the Nqutu [sic] district without first having travelled up from the sea or through countries such as Portuguese territory. What is the explanation for the sudden jumping of this disease from England to Nqutu?[42]

This was the first outbreak of the disease in Zululand. The infection was later traced to a shipment of cattle, destined for whites, from Cape Town, via Johannesburg and Vryheid.[43]

NAGANA

Whites in Natal perceived *nagana* as a problem in Zululand from at least the mid-1800s, if not earlier.[44] Until the advent of white settlement north of the Thukela, however, African herders experienced few serious epizootics of this disease.[45] Zulu settlement avoided the *amahlanze* (bushveld areas) known to harbour the tsetse fly. White settlement undermined these safeguards, however, by increasing congestion on the land and forcing Africans to move cattle into infected areas. The disease then spread out from the lower-lying regions and flared up after periods of drought. As Ford has argued, it was white settlers and the colonial

administration which were chiefly responsible for the expansion of *nagana*.[46]

Settlers somewhat erroneously linked the epidemiology of the disease to wild game in Zululand. Although the tsetse fly (predominantly *Glossina Pallidipes* in Zululand) was found alongside its main food source, large game, its habitat was not exclusively dictated by the range of these animals if substitutes were available. A complex relationship existed between climate, the bushveld habitat, game and the fly. A combination of hot, wet summer weather with an abundance of hosts, either game or cattle, provided optimal conditions for an increase in fly numbers. *Nagana,* however, manifested itself principally during the dry season. In 1927, Dr. H. Curson, Director of Onderstepoort (South Africa's principal veterinary centre), found that the main factor in the seasonal prevalence of *nagana* was the deterioration of pastures.[47] There is strong evidence to argue that this effect could be exacerbated by drought.[48]

Officials believed that the main hosts for the vector were harboured in the Umfolozi, Hluhluwe and Mkuzi game reserves. The Department of Lands led the crusade to safeguard white stock farmers from *nagana* by pressing for the de-proclamation of the game reserves and the wholesale slaughter of suspect game.[49] Following the establishment of the Ntambanana settlement in 1918, settlers were given free rein to eradicate all large game in the area. And yet the disease persisted and was often reported in areas where it

had previously been unknown. In a number of areas, *nagana* increased in proportion to the reduction of game as whites moved their cattle into the cleared areas.[50]

Finally, in 1928, the Natal veterinarian, Dr. H. Fuller, challenged the theory that *nagana* could be eradicated by the destruction of game. He pointed out that the rinderpest epidemic which killed off much of the big game in Zululand did not stop the tsetse from returning. Despite the huge destruction of game in the 1920s, *nagana* persisted and new cattle brought into the fly belt were infected. He argued further that similar game drives to eradicate the vector were equally inconclusive in Rhodesia.[51] The wanton destruction of game, however, continued. Whites wanted to hunt for reasons other than the containment of *nagana*. The NC of Nongoma, E.N. Braatvedt, complained that `people of the poor white class' were invading the crown lands and hunting for commercial purposes.[52] The NC at Ubombo noting an increase in white hunters, felt that local game should be preserved for Africans who could no longer augment their food supplies during periods of shortage.[53]

Whites were determined to become stock farmers in areas which were breeding grounds for the vector: areas which Africans avoided. As Dr. Curson pointed out, spreading *nagana* `... manifests itself as a result of encroachment of the fly area by European settlers rather than that the fly has invaded new areas'.[54] Settlers often ignored conventional Zulu wisdom by watering cattle in infected lower-lying pools and streams during droughts. Rather than

allowing the cattle to waste to a certain degree, (a condition of the `poor' Zulu-owned cattle attested to by many white observers) whites strove to maintain their herds in perfect condition even if it meant exposing them to infection.[55] Moreover, settlers and experts believed that the purer breeds of cattle purchased by whites in Natal and the Transvaal were more susceptible to *nagana*.[56] The real culprits of spreading *nagana* were not `ignorant' African herdsmen, but rather inexperienced white settlers. During the 1920s demobilised soldiers settling in Ntambanana purchased cattle from speculators to the northwest and then moved them down to the Lower Mhlatuze through the fly-infested Enseleni valley. The disease then settled in the Ntambanana area and white cattle traders spread it to Eshowe.[57]

Despite, at best, their uneven success with stock-keeping in the tsetse areas, the Union government was determined, however, to support the new white settlements.[58] Stock-farming was, in fact, a substitute livelihood for many of the white settlers of northern Zululand. By the early 1920s, the failure of dry-land cotton plantations at Candover and Ntambanana forced whites to consider, albeit with generous state support of £20,000, the transition to cattle-farming.[59] The powerful Department of Land was able to shape much of the crown land policy in the areas adjoining the reserves, including continued white hunting.[60]

R.H Harris of the Veterinary Department's entomological section tackled the problem of *nagana* by focussing on controlling the fly vector, and not on the eradication of game. He developed a simple, inexpensive but effective trap for the tsetse. By June of 1930, he had proved the trap's worth by capturing close to 3,000 flies in a 24-hour period.[61] Part of Harris's programme, however, included thinning out the game around the parks and cutting the bush back to reduce the fly's breeding grounds.[62] Through the 1930s, the Harris trap was used extensively and to great effect. *Nagana* cases were reduced around the settlement areas and in the reserves through most of the decade.

Nevertheless, after 1941, there was a serious resurgence of *nagana* when settlers encroached on a corridor established to contain game between the Mkuzi and Hluhluwe game reserves.[63] By 1942, an estimated 15,000 head of white- and African-owned cattle in northern Zululand were lost to the disease.[64] Although aerial spraying of the powerful insecticide D.D.T. was introduced in 1945, local complications undermined its effectiveness. Initially, brief but heavy rains and the density of the bush hampered spraying. Between 1944-46, severe drought depleted pastures and left cattle weak. Again, white settlers ignored both local conditions and restrictions on cattle movement by moving almost 2,000 head of cattle into the game corridor in search of water. This herd then dispersed over the settlement zone carrying infection over a one hundred mile area causing a severe epizootic among African- and white-owned cattle. The Veterinary Department, with limited

White Settlement and the spread of Nagana, 1905-1950



White Settlement Schemes

1905-1910: 1. Coastal & Amatikulu
2. Empangeni
3. Nkandhla-Qudeni
4. Nquthu
5. Melmoth
6. Umfolozi

1918-1930: 7. Ntambanana
8. Mkhuzi-Pongola (abandoned, 1927)
9. Never settled

resources and planes, could not hope to cover so large an area with D.D.T. spray. By the end of 1947, over 24,000 cattle were dead from *nagana*. Africans, understandably bitter because of their losses, correctly blamed the settlers and, although they did not receive it, demanded compensation.[65]

ACCUMULATION AND DISTRIBUTION

The two most important social mechanisms for the distribution of cattle in Zulu society were the institutions of *lobola* (*ukuLobola*: bridwealth exchange) and *sisa* (*ukuSisa:* the loaning out of cattle).[66] These practices remained important in modern Zululand because of their persistence and adaptation in the capitalist context.[67] The massively increased herds in Zululand were not equally distributed. The commoditisation of cattle and stock products reinforced and was reinforced by social stratification. More importantly, new cash demands and structural constraints changed the manner in which Africans accumulated stock, and therefore, their relative ability to do so. A rough breakdown of the accumulation of stock by class during this period shows the following: wealthy ruling elites received cattle through patronage, high *lobola* claims and natural increase; the poor barely maintained small herds against disease through occasional purchases or the *sisa* custom; the very poor relied on substitutes like goats or only *sisa* cattle.

That *lobola* should have survived at all in the face of repeated environmental assaults and the inclination of missionaries and the administration to abolish it needs some explanation. First, people responded quickly to any means for preserving and expanding the herds. Cattle were, at most times, accessible on the open market for those with cash. Africans still focussed on the accumulation of capital in stock because, as chief Manyala of Nkandhla argued, `Money is like the soil. It is easily washed away, but our cattle are always there.'[68] Moreover, while wage-labour enabled younger migrant males to acquire commodities outside the confines of rural patriarchy, they invested in cattle in order to secure themselves in the reserves through the socially accepted accumulation and circulation of livestock.[69] Second, the custom was adapted to maintain and enhance the position of the older men and the ruling elite in Zululand. Despite its concern about overstocking, the administration reluctantly accepted these processes in order to shore up the crumbling patriarchy. Third, congestion accelerated the deterioration of agriculture in the reserves tipping the balance of production in favour of cattle.[70] Overall, the persistence of practices favouring accumulation in cattle reflected a shift away from agricultural production in the reserves, partly because agriculture was more labour intensive than cattle-keeping, and partly because of the rise of white commercial grain-farming which undermined the sale of maize to stores by the Zulu (see below ch. on famine).

After 1900, the redistributive functions of *lobola* and *sisa* underwent dramatic changes both in form and content. Although continuity with the past was preserved through the largely ceremonial aspects of these practices, patterns of differentiation based on new adaptations were more apparent. Following the rinderpest epizootic most homesteads faced the arduous task of restocking. In the interim, people turned to substitutes for lobola. Goats, blankets, cash and metal implements were introduced into the exchange.[71] More often than not, however, people simply delayed the fulfilment of *lobola* until the family in question could recover from stock losses. The alternate items were viewed more as a gesture of goodwill and intention to deliver cattle than a complete payment. Once the herds had recovered, with the balance of distribution probably favouring the ruling elite, trends in accumulation established in the 1880s and 1890s accelerated.[72]

Under these circumstances inflationary local forces shaped the exchange of *lobola*. After 1900, the Zulu patriarchy demanded increasing numbers of cattle for *lobola* in order to redistribute migrants' earnings. The top limit of ten head for a commoner, although not intended to be the norm, became the rule, forcing young men to work longer to accumulate the necessary cash for cattle.[73] By the later 1920s, as the herds recovered, fathers increasingly demanded a return to the payment of *lobola* in cattle.[74] This reinforced the elders' control of migrant's earnings since the older generation controlled the grazing land needed to sustain cattle. As Murray and Harries have

argued, by setting the limit of bridewealth just beyond the easy reach of young men, elders and chiefs ensured their continued hold over the labouring youth.[75] These developments caused generational friction as some fathers reversed their customary role as purveyors of *lobola* cattle and appropriated their son's wage remittances to buy cattle for their own second wives.[76] Moreover, there was a tendency for fathers-in-law to demand payment of cattle in full prior to a marriage which delayed officially sanctioned marriages.[77]

By 1930, officials chastised fathers for demanding too high a number of cattle for *lobola*.[78] The limits established for *lobola* by the Natal Code of Native Law extended to Zululand were as follows: a maximum of ten head for a commoner; fifteen head for an *induna*; twenty head for an appointed chief and no limit for an hereditary chief.[79] Even Solomon acknowledged high claims were a result of fathers selecting for their daughters the man most able to pay.[80] The NC at Nongoma, a particularly well stocked district, stated that he had at least one case of a commoner claiming 25 head for his daughter.[81]

Chiefs were adamant that they should be allowed to set whatever level of *lobola* they liked.[82] Those who had obtained some form of official status within the administration, however, benefited most from the inflation of claims. Prior to the drought in 1931, some official *induna* claimed, and received, up to fifty head of cattle.[83]

Similarly, other petty officials took advantage of their dominant positions. The Natal Mercury claimed that,

> The police uniform also gives a Native a certain status, and in some cases an enterprising policeman has demanded, and received, an induna's lobola.[84]

By the mid-1930s, the NAD linked the perceived evils of overstocking directly to inflated *lobola* claims.[85] In an effort to reduce cattle numbers officials attempted to induce people to use a cash alternative for *lobola*, thereby removing a supposed motivation for maintaining large herds. Owing to the effects of rinderpest, the code of Native Law allowed for cash substitutes for *lobola* at a rate of £5 per head. At the turn of the century this rate was a fair reflection of the market value of cattle. By 1930, however, the market value had dropped to between £2 10s. and £3. Understandably, young men were reluctant to tender cash at the inflated rate when they could buy the necessary cattle at current market rates. The NC at Hlabisa believed that, in the few cases he knew of where the father had demanded the cash equivalent, the substitute defeated its intentions since the father could convert the £50 received for ten cattle into 16 or 17 head.[86]

There were class and generational differences of opinion over the proposed reduction of the cash value for *lobola* cattle among the Zulu. On the whole young male migrants favoured a reduction in the rate while older established men and the wealthier classes opposed any attempt to `cheapen' the custom. Chiefs claimed it would be retrogressive for them to accept less for their daughters

than they had `paid' for their wives, and that if the value of beasts were to be lowered then the number claimed had to go up.[87] When it was suggested that the object of lowering the rate was to help people in congested areas, they strongly objected to being placed on the same footing as Africans on white farms.[88] Furthermore, when officials reminded them of the difficulties experienced in ensuring cash remittances from migrant labourers, chiefs responded by stating that all *lobola* transactions should be made only in cattle and never in cash.[89] Rev. Timothy Mate, an African Zionist minister, pointed out the economic basis of the transactions in the modern context. Advocating the retention of the high rate, he noted that raising daughters was costly in terms of food and clothing and that these items were never going to be discounted by £2 at the stores.[90]

Conversely, young men and commoners complained that the £5 rate was far too high because the young cattle that fathers would accept instead of cash for *lobola* were not worth that amount, and most men earned less than £10 a year. The NC at Nongoma, apparently oblivious to the implications of these differences, and no doubt holding a firm belief in Zulu `traditionalism', summed up the opposing views:

> Curiously enough it was the uneducated men who said that £5 was too high a figure, and it was the Minister of religion who pleaded for that amount. It only goes to show that the so-called leaders of Native thought are often the most rapacious. I know of a famous religious leader who three or four years ago claimed and received 70 and 50 head of cattle respectively for two girls who were not in any way related to him, but who belonged to his church.[91]

Women, too, had a stake in maintaining higher rates for *lobola*. Many wives sought to control their share of cattle by manipulating *lobola* as they effectively managed the homesteads while the men were absent working.[92] By the 1930s, women in Zululand reinforced lobola as a means of maintaining or achieving status by making women from marriages unsanctioned by *lobola* objects of scorn and derision.[93] Moreover, chiefs' wives pressured their husbands to maintain high rates for the exchange in order to augment family herds. When chief Jantoni was pressed by the NC at Ubombo to explain why he was demanding 100 head of cattle for his daughter's *lobola*, he claimed it was his wives who demanded the high number since anything less would devalue their daughter, and by implication, the wives themselves.[94]

These attitudes helped to reinforc the trend towards the concentration of cattle in the upper strata of society through *lobola*-sanctioned marriages, although clearly even commoner fathers also benefitted. In part, the state played an important role in perpetuating this process by officially recognizing the high claims of chiefs and *induna*. Chief Gebemeweni of Mahlabatini, who had seven wives, reminded the government of the importance of maintaining this practice.

> I myself am still ready to take more wives. The Government should not object to that, because I should get children and these children will pay taxes and so increase revenue. With my seven wives I pay a lot of revenue to the Government, Sir.[95]

In August 1940, when the government was anxious over urban African opposition during the war, the NAD intended reducing the official value of *lobola* to £3 to fall in line with the recommendations of the Native Economic Commission.[96] In the face of `almost universal opposition from' Africans, however, the SNA reversed this decision stating that, `In these days we do not want to disturb the Native unnecessarily.'[97] Moreover, by the mid-1930s, the high rate was reinforced by official recognition that *induna* were not properly recompensed for their increased duties. The NAD felt that a combination of cash fees and high *lobola* were necessary to maintain *induna* as the administrative lynchpin of authority, especially in areas where there were fewer chiefs.[98] Clearly the ruling elite had convinced the state to maintain a mechanism which gave them a substantial portion of their income.

These conditions proved irksome to a number of men who claimed, but who by the 1940s, had little popular support or state recognition. Although there were no restrictions on the *lobola* they could claim, Mshiyeni and his brother, Pita kaDinuzulu complained that many fellow members of the royal family were classed as commoners for the purposes of *lobola*, and had to refuse, on pain of punishment, substantial offers of cattle for their daughters.[99] Mshiyeni also protested that the rate of two beasts set for seduction damages impinged on the `rights' of royalty to claim more. While the CNC, Lugg, recommended the NAD allow for higher claims in seduction cases involving royalty and families of rank, the NC at Nongoma warned against it.[100]

Zululand:

Population changes 1921-1946



Zululand:

Changes in cattle population 1921-1946



Noting the proliferation of claims to positions of rank in Zululand he argued:

> There are hundreds of members of the Zulu Royal house in Zululand and thousands of persons of rank in Zululand... Mshiyeni's proposal would not benefit anyone except the people of rank who would be enriched at the expense of the poorer people. It would only add to our overstocking problem, and would result in increased litigation and trouble. Such class distinction would be resented by the whole nation, and would be unfair.[101]

By 1948, other, less influential, men also faced official censure for `falsely representing' their status in order to receive more *lobola*. In Nquthu, chief Molife used his patronage to appoint a number of unofficial *induna* all of whom claimed high *lobola*. The NC was reprimanded for not having kept the matter in check and reminded that only officially recognized men should be allowed higher claims than commoners.[102]

SISA

While the herds increased and people appear to have had access to an `over-abundance' of cattle in Zululand, this did not mean equal ownership and full rights over stock.[103] Through the 1920s and 1930s, some families lost the battle to maintain any stock at all. By 1945, however, about 10 per cent of families in Nongoma and Nquthu, for example, were cattle owners. This suggests that, with an average of six or seven people per family, the majority of Zulu had access to cattle. Of this 10 per cent, nearly 40 per cent had more than 25 head while less than 7 per cent had fewer than five head which suggests that many owners in the

middling ranks held sustainable herds.[104] Nevertheless, there is evidence of an increase in the herds of the chiefly elite. Through the 1930s, the owners of increasingly large herds relied on the *sisa* practice of loaning out cattle to poor kin and commoners heavily, in part to make use of their labour for maintaining the herds in a reciprocal relation, and probably, in part, to ensure some degree of popular support.

In pre-colonial times, the *sisa* practice functioned for the mutual benefit of the owner and the recipient. Thus, the owner could amass larger herds than his family could ordinarily care for by exploiting the labour of other less wealthy families.[105] The caretakers benefited from milk while the cattle was under their care, and usually an *isiSinga* (literally a rope for tying up cattle but known as a gift of cattle) beast from the natural increase.[106] From this natural increase, a poorer family could build up a herd of its own. Ownership of the original cattle remained with the lender but long-term arrangements gave some security to the recipients. The practice also served as a safeguard against localised outbreaks of disease or drought by spreading the cattle over a number of different geographical zones. In the capitalist context, however, the reciprocal functions of the practice were undermined.

In twentieth-century Zululand, *sisa* lost its social dimension by taking on a more overtly exploitive role, and Zulu society perceived recipients of loaned-cattle as impoverished.[107] Implicit in the loaning out of cattle were

notions of charity and status associated with largesse.[108] The poor and cattle-less refugees ejected from white farms still received *sisa* cattle; now however, the retention of any natural increase was often contingent on a cash payment.[109] Chiefs with massive herds jealously guarded the productive and reproductive capacities of their cattle. Chief Mtubatuba reportedly owned 15,000 cattle which were spread out among his people. It was claimed, however, that commoners could not inspan the oxen lest they be overworked; that only the chief could slaughter the cattle for meat for himself; and that while his people could drink the milk, they could not retain hides or natural increase.[110]

With the advent of white settlement within and on the fringes of Zululand, *sisa* was no longer an exclusively African practice. Despite the political drive for segregation both nationally and locally, many whites were an integral part of the African cattle economy. When it suited them, they easily overcame their prejudice against `unhealthy' African-owned cattle, to take advantage of both labour clientage and grazing in the reserves. The *sisa* practice provided a convenient legal and social precedent for whites to gain access to these productive assets. A number of cash-strapped white families could not afford to employ labour for cattle herding or to pay the NAD's fees for grazing and dipping cattle in the reserves.[111] Other whites simply did not have access to enough varied grazing land in the areas of white settlement. The delimitation of Zululand had cut both ways in restricting access to

pastures. Thus, whites turned to Africans who were entitled to use free grazing land in the reserves, and, more importantly, who could provide free labour to care for their cattle-herding.

By the mid-1920s, substantial numbers of white-owned cattle were under African care in the northern districts. Close to 3,000 head of white-owned cattle were spread out over Mahlabatini, Hlabisa and Ubombo and a further 3,500 were grazed in Nongoma alone.[112] Concern about pasture degradation led the NAD to eject these cattle to `save' Africans from their own `folly' in allowing them in.[113] The underlying motive was to reduce the number of white-owned cattle cared for by Africans which were being dipped at the expense of the NAD.

Understandably, Africans were reluctant to admit they were in possession of white-owned *sisa* stock and the practice went largely unreported. Administrative caution meant officials were hesitant to interfere with a custom accepted by the people and codified in `Native Law' since the Shepstone era.[114] Initially, the NAD was prepared to make exceptions for cases in which *sisa* cattle were found to be `essential to the welfare' of a family.[115] In 1931, however, as concern over erosion increased, the CNC promulgated much stricter regulations against the practice and encouraged chiefs and *induna* to turn in fellow reserve dwellers if they had white-owned *sisa* stock `in excess' of an area's carrying capacity.[116] Once again, the ruling elite were favoured: *sisa* cattle considered `excessive'

were white-owned and not theirs. In 1932, in Nongoma alone, whites were forced to remove over 3,000 head of cattle which they had loaned to impoverished inhabitants.117 By 1950, officials had ejected all white-owned cattle and closed the area to any more loaned herds.118

CATTLE SALES

The transformation of cattle exchange from a form of barter to a saleable commodity accelerated the gulf in its differentiated ownership. Setswana sophistry put it succinctly: `money eat cattle'.[119] The introduction of direct cash costs to cattle-keeping and the manipulation of social institutions surrounding cattle changed the value of stock in the capitalist context. Few people could look to herding as a means of accumulating wealth although it was a mainstay of subsistence. The accumulation of cattle increasingly depended on differentiated access to diminishing resources. The commoditisation of cattle not only intensified conditions of impoverishment for Africans, it reflected wider processes of stratification. For large herd owners the sale of cattle was an entrée into the market and enabled them to purchase goods; for the rank and file it was a last resort in the struggle to resist dislocation from the rural economy.

It is difficult to trace the first occasion when Africans in Zululand sold cattle for cash on a wide-scale. Certainly barter and exchange relations based on cattle pre-dated the colonial era.[120] Initially white store-keepers in the reserves bartered cattle against grain. However, limitations on grazing when store-sites were leased prevented store-keepers from dealing in large numbers of cattle. The advent of cash markets for stock added a new dimension to the cattle economy by redirecting `surpluses' outside the local economy. Moreover, the administration's

demand for tax to be paid in cash rather than in goods from 1896, forced many families to sell off the occasional beast.[121] Certainly the development of road and rail infrastructure aided the movement of cattle for sale. A testimony to both the value of African-owned cattle and the demands of the expanding regional economy was that, in essence, the market came to Zululand rather than that Africans sought the market.

It was not until Solomon began his notorious cattle collections in the late 1920s that regular markets for Zulu cattle developed, however. His ambiguous dependence on the outside world extended beyond the white state. Through the later 1910s and 1920s, he was embroiled in a series of embarrassing financial dealings. Through the convergence of the mostly self-interested motives of the emerging petty bourgeois and members of the Zulu royal family, Solomon began a series of cattle and cash collections under the auspices of the nationalist organization *Inkatha kaZulu*.[122] Invoking the custom of royal tribute grounded in a long history of chiefly exactions, Solomon was able to service his mounting debt through the offerings of the Zulu `nation'. The administration, however, fearing a recrudescence of Zulu royal power, considered his actions to be a dangerous manipulation of `tradition'.

> He has been allowed to act in a manner which would not be tolerated in the case of any other official, European or Native. I refer to the many levies made by him on the Zulu Nation. There is no precedent for these levies... A general levy on the Nation was never resorted to. The practice that has sprung up is, therefore, an entirely new one.[123]

From the mid-1920s until 1932 some thousands of head of cattle and over £20,000 in cash was collected, most of which went to maintain Solomon's decadent lifestyle.[124] Although local officials derided the cattle offered as `scrub', la Hausse has remarked the subscriptions were a `...remarkable testimony [to] the willingness of drought-stricken Zulu commoners to respond to the appeals of the Zulu Royal House.'[125] The cash value of this collected cattle was never realised by the subscribers and so did not constitute a real participation in the market. What was significant for commoners was the advent of a number of white and African cattle speculators, associated with the royal collections, who fuelled cattle sales.

Central to Solomon's collections and general cattle speculation in Zululand was A. S. Blackhurst. Appointed as court messenger to the royal house in 1928, he established a hides and skins business in the reserves and developed this into a thriving livestock trade. Blackhurst, was `... a peculiarly unsavoury individual who had an intimate knowledge of Solomon's precarious financial position'.[126] Along with other, perhaps somewhat less predatory, white traders, he established a network for the purchase of cattle from cash-strapped Africans.[127] Blackhurst gained legitimacy and access to Zulu cattle not only through connections to the royal house but also through alliances with a number of calculating African entrepreneurs. Men like Petros Maling, the founder of Abaqulusi Land Union, Simpson Bhengu and Gideon Msimang exhibited remarkable energy in scouring the reserves for people willing to sell

cattle.[128] After Solomon's death in 1933, the combined efforts of these men remained focussed on Zululand's cattle as they transformed the cattle collections into widespread small-scale purchases.

While a number of itinerant traders and speculators worked the kraals and dipping tanks of southern and central Zululand, Blackhurst concentrated on his established territory, the northern districts. He set up the `Zulu Cattle Trust Fund' more commonly known as the `cattle bank'. [129] An insidious variant of established speculating practice, the `cattle bank' was Blackhurst's own modification of his earlier collections for Solomon. Under the scheme, he promised money to any `subscriber' who placed cattle in his care for later sale. The purported advantage of this plan was that the cattle could be fattened for sale on the better pastures of Blackhurst's Melmoth farm. Complications arose when Blackhurst experienced highly suspect `cash flow' problems and claimed he was unable to pay out the promised money. A number of subscribers sued him for failure to fulfil his contract and won their cases.[130] Under fire from the local NC, and threatened with prosecution, Blackhurst nevertheless continued his dubious practice.[131]

Despite their often tenuous financial dealings and the decided antipathy of the NAD, (which was latterly partly because of its introduction of cattle auctions, see below) cattle speculators thrived in Zululand. Part of the reason for their success was the impoverishment of many

homesteads. Speculators, in general, and Blackhurst in particular, were well poised to take advantage of the devastating effects of the drought and famine which hit Zululand in the early 1930s. The latter freely admitted that his `bank' had its origins in the depression and famine. Claiming that he provided a ready market for the very poor class of Zulu `scrub' cattle he argued:

> Long before any move was made by the [NAD], their stock, which had become a liability, or at least a potential loss [became] a profit to themselves and of course to me.... In the absence of any adequate demand for labour, the natives have only their cattle as a means of discharging their obligations. Many natives have no cattle fit for the Government sales, and it is the natives with the scrub cattle, whom I have specially catered for all along.[132]

Moreover, an important reason why the Zulu turned to the speculators was that they occasionally traded younger cattle in their reproductive prime, often in a two to one ratio, to Africans for older but heavier oxen which could be sold easily to the abattoirs for slaughter.[133] This allowed the Zulu to increase the reproductive capacity of their herds in less time than normal natural increases would provide for.

Support for the speculators was also based on political affiliations and cleavages in Zulu society. The ruling elite, who associated with Blackhurst because of his proximity to Solomon, maintained their patronage, partly as a form of opposition to the government. Thus, Mnyaiza Zulu, one of Solomon's chief advisers firmly supported Blackhurst, while Mabhoko Ntshangase, formerly a distinguished Zulu general, expressed resentment at the

local NC's exhortations to abandon Blackhurst in favour of NAD sales:

> You are speaking to us as if we were on a par with those people who hide away in the forests from their tax obligations, knowing quite well that we have endured a very severe time of food scarcity, and shortage of money and means generally. We don't like this kind of threatened expression- to be grabbed by the throats in this way and told the law will be put in motion against us. [echoing Blackhurst] I personally have no sons worth talking about- my children are my cattle and long before the Government came to our assistance we had been associated with a European in this very effort to get money.[134]

Speculators often offered the only ready market for Zulu cattle considered to be unfit for normal markets.[135] A co-operative scheme for selling cattle direct to the Durban abattoir, set up by Gideon Msimang with E. N. Braatvedt's support, was undermined, for example, by the rejection of many diseased cattle.[136] Similarly, Mr. D. Pretorius, an agent for the Union Cold Storage Company in Durban, was frustrated in fulfilling a large contract for the Italian Army with Zululand cattle as they were found to be underweight.[137] Moreover, speculators saved people from having to drive their cattle long distances across possibly infected areas to a rail-head or an auction site.

By the early 1930s, both African- and white-owned cattle from Zululand were stigmatised for originating in `Black Areas'.[138] Sellers often incurred an added capitation fee from the abattoir to cover potential losses from beef measles or had consignments rejected out of hand.[139] At least Blackhurst was prepared to accept `poor' cattle and fatten them himself. Furthermore, he had access to grazing

farms in the Vryheid district and so could obfuscate the origins of his consignments.[140]

CATTLE AUCTIONS

The widespread sale of cattle by Africans intensified during the serious drought and depression of the early 1930s. A combination of reduced labour demand, crop failures and general economic distress forced many homesteads to sell cattle to meet subsistence needs. In the early phase of the severe drought in 1931, however, local traders were unwilling to take emaciated cattle for maize, fearing they would have difficulty selling them while prices were down.[141] Africans immediately felt the pinch. Rugeni Ndwandwe, an *induna* in Nongoma, protested that, `Unless the authorities give us a good market for our cattle, all the gaols will be full.'[142] The failure of private enterprise to meet the demands of the crisis forced the NAD to consider alternative means of getting cash and therefore food into African hands.[143]

Following the lead set by white speculators and African entrepreneurs, the Department turned to auctions as a means of reducing cattle numbers. Braatvedt's involvement in Msimang's co-operative marketing scheme proved to an influential official that Africans were willing to sell independently of local speculators.[144] Apparently a number of the aspiring petty bourgeois were no longer prepared to suffer the vagaries of Blackhurst's operation. The CNC, J.M. Young, endorsed Braatvedt's enthusiastic suggestion

that they hold their own sales since government auctions neatly coincided with administrative desires to wrest control of the `surplus' productivity of Zululand away from an independent free market which, it believed, undermined its control of the Zulu, and to save the reserves from erosion.[145]

In late 1931, Braatvedt organized and vociferously promoted NAD sales for African-owned cattle in Nongoma. He was convinced that the people would turn out in large numbers to sell their stock, at least as long as the famine lasted.[146] Indeed, by the end of the winter, over 1,300 head had been offered. Prices, however, were low, averaging £2.4.9. a head and only 224 cattle were sold.[147] Undaunted by the poor results, the NC rationalised the situation by pointing out that few buyers had actually turned up and people had offered only thin `scrub' cattle.[148] It was clear that if the auctions were to succeed officials would have to persuade Africans to sell some of their best cattle at government sales and to persuade whites to attend the remote sales and consider thinner and presumably cheaper stock.

It was difficult for the NAD to achieve these aims considering the level of competition which surrounded cattle production in the Union. With the introduction of the Beef Bounties Act in 1923, aimed at improving cattle for the international export market by preventing the importation of underweight stock from neighbouring countries, white-stock farming in South Africa entered a

protectionist period which was intensified by the depression.[149] By the later 1920s, the department of agriculture hoped to eradicate all `scrub' stock held by both whites and Africans.[150]

Paradoxically, during the 1920s, whites struggling to improve their livestock, perceived African-owned cattle as both a commercial threat in a developing but tenuous market and a health threat to white-owned European breeds of cattle. Whites tended to favour cross-breeds of Hereford and Africander cattle which achieved weights which were 250 lbs. greater than most African breeds except for select herds of Zulu *nyonikayiphumuli* (white cattle principally held by the royal family).151 During the 1930s, as agricultural officials recommended areas of northern Zululand for the expansion of white cattle farming, settlers placed an even greater emphasis on segregating white- and African-owned herds, which were increasingly perceived to be the source of `scrub' breeds and disease.[152] This did not prevent speculators from purchasing reserve cattle, however, and re-selling it as white-owned cattle once it had been moved to a white farm and fattened.[153]

By the 1930s, agricultural officials were concerned with more than the threat that African-owned cattle posed to white marketing. They believed that the dramatic increases in African herds undermined the land's carrying capacity and threatened the reserve economy.[154] Veterinarians, moreover, argued that while more African `scrub' cattle

survived drought and disease than European breeds, they were carriers of infection and produced less milk.[155] Although African-owned cattle may have carried disease, the Zulu knew that their animals had resistance to disease and that larger numbers of cattle provided more milk than a few select ones.[156]

A number of factors undermined the state auctions. First, Africans were decidedly disappointed in the prices offered. It seemed pointless undertaking an arduous trek to the sales to be insulted with bids of under £4 for an ox which they felt should have fetched £10 or even £25.[157] Secondly, a brief respite in the drought allowed for a better maize and corn crop in 1932 thus reducing cash demands for food. Thirdly, and most importantly in the eyes of the NAD, Blackhurst and his cohorts were thought to be undermining the sales. Rumours circulated that the government would charge a 6s. penalty for any head of cattle offered and not sold and that if people did not respond willingly to the NAD sales they would be forced to sell later for lower prices.[158] Finally, the NAD linked African fears of prosecution and the attachment of cattle for failure to pay taxes to the poor support for auctions.[159]

The auctions picked up considerably in 1933. The numbers of cattle offered and sold increased dramatically, and a higher proportion of the cattle presented by Africans was sold.[160] This was due both to the improved condition of cattle offered and the willingness of Africans to accept lower prices. More significantly, it was a reflection of

more desperate financial need. Indeed, a graph of cattle sales for the Nongoma district reads like a time-line of economic distress. People sold heavily during the winter months when food was scarce. Sales fell off considerably during both the planting season and in periods when food was more abundant.[161] Africans nevertheless responded shrewdly to the market. During the mild drought of 1935, when cattle prices were up and disease less prevalent, the NC at Nongoma commented that

> Surprisingly the enterprising Zulu managed to produce many animals which were quite fat having been grazed in the lower Ivuna and Mkuze valleys.[162]

No records of the number of sellers and how many cattle each offered were kept. Some indication of how widespread participation was can be gleaned from the comment of the Zululand Cattle Auction Committee that at the original Mona sales over 1,200 cattle were offered, `by almost as many sellers'.[163] The picture is further complicated by the changing ownership of herds, however. As we have seen, by 1945, 10.5 per cent (just over 3,000 people) in Nongoma actually owned cattle.[164] As a general rule, people offered cattle for sale in proportion to their holdings. Thus, while small herd owners probably only sold infrequently or in dire circumstances, those commoners with five to twenty-five head, and chiefs and *induna* with larger herds probably sold more regularly. It would appear, then, that those selling at the auctions were among the middle and upper ranks of the cattle-owning classes. Commoner families with smaller herds, however, probably sold, on occasion, to local farmers and speculators. While there was a slightly

more equal distribution of cattle in the early 1930s, with most if not all families owning at least a few head, and more commoners sold stock during the depression, the auctions were best supported by government-appointed chiefs and *induna* while Solomon, the royal family and chief Bokwe of the Mandlakazi, who were probably the largest herd-owners, preferred to deal with Blackhurst.[165]

The auctions had an uneven effect on the local economy. Only those with cattle could benefit directly. Increasingly, many families had to meet regular cash demands through migrant wage labour. When the NAD extended the sales to southern Zululand, it met the concerns of local whites with ironic assurances.

> Farmers should not be apprehensive that their labour supply will be adversely affected. Labour agents in Nongoma district state that the labour supply has, if anything, improved since the sales were introduced - probably because the Native begins to aspire to a better standard of living, and because the people are better fed and consequently in better physical condition.[166]

While the auctions did mean the infusion of substantial amounts of cash into the local economy it did not reach all impoverished commoners. Between the start of the sales and the middle of 1933, sales revenue amounted to £4355. By 1937, the sales were bringing in well over £25,000 a year.[167] Braatvedt, however, mistakenly attributed high rates of tax collection and the reduction of the mealie debt to these sales.[168] On the contrary, most of the debt repayment and taxation were met by increased labour migration.[169] Nevertheless, the NC eulogised the effects of the sales:

> From being the worst tax paying District in Natal, Nongoma has become the best. We have paid off £10,000 of our mealie [maize] debt, and the whole of Solomon's levy [over £4,000 assigned to the Usuthu by the NAD after it covered his debts]. The result is more contentment, a better fed people, and a better feeling between European and Native.[170]

In fact, as Cope has shown, it was the NAD itself which came to the rescue of the Usuthu and wrote off much of the `tribal levy' in 1937, although much of the maize debt remained.[171] Moreover, Braadvedt admitted that the majority of cattle sold came from chiefs, the large herd owners who `did not need to sell at all'.[172] Since it was the impoverished cattle-less Zulu who incurred most of the maize debt, the sales could not have helped them.

The NAD was so convinced of the value of the Braatvedt's sales that it rapidly extended them to the southern districts, where problems of congestion and overstocking were at their worst, and later to Natal and the Transvaal in a country-wide effort to reduce overstocking.[173] While these auctions failed to attract any significant support, the NAD's persistence indicates a rather desperate attempt to provide some material viability to African rural areas.

By 1935, auction yards had been erected in Eshowe, Nquthu, Nkandhla and Melmoth. Overall, the sales were a complete failure in these districts. Most people sold directly to speculators and butchers who had easy road access to the southern reserves.[174] The advantage that the NAD had of securing a relaxation of East Coast Fever restrictions for their sales was lost when butchers bought and slaughtered

stock in the reserves and simply removed the meat.[175] White stock-farmers in the inland districts often bartered mealies directly for African-owned cattle. Many people in Nquthu and Nkandhla were scared off from the government auctions by the threat of prosecution for tax-default.[176] Through the 1940s, despite persistent efforts to increase sales the auctions failed to achieve the stated goal of reducing stock numbers. Although higher prices prevailed during World War II, in 1946, after a serious drought and disease with the consequent loss of over 20,000 head of cattle, sales dropped until the herds recovered.[177] The introduction of an auction tax of 6s. per head in 1945 did not help the sales.[178] Moreover, by the mid-1940s, polarisation between Africans and the state had increased. Braatvedt, exhibiting the typical hostility of Natal officials to African politicians, claimed that the poor attendance at the sales was a result of `The ill-will towards the White man which is being preached in season and out by prominent Native leaders.' and that:

> One is frequently met with the argument that the encouragement given to cattle sales is for the purpose of impoverishing the Native by depriving him of his cattle and land. [179]

The failure of the auctions should be seen in the context of the state's underlying desire to contain Zulu cattle and prevent erosion. Moreover, the total market for African-owned cattle has also to be taken into consideration. There was an increase in the number of speculators circulating through the reserves and redirecting the sale of cattle into private hands when the auctions slumped.[180] Moreover, the Zulu believed that speculators had no agenda other than

the profit motive, to purchase African-owned cattle. It is not possible to gauge the total off-take of cattle through sales in Zululand without accurate figures for private sales. Overall, the numbers sold, slaughtered or lost to drought and disease did not keep pace with the rates of natural increase, however.[181]

The evidence suggests that, even at their peak, cattle sales in Zululand never threatened to undermine herd maintenance. During the 1930s and 1940s, the number of cattle sold in the drier low-potential grazing areas of Nongoma, Hlabisa and Ubombo averaged around 6 to 8 per cent of the total herds in these districts.[182] According to model herd projections developed for East African pastoralism, this level of sale does not usually cause an overall reduction in herd size unless severe drought or disease strike.[183] In southern Zululand, where auctions were poorly supported, sales constituted less than 0.5 per cent of local herds.[184]

Moreover, the bulk of the cattle offered for sale consisted of animals which were not crucial either to the reproduction of the herds or the provision of milk. In Nongoma, for example (the only district for which there are accurate figures), between 1934 and 1948, only between 1 and 3 per cent of cattle sold at the NAD auctions were heifers with the potential to calve in the next few years. Close to 60 per cent of the animals sold were older slaughter and draught oxen; these fetched the best sale prices at Durban abattoirs. The remaining animals sold were

split equally between older cows, bulls and `tollies' (young, un-castrated males).[185] For the whole of Zululand, available figures for the period 1945-1950 suggest that mature slaughter oxen and older cows constituted the bulk of sales, ranging from 60 to 80 per cent of animals sold. Heifers and `tollies' never accounted for more than 15 per cent of cattle sold and were usually about 5 to 10 per cent of animals offered.[186]

It was unlikely that, apart from a few wealthy chiefs, the Zulu gained any ground in their struggle against impoverishment through the sale of cattle. Sales were, on the one hand, a means to delay or escape entering into wage labour for a very few. Most families, however, could not count on establishing ownership of their own viable and reproducing herd from which to make regular sales to meet cash needs. On the other hand, chiefs, *induna* and men of status could generate substantial incomes from the sale of cattle without undermining their herds. The overall trend was for the vast majority of Zulu to get poorer while the few who owned cattle got richer.

[1] For increases in cattle numbers see the statistical appendix. Similar cases of herd growth have been considered in G. Dahl and A. Hjort, *Having Herds. Pastoral Herd Growth and Household Economy* (Stockholm, 1976) and I. Scoones, `Why Are There So Many Animals? Cattle Population Dynamics in the Communal Areas of Zimbabwe', in R. Behnke, I Scoones and C. Kerven, *Range Ecology at Disequilibrium* (O.D.I., London, 1993), pp. 62-76.

[2] J. Ferguson, `The Bovine Mystique: Power, Property and Livestock in Rural Lesotho', *Man*, Vol. 20, 1985, pp. 647-674, `The Cultural Topography of Wealth: Commodity Paths and the Structure of Property in Rural Lesotho', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 94, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 55-73 and *The anti-politics machine: Development, depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 171-193. See also J. and J. Comaroff, `"How Beasts Lost Their Legs": Cattle in Tswana Economy and Society', in G. Galaty and P. Bonte, *Herders, Warriors and Traders*, (Oxford, 1991), pp. 33-61. For an excellent review of the recent literature on pastoralism see D. Anderson, `Cow Power: Livestock and the Pastoralist in Africa' *AA*, Vol. 92, No. 366, Jan. 1993, pp. 121-134.

[3] See Dahl and Hjort, *Having Herds*, p. 17 and Z. Konczacki, *The Economics of Pastoralism* (London, 1978), pp. 40-53.

[4] Brookes and Hurwitz, *Natal Regional Survey, Vol.* 7, p. 28.

[5] See Dahl and Hjort, *Having Herds*, p. 259 and D. Tapson, `Biological Sustainability in Pastoral Systems: The Kwazulu case', in Scoones, Behnke and Kerven, *Range Ecology*, pp. 118-135 and `The Overstocking and Offtake Controversy Reexamined for the case of KwaZulu', O.D.I., *Pastoral Development Network Paper*, No. 31A, July 1991. For cattle immunity to disease see P. Cranefield, *Science and Empire: East Coast Fever in Rhodesia and The Transvaal* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 341, fn. No. 21. See also below and appendix.

[6] J. Guy, `Destruction and Reconstruction' and R. Packard, `Maize, Cattle and Mosquitoes: The Political Economy of Malaria Epidemics in Colonial Swaziland', *JAH*, No. 25, 1984, pp. 189-212.

[7] See for example H. Curson `Meteorological Conditions and the Seasonal Prevalence of Nagana in Zululand' *SAJS*, Vol 24, pp. 377-381, editorial, `Tsetse fly and Nagana in Zululand', *DAJ*, Vol. 10, 1925, pp. 417-420, J. Ford, *The Role of Trypanosomiasis in African Ecology: A study of the Tsetse Fly Problem* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 481-82, Cranefield, *Science*, pp. 10-12, 225-235, G. De Kock, C. Van Heerden and R. Du Toit, `Bovine Theileriasis in South Africa', *OJVSAI*, Vol. 8 No. 1, 1937, pp. 90-128, W. Morrison, P. Lalor, B. Goddeeris and A.J. Teale. `Theileriasis: Antigens and Host-

Parasite Interactions' in T.W. Pearson (ed.), *Parasite Antigens: Towards New Strategies for Vaccines* (New York, 1986), pp. 167-206 and S. Rolando 'The Development of and Response to Veterinary Services in Natal, 1874-1903.' M.A. Thesis, Natal 1990.

[8] Colonial Office, Colony of Natal, original correspondence, (C.O. 179) Vol 212/21864, confidential, 7 June 1900. For impact of rinderpest on southern Africa see C. van Onselen, Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa, 1896-97', *JAH*, Vol 13, 1972, pp. 473-488, and C. Ballard, `The Repercussions of Rinderpest: Cattle, Plague and Peasant Decline in Colonial Natal.' *IJAHS*, Vol 19, no 3, 1986, pp.421-450.

[9] See ch. 1.

[10] See the special edition of *JSAS* on conservation edited by W. Beinart and especially his `Soil Conservation and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900-1960', Vol. 11, No. 1, Oct. 1984, pp. 52-84 and D. Anderson and R. Grove, *Conservation in Africa* (Cambridge, 1987). For the world-wide concern over erosion see G.V. Jacks and R.O. Whyte, *The Rape of the Earth: A World Survey of Soil Erosion* (London, 1939).

[11] See below ch. on betterment.

[12] See for example the introduction to Behnke, Scoones and Kerven, *Range Ecology* and T. Driver, `Overgrazing and Land Degradation in the Communal Areas of Zimbabwe' unpublished paper in the author's possession.

[13] For contemporary accounts of these developments see C.O. 879/115, 1024, Sir Rider Haggard's letter to Lewis Harcourt, M.P., on his tour through Zululand and Rhodesia, 1 June 1914 and S. P. Hyatt *The Old Transport Road* (London, 1914), pp. 160-175. For the increased levels of potential infection see Cranefield, *Science*, pp. 19-21.

[14] CNC 186, 1513/14, 16 Oct. 1914, Report on DNC Gibson`s tour through Zululand. See also Bill Guest, `The New Economy' in Duminy and Guest, *Natal and Zululand*, p. 317 and Brookes and Webb, *A History of Natal*, p. 215.

[15] NNAC, p.879.

[16] See for example NNAC the evidence of Chief Mtshana, pp. 875-896. During epizootics Africans ate the meat of cattle killed by disease even after several days and the meat reportedly had a flavour similar to `high' game. See Zululand Government House Records [ZGH] Vol 775, Z154/97, C.R. Saunders to Governor, Natal, 27 Feb. 1897.

[17] See De Kock, Van Heerden and Du Toit, `Bovine Theileriasis', p. 15. Similar claims were made about bovine

tuberculosis. See B. Sampson, `Bovine Tuberculosis in relation to Man', *SAMJ*, Vol. 8 Nov. 1934, pp. 842-845.

[18] CNC 115A, N8/15/2 (22), CNC to all NCs, 12 June 1912.

[19] For similar popular resentment in the Transkei see C. Bundy, `"We don't want your rain, we won't dip" Popular Opposition, Collaboration and the Social Control Movement in the Anti-dipping Movement, c. 1908-16', in Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, pp. 191-221.

[20] See Resident Magistrate and Native Commissioner's files, Nongoma, [1/NGA], 3/3/1/1, 16/4, file on hut tax collections for 1916, and CNC to all Magistrates, 13 April 1915 and CNC 115A, N8/15/2 (22), CNC to SNA, 21 Dec. 1939.

[21] See NEC, evidence of Frederick Rodseth, Inspector of Native Reserves for Zululand, p.1965-66. A similar pattern was established in Pondoland around the same time. See Beinart, *Pondoland*, p.156.

[22] 1/NGA, 3/3/2/4, 2/10/2, NC to Veterinary Officer, 25 Nov. 1935.

[23] See CNC 113A, N8/15/2 (X), 103/1, Rodseth to CNC, 25 Jan. 1926.

[24] CNC 48A, N8/20/3/(18), 42/12, NC, W. Boast to CNC, 21 Nov. 1928, and NC Eshowe to veterinary department, 12 Dec. 1930.

[25] Ibid, Boast to CNC, 21 Nov. 1928.

[26] See CNC 114A, N8/15/2 (X), II, Senior Veterinary Officer to CNC, 25 Jan. 1938. The Cattle free zone was established in 1935.

[27] CNC 114A, N8/15/2 (18), 103/38, NC Mack to CNC, 6 Sept. 1938.

[28] For a full exploration of the relative virtues of `scientific' and indigenous African methods of agriculture and stock keeping see P. Richards, *Indigenous Agricultural Revolution. Ecology and Food Production in West Africa* (London, 1985).

[29] CNC 85A, N1/1/4 (X), part III, notes of meeting of CNC and NC, J. Ashdown of Mahlabatini with chiefs of the district, 17 May 1934.

[30] See for example CNC 105A, N2/11/2, 84/1, Part I, NAD Engineer to CNC, 21 June 1937.

[31] See 1/NQU, 2/4/1/4, 2/40/2, Annual Reports 1923-39, Report for Jan. 1924.

[32] See H. Curson, `Studies in Native Animal Husbandry', No. 13, *OJVSAI*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Oct. 1935, pp. 531-535 and Cranefield, *Science*, pp. 225-227.

[33] See NEC, evidence of Wheelwright, p.1733.

[34] See for example 1/NGA, 3/3/2/3, 2/8/3, NC's meetings with chiefs, Nov. 1933 and CNC 85A, N1/1/4 (X), part III, A. Rowe, Secretary of The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) to CNC, 21 Sept. 1935 and article in the *Natal Mercury* of 15 Sept. 1935.

[35] See A. Theiler, `Experiments to determine the safe dose of white arsenic dip' *DAJ*, Vol 3, 1912, pp. 321-351 (Theiler was responsible for discovering most of the epidemiology of the fever) and D. Steyn and P. Bekker, `The toxicity of some dipping fluids containing arsenic and sulphur.', *OJVSAI*, Vol. 11, No. 1, July 1938, pp. 247-262.

[36] See CNC 40A, N3/7/2 (29), NC's meeting with residents of chief Mfungelwa's ward, Eshowe, 27 July 1931.

[37] See 1/NGA, 3/3/2/11, 2/91, NC's Report for 1928.

[38] See CNC 115A, N8/15/2 (41), NC to Stock Inspector, 9 Nov. 1932. Senior Veterinary Officer, Natal to CNC, 10 July 1933.

[39] Ibid CNC to Senior Veterinary Officer, 8 June, 1932 and Senior Veterinary Officer, Natal to CNC, 10 July 1933.

[40] NTS 10318, 2/427, Secretary for Agriculture to SNA, 7 Oct. 1930.

[41] Ibid, CNC to SNA, 15 March 1933.

[42] 1/NQU, 2/4/1/4, 2/40/2, Annual Reports 1923-39, Report for 1938 and 1/NGA, 3/3/2/9, 2/37/2, comment of Mbangomunyi at chiefs' meeting, July 1938.

[43] See the *Natal Witness*, 18 July 1938 and 10 Aug. 1938.

[44] See A.T. Bryant, *The Zulu People as they were Before the White Man Came*, Second Edition (Pietermaritzburg, 1967), pp 10, 108-111. See also article entitled `Tsetse Fly in Zululand by C. Fuller, *Farmer's Weekly*, 29 April 1925, excerpts of which can be found in CAD Department of [White] Lands, Natal [LDE-N] Vol. 8546.

[45] W. Allan, *The African Husbandman* (Westport, 1965), p. 168.

[46] See Ford, *Trypanosomiasis*, pp. 6-8 and for the Zululand case pp. 481-82.

[47] See H. Curson, `Meteorological'. Onderstepoort, the

Government Veterinary lab in Pretoria, was instrumental in studies which helped to control cattle disease in South Africa.

[48] See Ford, *Trypanosomiasis*, pp. 456-457.

[49] See LDE-N, 745, 856, Curson to Director of Agriculture, 29 Sept. 1928, Secretary for Lands to Secretary of Agriculture, 17 Oct. 1928, and *Natal Witness*, 17 Nov. 1928, 12 June 1930.

[50] See Province of Natal, Report of the Game Reserves Commission (Pietermaritzburg 1935), p.2. (A copy of this report is contained in CNC 6A, 3/8/3/(X)) and CNC 60A, 3/8/3/(X), NC Nongoma to CNC, 18 July 1932.

[51] See the *Natal Mercury*, 5 Sept. 1928.

[52] CNC 60A, 3/8/3/(X), NC to CNC, 3 Sept. 1936.

[53] Ibid, NC Ubombo to CNC, 16 Nov. 1932.

[54] Ibid, H. Curson's report to Department of Agriculture, 29 Sept. 1928.

[55] LDE-N 745, 856, Curson, to Department of Agriculture, 29 Sept. 1928.

[56] Letter from Harry Sparks to the *Natal Mercury*, 9 Oct. 1928, contained in LDE-N 745, 8546. This point was supported by the Inspector of [white] Lands in a 1936 report on the Zululand settlements. See LDE-N 37A, 307/11, 20 July 1937, p. 7.

[57] See LDE-N 745, 8546, Nagana in Zululand 1925-38, Minute by the white Inspector of Lands, Eshowe, 9 Aug. 1927 and map of tsetse infestation.

[58] The powerful players behind the Union Government's support of the Zululand settlers were the rural farm lobby and in particular the influential M.P. for Zululand, G. Heaton Nicholls. See chp. on labour, A. Jeeves, `The Zululand Sugar Planters, The Gold Mines and the Scramble for Labour in South East Africa, 1906-1940', Paper delivered at the CAAS Conference, Toronto, May, 1991, and Marks, *Ambiguities*, f.n. 18, p. 132 and her `Natal, The Zulu Royal Family'. See also G. Heaton Nicholls, *South Africa in My Time* (London, 1961).

[59] Ibid, Secretary for Lands to Secretary for Agriculture, 17 Oct. 1928. A severe flood in 1925 followed by drought and a locust attack destroyed in 1928 the tenuous cotton farms in these areas.

[60] See CNC 60A, 3/8/3/(X), Provincial Representative of the Department of Lands, Natal to Provincial Secretary, 25 Aug.

1936.

[61] See the *Natal Witness*, 12 June 1930.

[62] See CNC 6A, 3/8/3/(X), *Report of the Game Reserves Commission, 1935* (Pietermaritzburg, 1935) and *Natal Mercury*, 23 May 1929 and 30 Sept. 1929.

[63] See the *Natal Mercury*, 29 Oct. 1942.

[64] Ibid.

[65] *Natal Mercury*, 3 May and 13 May 1946.

[66] This chapter does not attempt to deal with the complexities and changes in family structure in modern Zululand. For the purposes of this analysis the most important works are: J.L. Comaroff (ed.) ,*The Meaning of Marriage Payments* (London, 1980); A. Kuper, *Wives for Cattle: Bridewealth and Marriage in Southern Africa* (London, 1982); E. J. Krige, *The Social System of the Zulus* (Pietermaritzburg, 1950); H.J. Simons, *African Women: Their Legal Status in South Africa* (London, 1968) and especially, C. Murray, *Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho* (London, 1981), ch. 6. Contemporary accounts include: H.C. Lugg, `The practice of Lobola in Natal', *AS*, Vol 4, No. 1, March 1945, pp. 23-27 and H.P. Braatvedt, `Zulu Marriage Customs and Ceremonies', *SAJS*, Vol. 24, 1927, pp. 553-65.

[67] See Murray, `Marital Strategy in Lesotho: The Redistribution of Migrant Earnings', *AS*, Vol. 35, no 2, 1976, pp. 99-121; `High Bridewealth, Migrant Labour and the Position of Women in Lesotho' *JAL*, Vol 21, no 1, 1977, pp. 79-96 and `Migrant Labour and Changing Family Structure in the Rural Periphery of Southern Africa', *JSAS*, Vol 6, no 2, 1980, pp. 139-156.

[68] NTS 7216, 83/326, III, NC Nkandhla to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 24 Feb. 1937. See also the Comaroffs, `"Beasts"', p. 53.

[69] For the `rationality' of cattle accumulation in modern Lesotho see Ferguson, `Cultural Topography', pp. 64-65 and Murray, `High Bridewealth', p. 80 and `Marital Strategy', pp. 111-112.

[70] See below, ch. on the decline of African agriculture.

[71] See NTS 9166, 8/366, III, Report on *Lobola*, CNC to SNA, 12 Dec. 1934, re past practices and see Lugg, `The Practice', p. 23 and Braatvedt, `Zulu Marriage', p. 555.

[72] See Guy, `Destruction and Reconstruction', pp. 180-182.

[73] See CNC 110A, N1/15/5, 94/19C, draft copy of an address

by H. Lugg to Natal University College students, 8 May 1943. For the pre-colonial custom see NEC, evidence of C. Adams, p.1665 and Guy, `Destruction and Reconstruction' p. 181.

[74] See for example NTS 9166, 8/366, II, NC Nongoma to CNC 8 Nov. 1928.

[75] Murray, `High Bridewealth', p. 90-91 and P. Harries, `Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-colonial labour migration. Labour migration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa, up to 1895', in Marks and Rathbone *Industrialisation*, pp. 142-166, pp. 147-149.

[76] NEC, evidence of Archbishop Lee, p.1443.

[77] For this effect in Natal see Simons, *African Women*, p. 70 for Lesotho, see Murray, *Families Divided*, p.127.

[78] See for example CNC 109A, N1/15/5, 94/9, NCs' conference, 17 Nov. 1933, comments of NC Lowe, Nquthu, NC. Crawford, Eshowe, and Ashdown, Mahlabatini and NTS 9166, 8/366, III, NC Hlabisa to CNC, 13 Dec. 1934.

[79] The section on *lobola* in the code was constantly revised. See draft copies in CNC 110A, N1/15/5, 94/19C.

[80] 1/NGA, 3/3/2/3, 2/8/3, quarterly meeting, 21 Jan. 1931.

[81] Ibid.

[82] See for example CNC 105A, 1/1/2 (X), 78/4C, Meeting of chiefs, Nquthu, 10 June 1935, statements of chiefs Zulu, Mdhlalose and Mazibuko.

[83] See NTS 9166, 8/366, III, Report on *Lobola*, CNC to SNA, 12 Dec. 1934.

[84] `Zulu Courtship and marriage customs', *Natal Mercury*, 19 Aug. 1927.

[85] See CNC 108A, N7/9/2, 94/4, CNC to SNA, 30 Aug. 1932.

[86] NTS 9166, 8/366, II, CNC's circular of 2 June 1934 on cash substitutes for *lobola* and NC Hlabisa's response, 2 Aug. 1934.

[87] CNC 105A 1/1/2 (X), 78/4C, Meeting of chiefs and the NAD, 10 June 1935.

[88] NTS 9166, 8/366, II, NC Ing. to CNC, 15 Jan. 1935 and see `Chiefs Oppose Reduction of Lobola', *Natal Mercury*, 29 July 1937.

[89] Ibid, NC Melmoth to CNC, 23 Jan. 1935.

[90] 1/NGA, 3/3/2/6, 2/25/2, NC to CNC, 4 Jan. 1935.

[91] Ibid.

[92] See Murray, `High Bridewealth', p. 80.

[93] See NEC, p. 10 of A. Stanford's (NC for Eshowe 1922-25) written evidence following p. 6526.

[94] 1/UBO, 3/2/3/4/4, 3/4/4, NC to CNC, 23 June 1937.

[95] NEC, p. 6188.

[96] For the tensions in the government over African opposition at this time see Nuttall, `Class', pp. 187-192. I would also like to thank Peter Alexander for information about urban tensions during this period. See also NEC, Report of the Commission, paragraph 124.

[97] NTS 9166, 8/366, part III, draft copy of Governor-General's Proclamation amending the Natal Code of Native Law, no. 19 of 1891 and SNA to CNC, 3 Oct. 1940.

[98] 1/NGA, 3/3/2/4, 2/13/4, NC responding to a CNC circular of 8 Nov. 1935, re fees payable to Chief's deputies for settling garden boundaries.

[99] NTS 9166, 8/366, part III, NC Nongoma to CNC, 2 Oct. 1943.

[100] 1/NGA, 3/3/2/6, 2/25/4, CNC to NC, 31 Dec. 1937.

[101] Ibid, NC to CNC, 4 Jan. 1938. Similar developments were evident in the expanding number of `sons of Moshweshwe' in the royal family in Lesotho. See Murray, *Families Divided*, pp. 167 and *Black Mountain*, pp. 48-50.

[102] NTS 9166, 8/366, part III, NC to CNC, 13 Sept. 1948 and CNC's reply, 5 Nov. 1948.

[103] For similar patterns of distribution see Murray, *Families Divided*, p.92.

[104] Distribution of Cattle Ownership, 1945:

	5 head or less		5-25 head		over 25 head	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Nongoma:	116	3	1275	42	1713	55
Nquthu:	420	10	2843	71	747	19

Total Number of Owners:

	total pop.	no.of owners	% of total pop
Nongoma:	29,400	3,104	10.5
Nquthu:	36,100	4,010	11.0

Source: SEPC, p.23 The SEPC noted that these figures were

subject to a large margin of error as complete ownership was difficult to ascertain owing to *sisa* cattle.

Nongoma is perhaps somewhat atypical in Zululand because it is the home district of the royal family which held large herds, but Nquthu had patterns of ownership more typical of the congested south.

105 For the manner in which *sisa* disguised the extraction of surplus labour see Beinart, *Pondoland*, pp. 82-84, 118.

106 See Krige, *Social System*, p.187.

107 Oral interview with Mr. H. Zulu.

108 See Vilikazi, *Zulu Transformations*, p.115.

109 Interview conducted by the author with Mrs. Tozo Zwane. She moved to the Mahlabatini District in the late 1940s from Msinga without any cattle. Their family cattle had been sold to finance the trip from Msinga.

110 See NEC, evidence of F. Higgs, p. 1781. It is unlikely that the chief could have managed to enforce these edicts or was able to keep track of all the natural increase.

111 See CNC 42A, N2/8/2/X, letter from Mrs. M. Dore to NC Nongoma, 30 June 1931, and NC Nongoma to CNC, 29 June 1931.

112 CNC 113A, N8/15/2 (X), 103/1, compiled from lists of white-owned cattle in the reserves, no date, 1925.

113 Ibid, CNC to all NCs, 18 Nov. 1926.

114 Ibid, SNA to Secretary of Justice, 15 June 1927.

115 Ibid, CNC circular, 10 Feb. 1931.

116 CNC 113A, N8/15/2 (X), 103/1, copy of proclamation 123 of 1931 under the regulations governing the reserves covered by section 25 of the Native Administration Act (no. 30 of 1927) and see NC Nongoma to CNC, 19 Aug. 1931 and 21 Aug. 1931.

117 CNC 42A, N2/8/2/X, NC Nongoma to CNC, 10 Aug. 1932.

118 See for example, 1/NQU, 3/4/1/1, 2/1/6, NC's Meetings, 25 May 1939. the one notable exception to this was E. Braatvedt of Nongoma who time and again opposed forcing impoverished families to relinquish loaned stock. See for example his letter to the CNC, 19 Aug. 1931, in CNC 42A, N2/8/2/X.

119 See J. and J. Comaroff, *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination*, (Oxford, 1992), especially ch. 5, `Goodly Beasts and Beastly Goods' which is a later version of their

article, `"Beasts"'.

[120] See C. Ballard, `The role of Trade and Hunter-traders in the Political Economy of Natal and Zululand, 1824-1880.' in *AEH*, Vol. 10, 1981, pp 3-21.

[121] See Guy, `Destruction and Reconstruction', p.183-185.

[122]) This is a brutally condensed explanation of events surrounding Solomon's finances. The complexities of Solomon's relationships have been thoroughly dealt with in Cope's, `Royal Family'. This work follows directly on from Marks seminal chapter, `The Drunken King' in *Ambiguities*. A further exploration of these issues is found in la Hausse's `Ethnicity', pp. 303-312.

[123] CNC 82A, N1/1/3 (32), NC NGA to CNC, 15 June 1931.

[124] Ibid, and see la Hausse, `Ethnicity' p. 304-310.

[125] See Ibid, p.328 and CNC 82A, N1/1/3 (32), containing lists of cattle offered to Solomon, no date, c. 1931.

[126] la Hausse, `Ethnicity', p. 325. A contemporary of Blackhurst's, Mr. Norman Bond, a store-keeper in Nongoma who had dealings with him confirms this view of Blackhurst's character. Oral interview conducted by the author with Mr. Bond.

[127] NTS 7216, 83/326, I, Blackhurst to NC Nongoma, 18 Oct. 1930.

[128] See NTS 7217, 83/326/(C), correspondence on Blackhurst. Maling, a former leader of the Abaqulusi Land Union, became a royal agent to Solomon and the chief cattle collector for Blackhurst by the end of the 1920s. Simpson Bhengu, a former member of the Natal Native Congress, became Solomon's personal Secretary and Maling's partner. Msimang came from a prominent Natal *kholwa* family and along with E.N. Braatvedt set up a co-operative cattle marketing scheme prior to the NAD auctions. For more details of these personalities see NTS 7216, 83/326, I, NC Nongoma to CNC, 23 Nov. 1931, and la Hausse, `Ethnicity' pp. 318-320.

[129] See CNC 82A, N1/1/3 (32), NC Nongoma to CNC, 15 Dec. 1933.

[130] NTS 7217, 83/326 (1), NC Nongoma to CNC, 7 July 1933.

[131] Ibid, NC Nongoma to Blackhurst, 26 July 1932.

[132] NTS 7217, 83/326 I, Minutes of Meeting between Blackhurst and the people of Nongoma, 17 Jan. 1933.

[133] See for example NTS 7217, 83/326 I, NC to CNC 20 July 1932 and NC to Blackhurst, 26 July 1932.

[134] Ibid, Blackhurst's meeting, 17 Jan. 1933.

[135] For the relative `efficiency' of `free market' cattle speculators in the development discourse see S. Sandford, *Management of Pastoral Development in the Third World*, O.D.I (London, 1983), pp. 203-208.

[136] NTS 7242, 168/326 (1), NC Braatvedt to CNC, 13 May 1931, and Blackhurst's comments in NTS 7217, 83/326 (1), 17 Jan. 1933.

[137] See CNC 82A, N1/1/3 (32), Pretorius to Min. of Native Affairs, E. Jansen, 23 June 1932 and NTS 7216, 83/326, part I, Assistant Director of Native Agriculture to Director of Native Agriculture, 15 June 1932. Pretorius was later found in the company of Simpson Bhengu, Solomon's private secretary, in the Utrecht District collecting cattle. See CNC 82A, N1/1/3 (32), NC NGA to CNC, 18 Nov. 1932 and Magistrate Utrecht to CNC, 23 Nov. 1932.

[138] See KCAL, files and circulars of the Natal Agriculture Union, (NAU), KCM 30025, 29 Feb. 1929, p. 110, 28 Feb. 1931, p. 212, KCM 30026, 28 Feb. 1933, 12 Nov. 1934, and KCM 30027, 29 Jan. 1935, p. 12.

[139] Ibid, KCM 30026, 28 Feb. 1933.

[140] NTS 7217, 83/326 (1), minutes of meeting, 17 Jan. 1933.

[141] NTS 7834, 9/336 part I, J. Hoff, trader, to NC Nongoma, 18 Sept. 1931.

[142] 1/NGA, 3/3/2/3, 2/8/3, Report of NC's meeting with chiefs, 21 Jan. 1931.

[143] Ibid, NC Nongoma to CNC, 2 Oct. 1931.

[144] Msimang was the `secretary' of the co-op and drew a salary of £5 per month for organizing the shipment of cattle to the Durban abattoir. Each member paid in 6s. 6d. per animal to cover transport and running costs. See NTS 7216, 83/326, part I, Assistant Director of Native Agriculture to Director of Native Agriculture, 2 Sept. 1931 and 1/NGA 3/3/2/3, 2/8/5, NC to CNC, 1 Feb. 1932. One need only sift through correspondence between the CNC and the NC of Nongoma and subsequent correspondence from the CNC to higher authorities to see the importance of Braatvedt's views and the almost wholesale adoption of them. See for example, NTS 7216, 83/326, part III, SNA to Public Service Commission, 23 July 1949. Eilert Nils Braatvedt was born the son of missionaries in Eshowe in 1885 and rose through the ranks of the NAD to become President of the Native Appeal Board for the Transvaal and Natal in 1943. His brother, H.P. Braatvedt, was equally successful and served as NC in Nongoma following Nils in 1944. H.P. Braatvedt is

the author of *Roaming Zululand With a Native Commissioner* (Pietermaritzburg, 1949).

145 See NTS, 7216, 83/326, part I, SNA to Spilhaus of the Union Cold Storage Company, 1 Oct. 1931 and SNA to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 12 Oct. 1931.

146 Ibid, NC to CNC, 30 Oct. 1931.

147 Ibid, Superintendent of Native Reserves report on the sales, 24 Oct. 1931 and Director of Native Agriculture to SNA, 16 Nov. 1931.

148 Ibid, NC to CNC, 22 Feb. 1932.

149 The department of agriculture set a minimum live weight of 800 lbs. for any head of cattle imported into the Union. This measure was directed specifically at the High Commission territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. See *DAJ* Vol. 8, No. 3, 1924, pp. 201-220, 261-263, Vol. 11, No. 6, 1925, pp. 461-465, 496-501. I have benefited from discussions with S. Milton about the intensification of protection for the cattle industry during the 1930s. He is currently completing a Ph.D. on the cattle industry in South Africa at the University of London.

150 See for example the *Natal Witness*,`The Beef Industry' 5 Jan. 1929 and `Scrub Cattle', 25 June 1929.

151 See `Grading of Beef', *DAJ*, Vol. 10, No. 5, 1925, pp. 446-452. For Zulu cattle and Solomon's `white' herds see CNC 82A, N1/1/3 (32), I, NC, NGA to CNC, 8 April 1931 and NTS 10150, 22/419, R.W. Thornton, Director of Native Agriculture, Report on Agricultural and Pastoral Conditions in Natal and Zululand, 1929.

152 *DAJ*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1924, pp. 213-215 and the *Zululand Times*, `Dairying in Hlabisa', 10 June 1925. See S. Milton, `"The Apocalypse Cow": Russell Thornton and State Policy towards African Cattle Husbandry in the Union of South Africa, 1929-1939', AHS, SOAS, 30 Nov. 1994 and for state policy drives to segregate `traditional' and `modern' cattle sectors see P. Raikes, *Livestock Development Policy in East Africa* (Uppsala, 1981), p. 190.

153 See NTS 7216, 83/326, NC Nongoma to CNC, 6 Oct. 1937 and C. Adams to CNC, 1 June 1938.

154 This is contrary to current theories about carrying capacity. For these views see ch. on `betterment' and for the recovery of herds and misconceptions about carrying capacity see Scoones, `Why Are There So Many Animals?' and Tapson, `Biological Sustainability' pp. 119-121.

155 See *OJVSAI*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1933, Cranefield, *Science*

pp. 220-223, 237, 341; fn. no. 21 and Milton, `"Apocalypse Cow"'.

156 See Cranefield, *Science*, p. 341. The argument that more cattle meant more milk to the Zulu especially under drought conditions was confirmed in an oral interview with Mr. H. Zulu.

157 NTS 7216, 83/326, part I, Assistant Director of Native Agriculture to Director of Native Agriculture, 15 June 1932.

158 See Ibid, NC NGA to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 26 April 1932 and 1/NGA, 3/3/2/3, 2/5/1, NC to CNC, 23 July 1932.

159 NTS 7217, 83/326, (1), NC Nongoma to Blackhurst, 26 July 1932. This tactic was later resorted to at the Nquthu sales. See 1/NQU, Vol 3/4/1/1, 2/1/6, NC's meeting of July 1935.

160 See NTS 7235, 153/326, Cattle sales, Nongoma. 1938-42 graph of cattle sales and appendix.

161 Ibid. Note changing monthly averages. For comparisons with state auctions in Lesotho in the 1980s see Ferguson, `The Bovine Mystique', pp. 650-651.

162 NTS 7235, 123/326, NC to CNC, 8 Nov. 1935. for similar approaches to the market elsewhere in Africa see C. Kerven, *Customary Commerce: A Historical Reassessment of Pastoral Livestock Marketing in Africa* (O.D.I, Occasional Paper No. 15) (London, 1992), especially pp. 6-10, 36-38.

163 NTS 7216, 83/326, part III. Committee memo, 7 Aug. 1945.

164 SEPC, Report, p. 111.

165 NTS 7216, 83/326 part I, NC, NGA to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 17 Oct. 1933.

166 NTS 7234, 147/326, Cattle sales Mtunzini 1937-59, NC Braadvedt to CNC, 2 Oct. 1937.

167 NTS 7216, 83/326, part I, report of Nongoma cattle sales, 28 March 1933 and NC NGA to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 17 Oct. 1933 and NTS 7216, 83/326, part II, NC NGA to CNC, 2 April 1937.

168 Ibid.

169 See chapter on labour.

170 NTS 7216, 83/326, part II, NC NGA to CNC, 2 April 1937.

[171] See Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 411-412 and see below ch. on famine for the maize debt.

[172] NTS 7216, 83/326, part II, NC NGA to CNC, 2 April 1937.

[173] See NTS 7216, 83/326, Part III, List of NAD cattle sales in Zululand, Natal and the Transvaal, 1 April 1936-31 March 1938, and see, U.G. 48-'37, *NAD Report for 1935-36* (Pretoria, 1937), p. 45.

[174] Ibid, NC Nkandhla to CNC, 18 Nov. 1936. It is not known if any of these butchers were African, but for the competition between whites and Africans butchers see P. la Hausse `The Message of the Warriors: The ICU, the Labouring Poor and the Making of a Popular Political Culture in Durban, 1925-1930', pp. 19-57 in P. Bonner, I. Hofmeyr, D. James and T. Lodge, (ed.s), *Holding Their Ground. Class, Locality and Culture in 19th and 20th Century South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1989), p. 25.

[175] NTS 7216, 83/326, Part III, NC Eshowe to CNC, 30 Sept. 1937.

[176] NTS 7227, 113/326, E.W. Tittlestad, general dealer, to T. Briggs, Auctioneer at Nkandhla, 15 Dec. 1934.

[177] NTS 7216, 83/326 Part III, see throughout.

[178] NTS 7216, 83/326, III, Memo on the Zululand Cattle Sales Committee, Aug. 1945.

[179] Ibid, NC NGA to CNC. 10 Sept. 1944.

[180] Ibid, NC Nongoma to CNC, 23 Dec. 1936 and NC Nkandhla to CNC, 3 Nov. 1937.

[181] NTS 7216, 83/326, III, NC Nongoma to CNC, 10 Sept. 1944.

[182] These figures are based on NTS 7235, 153/326, Nongoma sales, 1938-1942, NTS 7234, 147/326, Mtunzini sales, 937-1959, NTS 7218, 83/362 II, Ubombo sales, 1933-1951, NTS 7278, 598/326, Nkandhla sales, 1933-1948, NTS 7227, 113/326, Eshowe sales, 1934-1956, NTS 7227, 105/326, I and II, Hlabisa sales 1933-1948, NTS 7227, 116/326, I, Melmoth sales, 1935-1948. The figures are for monthly averages of total yearly sales only and are fragmentary.

[183] See for example Dahl and Hjort, *Having Herds*, pp. 167-168, 180-181, Raikes, *Livestock* and Kerven, *Customary*.

[184] See for example sales figures for Nkandhla, Melmoth and Eshowe for 1937-1948 in NTS 7278, 598/326, 7227, 116/326, I and II and 113/326, I and II.

[185] figures compiled from NTS 7216, 83/326, II.

[186] Based on NTS 7228, 116/326, returns of Zululand cattle sales, 1945-1950.

CHAPTER FOUR

LABOUR

Opportunities and experiences of wage labour for Africans in and around the fringes of Zululand were an important part of the labour story in industrialising South Africa. Employment on sugar and wattle farms, coal mines and government works projects formed a link in the wage employment `chain' between rural peasant production and those fully engaged in migrant labour in the urban areas. The advent of white commercial agriculture in Zululand in the early 1900s often provided the first foray into capitalist relations of employment for the Zulu and was, equally often, the remaining recourse for men burned out by the mines. Moreover, Zululand was a transitional region for men moving along the `chain' in either the direction of more stable urban employment or back into rural `retirement'.[1] Workers from as far afield as the Transkei and Nyasaland resorted to contracts in Zululand when other avenues of employment were closed to them or if they desired shorter periods of employment.

From the 1910s, the development of white commercial farming in Zululand, predominantly sugar plantations, failed to attract local Zulu labour.2 Labour migration from Zululand, which began in the 1880s and increased dramatically in the first half of the twentieth century, was primarily directed beyond the confines of the old Zulu Kingdom.3 Even before the turn of the century, the majority of the Zulu male migrant population had developed strong links with the Rand

mines and industry in Durban. Chronically under-capitalised, but with a political strength disproportionate to their role in the South African economy, the sugar planters replicated the processes and problems the mines had in recruiting Zulu migrant labour, although they were far less successful in solving them.4

`ZULU' LABOUR

The `ethnic specialisation' of labour, evident on the Rand and in Natal by the 1890s, allowed for the development of a Zulu migrant consciousness. Most Zulu at least aspired to take better-paid jobs on the Rand and Durban rather than rely on poorly paid local employment and they carved out niches for themselves as `washermen', dock workers, and slightly later, police men on the mines.5 Although, as will be seen below, this consciousness changed over time and was often appropriated by a range of ethnic groups, it was an important element in local resistance to work in the sugar industry. At the same time, the number of Zulu engaged in migrant labour steadily increased through the first four decades of the twentieth century as impoverishment drove more of them into the burgeoning industrial and manufacturing centres of South Africa.6 By the 1930s, pressure on land, the rapid deterioration of reserve agriculture and the concomitant necessity to purchase food were crucial in driving out migrant labour (see ch. on famine).

This thesis cannot deal adequately with the experience of Zulu migrants in South Africa's industrial centres. It does, however, attempt to survey the priorities of the Zulu worker in terms of work experience and job preference. In an important article, William Beinart has underlined the importance of the rural background in shaping migrant workers' consciousness.7 In the Zulu case too, this was important. At the same time, aspects of ethnic differentiation deeply permeated the mind-set of people in the reserves, both as a result of their migrant experience and the nature of local labour opportunities.8

Rates of formal labour migration from Zululand rose steadily during the 1920s, reaching an average annual total of approximately 45,000 out of a total population of 320,000 during the depression. Approximately 3,500 of these were women. The majority of migrants sought work in Durban and other urban centres and about 3-4,000 worked on the coal mines. The balance (totals available for Natal and Zululand were 5,094 in 1920, 6,034 in 1930, 16,163 in 1936 and 18,472 in 1939) of male migrants were contracted by the Rand mines or found their way into other work in Johannesburg.9 The overall demographic effect of this predominantly male migration was reflected in the reserves masculinity ratio. By 1936, 49 per cent of the African male population between the ages of 18 and 54 were absent from the reserves.10 This substantially increased the burden of homestead labour on women and children as the potential for agricultural productivity on congested land decreased.[11]

The number of people seeking work peaked during years of economic and environmental crisis, such as in 1930-32, 1936, and 1942. When these peaks coincided with a shortage of labour opportunities in urban areas many Zulu men were forced to turn to local work. In 1931, for example, due to the depression, the Enyati and Hlobane coal mines in Natal retrenched over 3,000 men and the Rand mines cut back on recruiting, forcing the workers to seek employment on white farms, albeit for a short period.12 During a milder drought and depression in 1942, unskilled Zulu migrants, competing with increased numbers of foreign workers, were again reluctantly forced to turn to the sugar farms for relief employment.13 Moreover, during drought, older, `retired' men who had re-established themselves in the reserves were forced out in search of wage labour to buy food.14 Rejected by the mines as `unfit', older men often resorted to local work on the cane farms or occasionally on state relief projects after the 1930s, to earn cash.[15] By the late 1930s and into the 1940s, not only was the age of `retirement' for men rising; the frequency with which `retirees' had to find some form of low-paid local work also increased.16

The involvement of the majority of Zulu families in migrant wage labour had a considerable impact on the rural political economy and the reconstruction of social relations. By the late 1920s, the atomisation of larger kin-supported families was apparent. The Zulu developed a new reliance on migrants and the remittance of wages which contrasted with earlier generations' ability to sustain themselves solely from agriculture in the reserves. By the

early 1930s, this reliance was an acute symptom of the deterioration of the rural economy.[17]

Through the 1920s and 1930s Zulu migrants resisted state efforts to get a portion of their earnings. Tax arrears in Zululand mounted steadily during the 1920s to reach over £90,000 by 1936.18 Although officials attempted to prosecute tax defaulters, most of them escaped the short reach of the law. Following the precedent set by magistrates who were reluctant to prosecute deserters, since they perceived the breach of contract to be a civil law matter, the NAD found a far more effective way to prise taxes from migrants. In 1932, the NC of Nquthu started suing defaulters and attaching their families' property. This method also tended to reinforce rural-urban linkages. As the NC stated,

> The writs appear to have very far reaching effect and many defaulters have been discovered in labour centres by the importunity of the home relatives who fear the threat of the sale of stock.19

It was this threat to family property in the reserves which prompted migrant remittances.

Despite increasing urbanisation, the majority of Zulu migrants preferred to enter wage labour on the mines under the Assisted Voluntary Scheme (AVS), established in 1928.20 As Crush has argued, employment through the AVS was one indication of strong rural links and family control over migrants since they could select the time of year when men were sent out.21 Moreover, crisis situations highlighted

the links, both social and economic, between the migrant labour force and rural families.

DIFFERENTIATION, ETHNICITY AND LABOUR MIGRATION

The contrast between those Africans engaged in local employment and those migrating, which was blurred in the 1910s, was brought into sharp relief in the 1920s and 30s. Specialised employment in the local state administration, as clerks, interpreters, police, and dipping inspectors, tended to be reserved for men of rank. Although, as Beinart has argued, pre-colonial forms of rank and authority were to some extent translated into the new context, by the 1920s, work experience was an important factor in determining the ability of migrants to secure better jobs and pay.22 Labour touts in Zululand often made cash advances above the £2 limit to men `whose antecedents were known' and who had a proven work record.23 Between these two groups, mission-educated literate Africans found a niche on mission stations, as teachers, or in service to the ruling elite. Lesser paid local jobs, in agriculture or later in state relief works (see ch. on `Betterment'), were the domain of commoners who ultimately sought jobs in the cities.

Zulu male workers firmly believed in their `superior' status as labourers ascribed to them by the Zulu patriarchy and white officials. Shaped in part by the gendered division of labour in Zulu society, and in part by wider work experiences, Zulu men clung to ethnic identities

which, as Guy and Thabane have argued in the case of the Sotho, protected them in a hostile and rightless environment.[24] It was with a certain degree of embarrassment that men interviewed about their working lives reluctantly admitted to working on sugar farms, and then added that they had only done so for a few years as young boys.25 Most men prided themselves on not having had to resort to agricultural labour, which they perceived to be `woman's work'. When questioned about working conditions in local agriculture by the Herbst Committee, appointed to consider the labour needs of white farmers, the regent, Mshiyeni replied:

> I do not know anything about the treatment on the cane fields as my people don't need work there. They only work for one to three years as boss boys on the mines [and] some work for the Government.26

These claims to a superior status were so resounding that officials accepted them as the reason for the Zulu refusal to work in the cane belt. Acknowledging their preference for work as clerks, policemen and domestic servants in urban centres, the Native Affairs Commission of 1933 emphasized that `The Zulu looks upon himself as an aristocrat and consequently it is his habit to choose his work.'27 Thus, because it served their interest in controlling labour along ethnic lines, the state and employers accepted the mythology of Zulu superiority and martial skills, and provided many men from the region with jobs as police or labour recruiters.28 The state's belief that Africans were averse to local work because of `cultural habits', however, served to shift attention away from the poor conditions of employment in Zululand, and

helped to justify the perpetuation of cheap migrant labour in the sugar industry.

The Zulu gained definite material benefits by manipulating these ethnic stereotypes.[29] Kinship links with fellow Zulu and the establishment of informal `Zulu guilds' on the mines assured many of them better jobs. Moreover, other ethnic groups in the region quickly associated themselves with these identities. By the later 1930s, most southern Mozambiquan migrants, for example, appropriated a Zulu *isibongo* (surname) and spoke fluent Zulu while their wives, who remained at home, still spoke Shironga.30 The object of this ethnic camouflage was two-fold. First, Zulu speech facilitated their recruitment by predominantly Zulu-speaking labour touts. Secondly, the appropriation of a Zulu identity made it easier to avoid recruitment by the sugar industry which targeted Mozambiquan labour and to gain access to better-paid jobs on the Rand.[31]

LABOUR IN ZULULAND

A major theme in the sugar-cane planters' professed struggle for local labour was their belief that the Zulu were at once too wealthy in terms of cattle and land (ie. too productive with the diminishing resources available to them) and too indolent and averse to agricultural work to provide the necessary seasonal contingents for the sugar industry.[32] As Kimble has shown for the origins of migrancy from Basutoland, the rise in mobile or `free' labour `had dramatic repercussions' for labour relations on the land

for under-capitalised white farmers, and this was particularly true for Zululand's sugar planters.[33]

Undercapitalised, and uncompetitive on world markets, sugar farms were notorious for the poor wages and appalling working conditions for their African employees.[34] Different groups of workers moved into and out of Zululand in overlapping phases as they struggled to free themselves from migrant farm labour. While other farming and rural fractions of white capital, most notably wattle farming and coal mining, vied with the planters for labour, the sugar farmers' lobby was the most successful in focussing attention on its labour needs.

The powerful planters' lobby won concessions and support from the state, in part because of the over-representation of rural constituencies in national politics after 1910, and in part because of the state's determination to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency in food staples, a policy which favoured protection for sugar producers.[35] George Heaton Nicholls and his successor as M.P. for Zululand in 1934, Leif Egeland, helped the weakest producers in the industry, the Zululand planters, benefit from substantial state price supports and protective tariffs. Moreover, the planters' insistence on their agricultural status ensured they were free from most official regulations for labour under the Native Labour Regulation Act, No. 15 of 1911.[36] The control of what Jeeves has called a `malleable', `rightless and poorly paid' migrant labour force was crucial for the sugar planters.[37]

While the Natal sugar industry was developed on the backs of indentured Indians, Zululand planters benefited from access to this cheap source of labour for only a brief period, from 1906 to about 1916.[38] The combined effect of the Immigrants Regulation Act, No 22 of 1913 and a major strike by Indian indentured labourers affecting much of southern Zululand and Natal in the same year forced sugar farmers to seek labour elsewhere.[39] As the availability of Indian labour dropped in Zululand after 1913, white planters struggled to secure replacements among local Zulu for the rapidly expanding sugar, cotton, tobacco and wattle plantations. Although it has been argued that various Natal commercial farmers were aware of the impending removal of Indian labour from their grasp and prepared for alternative labour supplies, none of them, least of all the sugar planters, were prepared for the wide-spread aversion of Africans to local employment.[40]

Local Zulu, well aware of the poor conditions on the cane farms and wattle plantations managed, on the whole, to avoid long-term employment in Zululand. They preferred the better conditions, opportunities and, especially, pay offered on the Rand and in Durban.[41] Frustrated by what they perceived to be the unreliable local labour supply, sugar farmers joined the well-established wider southern African recruiting nexus.[42] From the late 1910s, southern Zululand planters, following the practice of Natal estates, formed recruiting syndicates and engaged organisations such as the Natal Coast Labour Association to hire migrant labour from the Transkei and Basutoland.[43] Even the

Secretary of the African Workers' Union of Durban supplied planters with labour until competing white agents had him closed down.[44] By the 1920s, these workers, far from home and kin support networks, were suffering the worst effects of neglect in the cane fields.

White notions of the `unreliability' and relative ability of particular labourers related directly to their availability and long-term commitment to the sugar farmers. Farmers anticipated that once out of indenture, Indian `free' labourers would be as irregular as Zulu men were considered to be.[45] Similarly, Zulu from the southern districts, where the vast majority of the work force was in regular migrant labour, were considered to be indolent `kraal-loafers' compared to the Mozambiquan `Shangaans' who offered themselves for longer periods. Replicating mine strategies for securing labour, the sugar industry found long-distance migrants were more easily controlled.[46]

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUGAR BELT

A distinction should be made between the various classes of sugar farmers in Zululand and their relation to labour. Under the original settlement schemes in the fertile, relatively well-watered `cane-belt' of southern Zululand, the government offered whites 99 year annual leases at 2s. and 1s. per acre for first- and second-class farms respectively.[47] Before World War I, planters who settled closer to the rail-line were able to take advantage of the burgeoning Union markets and preferential rates over

competing Mozambique sugar.[48] Thus, sugar production expanded rapidly between 1905 and 1915. A particularly favourable climate and consistent rains between 1909 and 1911 also ensured rapid expansion. These planters acquired a fairly consistent supply of local labour to off-set diminishing Indian labour by offering competitive wages which ranged from 20s. to 30s., occasionally rising to 60s. per month, and female `togt' labour (engaged on a daily basis only and often for some cash and some food) received between 3d. and 1s. a day.[49]

After 1918, white settlements at Ntambanana, the Nkwaleni valley, Hluhluwe and Mkuzi developed more unevenly under the state's returned soldiers scheme which provided settlers with Land Bank loans for farms and machinery. On top of structural supports for sugar pricing and rail development, they relied on state grants for irrigation schemes, price subsidies and crop insurance.[50] Nevertheless, initially, the employment of Africans was erratic and beyond the means of many new farmers.

In the 1920s, established growers pressured new settlers to put most of their land under cane in order to bolster the Zululand growers associations and to ensure that cotton and stock farming, which, although they failed (see ch. on cattle), initially competed for well-watered land, did not threaten cane farming. With limited resources they now suffered the combined effects of a down-turn in the sugar market, drought, and limited labour supplies owing to the ravages of influenza.[51] Similar problems surfaced during

attempts to settle returning soldiers after 1945.[52] While the most telling blow to the fragile white settlements at Ntambanana and Hluhluwe was undoubtedly drought, competition with established farmers for reluctant labour further compromised their development. Moreover, until the later 1920s, the relative abundance of land in the reserves meant a few dissatisfied African farm tenants could escape pernicious labour-tenancy arrangements.[53]

The new under-capitalised farmers were determined to exact the greatest possible productivity from each contracted worker. Labour relations on sugar farms took on the style of more highly industrialised employment. In an effort to attract Mpondo and Sotho labourers, who were used to the contract system, many planters offered Africans informal thirty-shift tickets modelled on mines contracts under the 1911 Labour Act.[54] These contracts, which provided for payment only on completion of set `tasks', were illegal on sugar farms and local officials refused to enforce them. They were, however, common among recruited workers on the poorer class of sugar farms by the 1920s and planters also turned to the Masters and Servants legislation, which regulated agrarian labour, to control their workers.[55] In order to bind deserting workers more fully to their farms, planters often paid their 20s. fine for desertion under Masters and Servants laws themselves and added it to the amount workers owed for the repayment of advanced money.[56]

Although, as Jeeves has argued, the recruitment of the infirm and disabled was not formal policy for the farming

sector; it was *de facto* practice, this did not prevent many farmers from railing against the poor state of labour available to them.[57] As part of a larger strategy to secure government support, or at least avoid the regulation of sugar farming, planters, competing with other employers, cried foul at every turn. They repeatedly claimed that they bore the brunt of the cost of sick labour burned out by the mines.[58] Despite regular complaints about the poor quality of their labour, however, planters steadfastly refused to improve conditions and even balked at instituting their own medical screening, ostensibly for fear of scaring off recruits, but more probably because they did not want to pay the cost.[59]

Duplicity operated on both sides of the recruitment process. While there is no doubt that many migrant workers, especially from the Transkei, suffered from illnesses contracted in the mines, planters' complaints were, in part, used to deflect criticism of their own shortcomings. In fact it was more often the case that conditions on the farms caused or exacerbated health problems. Farmers had no compunction about driving sick workers to the point of exhaustion or even death, and they encouraged employees requiring medical aid to leave the farms.[60] They sought out private recruiters who would present the sugar industry in the best possible light. Unscrupulous recruiters often misrepresented the conditions on farms, and trapped workers with cash advances and ready transport.[61] As Hobsbawm has argued, labour contractors flourish where there is a large demand for labour from a population group ignorant of

Malaria in Zululand 1920-1950



Sources: CNC 16A, 13/2/6 (9), GES 2628, 6/56 and Le Seur, D. Sharp, B. & Appleton, C. (1993).

conditions of employment.[62] And this was undoubtedly true on the sugar plantations of Zululand

THE STRUGGLE FOR ZULU LABOUR

Convinced that the reserves still provided Zulu subsistence, cane farmers were slow to react to the changing circumstances of the wider South African labour market and the upward pressure on wages.[63] Moreover, ineffective state controls on labour recruiting by outside agencies such as the Natal Coast Recruiting Corporation and the coal mines meant that the surreptitious touting of labour was rife in southern Zululand.[64] Recruiters for Natal sugar farms and coal mines often entered Zululand with ready cash for substantial contract advances or loitered just outside the districts which the state had closed to recruitment by urban industry, prepared to entice any willing worker away with up to £8 or £10 and a rail ticket.[65]

While white farmers argued that Africans were `single target workers', and claimed that any increase in wages would necessarily diminish the length of time worked, Africans consistently pointed to the inadequate wages paid by farmers in contrast to the rapidly increased cost of living.[66] Simeon Zulu, an `*induna*' on an Eshowe cane farm, for example, noted that `Things are different now... Medical fees, education, clothing, all require money.'[67]

During the 1920s, the Zululand Planters Union (ZPU) repeatedly complained to the state about the loss of local labour and called for the closure of all the Zululand sugar farming districts to outside recruitment.[68] As cane planting expanded northward, increasing numbers of Africans were forced off the sugar-cane land. Once back in the reserves, Zulu workers often preferred to engage only in `togt' labour, making the provisions of the Masters and Servants legislation difficult to enforce.[69] There were, however, exceptions to this trend, most notably among the better capitalised sugar farmers, who held two farms and followed the Transvaal practice of using one as a source of tenant labour.[70]

There was little state support for the planters' demand for protection. In order to secure labour for the mines, the Native Labour Department repeatedly refused to close any more districts to outside recruiting, on the grounds that it was not in African interests. In 1919, the Director of Native Labour stated that only in those districts where the majority of Africans resided on white farms would he consider closure. Noting that in Eshowe there was a substantial `free Native population', he argued that,

> local employers of labour should, by reason of their proximity to the place of residence of the Natives, be able to compete with other labour markets on favourable terms if their conditions of employment approximate those elsewhere. Labourers are entitled to sell their services in the best market available and I see no reason to afford protection to the Eshowe Farmers' Association at the expense of the Natives resident within the District.[71]

Zululand farmers responded to this policy with further calls for measures to bind local labour to the region. These included the tightening of pass controls, reduced taxation for local men who proved they had worked for whites for at least six months, a limit to the rate of cash advances offered and the re-imposition of the *isibalo* forced labour system, which the Union government had abolished in 1910 to prevent Natal bottling-up its labour.[72] While some lip service was paid to these requests, the state did not implement any of them. The poor conditions of work and low wages offered on most farms were, in fact, self-defeating. By 1929, while Zulu workers in urban areas could usually count on wages of over £3 a month, cane workers often received less than £2 for a 180-shift ticket which could take up to two months to complete.[73]

The uneven supply of labour can, to a certain extent, be attributed also to the uneven capitalization of individual farmers. African perceptions of labour conditions in the cane belt were affected by the worst cases. While some farms, generally unnoticed exceptions, did provide adequate food and competitive wages, on the majority of farms conditions were appalling. Sugar farmers were notorious for exacting long shifts, often twelve or fourteen hours in the fields, and providing inadequate housing and food rations, consisting principally of mealie meal with only the occasional meat, fruit or vegetable supplement, and this made workers more susceptible to disease.[74]

As the area under cane expanded and labour requirements increased, the cost of housing became an issue even for better-off farmers. Shifting demands for migrant labour were reflected in the provision of accommodation. In 1925, as official concern about malaria in the cane belt rose, Dr. G.A. Park Ross, Assistant Health Officer for the Union and in charge of the anti-malaria campaigns in Natal and Zululand, outlined a plan for the conversion of Indian indentured family housing into mosquito resistant barracks for African labourers.[75] A significant feature of the conversion was the provision of space for twelve African workers in homes built for a family of four.[76]

Yet the farmers united to resist the changes recommended by both the Department of Health and the NAD. According to William Beinart, Natal's NAD was largely indifferent to the plight of Mpondo workers in the cane fields; nevertheless, some Natal officials, most notably Park Ross and Frederick Rodseth, Inspector of Native Labour in southern Zululand in the 1920s and later instrumental in anti-malaria campaigns, assiduously tried to convince planters of the benefits of improved working conditions.[77] The ZPU, however, cognizant of the uneconomic position of many farmers, appeared to accept the lowest common denominator as the rule for conditions of employment. Thus, it robustly declared

> We cannot hope as individual planters to hold or control our labourers unless we have uniformity of treatment, not only as regards wages, food, degree of punishment, but as regards task work and advances. The schedule of wages and the scale of food, will present no difficulty provided we are loyal to each other.[78]

Nevertheless, competition between sugar farmers over cash advances to Africans remained strong until 1922 with the implementation of the Native Advances Regulation Act No. 18 of 1921 which limited cash advances to £2. South Africa's rural farm lobby had been successful in pressuring the state to implement this act in order to limit the flow of labour to the more competitive and better capitalised industries.[79]

The enforcement of the Act was far from efficient, however, and both well-established sugar farmers and many recruiting agents for the Rand mines, in collusion with prospective employees, found ways around its operation, mostly through obfuscating cash advances in the form of separate loans. One effect of the Act, however, was to force the rate of wages for workers in the cane belt up from 25s.-30s. per month to 40s.-50s. per month, since Africans still demanded higher wages whether or not they were in the form of advances.[80]

Given these conditions the sugar industry experienced a far more rapid labour turnover than did mining. While about half of the 10-12,000 plantation workers originated in Zululand, their employment in the sugar industry was erratic.[81] Planters and millers struggled to overcome the shortcomings of its short production season, and they relied on a highly inefficient system of local labour recruitment.

The seasonal nature of sugar production (the short cutting and crushing season ran from May to September, with milling occasionally extending into December) meant that planters needed a much larger pool of labourers than did more stable forms of urban employment since Zulu workers were bottled up in the reserves. Although Jeeves has suggested that planters required access to roughly 25,000 to 30,000 workers a year to fulfil the two six-month contracts of seasonal work, it seems likely that an even larger labour pool was needed.[82] As early as 1918, the ZPU, in support of new settler farmers, complained of inequities in employment practice between better off-farmers who controlled and contracted labour, not only on their farms, but in the reserves, and poor farmers who could not compete. It attacked those who `nurse a gang at their kraals for future use and for contingencies', and continued:

> Why should a man who requires a complement of 30 tie up say 50 or 60 boys? There is something essentially wrong in a system which permits boys under contract of service to laze at their kraals because others also bound by their service can be found to take their place.[83]

Through the 1920s and 1930s, established planters continued advancing cash to bind contract workers to future service. They claimed they had to maintain from 25-60 per cent more labour on their books than actually worked at any given time to ensure an uninterrupted supply.[84] This is not to suggest that all the Zulu workers in the reserves were engaged only in homestead production for most of the year. Many workers on the planters' books were simply in between jobs in urban areas. Moreover, the high rates of attrition

from worker illness, including malaria, and desertions also contributed to a rapid turnover.

Most of the Zulu labour available to sugar farmers was on the fringes of the mainstream wage working population. Most Zulu men only worked on the cane fields in their youth, old age or at moments of economic stress. Often youths would engage in one or two six-month contracts to earn enough money to make their way to Durban or the Rand.[85] Labour also came from families suffering eviction from white farms. In 1926, for example, the Natal Tanning and Extract Company in Melmoth planted wattle trees on 23,000 acres of land delimited in 1902, evicting its African occupants.[86] The company was not able to absorb their labour immediately as the trees took ten years to mature. Hundreds of evicted families with weak links to the reserve economy or kinship networks had no access to land or grazing. In order to re-stock, make payments to chiefs for rights to land or simply to purchase food, they sent out a proportion of their members to seek wage employment. Many had no choice but to take the poorly-paid jobs on cane farms or coal mines.[87]

ALTERNATIVE LABOUR SUPPLIES

Frustrated in their efforts to capture a malleable and consistent supply of local labour, Zululand planters turned to alternative sources. Resigning themselves to accepting marginal workers, many planters called for labour from local jails. This proved unworkable, however, since a rise in the number of tax defaulters, the principal source of

inmates, tended to coincide with periods of economic stress when labour was plentiful. Conversely, few defaulters could be found when conditions improved and local labour was scarce.[88]

In suggesting other, equally problematic, sources of labour, farmers had to contend with the almost overwhelming power of the urban areas and mines to attract African labour. Although the severe malaria epidemic of 1929-32 improved the planters' control of malaria-tolerant labour which the mines previously recruited, a `gentlemen's agreement', between the Chamber of Mines and the ZPU for 2000 workers a year, still gave the mines the best of Zululand's labour.[89] Mine recruiters argued that the planters should not complain about competition since over 30 per cent of the mine recruits were rejected as `unfit' and were therefore available for local employers.[90] By the 1930s, farmers, still desperate for workers, revised their public views about `unfit' labour. The Candover Cotton Farmers' Association stated that they accepted `unfit' labour, and claimed that Africans `need only be 50% proficient to work on a cotton plantation'.[91] Most farmers admitted that they actively sought `unfit' workers, and that over half their work force was compromised in some way. The sick, the lame, even the blind and of course `deserters' from the mines formed a significant number of recruited labourers in the cane fields. One luckless sugar farmer who contracted 466 men in 1931, had five dead within a week of arrival, 34 hospitalised with malaria, 21

suffering from TB, and 126 deserted by the following year.[92]

Sugar farmers looked to the real and perceived advantages of engaging the newly proletarianised sectors of the population. By the 1910s, if not earlier, changing circumstances in the political economy of Zululand, as elsewhere in southern Africa, had released women and children into the wage labour force.[93] Increasing cash demands and the growing independence of family members engaged in migrant labour forced those who remained in the reserves to develop new strategies to meet shortfalls in wages themselves, now that they were forced, increasingly, to be self-reliant for subsistence.[94]

The exploitation of women and children as wage labour can, to a certain extent, be seen as the diversion of domestic labour power away from customary forms of accumulation and its adaptation to new demands in the capitalist context. Its use on the sugar fields in Zululand seems initially to have been less of a drain on household production in the local reserves than in Pondoland where migrants travelled longer distances.[95] Until the 1910s, occasional work on local white farms provided a useful means of overcoming shortfalls in subsistence production while still allowing women and children in Zululand to maintain, albeit decreasingly, the homestead. By 1914, however, the DNC for Zululand was noting with concern that `togt' labour on white farms by women and children curtailed homestead production.[96] As husbands spent increasing periods of time

away from the reserves, women often bore the brunt of the failure to meet tax demands and many women sought alternative means of getting cash.[97]

White farmers found the employment of women and children advantageous, particularly for specific jobs.[98] Women were largely employed on the cane fields to weed, a task thought to coincide with their `traditional' domestic work.[99] Cotton farmers preferred to employ inexpensive African children since they could pay them 10s. to 12s. per month with less rations than for men and they `...found that [the children] make expert pickers, and are freely available so that the labour bogey will not affect things'.[100] Planters claimed, moreover, that they provided a form of `apprenticeship' (an ominous term in the history of South African labour relations, and considered a form of tied labour) for youths and children which prepared them for future work in the capitalist sector.[101] In 1935, the Natal Agriculture Union petitioned the Natal Department of Education to develop a scheme, ironically under the Child Protection Act, whereby `juvenile delinquents' and destitute children between the ages of 13 and 15 could be tied as `apprentices' to the sugar estates.[102] The underlying motive, however, was to bind over labour to agriculture before it became aware of the poor conditions on farms or the alternatives. As a ZPU representative put it:

> ...if you can get these *umfaans* [sic *abafana;* boys, young people] when they are young, afterwards they become very much better labourers than if you get them when they are older. All my best boys have been boys I have *caught* young. [my emphasis].[103]

A major reason why planters rejected the application of the Native Labour Regulation Act in Natal was its prohibition on the recruitment of under-age labour.[104]

To a certain extent farmers' demands for a more `rightless' labour force (both women and youths were considered legal minors under the revised Natal Code of Native Law) coincided with administrative and African patriarchal desires to control the effects of social change in the reserves.[105] Short-term or daily agricultural labour in Zululand allowed women and children to remain closer to home and maintain at least some of their own production. White farmers, however, had to be careful not to undermine male authority over the labour of `dependent' women and children. If the employment of sections of families responsible for the maintenance of the homestead was not to threaten the reproduction of the adult male migrant labour force then, in theory, men had to retain some control. Thus, in 1932, the former CNC, C. A. Wheelwright, now a Melmoth farmer, noted with surprise that he was, for the first time, able to employ women on his fields and that women wage-labourers were increasing in numbers throughout Zululand.[106] He was under the impression that local chiefs had forbidden women to go out to work and his concerns were eased only after he established that his women workers were the wives or relatives of men already employed on his farm.

By the 1930s, however, women and, to a lesser extent young people, were also more independent and able to take advantage of wider opportunities in industrialising South

Africa. Farmers, therefore, had to strike a delicate balance between attracting this less costly labour and placating male authority. They believed that `...fathers are beginning to realise that their children will not tolerate [having to give their wages over to them] and so are the employers'.[107] Although the latter had started to pay children directly, to avoid inciting the opposition of fathers they were forced to turn over a portion of the wages to the families. The Zulu patriarchs resented children becoming partially independent wage-earners and yet still relying on their families. As chief Mtembu complained:

> They [children] do not provide us with the means for buying food... and we may be in want. And here we are landed with our children, who are proving to be of no use to us.[108]

Through the 1930s and 1940s, the trend for farmers to employ women and children shifted in favour of children. By and large, women were able to find other niches in the local economy or in the urban areas. When not engaged in homestead labour they often preferred the more flexible and more remunerative informal sector activities in the cane belt, particularly beer-brewing, and to a lesser extent the sale of dagga and the practice of prostitution (see below).[109] The employment of children was, moreover, less threatening to the productive and reproductive capacities of homesteads than the employment of women. Thus, even with access to imported labour, planters recruited a substantial number of male children.[110] While the number of women formally employed by the sugar industry in Zululand never

exceeded 1000 (about 6 per cent) for the period 1930-1946, children numbered over 3,400 (roughly 20 per cent).[111]

Before this happened, the Zululand planters were so desperate for labour that Heaton Nicholls, the ideologue of segregation, suggested a supply scheme which illuminates the tensions created by white labour policies. In 1925, he called for government subsidies to restructure the employment of semi-skilled Africans in Zululand sugar mills.[112] He pointed to the effects of the radicalisation of white workers on the Rand in the early 1920s and the move towards an industrial labour colour bar to gain government support for the exclusive employment of whites in the mills.[113] His proposals even extended to the employment of whites in the fields. While they would use tractors and heavy machinery, the `unintelligent labour of cutting cane by hand' would be left `to the Native'.[114]

Most Zululand planters were sceptical of the scheme, fearing that white worker demands for high wages and state intervention to ensure decent working conditions would prove too costly. Heaton Nicholls argued, however, that owing to high rates of desertion and the attrition of disease, `...not to mention other undesirable features' African labour was not `nearly as cheap as it appears to be'.[115] In the end, the ZPU once again proclaimed its poverty and refused to support the plan. Despite strong support from senior government officials, perhaps influenced by the Hertzog administration's campaign against white poverty, and the availability of subsidies, only a

handful of white apprentices were assigned to the sugar mills around Empangeni.[116] Overall, white employment in agriculture in Zululand grew little between 1920 and 1948. Between 1925 and 1930 whites employed on farms in the region increased by only 89, from 926 to 1015.[117] While intermittent employment for white supervisors increased on the Pongola irrigation works, only another 180 whites found permanent employment on new sugar farms in northern Zululand between 1930 and 1948.[118]

ETHNICITY, DIFFERENTIATION AND FRICTION ON THE CANE FIELDS

The failure of planters to improve working conditions in the 1920s led to a major crisis in labour supplies in the 1930s. Undoubtedly the greatest problem relating to labour during this period was malaria. Zululand planters accepted state and medical recommendations for the importation of `malaria-tolerant' labour since they defined health problems in terms of inherent African immunity or lack thereof, thus deflecting attention away from working conditions. Packard has similarly argued that the Chamber of Mines definition of `tropical' workers provided the mines with renewed sources of labour without incurring the costs of reform.[119] Although tolerance to particular strains of malaria does not necessarily imply complete immunity, crude statistics and expert medical opinions of the day suggested a definite difference between the resistance of Mpondo workers and that of local Zulu and Mozambiquan labour.[120] Suffering from malnutrition and

overwork, Mpondo workers without previous exposure to malaria succumbed to the disease in their thousands.

While non-tolerant labour succumbed more quickly to malaria than did the Zulu, both groups suffered high rates of mortality when working for long periods in the sugar industry. Thus, the invention of the `tolerant' worker was only partly based on reality. Nevertheless, increasing pressure from Natal and Transkei NAD officials combined with mounting evidence from the Department of Health to curtail the recruitment of non-malaria-tolerant labour by farmers.[121]

There is compelling evidence to suggest that by the mid-1920s, prior to the most intense epidemic, Mpondo and Basuto workers (who peaked at 5,000 in 1929) were moving from the most notoriously malarial sugar farms.[122] The fledgling wattle industry was more appealing to many workers since, although the food and pay were also poor, it was situated in the less malarial interior. By the early 1930s, some wattle farms were staffed almost entirely with Mpondo labour.[123] The bitter experiences of many cane workers had, moreover, filtered back to the Transkei. In one well-publicised case, F. Konigkramer, a Gingindhlovu planter, had so abused his workers that he was charged with criminal assault. Despite the reluctance of Department of Justice magistrates, in contrast to NAD officials, in Eshowe, Mtunzini and Empangeni to prosecute white farmers, they were forced to do so in this case because it was so scandalous.[124] Not only was Konigkramer himself unable to

attract any more Mpondo labour; farmers of `every class' in southern Zululand experienced shortages of recruited labour as a result of his actions.[125]

In the early 1920s, planters, frustrated by the rapid attrition of Mpondo workers from malaria, agreed to cease active recruiting in the south.[126] Many Cape workers, however, still made their own way to cane farms, with dire consequences. Moreover, threats to the supply of Mozambiquan migrants under the revised 1928 Mozambique Convention between the Portuguese and Union governments for the regulation of migrant labour, spurred the recruitment of Cape and Basutoland workers for a brief time.[127] However, the devastation of the malaria epidemic of 1929-32 among Mpondo workers finally provided the Department of Health with enough ammunition to ban their employment north of the Thukela in 1935. The restriction on non-tolerant labour was reaffirmed in 1944, despite claims from farmers that malaria was no longer a threat.[128]

As a *quid pro quo* for the loss of Mpondo labour the planters demanded government assistance to regularise the flow of Mozambiquan labour into Zululand. With the recommendations of the Welsh-Barrett Committee, appointed to consider the shortage of labour in Zululand, malaria tolerance became the defining feature of labour sought for the Zululand cane belt.[129]

Initially, the Department of Health attempted to refuse to allow Mozambiquan migrants south of the Mfolozi River

fearing that they carried potent strains of malaria.[130] Health officials had grave concerns that uncontrolled migration from Mozambique might include `tropicals' from Nyasaland and areas north of 22 degrees who were carriers of sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) which could infect the Zululand tsetse fly.[131] In 1920, however, after assurances from Dr. Park Ross that there was no danger of the infection being transferred, and that the benefits of malaria tolerance for workers in Zululand out-weighed any hazards of spreading trypanosomiasis, the restrictions were relaxed.[132] This coincided with the reduction of non-tolerant Mpondo labour. Twenty years later, Heaton Nicholls relied on this policy to support an unsuccessful scheme to import malaria-tolerant labour from South West Africa.[133]

Labour migration from `Maputaland' in north-eastern Zululand and Mozambique into Natal dated back to the mid-nineteenth century.[134] Until the twentieth century, however, there was nothing to hold these workers in Zululand. Historically this movement was related to wider state intervention in the supply of labour and a compromise between the two dominant sectors of white capital: mining and farming. On the ground, however, African migrants moved according to their own initiatives and their ability to avoid structural controls. The clandestine immigration of Mozambiquans into Zululand, beginning in the 1920s, was by the 1930s the mainstay of the plantations, particularly the new northern white farms. African workers from southern Mozambique were quick to take advantage of blurred frontier relations and ethnic identities to gain access to

employment in the Union. The pre-colonial Maputan Kingdom in northeastern Zululand, so long overshadowed by the Zulu Kingdom's power and Zulu ethnicity (a tradition continued even by latter-day historians) provided unique opportunities for migrant workers.[135] Migrants and recruiters alike subverted Portuguese and Union immigration controls by bribing border police, purchasing false documents, especially Union passes, and misrepresenting themselves.[136] The Maputan kingdom fell on both sides of the long uncontrolled border running through dense bush between Zululand and Mozambique. It was, therefore, often impossible for a handful of Union officials, a number of which were local African police, to distinguish which Maputans belonged on which side of the border.[137]

Once in the Union, however, migrants still faced a series of hurdles before reaching their ultimate goal: employment in the urban areas. Sugar farmers and their recruiters loitered along the border, ready to pounce on illegal migrants using a mixture of threats of violence and coercion and promises of cash advances and ready transport (often at an unspecified cost which the recruit had to pay for out of his wages) to trap workers.[138] Many of the inexperienced endured one or two years working for low wages on the marginal northern farms until they could gain the contacts and knowledge needed to pass through Zululand to the urban areas.[139]

From 1928 until 1936, Zululand farmers faced threats to the flow of Mozambique labour as the provisions of the 1928

convention helped funnel workers to the Rand and tightened the controls over clandestine immigrants.[140] The depression also forced the NAD to reconsider its earlier policy of turning a blind eye to illegal immigration. In 1932, the SNA, Herbst, instructed Natal's CNC to stop the flow in order to guarantee jobs for Union Africans. Perhaps with his eye on Heaton Nicholls's role in parliament, Herbst warned, however, that `... you will have to be very careful that the farmers do not get wind of any instructions... or we will get the reaction in the House at once.'[141] The planters' lobby did `get wind' of the new policy, probably due to a reduction in migrants, and pressured the NAD to keep the border open. The CNC then often relaxed the regulations to allow Mozambique workers into Zululand despite protests from the Chamber of Mines about the potential diversion of `their' labour supply.[142] On the ground, surreptitious recruiters and farmers once again moved into the border area to spirit away truck-loads of men in the night.[143]

Once again the sugar farmers could not hold their labour, however. Through the 1930s, their continued efforts to maintain the cheapness of African labour served to drive it away. During the height of the drought and depression in Zululand, farmers, suffering from a drop in the price of sugar, pushed African wages down by between 5s. and 10s. to 30s a month. They claimed that government subsidies for mealie meal and a general reduction in the cost of living meant that the drop in wages `...could be done without any injustice to the Native or taking undue advantage of the

abnormal increase in the labour offering'.[144] In an effort to compensate for the lower wages they paid, farmers made marginal improvements in food rations and conditions, still only partially meeting those advocated by NAD and health officials.[145] Initially, some farmers found that increasing food rations gave them an affordable competitive edge over others, although this way they risked the enmity of their poorer neighbours. In the long-term, this strategy did not attract many workers: improved food, however nutritious, could not be sent home. They wanted higher wages. Moreover, during the 1940s, the cost of food had risen sharply and few farmers could afford to maintain consistently decent rations.[146]

By the late 1930s, migrant labour from outside the Union started to circulate out of Zululand. While farmers agreed that, following the revised Mozambique Convention of 1934 and the recommendations of the Welsh-Barrett Committee, they now had sufficient supplies of labour, they complained that the workers merely `drifted' through Zululand. At Mtubatuba, the Zululand Native Farm Labour Committee complained to the Herbst Committee that, in the first six months of 1937 alone, over 2,000 imported workers had left Zululand for work in Natal and Durban.[147] Moreover, between 1934 and 1937, the Portuguese Government, concerned about the loss of migrants and their tax money to the Union, demanded the implementation of a labour registration system at a cost to farmers of 5s. per worker.[148] By the end of the 1940s, planters deemed Mozambiquan labour to be totally unsatisfactory for, among other reasons, it was using

Zululand as a stepping stone to the Rand (see below).[149] Once they gained access to the Union through farm labour, migrants quickly moved to the better employment opportunities and other attractions of the cities. As a consequence of this rapid circulation and the improved methods of malaria vector control, by the late 1940s, the NAD considered allowing non-tolerant labour back into Zululand.[150]

Migrant labourers benefited from differential treatment and improvements in the conditions of employment as sugar farming stabilised in the 1920s, and the industry shifted away from using local and indentured Indian labour. Zulu labour had already proven its antipathy to the cane farms and, for many of them `malaria-tolerance' was achieved by avoiding the most malarial areas during the height of the infectious period, which coincided with heavy work in the cane fields.[151] Planters favoured migrants who took long contracts by offering larger cash advances than for local men, and provided them with better food.

Although the sugar industry as a whole apparently did not query the availability of reserve subsistence which was the basis for differing treatment, at least one farmer questioned `If better rations have to be given to imported labour, then why in all conscience should not the same apply to the labourers we have at our doors.'[152] Farmers believed that migrant workers had expert skills in cutting cane and `enjoyed' the intense summer heat, qualifications which they had initially attributed to Indian and Zulu

workers. Planters in Mtubatuba often placed Nyasalanders in better-paid jobs, believing them to be smarter and better able to adapt to complex tasks. Moreover, `Bein[g] of the Mohommedem [sic] faith,' it was asserted, `they despise liquor.'[153] By the 1940s, farmers complained that police raids on their migrant employees for illegal liquor and prostitution, problems they railed against a decade earlier, should cease since they drove workers away.[154]

Local African men were increasingly concerned with the threat posed by a large migrant labour force in their midst. As van Onselen has shown, worker consciousness is not only articulated through more formal structures such as trade unions.[155] Although Zulu men did not take employment on the cane belt often, they still constituted a substantial portion of the work force. Moreover, as we have seen, they relied on occasional short-term contracts with farmers during times of stress, or when `retired'. By the early 1940s, Mozambiquan and other `foreign' labour accounted for between 9,000 and 10,000 of the total work force of 16,000 men.[156] In addition, an unspecified number of Mozambiquan women and children filtered into Zululand in search of work or to accompany husbands and fathers. Chief Zungu of Mahlabatini pointed to the underlying tensions caused by the resulting competition:

> We don't know why the Portuguese natives come and work here,... we don't know how they live in their kraals. Some of our people have hardly got a blanket in which to sleep, and they must work, but they want more wages. These Portuguese boys will work for anything.[157]

On a more desperate note, during the drought of 1945, chief Mtetwa, whose ward was adjacent to an Eshowe cane farm, initiated a particularly violent `faction fight' by rallying his men to drive farm employees out of the district. In defence of his actions, Mtetwa argued that he could not restrain his men because they vehemently objected to Mozambiquans moving into the ward, `taking jobs, flaunting money, consorting with local women and driving the price of store goods up'.[158]

One Zulu witness, questioned by the Herbst Committee about the importation of labour, stated: `We would not like outside natives to receive our money. With what should we pay our taxes?' In a militant tone, chief Mankereke pointed to the inequities of the government's support of the migrant labour system.

> We will provide the labour for the farmers if the wages are more attractive. The Legislature has the authority to fix good wages. We would all like some agreement between the farmers and the natives, some sort of compromise about the wages.[159]

During the 1940s, other forms of social change struck at the heart of Zulu patriarchal attempts to maintain stable family relations in the new context. Zulu women sought alternative associations with wage-earning men in the region. Much to the alarm of chiefs, *induna* and male commoners in Mtunzini for example, women, occasionally widowed but commonly estranged from husbands and, therefore probably without access to their wages, established themselves as `kraal-heads' along the boundaries of sugar farms.[160] In many cases, migrants built huts adjacent to

their place of work and then established liaisons with these local women who could claim the right of residence for the huts. Chiefs and officials complained that these mutually beneficial relationships were for the sole purpose of selling intoxicating liquor to foreign workers.[161] Zulu men further complained of an `...alarming increase of immorality and venereal disease', due, they claimed, to `...their women being bought by the foreigners brought here by the Europeans'.[162] The Zulu perception that migrants' sexuality threatened local society was an important sign of rising ethnic tensions, and not dissimilar to white society's fears of African sexuality and disease.[163]

By the 1940s, Mozambiquan workers migrating to the sugar plantations, accompanied by a host of their compatriots who were anxious to supply their needs, had established themselves firmly in Zululand. Mozambiquan men and women became traders and hawkers in Zululand towns, sold liquor, engaged in prostitution, appropriated Union tax passes, received medical treatment at provincial hospitals and, in effect, became Union African `citizens'.[164] The state, however, certainly did not contemplate the advantages won by migrants, the cost of administration and medical services, and the problems of friction between migrants and reserve inhabitants when it supported the cheap migrant labour system in Zululand.

Following a short but severe drought in 1943, Mozambiquans came into Zululand, in increasing numbers. In 1946 alone, border police issued 7,649 formal entry permits, and

clandestine migrants continued to move in apace.[165] The NAD responded to the problem by targeting informal women migrants for deportation. Despite warnings from local officials that the removals would lead to further friction between local men and migrants on the grounds that Mozambiquan men would then seek out local women, Natal's CNC persevered in the repatriations.[166] Echoing the concerns voiced over migrant women on the Rand, the NAD believed it could prevent the problems of social dislocation in a migrant labour industrial environment by preventing the stabilisation of families, rather than by supporting them.[167] In 1948, the NAD bussed large numbers of Mozambiquan women, and some men suffering from infectious diseases, to the border for repatriation.[168]

White commercial farmers in Zululand developed unevenly and were unable to attract a reliable supply of local labour. The Zulu, preferring the better-paid jobs in urban areas, on the whole, successfully avoided working in the harsh and unhealthy cane farms. Whites experienced a crisis in labour supplies after indentured Indians were withdrawn from the sugar industry, and the gap was only partially filled by women, elderly men and children. Imported labour from within South Africa also proved problematic as the planters refused to improve conditions of pay and work in the areas of endemic malaria.

The use of large numbers of migrants in the cane fields heightened labour and ethnic tensions in Zululand. Beinart has shown the importance of ethnicity in patterns of

migration from rural to urban areas.[169] I have argued here that ethnic patterns of employment and ethnic tensions were also evident in rural Zululand. While imported labour from Mozambique proved to be more reliable through the 1920s and 1930s, by the 1940s the problems of social instability which had plagued the urban areas surfaced on the cane belt. Migrant wage labour remained important to the Zulu through the 1920s, and with the rapid decline of reserve agriculture in the 1930s, it became crucial. In the final analysis, the under-capitalised sugar cane industry contributed to the Zulu awareness of differential employment opportunities and conditions of work which fed into wider patterns of `ethnic specialisation' in employment, and ultimately undermined a unified worker consciousness.

[1] For a further discussion of the theory on the `continuum' of proletarianisation from the rural peasantry to permanent urban employment see the interesting debate between J. Ferguson, `Mobile Workers, Modernist Narratives: A Critique of the Historiography of Transition on the Zambian Copperbelt' Parts I and II, *JSAS*, Vol 16, No. 3, Sept. 1990, pp. 385-412 and Vol 16, No.4, Dec. 1990, pp. 603-621 and H. MacMillan, `The Historiography of Transition on the Zambian Copperbelt -Another View', *JSAS*, Vol. 19, No.4, Dec. 1993, pp. 681-712. For a wider discussion of alleged `single target' migrant workers, the `backward sloping curve of labour supplies' and urbanisation see S. Marks and P. Richardson (who reject these categories), Introduction to *International Labour Migration. Historical Perspectives*, (London 1984), pp. 1-18 and the following chapters and S. van der Horst, *Native Labour in South Africa* (London, 1971), pp. 230-240.

[2] Similar patterns were evident in the Natal sugar industry, from which the Zululand planters expanded. See P. Richardson, `The Natal Sugar Industry in the Nineteenth Century' in Beinart, Delius and Trapido, *Putting a Plough*, pp.129- 175. Sugar plantations have been considered essentially industrial in terms of their labour demands and production processes. Thus, they brought the `factory to the farm'. See S. Mintz *Sweetness and Power. The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York, 1986), p. 3, 24-30, and A. Jeeves `The Zululand Sugar Planters., the Gold Mines and the Scramble for Labour in South-East Africa, 1906-1940', paper delivered to the CAAS Conference, Toronto, May 1991.

[3] See Guy, `Destruction and Reconstruction'.

[4] A. Jeeves, `Planters' pp. 2-4 For the rise of the Zululand planters in Union politics see Marks, *Ambiguities*, pp. 132-33 and A. Duminy, `The "Natal Sugar Interest" and the Smuts Government, 1919-24', in Collected Seminar Papers, `Natal and the Union, 1909-1939', Department of History Workshop, University of Natal, July 1978.

[5] C. van Onselen details a fascinating account of the rise and fall of the *Amawasha* in his `The Zulu washerman's guild of the Witwatersrand, 1890-1914.' in C. van Onselen, *Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914*, Vol 2, *New Nineveh* (Johannesburg, 1987) pp. 74-110. For the ethnic dimensions of labour categories in Durban see, D. Hemson `Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: Dock Workers of Durban' Ph.D. Warwick, 1979 and `Dock Workers, Labour Circulation and Class Struggles in Durban, 1940-59', *JSAS*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Oct 1977, pp. 88-124. See also K. Atkins, *The Moon is Dead! Give Us Our Money! The Cultural Origins of an African Work Ethic in Natal c. 1943-1900* (London, 1994), pp. 18-20, 114-124. For the Zulu police force on the mines see A. Jeeves, *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy. The*

Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 1890-1920 (Kingston and Johannesburg, 1985), p. 181. J. Crush, *The Struggle for Swazi Labour, 1890-1920* (Kingston, 1987), p. 59 and for the specialization of Zulu migrant labour see, C. van Onselen, *Chibaro, African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933* (Johannesburg, 1980) p. 139.

[6] See Hemson, `Class', ch. 3 and J. Crush, A. Jeeves and D. Yudelman, *South Africa's Labour Empire: A History of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines* (Cape Town, 1991), pp. 55-67.

[7] W. Beinart, `Worker consciousness, ethnic particularism and nationalism: the experience of a South African migrant, 1930-60', in S. Marks and S. Trapido, (eds.), *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa* (London, 1987), ch. 9. For a discussion of the antecedents to this see P. Harries, `Culture and Identity in Early South African Labour History' ICS, SSA paper, 26 June 1991, and `Plantations, Passes and Proletarians: Labour and the Colonial State in Nineteenth Century Natal', *JSAS*, Vol.13, No. 3, April 1987, pp. 372-399.

[8] Thers is not the scope within this thesis to cover the background to labour migration from Zululand but see Appendix for labour supply figures and rates of migration, Hemson, `Dockworkers', Atkins, *The Moon*, pp. 88-98 and Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion* pp. 128-152.

[9] `Formal employment' was accounted for by passes issued to seek work. Statistics for labour migration to the mines only from Zululand are not readily available. My requests to examine Chamber of Mines files for recruitment and AVS workers from Zululand were met with claims that the files had `disappeared.' Figures supplied to the author by Mr. Graham Gregory of TEBA (The employment Bureau of Africa) from the Ulundi office were limited to numbers from the 1980s and 90s and thus are not helpful in extrapolating statistics for the 1930s and 40s. Nevertheless, I am grateful to Mr. Gregory for supplying these interesting files. Other available statistics are listed in the appendix.

[10] See SEPC, p. 35. and appendix.

[11] See ch. on agriculture. For the wider implications of male migrancy see for example Murray, *Families Divided*.

[12] CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), NC Vryheid to CNC, 23 Feb. 1932.

[13] NTS 2213, 379/280, Deputy Commissioner of the South African Police (S.A.P.) to Commissioner, 17 April 1942.

[14] The average age for withdrawal from migrancy was 45. See CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), report on labour, 10 June 1936. The whole notion of rural `retirement' is, I believe, problematic and in need of further research but see H.

Wolpe, `Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid', Economy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 4, Nov. 1972, p. 435 and J. Ferguson, `Mobile Workers' Part One', p. 391. By the later 1930s, it was apparent in Zululand that older men increasingly had to take local work to supplement whatever they had accumulated for `retirement'.

[15] See CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), report on labour, 10 June 1936 and the chs. below on famine and betterment.

[16] See for example NEC, evidence of A. Lee, p. 1454 and CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), NC, Nquthu to CNC, 3 May 1932. The SEPC considered the average age of retirement in 1936 to be 54 and by 1939 the Native Farm Labour Committee was counting employees up to the age of 65. See CAD, K-356, Box 2, evidence before the Native Farm Labour Committee (Herbst Committee, hereafter NFLC), undated list of age composition of mines labour force. In fact the age range was extending at both ends of the formal spectrum and workers as young as 13 were also counted.

[17] For African perceptions of these changes in Zululand see the NEC, pp. 1683-1720.

[18] Zululand Tax arrears, 1928-1940:

1928-29: £26,252
1932-33: £20,953
1935-36: £22,498
1939-40: £21,089
Total : £90,792

Source: G.P.S. 8618, No. 2/1943, *Review of the activities of the NAD for 1942-43* (Pretoria, 1943).

[19] 1/NQU 2/4/1/4, 2/40/2, District Administration Report to CNC, 1932. The same procedures were later applied in other Zululand districts. See for example 1/NGA, 3/3/2/11, 2/91, NC's report on meetings with chiefs, 1931.

[20] See CNC 121A, N3/13/4 (X), 120/3, undated list of Zululand recruits.

[21] Crush, *Swazi Labour*, p. 70.

[22] Ibid, p. 1433.

[23] See GNLB, 45 1159/12/38, NRC agent A. Shuttleworth to Chamber of Mines, 29 Oct. 1924.

[24] J. Guy and M. Thabane, `Technology, Ethnicity and Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the South African Gold Mines.', *JSAS*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1988, pp. 256-278, p. 259. For a wider discussion of ethnicity in southern African history see L. Vail, `Introduction' to *The*

Creation, pp. 1-19.

[25] Oral interviews conducted by the author with Mr. T. S. Qwabe and Mr. Simon Ngema.

[26] NFLC evidence, K-356, Box 4, p. 2.

[27] U.G. 3-`34, *Report of the Native Affairs Commission for 1932-33* (Pretoria, 1934), p. 10.

[28] Crush, *Swazi Labour*, p. 59.

[29] For ethnicity and Mozambiquan labour migrancy see P. Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity. Migrant Labourers in Mozambique and South Africa c. 1860-1910* (London, 1994), pp. 4-6, 88-90, 210-212.

[30] Unpublished historical resume of the TEBA offices in the Maputa district of Ingwavuma, from TEBA (Ulundi) files in the author's possession.

[31] Ibid, p. 215.

[32] See for example, NNAC, evidence of: H.T. James, Farmer at Melmoth, p. 34, C.F. Adams, store-keeper at Eshowe and Nongoma p. 606 and B. Cressy, miller southern Zululand, p. 33. Similar views were expressed nearly 25 years later by F. Higgs to the NEC, p. 1786 and C.W. Dent, representative of the Zululand Farmer's Union, p. 1823-1831. See also ILO, report on `Native Labour on Zululand Sugar Estates', *ILR*, Vol. 33, No. 6, June 1936, pp. 861-863.

[33] See J. Kimble `Labour Migrancy in Basutoland c. 1870-1885', in Marks and Rathbone, *Industrialisation*, pp. 119-141, p. 121.

[34] See for example ILO, `Report on Labour Conditions on the South African Sugar Estates', *ILR*, Vol. 30, No. 1, July 1934, pp. 98-101.

[35] See W. Beinart, `Transkeian migrant workers and youth labour on the Natal sugar estates, 1918-1940', *JAH*, Vol. 32, 1991, pp. 41-63, pp. 49-51, Jeeves, `Sugar Planters' and Lacey, *Boroko*, pp. 276-277.

[36] See NAU, KCM 30034, minutes, 1924-1944, minutes of ZPU meeting, 24 April 1924, NAU, KCM 30027, minutes of NAU 10 Sept. 1935 and see Nicholls and Egeland's repeated entreaties to the Department of Agriculture and the NAD in NTS 2211, 379/280, Part I, and NTS 2212, 379/280.

[37] See Jeeves, `Sugar Planters'. For the development of controls over farm labour elsewhere in South Africa see T. Keegan, *Rural Transformations in Industrialising South Africa: the Southern Highveld to 1914* (Johannesburg, 1987), pp. 121-130. For developments in the Natal sugar industry

see Richardson, `Sugar Industry', E. Wurthrich, `The Sugar Industry in Natal and Zululand', *ISJ*, Vol 24, 1922, pp. 243-247 and R. Osborn, *Valiant Harvest: the founding of the South African Sugar industry, 1848-1924* (Durban, 1964). For a fascinating examination of the development of sugar production see S. Mintz, *Sweetness*.

[38] See `Labour and the Farmer', *Zululand Times*, 12 Dec. 1920.

[39] For a discussion of the strike at Amatikulu see Beinart, `Transkeian migrant workers', J.D. Beall and M.D. North-Coombes, `The 1913 Disturbances in Natal: The Social and Economic Background to "Passive Resistance", *JNZH*, Vol. 6, 1983, pp. 48-81 and A. de V Minnaar, `Labour Supply Problems of the Zululand Sugar Planters, 1905-1939', *JNZH*, Vol. 12, 1989, pp. 53-72, esp. pp. 54-56. For a discussion of Indian indentured labour in Natal see M. Tayal [Swan], `Indian Indentured Labour in Natal, 1890-1911', *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1977, pp. 519-547 and J. Brain, `Natal's Indians, 1860-1910' in Duminy and Guest, *Natal and Zululand*, pp. 249-274. For a fuller discussion of the decline in Indian agricultural labour in Natal see V. Padayachee, S. Vawda and P. Tichman, *Indian Workers and Trade Unions in Durban: 1930-1950*, University of Durban Westville, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Report No. 20 (Durban, 1985), pp. 20-25. I am grateful to Peter Alexander for drawing this work to my attention.

[40] See Beall and North-Coombes, `The 1913 Disturbances', pp. 54-63.

[41] For an insightful contemporary analysis of the Zulu aversion to work in the cane belt see M. Gluckman's submission to the NFLC, CAD, K-356, NFLC evidence, box 4, written evidence, also contained in CNC 121A, N3/13/4 (X) 120/3, 22 Nov. 1937.

[42] For the `nexus' see Jeeves, Migrant Labour, ch. 5. and Crush, *Swazi Labour*. For comments on the `unreliability' of local Zulu labour see *SASJ*, Vol. 3, 1919, p. 239 and Vol. 4, No 9, 1920, p. 771, KCAL, Minute Book of the Emoyeni Planter's Association, KCM 3041, minutes of meeting, 10 Dec. 1931 and NEC, comments of ZFU, pp. 1817-1830.

[43] See KCAL, NAU, KCM 30034, minutes of ZPU meeting, 24 April 1924, and *Zululand Times*, 9 April 1920.

[44] See *SASJ*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1928, p.71.

[45] See NEC, evidence of C. Dent p. 1815-1827 and NTS 2201 315/280, 5, Minutes of Evidence before the Departmental Committee appointed to enquire into and report upon certain questions relating to Native Labour in Zululand, the Transkeian Territories and the Ciskei (Welsh-Barrett

Committee). See also Minnaar, `Labour Supply Problems', p.55.

[46] See Jeeves, Migrant Labour, and M. Legassick and F. de Clercq `Capitalism and Migrant Labour in Southern Africa: The Origins and Nature of the System', in Marks and Richardson, *International Labour Migration*, pp. 140-166.

[47] See `Beginnings of the Natal Sugar Industry' *SASJ*, Vol. 33, April 1949, [also contained in KCAL, MSS CAMPB, (Sir Marshall Campbell Papers), KCM 32758, file 10], Christopher, `A Note, pp.201-208 and his `Natal: A study'. Also see above ch. 1 and my `The Impact'.

[48] U.G. 22-'22, *Report of the Sugar Enquiry Commission* (Pretoria 1922), p. 10.

[49] CNC 380B, 3392/3435 1919, see reports of NCs on Labour in Zululand.

[50] See A. Hammond, *South African Cane Growers' Association. The First 50 Years, 1927-1977* (Durban, 1977), pp. 22-23, the Umfolozi Co-operative Sugar Planters Limited, *Progress... Umfolozi, 1923-1951* (Durban, 1951) [contained in KCAL, MS Nic, KCM 3791] pp. 7-10, 15-18. Wattle farmers also benefited from an increased state subsidy when their product price dropped. See NAU, KCM, 30027, 30 April 1935, p. 65.

[51] For the failure of these settlements see *SASJ*, Vol. 3, Nov. 1919, p. 875, Vol. 17, Sept. 1933, p.473 and Vol. 20, Oct 1936, p.623. See also ch on the cattle economy and S. Brookes, `Playing the Game' ch. 2. For the effect of the Influenza epidemic on labour supplies see H. Phillips, `Black October: The Impact of the Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 1918 on South Africa', Archives Yearbook of South Africa (Pretoria, 1990).

[52] See below and `The Sugar Industry and the Returned Soldier', *SASJ*, Vol. 28, Dec. 1944, pp. 131-148 and `Sugar Farm Labour in South Africa', Vol. 30, June 1946, pp. 321-333.

[53] See for example, 1/ESH, 3/2/3/4, 1/98, NC Eshowe to NC Mahlabatini, 12 Sept. 1922 and NC Hlabisa to NC Eshowe, 8 Nov. 1925.

[54] See NEC, evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, p. 1751.

[55] See CNC 380B, 3392/1919, report on Masters and Servants cases, CNC to SNA, 12 Sept. 1919, and *SASJ*, Vol. 10, Jan. 1926, pp. 39-45. For a discussion of the Masters and Servants Act as it related to farm labour see M. Lacey, *Boroko*, ch. 4 and J. Nattrass, `Migration flows in and out of Capitalist Agriculture' in F. Wilson, A. Kooy and D. Hendrie (ed.s) *Farm Labour in South Africa* (Cape Town,

1977), pp. 51-61.

[56] *SASJ*, Vol. 3, May 1919, p. 377.

[57] A. Jeeves, `The Politics of Public Health in South Africa. The Sugar Industry and Malaria Epidemic of 1923-1935.' paper presented to the *CRCSA*, Annual Research Workshop, 1991, p. 2.

[58] See for example the comments of G. Patrick, President of the ZPU, before the Natal Provincial Hospital Commission contained in SASJ, Vol 9, March 1925, p. 229 and NTS 2211 379/280, Part I, comments of C. Dent representing the ZFU to the Minister of Native Affairs, 18 Dec. 1933 and a review of this meeting with G. Heaton Nicholls in the *Zululand Times*, 12 Feb. 1934.

[59] See KCAL, KCM 91/15/5, minutes of Gingindhlovu-Mtunzini Farmers' Association meeting, 12 Dec. 1929.

[60] CNC 17A 13/2/4, Deputy Chief Health Officer to CNC, 31 July 1937, and 17 Sept. 1937 and see, NEC, evidence of F. Rodseth p. 1943 Much the same picture was given for Natal estates in the 1920s by Beinart in `Transkeian Migrant Workers'.

[61] NEC, evidence of Rodseth, p. 1941.

[62] E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1884-1875* (London, 1977), p. 235, quoted in Marks and Richardson, `Introduction' to *International Labour Migration*, p. 12.

[63] See Beinart, `Transkeian Migrant Workers', p. 6 and Hemson, `Class Consciousness', pp. 54-58.

[64] See for example NTS 2068 139/280, Impapala Farmers' Association to RM, 25 March 1914; GNLB 177 663/14, SNA to President of the Mtunzini Farmers' Association, 20 April 1914; GNLB 253 357/16, passim, and GNLB 1159/12/38 (33) recruiter Mr. G. Arnold to RM, 5 Dec. 1921.

[65] See GNLB, 177 663/14, President of Mtunzini Farmers' Association to SNA, 14 March 1914, and NTS 2068 139/280, Eshowe Farmers' Association to Minister of Agriculture, 22 April 1919. For the closure of districts to outside recruiters see GNLB, 177 663/14 and NTS 2268, 139/280; NTS 2329, 983/280 and NTS 2206, 344/280.

[66] *SASJ*, Vol 16, No. 10, 1932, p. 587 and see Marks and Richardson, `Introduction' for the insufficiencies of the `single target worker' theory.

[67] NFLC, evidence taken at Eshowe, 19 Oct. 1937, p. 3.

[68] The Mtunzini and Lower Umfolozi Districts had been closed in 1912 under the application of the Natal Anti-

Touts Act of 1906 in order to protect the planters' labour. See GNLB, 177 663/14, protests of the ZPU and the Mtunzini Farmers' Association to the Director of Native Labour and the Minister of Native Affairs, 10 March and 15 March 1914 and ZPU to CNC, 2 March 1923 and 19 May 1929.

[69] Ibid. For a further discussion of the Masters and Servants legislation as it applied to Natal see Rogers, *Native Administration*, p. 22, Lacey, *Boroko*, pp. 158-163 and van der Horst, *Native Labour*, pp. 286-288.

[70] NEC, evidence of Braatvedt, p. 1868 and van der Horst, *Native Labour*, p.287.

[71] NTS 2068 139/280, Director of GNLB to SNA, 13 June 1919. This pre-dates what D. Hindson noted as the Pretoria government line that Africans should be able to participate in a `free labour market'. See his *Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 87.

[72] Ibid. CNC to SNA, 22 June 1916. For the various measures called for see the *Agricultural News and Sugar Planters' Gazette*, from 1914 to 1919 and the *SASJ*, from 1919 onwards. See also the minutes of various meetings of the ZPU in KCAL, NAU, KCM 30034, minutes, 1924-1944 and KCAL, Files of the Kwambonambi Planters' Union (MS KWA), KCM 53366, minutes 1922-31. Many of these same demands were voiced before the NFLC. See NFLC, K-356, Box 4, evidence of J.A. Erlandson, Representative of the Zululand Planters Association of Mtubatuba taken at Empangeni, 18 Oct. 1937 and the Welsh-Barrett Committee report of evidence, 25 March 1935. For a discussion of the forced labour system in Natal and Zululand See S. Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp. 43-45, and 132-133 and Unterhalter, `Religion', p. 386. For another southern African equivalent see C. van Onselen, *Chibaro*, p. 99.

[73] See CNC 380B, 3392, 3393 re payment of shift tickets, 1927-1930 and the *Natal Mercury*, 20 Dec. 1929.

[74] The issue of poor housing and particularly food rations was taken up by a number of government officials. See for example Rodseth's comments to the Gingindhlovu-Mtunzini Farmers' Association, KCM 91/15/5, 12 Dec. 1929, his evidence before the NEC, pp. 1938-1945 and his book *Ndabazabantu: The Life of a Native Affairs Administrator* (Johannesburg, 1984) pp. 59-60 and the Welsh-Barrett Report, p. 5. For descriptions of the shocking conditions on the cane fields see for example NEC, evidence of F. Rodseth, pp. 1949-52 and NFLC, evidence of Mutiwampela Nkwanazi, Empangeni, p.1, Luke Gumede, Empangeni, pp.2-3, and Msongelwa, Ingwavuma, p. 3. For the problems of ill-health resulting from work in the cane industry see Beinart, `Migrant workers' and my `"Weary workers"'.

[75] The story of Park Ross and the anti-malarial campaign is an important one. Unfortunately, this thesis does not provide the scope for the in-depth chapter I have written discussing the issue which I intend submitting as a journal article later.

[76] G. Park Ross, `A standard house plan for Coloured Labour and details of its conversion to Mosquito-proof quarters', in *SASJ*, Vol 5, May 1925, pp. 349-352.

[77] See Beinart, `Transkeian Migrants', pp. 13-14, KCAL, MS Kwa, KCM 53366, Inspector of Native Labour's address to the ZPU, 10 Dec. 1929, and a very useful review of the department of health regulations governing the housing of labourers on the sugar estates in *SASJ*, Vol 20, Aug. 1936, pp. 493-497.

[78] GNLB, 253 357/16 (77), extracts from ZPU meeting, 12 June 1918.

[79] See CNC 380B, 3392-3435, throughout.

[80] Ibid. Cash advances were technically prohibited under the Masters and Servants legislation. For the creative manner in which recruiters avoided the £2 limit to cash advances see GNLB 177, 663/14, SNA to President of Mtunzini Farmers' Association, 20 April 1914.

[81] Figures of employment varied considerably from source to source. This breakdown is an estimate based variously on, U.G. 13-`27 and U.G. 12-`32, Department of Census and Statistics, *Agricultural Censuses for the Union* for 1925, and 1931; CNC 121A N3/13/14, CNC to SNA, 5 Nov. 1938, containing Zululand Farmers Union estimates submitted to the Native Affairs Commission of 1932. See also U.G. 3-`34, *Report of the Native Affairs Commission for 1932-33*; Report of the Welsh-Barrett Committee, p.3; GES 2628 6/56N, report on malaria-tolerant labour in Zululand, 23 Nov. 1948 and the *Zululand Times*, 3 Nov. 1941, 12 Nov. 1944 and 10 June 1946. Labour employed increased to roughly 16,000 in the 1930s, (of which approximately 9,000 were foreign workers) but never appeared to reach the 20,000 claimed by the planters as their requirement in an above average year. See also R.H. Smith, *Labour Resources of Natal* (Cape Town, 1950) ch. 5 and statistical Appendix for complete figures.

[82] Jeeves, `Zululand Planters', p.4.

[83] See GNLB 253 357/16, minutes of ZPU meeting, 12 June 1918.

[84] See for example NEC evidence of Rodseth, p. 1952 and H. James, p. 1848 as well as NTS 2201 315/280 evidence of ZPU before the Welsh-Barrett Committee, 25 March 1935.

[85] Oral Interviews with S. Ngema, T.S. Qwabe and H.C. Zulu,

and see NFLC, Box 4 evidence of R. Anderson, Mtunzini, taken at Empangeni, 18 Oct. 1937, p. 10.

[86] NEC, evidence of H. James, p. 1848 and see editorial in *The Sun and Agricultural Journal of South Africa*, Vol. 17, 1926, pp. 881-883.

[87] Ibid.

[88] See *Zululand Times*, 26 Jan. 1925 and *SASJ*, 9 March 1926, p. 332.

[89] See the *report of the Welsh-Barrett Committee*.

[90] NFLC, evidence of J. Horsfall, District Superintendent of the NRC, Zululand, Ingwavuma, 14 Oct. 1937, p. 8.

[91] NFLC, evidence of Mr. A. Colenbrander, Candover, Ingwavuma, 14 Oct. 1937, p. 9.

[92] *SASJ*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1932, p. 149.

[93] For a discussion of the changing labour demands on Africans see J. Guy, `Gender oppression in southern Africa's precapitalist societies' in C. Walker (ed.) *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945* (Cape Town, 1990), pp. 43-47, C. Walker `Gender and the Development of the Migrant Labour System C. 1850-1930', in the above work, pp. 168-196 and C. Murray, *Families Divided*, and `High Bridewealth' pp.79-84.

[94] Iris Berger details these developments and pinpoints 1925 as the time a rapid industrialisation which drew in a number of classes of women. See her *Threads of Solidarity: Women in South African Industry, 1900-1980* (London, 1992), especially chs. 1 and 2.

[95] Beinart suggests that the use of child wage labour in Pondoland was not such a dramatic a shift in exploitation since they were already part of the domestic system of production. See his `Transkeian Migrant Workers'.

[96] CNC 186, 1613/14, 16 Oct. 1914, Report of DNC Gibson's tour of Zululand.

[97] See S. Redding, `Legal minors and social children: Rural African Women and Taxation in the Transkei, South Africa', *ASR* Vol. 36, No. 3, Dec. 1993, pp.49-74.

[98] Similar patterns were evident on the Nyasaland tea plantations. See W. Chirwa, `Child and Youth Labour on the Nyasaland Plantations, 1890s-1953', *JSAS*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Dec. 1993, pp. 662-680 and R. Palmer, `Working Conditions and Worker Responses on the Nyasaland Tea Estates, 1930-1953' *JAH*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1986, pp. 105-126.

[99] NEC, evidence of Wheelwright, p. 1751.

[100] *SASJ*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1919, p. 295.

[101] See for example the discussion of `bonded' forms of labour in Marks and Richardson, `Introduction', p. 11 and B. Grier, `Invisible Hand: The Political economy of Child Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1930', *JSAS*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1994, pp. 27-52. For an analysis of `apprenticeship' as a form of virtual slavery see P. Delius and S. Trapido, `Inboekselings and Oorlams: The Creation and transformation of a servile class', in B. Bozzoli, (ed.), *Town and Countryside in the Transvaal: Capitalist Penetration and Popular Response* (Johannesburg, 1983), pp. 55-88.

[102] KCAL, NAU files, KCM 30027, 10 Sept. 1935, p. 117 Similarly, the NAD had developed a scheme to commit African juveniles over to chiefs and *induna* in Zululand in order to contend with the rising numbers of pauper children in the urban areas. See CNC 109A, N7/15/3 94/14, CNC circular, No. 94/14, 3 March 1936.

[103] NEC, evidence of S. Forest, pp. 1826-27.

[104] See KCM 91/15/5, Gingindhlovu-Mtunzini District Farmers' Association minutes of meeting, 20 Dec. 1929 and Beinart, `Transkeian Migrant Labour'.

[105] For a further discussion of women's rights see Marks, `Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness', in Vail, *Tribalism*, pp. 215-240, S. Redding, `Legal minors' and Simons, *African Women*.

[106] NEC, evidence, p. 1752.

[107] Ibid, pp. 1760.

[108] NEC, evidence of Chief Msigana Mtembu, Empangeni, p. 1808.

[109] See for example NFLC, evidence of Mahaliya Mnyango, Eshowe, 19 Oct. 1937, p. 4 and NTS 2213, 279/280, PEA Labour In Zululand, 1941-49, ZFLC to Minister of Native Affairs, 22 Oct. 1943. For further discussion of women's beer brewing in rural Natal see H. Bradford, `"We are now the men": Women's Beer Protests in the Natal Countryside, 1929', in B. Bozzoli (ed.), *Class, Community and Conflict* (Johannesburg, 1987), pp. 292-320.

[110] See NTS 2212, 379/280, NC to CNC, 28 Jan. 1941.

[111] See CNC 121A N3/13/4 (X) CNC to SNA, 5 Nov. 1938, Appendix of employment statistics and NTS 2213, 379/280 CNC to SNA, report of NC's conference, 24 Sept. 1946.

[112] LDE-N, 37(a) 1492/4, G. Heaton Nicholls, `A plan for

the exclusive employment of white labour in the Umfolozi sugar factory', 7 Feb. 1925.

[113] For a discussion of white labour unrest and the state's responses see J. Cell, *Segregation. The Highest Stage of White Supremacy. The origins of segregation in South Africa and the American South* (Cambridge, 1982), ch. 3 and Marks and Trapido, `The Politics', pp. 8-10, 43-45.

[114] LDE-N, 37(a) 1492/4, Heaton Nicholls' scheme, p. 11 and *SASJ*, Vol. 9 No. 7, 1925, pp. 427-459.

[115] See *SASJ*, Vol. 12, No. 5, 1928, pp. 262.

[116] See LDE-N, 37(a) 1492/4, Secretary for [white] Lands to Director of Irrigation, 20 Feb. 1925; Minister of [white] Labour to Secretary for Lands, 4 March 1925 and *SASJ*, Vol.9 No. 5, 1928, p. 439.

[117] U.G. 13-`27 and U.G. 12-`32, *Agricultural Censuses for the Union*, 1925 and 1931, and see appendix.

[118] *SASJ*, Vol. 31, No. 7, 1947, p.411.

[119] See R. Packard, `The Invention of the "Tropical Worker": Medical Research and the Quest for Central African Labor on the South African Gold Mines, 1903-1936', *JAH*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1993, pp. 271-292. See also A. Butchart, `The Industrial Panopticon: Mining and the Medical Construction of Migrant African Labour in South Africa', ICS, Health and Empire Seminar, 3 June 1994.

[120] See A. MacKinnon, `"Weary workers" and the epidemiology of malaria in Zululand, 1900-1950', paper presented to the CRCSA workshop, Kingston, Canada, Nov. 1994; J. Gear, C. Hansford and R. Pitchford, *Malaria in Southern Africa* (Pretoria, 1981); P. Prothero, *Migrants and Malaria* (London, 1965) ch. 3; D. le Sueur, B. Sharp and C. Appleton, `Historical perspective of the malaria problem in Natal with emphasis on the period 1928-1932; *SAJS*, Vol. 89, May 1993, pp. 232-239; J. Brain, `"But only we Black men die": the 1929-1933 malaria epidemic in Natal and Zululand', *Contree*, Vol. 27 , 1990, pp. 18-25; N. Swellengrebel, S. Annecke and B. De Meillon, `Malaria Investigations in Some Parts of the Transvaal and Zululand', *SAIMR*, Vol. 4., No. 27, July 1931, pp. 245-274 and S. Javett, `Malaria- notes on some conditions in Zululand', SAMJ, Vol. 8, Jan. 1934, pp. 55-57.

[121] See my `"Weary workers"'.

[122] This is a rough estimate only. See *SASJ*, Vol. 12, No. 12, 1928, p. 737.

[123] See NEC, Evidence of H. James, p. 1849-50 and *SASJ*, Vol 15, No. 12, p 769.

[124] See *SASJ*, Vol. 13 No.6, 1929, p. 367 and NEC, evidence of C. Dent, p. 1835. In 1935, the Three JUS district were transferred back to the NAD under the provisions of the Native Administration Act of 1927 at the request of local farmers who hoped that uniformity in administrative treatment would secure better labour supplies. For the debate between white interest groups over this matter see CNC 109A, N1/15/6, 94/12 and Dubow, *Racial*, fn. no. 78, p. 93. Dubow is inaccurate in stating that the transfer took place in 1928.

[125] See *SASJ*, Vol. 13 No.6, 1929, p.367 and NTS 2068 139/280, Inspector of Native Labour to CNC, 6 July 1925.

[126] See KCAL, MS KWA, KCM 53366, minutes of meetings, 13 Dec. 1922, p. 7 and 5 Sept. 1924, p. 46. See also *SASJ*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1921, p. 179.

[127] For a useful discussion of the negotiations surrounding the Mozambique Convention see A. Jeeves, `Migrant Labour in the Industrial Transformation of South Africa, 1920-1960',in Z.A. Konczacki, J.L. Parpart and T.M. Shaw (ed.s), *Studies in the Economic History of Southern Africa*, Vol. II (London, 1991), pp. 105-144, pp. 109-121.

[128] NTS 2213, 379/280, Sect. for Commerce to Sect of. S.A. Sugar Association, 17 Nov. 1944.

[129] See the NAD, *Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to Enquire into and report upon certain questions relating to Native Labour in Zululand, the Transkeian Territories and the Ciskei* (Pretoria, 1935) found in NTS 2202 315/280 and NTS 2213 214/280 for minutes of evidence.

[130] See Ibid and NTS 2211 379/280, Part I, General Manager of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, (WNLA) to SNA, 24 Nov. 1924, and see Minnaar, `Labour Problems', p. 63.

[131] Ibid, CNC to SNA, 23 April 1925 and SNA to CNC, 26 May 1925. See also a report on sleeping sickness conference in South Africa by Dr. J. Mitchell, Secretary for Public Health, in *MJSA*, Vol. 4, No. 5, 1920, pp. 226-235 and *SASJ*, Vol 4, No. 8, 1920, pp. 733-735.

[132] *MJSA*, Vol. 4, No. 5, 1920. According to Dr. David Evans and Dr. R. Warhurst of the Department of Parasitology, University of London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, it is possible for the human strain of trypanosomiasis to cross-infect vectors and then spread the disease to a new human population, though why this did not occur in Zululand is not clear. See also H. Mulligan, *Trypanosomiasis: The African Illness* (London, 1970). I am grateful to Drs. Evans and Warhurst for this information.

[133] NTS 2213, 379/280, Nicholls to SNA, 27 May 1941.

[134] For `Maputan' labour migration and the relationship of northeastern Zululand to the Zulu see variously comments by Jantshi in Webb and Wright, *James Stuart Archive*, Vol 1, p. 186 and Vol. 2, pp. 249-250, P. Harries, `Labour Migration from Mozambique to South Africa: With Special Reference to the Delagoa Bay Hinterland, c. 1862-1897', Ph.D. London, 1983, chs 2 and 3, his `History, Ethnicity and the Ingwavuma Land Deal: The Zulu Northern Frontier in the Nineteenth Century', *JNZH*, Vol. 6, 1983, pp. 1-27, `Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-colonial labour migration: labour migration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa up to 1895' in Marks and Rathbone, *Industrialisation*, pp. 142-166, P. Warhurst, `Britain and the Partition of Maputaland, 1875-1897', in University of Natal Conference on Natal and Zululand History, Collected Papers, Vol. 3, C. Ballard, `Migrant Labour in Natal, 1860-1879: With Special Reference to Zululand and the Delagoa Bay Hinterland', *JNZH*, Vol 1, 1978, pp. 32-39. and N. Etherington, `Labour Supply and the Genesis of South African Confederation in the 1870s', *JAH*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1979, pp. 235-253.

[135] For misunderstandings about the Maputan Kingdom and tensions with the Zulu see P. R. Warhurst `Partition of Maputaland' and Harries, `History, Ethnicity'.

[136] NTS 2211 379/280, CNC to NC Ingwavuma, 21 Jan. 1925 and CNC to SNA, 22 Jan. 1925.

[137] See Ibid, Sub-Inspector, SAP, Nongoma to District Commandant, Eshowe, 2 July 1926 and CNC to SNA, 21 Feb. 1928.

[138] See NTS 2212, 379/280 , minutes of the Welsh-Barrett Committee; NTS 2202, 315/280, evidence of NC Ingwavuma before the Committee taken at Eshowe; NTS 2213, 379/280, ZFLC to SNA, 17 June 1941; NTS 2219, 415/280 (29), statement of J. Sibiya Pelembe to the Eshowe Native Labour Advisory Board, 1 Aug. 1941, and a report by F. Rodseth to the SNA, NTS 2246 603/280, 22 Aug. 1947.

[139] M. Murray has made similar points about migrants entering the north-eastern Transvaal to me in personal discussions. His findings will be published in a forthcoming issue of *JSAS*.

[140] See NTS 2211, 379/280, review of the conditions of the Mozambique Conventions of 1928 and 1936. See also Jeeves, `Industrial Transformation.'

[141] CNC 97A, N7/8/2 (X), SNA to CNC, 7 March 1932.

[142] NTS 2211, 379/280, Nicholls to Secretary of the Interior, C. Schmidt, 21 March 1928, 12 July 1932 Schmidt to Nicholls, 22 March 1928 and CNC circular to all NCs,

Zululand, 15 June 1928.

143 Ibid, NC Ngotshe to SNA, 10 Aug. 1935 and statement of R. Rouillard to the SNA, 3 June 1935.

144 *SASJ*, Vol 15, No. 5, 1931, p.455.

145 *SASJ*, Vol. 30, No. 6 1946, p. 307.

146 Ibid.

147 NFLC evidence, Box 4, p. 7.

148 The regularisation of Mozambiquan labour was set under the Mozambique Convention of 1934. A Portuguese government representative was stationed in Zululand from 1937 to ensure that workers paid their taxes. See NTS 2212, 379/280, resolutions of Round Table Conference between the Union Government and the Portuguese Curator, 28 March 1940, and Government Notice No. 217 of 1937.

149 NTS 9549 149/400 L. Ratray, representative of the South African Sugar Association at meeting with the NAD, sugar and coal owners associations, 22 Nov. 1948.

150 Ibid, CNC to SNA, 12 Aug. 1949.

151 Oral interview with Mr. T.S. Qwabe and see le Sueur, Sharp and Appleton, `Historical malaria', p. 235.

152 *SASJ*, Vol. 4, No. 9 1920, p. 773.

153 NTS 2213, 379/280, Report of the S.A.P. Station Commander, Mtubatuba to NC, Hlabisa, 8 May 1946.

154 NTS 2213, 379/280, Report of the ZFLC to Minister of Native Affairs, 22 Oct. 1943. The Zululand Sugar Millers and Planters Inc. of Empangeni then applied for licences to brew their own African beer in their compounds. See NTS 7070, 592/322, applications for 12 Dec. 1947 and 10 Oct. 1952. For the role of alcohol in labour control in Natal see R. Edgecombe `The role of Alcohol in Labour Acquisition and Control on the Natal Coal Mines, 1911-1938', pp. 187-210 and P. la Hausse `Drink and Cultural Innovation in Durban: The Origins of the Beerhall in South Africa, 1902-1916' in J. Crush and C. Ambler (eds.), *Liquor and Labour in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg, 1992) pp. 187-210 and 78-115 respectively.

155 C. Van Onselen, `Worker Consciousness in Black miners in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1920', *JAH*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1973, pp. 237-255.

156 NTS 2219, 415/280 (29), Native Labour Advisory Board minutes of meeting, 26 June 1941.

[157] NFLC evidence, Box 4, Nongoma, 14 Oct. 1937, p.4.

[158] NTS 7680, 154/332, report of the S.A.P. Station Commander to District Commandant, 26 Feb. 1945.

[159] NFLC, evidence of chief Mankereke, p. 5.

[160] 1/MTU, 3/4/3/2, 2/16/3a, S.A.P. Station Commander, Inyoni to NC, 19 March 1946.

[161] Ibid, NC's meetings with chiefs and *induna*, 8 Nov. 1945, 10 Feb. 1946.

[162] NTS 2219, 415/280 (29) report of the Eshowe Native Labour Advisory Board, 26 June 1941, p. 3.

[163] For South African society's perceptions of venereal disease see K. Jochelson, `The Colour of Disease: Syphilis and Racism in South Africa, 1910-1950', D. Phil. Oxford, Aug. 1993, pp. 2-3, 110-118. For the wider implications of African ill-health and white perceptions of it see S. Marks and N. Anderson, `Typhus and social control: South Africa, 1917-1950', in R. Macleod and M. Lewis,(eds.) *Disease, Medicine, and Empire* (London, 1988), pp. 257-283, M. Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills. Colonial Power and African Illness* (Stanford, 1991), pp. 129-151, T. Ranger, `Plagues of beasts and men: prophetic responses to epidemic in eastern and southern Africa', in T. Ranger and P. Slack, *Epidemics and Ideas* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 241-268, H. Phillips, `Black October' and M. Swanson, `The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900-1909', *JAH*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1977, pp. 387-410.

[164] NTS 2213, I 379/280, minutes of meeting of NC's conference on PEA labour in Zululand, Aug. 1946 in CNC to SNA, 24 Sept. 1946.

[165] Ibid, CNC to SNA, 19 June 1946.

[166] Ibid, NC Empangeni to CNC, 12 May 1947.

[167] See P. Bonner, `"Desirable or Undesirable Basutho Women?" Liquor, Prostitution and the Migration of Basutho Women to the Rand, 1920-1945' in Walker (ed.), *Women and Gender*, pp. 221-250.

[168] NTS 2213, 379/280, II, CNC to SNA, 10 Jan. 1948 and Manager of South African Railways to CNC, 21 Oct. 1949.

[169] See Beinart, `Worker consciousness'.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE DECLINE OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURE IN THE RESERVES

Although there is some controversy over when reserve agricultural production declined in South Africa, it is clear that, before 1920, and possibly even before 1910, in the Zululand reserves Africans produced less than 50 per cent of their food requirements.[1] There is evidence that, by the 1930s, the non-capitalist means of subsistence in the reserves had deteriorated dramatically, and close to 60 per cent of grain requirements had to be imported.[2] Although Simkins has argued that Zululand remained one of the most self-sufficient reserve areas in South Africa, producing from 25 to above 75 per cent of its subsistence food needs between 1927 and 1960, his aggregated analysis obscures regional and class differences in both production and entitlement.[3] A more detailed look at production figures for different districts in Zululand in the 1930s and 1940s, suggests that the picture for African agriculture in the first half of the twentieth century was rather more bleak for the majority of commoners than Simkins suggests. Nor does he consider the unequal effect of the rapidly expanding white-dominated market on Africans, producers or consumers, which certainly caused the gulf between rich and poor to widen in Zululand.

Despite Simkins's figures for the overall levels of production from 1927-1960, the 1930s and 1940s were years of extreme want and suffering for most Africans. Simkins argued that `...unless the terms of trade in the reserves

deteriorated consistently or the production of output traded increased (it may have done a little with the shift towards livestock production)', production per head would have remained the same.[4] Yet, the very nature of the isolated Zululand market, and its extreme volatility could, in Simkins words, make `Africans production worth less in terms of subsistence requirements' than he estimated.[5]

African production of the principal crop, maize, fluctuated dramatically over time. The overall trend, however, at least until 1948, was a shortfall in even the most conservatively-estimated food needs. In 1923, total maize production in the reserves was approximately 241,000 200lb. bags. In 1927, production dropped to 196,000 bags and bottomed out at below an estimated 100,000 bags in 1931. Occasionally reserve production did rebound. Following the severe drought and depression from 1931-1933, maize production peaked at 278,000 bags, a testament to the resilience of African producers. Yet, by 1937, with the intensification of state relief and the reliance on the market, production had dropped to a decade low of 118,800 bags or 66 lbs. of maize per person. Nor did production recover in the 1940s. While the population of Zululand increased by 39 per cent between 1921 and 1936, from 257,000 to 357,000 and by 10 per cent between 1936 and 1946, to 391,000, production peaked at 242,300 bags or 123 lbs. per person in 1944. By 1946, admittedly a drought year, production had again dropped to 167,000 bags (36,000 bags less than ten years earlier) or 85 lbs. per person.[6] Moreover, while drought was unquestionably the overriding

factor in short-term food shortages, it did not account for the overall decline in reserve agriculture. The reasons for this lay in the unequal distribution of land and resources, both between whites and Africans and among sections of the reserve population, the rise in wage labour, and the impact of the white dominated market.

It is worth noting that for a population of roughly equal size, Africans in Zululand produced substantially smaller quantities of maize, less than half as much, than Africans in Pondoland.[7] Part of the reason for the difference undoubtedly relates to the rougher, more drought-susceptible terrain in Zululand. Another possible explanation could be that, to a certain extent, a greater population density in Pondoland, (84 per square mile vs. 42 in Zululand in 1936) meant more intensive use of the land for agriculture.[8] More importantly, as has been argued earlier, the Zulu placed a greater emphasis on increasing their cattle herds, which were a valuable source of food. Thus, the estimated mean herd size in Zululand between 1937 and 1951 was approximately 26 head per family compared with 13.4 head per family in the Transkei.[9] Nevertheless, the substantially lower levels of crop production in Zululand suggest a rather greater reliance on the market for vegetable food supplies than was evident in Pondoland.[10]

Between 1934 and 1939, the average per capita output of maize in Zululand was estimated at .51 bags per person per year.[11] During the 1946 drought, this dropped to .27 bags and only increased to .42 bags per person during the

`bumper crop' year of 1948. According to the Mine Wages Commission, the average annual minimum requirement of grain per worker was 2.75 bags, (or roughly 1.5 lbs. per working male per day) and this was only considered adequate if taken with other foods. Clearly Africans in Zululand were producing considerably less than this even if children and the elderly required only half a worker's minimum.[12]

By the 1940s, the sale of maize by Africans to local stores represented only a small fraction of their total production. Africans felt the unequal terms of market exchange most acutely through the sale of food. As Whitehead has argued, the poorer you are the more coercively you experience the sale of food.[13] Delayed or insufficient remittances from family members in urban centres meant that many reserve dependants, predominantly women, older men, and even children, were forced to sell maize early in the agricultural cycle for low returns and re-purchase it late in the year, before the next harvest, for high prices. As Whitehead has further argued, `There should be no suggestion that subsistence needs [for food] are met before surplus is marketed'[14] This calls into question the whole notion of subsistence production and just what could rationally be considered a surplus since the market value of grain sold during the harvest was often considerably lower than the market cost of buying smaller amounts of grain during a time of scarcity. Even in favourable years, surplus production was limited, and many families were forced to sell what was in fact `subsistence

food' to meet cash demands only to have to re-purchase food later at higher prices.[15]

The amount of maize Africans traded or sold to local stores varied from district to district and from year to year. In 1939, a poor to average year for crops, Africans in the drier northern areas sold less than 6 per cent of their maize crop.[16] Most grain was sold in small amounts over long periods of time as the need arose. In southern districts, Africans managed to sell close to 12 per cent of what they produced. This figure belies the unequal levels of productivity between households in the more congested south. Africans in the south sold larger percentages of grain, however, they also imported larger amounts from outside the reserves.[17] Although it is difficult to distinguish `surplus' grain from subsistence requirements, it is more likely that the importation of larger amounts of grain in average years meant that southern households produced less of their subsistence requirements than their northern counterparts.

Apart from the principal crops of maize and corn, cash cropping included, in descending order of value, sugar-cane, tobacco, groundnuts, potatoes and lessor and probably insignificant amounts of oats and barley.[18] The cash value of produce is difficult to ascertain. The unequal terms of trade, however, meant that Africans received only between 20 and 40 per cent of the re-sale value of grain they sold to white store-keepers.[19] Informal trade with speculators and farmers ranged from cash purchases to trade in cattle

and differed considerably from individual to individual depending on the condition of cattle and proximity to the farmer. The market and informal sectors are therefore not strictly comparable, and exact figures cannot be calculated.[20] Tobacco, grown in modest amounts by women in nearly every district in Zululand probably contributed only a small percentage of total cash coming into the reserves. Nevertheless, tobacco played an important role in providing cash to women, who sold it to white tobacco farmers at well below market value, partly because it could be grown with less labour and on smaller plots of land than maize.[21] The importance to the family of women's cash-cropping in conjunction with subsistence production should not be underestimated.[22]

In the 1930s, the introduction of what can be described as itemised costing for grain supplies, as part of the trend in the commoditisation of food stuffs, played a part in increased food costs. African consumers were at a disadvantage in both the sale and purchase of maize when central suppliers started making separate charges for the burlap bags the grain was shipped in.[23] Store-keepers set lower purchase prices for African maize when they had to buy it in small quantities and then bag it themselves, which was usually the case. While the Maize Control Board (established in 1931 to regulate the sale and distribution of grain. See ch. on famine) set profit margins for the sale of 200 lb. bags at 6d. per bag there were no limits on prices charged for smaller quantities. Cash-strapped Africans, often forced to buy food in small quantities as

immediate demands dictated, were charged as much as 4s.3d. more for the equivalent of a bag doled out in smaller tins. When store-keepers had to incur the cost of bags for grain supplies, they then extended the practice of doling out maize in paraffin tins to sales where the purchaser wanted a full bag and even demanded Africans bring their own containers.[24]

Other, predominantly women's', cash-cropping within the informal sector, was probably more significant in cash terms than food or tobacco. Women contributed to family income through the sale of `*dagga*' or *insangu* (cannabis), *utshwala* (beer), *ubusulu* (palm wine) and isishimeyane (alcohol, also termed *itshimiyana*) though the amount cannot be estimated.[25] Certainly in the 1940s, some local officials complained that the combined effect of young men earning `high wages' in the cities and `illicit' agricultural activities such as alcohol and *dagga* production had undermined food production as `... more and more people are abandoning the tillage of the land in favour of these more lucrative pursuits'.[26] These illegal activities were, however, not without hazards. NCs were constantly on the look-out for Africans selling illicit *dagga* or liquor along the reserve roadsides, and did not hesitate to prosecute those caught, even in times of economic hardship.[27]

Official concerns that cattle herding also undermined agriculture were not entirely accurate. There was no direct cause and effect relationship between an increase in cattle

herds and a reduction in crop production. Cattle used for ploughing actually increased agricultural production and many Africans without cattle, but with cash, could hire cattle to plough. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that agriculture decreased because cattle increased. It is perhaps more accurate to suggest that agriculture decreased as a product of the unequal distribution of cattle and land since wealthy chiefs with their large herds displaced potential farmers. Despite repeated and vociferous criticisms from white officials to the contrary, cattle did not contribute significantly to reduced agriculture through erosion and did not necessarily compete with crops for the same type of land.[28] Indeed, the two greatest constraints on agriculture in Zululand, as elsewhere in Africa, were labour shortages as men were siphoned off to the mines and the disadvantaged position of Africans in the market.[29]

Pastoral products contributed a substantial portion of reserve income. In 1937, the sale of wool and hides brought in over £20,000 (£5,200 and £15,000 respectively) and the sale of cattle through NAD auctions alone a further £25,000.[30] These figures are, however, somewhat misleading. By the 1930s, the bulk of Zululand's stock was unevenly distributed regionally and some men controlled disproportionately large herds. Wooled sheep for example were almost exclusively maintained by chief Hlubi's people in Nquthu and chiefs and royalty in the north owned some herds of cattle in excess of 500 head.[31] Thus, some sections of reserve society were better poised to benefit from stock product sales than others. As in East Africa, in

Zululand Africans rarely slaughtered their cattle for consumption because they relied on *amasi* (milk) as a dietary staple, and because the value of cattle for ploughing, *lobola*, and from potential cash sale was greater than the value of the meat.[32] Africans with small herds, however, were reluctant to sell or trade this form of accumulated capital in any but the most dire circumstances.[33] While the sale of hides from cattle which died from drought or *nagana* probably helped some cash-strapped Africans to purchase food a more significant by-product of dead cattle was the edible meat (see famine ch. below).

AFRICAN PEASANT PRODUCTION

African peasant production in Zululand remained limited and in small pockets in the twentieth century. The Zululand peasantry can be simply defined, following Bundy, as a class of rural producers using family labour who struggled to meet their food and cash needs from agro-pastoral production on the land. Many peasants, however, often relied on alternative sources of cash, such as employment in the administration, to support themselves and their production.[34] There was a broad range of producers along a spectrum which illustrated the phenomenon of transition, predominantly from rural producer to proletarianised wage labourer, or the `peasantry as a process'. A very few, such as the Khuzwayo family in Melmoth, became wealthy capitalist farmers, and eventually employed other Africans as labourers.[35] The majority of Africans in Zululand,

however, were split between those that followed a more strictly `peasant' path, producing mostly for the local market and those who followed a more `capitalist farming' path by producing crops, mostly sugar-cane, for cash sales to commercial concerns outside the reserves.[36]

By the 1930s, there were only a few African peasants, mostly *kholwa*, in Zululand who maintained themselves on the land through special relationships with the chiefs and *induna*, though the exact number is unknown. As Guy has shown, most of them had their origins outside the region.[37] In 1931, there were only eight African farmers' associations in southern Zululand districts, mostly concentrated outside the cane-farming areas, with a total membership of less than 250; and not all their members were attempting to produce for the market.[38] Roughly one third of these so-called `progressive' farmers were what can be termed `producer-traders', that is they grew their own produce, were actively engaged in the market on a regular basis and had taken out official licences in order to trade legally with local store-keepers or other commercial concerns.[39] Overall, as has been argued earlier, cattle-keeping remained the most productive and profitable form of peasant endeavour, partly due to the climate and geography of Zululand, and it was largely restricted to male Zulu within the rigidly defined gendered division of labour.

Prior to the 1930s, the state gave little support for African agriculture in general and, only limited encouragement to peasants. Competing whites were as hostile

to both official and African efforts to advance `progressive' African farming in the 1920s as their Natal compatriots were a generation earlier.[40] The Zululand Native Agriculture Show, started in 1923 as a small exhibit within the local white agricultural show had, by 1927, grown substantially but segregated from the white show `to prevent the undesirable intermingling of Europeans and Natives'.[41] In 1928, the Zulu show was taken over by the Zululand Native Show Society which was dominated by members of the local wealthy elite, including A. Mpanza (later Secretary of the Zulu Society) and prominent members of the Kuzwayo family, who were less interested in promoting African agriculture than their own accumulation and Zulu `nationalism'.[42] By 1933, the NAD shifted financial support away from African agricultural shows and into `stimulating the growth of Native industries and handicrafts' for which there were no possibilities for export and only a very limited local market.[43]

Africans and concerned whites complained that the greatest constraints on African peasant production related to the fragmented and unequal nature of the market. For most aspiring peasants in the congested reserves, access to land remained crucial, although at least some were able to overcome the constraints of chiefly control over land, usually by escaping to mission reserves, through bribery, kin ties to a chiefly family or as *induna*. As Beinart has argued for the late nineteenth century Pondoland, for this class,

> It was the very dependence on the wider colonial economies in which the terms of trade turned against the peasant, rather than the absence of involvement in markets, which first constrained the development of peasant agriculture. [44]

Thus, by the early 1930s, some local officials believed that the `very small percentage' of Africans engaged in commodity production was

> experiencing the disabilities occasioned by the absence of an accessible and suitable market for produce.The surplus production is inconsiderable, yet the absence of a suitable market tends to retard production in excess of personal demand.[45]

Of this class, three peasant producers in Nongoma stand out, partly as a function of sources but partly also because they were exceptional examples of a wealthier peasantry: Shiyabane Mncwango and Mkwintye Zulu, both *induna* under chief Bokwe of Nongoma and Timoti Khumalo son of chief Sibindi, also of Nongoma.[46] These mission-educated men had gained farming experience on white farms in Natal and all believed that the principal obstacles to progress in agriculture were the power of chiefs and *induna* to allocate land and the insufficiencies and inequities of the local market.[47]

They protested to the Native Economic Commission that their trade was limited, almost exclusively, to reserve Africans, and that local white store-keepers would not deal with them. Khumalo was engaged in a cycle of trade which ultimately relied on cattle as the object of exchange. He produced maize, ground nuts and cow-peas and traded most of this to cash-strapped reserve Africans for cattle. He then sold the cattle, for cash, back to other Africans in the

reserves or occasionally to Durban speculators. He believed that he was not able to compete effectively on the open market since local store-keepers offered poor prices for maize and preferred to give only goods and not cash.[48] Clearly these peasant traders were far more flexible than the store-keepers, and probably served the needs of a wider cross-section of the community, including the very poor who had little cash or cattle, and the wealthier class who either had cattle or earned a wage.

All three men apparently made a good living from the trade and sale of their produce; Khumalo and Mkwintye both owned automobiles and Khumalo hired four other men to work his fields. Nevertheless, they still found local marketing difficult. As Mkwintye put it:

> During the last season we worked hard and got a very good yield, but it is plain that much of what we have reaped will go to waste through lack of markets.. We have no financial refuge when we cannot sell all our produce.[49]

In general, the reserve market appeared to be more favourable than the unequal terms African producers faced on the wider market. Although Mcwango sold hides and poultry to Durban buyers, he complained that they were white buyers and gave him poor prices for his `Native' produce, a stigma which also affected African-produced cattle and wool.[50] Mkwintye also stated he would not sell his maize to Durban buyers because, `That would be unprofitable. The money received just now [1932] in Durban for a bag of mealies is only 7/- [shillings].'[51] African peasants were undermined more by the unequal terms, lack of

capital and the lack of state support than the absence of a market itself. The playing field was far from level.

In 1933, in Nongoma, a small number of *kholwa* producers called on the NAD to provide the people with proper storage sheds for their grain to improve marketing and reduce their reliance on store-keepers.[52] The petitioners argued they needed a place to sell their maize for cash since local stores only offered them goods in exchange. The NC supported the petition, arguing that without cash sales there was no longer any incentive for people to grow food in excess of their own family needs.[53] The CNC, T. Norton, embodying the standard racism and hostility to African agriculture, replied that the formation of a cooperative society would probably serve the people's need, `... but no doubt the Natives concerned are insufficiently advanced for such an undertaking'.[54] The NAD was only prepared to support the formation of a local `thrift society', and advised Africans to develop more `thrifty habits' while relying on local stores for the sale of their grain.[55]

By the end of the 1930s, the terms for marketing turned even more sharply against African peasants. Africans complained that the introduction of the Maize Control Act (No. 39 of 1931, amended in 1937) which imposed a levy on all grain sold in the Union, including small amounts destined for local markets, made store-keepers reluctant to purchase African maize at a fair price (see below).[56] According to the SNA, D. Smit, the NAD had attempted to secure concessions from the control board for maize

produced in the reserves, but that the board had maintained it was impossible to differentiate between white and African producers since it would mean higher sales in the reserves and outside producers (ie. whites producing for export) would suffer.[57]

The sale of maize also highlighted tensions between conservative and `progressive' factions in Zulu society. On the one hand, Rev. John Dube and Natives Representative Councillor for Vryheid and former Nkandhla resident, William Ndhlovu, condemned the operation of the Act for preventing women and children from selling small amounts of grain when they needed to buy goods or clothing.[58] Bishop Vyvyan of the Anglican Diocese of Zululand joined their criticism and pointed to the paradox that, while the NAD implemented schemes to improve African crops, the central state undermined their sale.[59] On the other hand, Mshiyeni believed that the sale of maize was undermining the entire fabric of Zulu life. Although he acknowledged that the practice continued, he had tried to prevent women from selling maize to the stores because, he claimed, food only had to be bought later at higher prices and many women squandered their money on clothing.[60] Despite Mshiyeni's protestation, the tensions between these two viewpoints heightened in the 1940s, when, it was claimed, women were abandoning farming to pursue more remunerative work.

African endeavours to participate in the market fared slightly better in the 1940s. They began selling tropical fruit in the southern coastal districts as roads slowly

penetrated the reserves and more affluent whites travelled through the area. For example, a cooperative marketing organization supported by the NAD, the Gingindhlovu Native Produce Market, boasted ten members in 1942.[61] Since local fruit was not normally traded at stores, because of storage problems, in general, African fruit growing was not initially opposed. By the mid-1940s, however, with a growing white population and rising racial tensions, objections to African markets along roads in white areas were more frequent. The local white health committee demanded that the market stalls be closed for being `unhygienic' and an `eyesore'[62] Nevertheless, the NC at Mtunzini refused to comply with the request, on the grounds that since the produce was always fresh and turnover rapid, he could not deny people one of their last remaining market outlets.[63] Similar market gardening schemes for pineapples in southern Zululand and Natal districts bordering the Thukela also proved to be relatively successful in the later 1940s.[64]

Perhaps the best hope for many aspiring southern Zululand peasants was the commercial production of sugar cane. While African sugar-cane farmers cannot, strictly speaking, be defined as peasants since all their produce was for cash sale, in Zululand most also grew their own food. Zulu cane-farmers fall more neatly into Bundy's category of `small scale commercial farmers', although their experience with the white dominated-market was not so different from that of the standard peasant as Bundy would suggest.[65] African cane-growing for domestic use dated back before 1820 and in

the twentieth century was undoubtedly the principal source of income for a number of prosperous and politically active Natal African families, such as the Lutulis and Gumedes.[66] African cane farming in Zululand, however, was on the whole, limited, declined in the 1930s and 1940s, and did not contribute to the formation a stable class of commercial farmers.

There is little mention of African cane-production in the records for Zululand through most of the 1920s. In the late 1920s, however, the ever industrious Frederick Rodseth, Superintendent of the Reserves and Inspector of African Labour from 1924 to 1932, developed a cane-farming scheme on divided lots in Eshowe.[67] Under Rodseth's scheme, the inequities in land allocation which hindered commoners elsewhere in the reserves were entrenched for would-be cane farmers, although it appears that the central NAD had rather more to do with these restrictions than Rodseth. In terms of the scheme, chiefs were allowed up to fifty acres of land for cane in Eshowe compared with only fifteen for commoners.[68] As Natal's CNC, T. Norton, pointed out, fifteen acres hardly sufficed to meet most families' food and cash needs, so that the scheme would force growers to become purely commercial farmers:

> I assume that the growth of cane would, in the course of time, supersede the growth of Native foodstuffs by those engaged, as we could hardly afford to allot land for both purposes.[69]

Nevertheless, the NAD pressed ahead with the plan and, under Proclamation No. 42 of 1931, tried to stimulate African interest in cane production. Moreover, under a

revised Sugar Act in 1936, the NAD won a set quota from the sugar industry for African producers.[70]

NAD support was limited, however, and Zulu cane-farmers could not overcome the problems of under-capitalization and strong white hostility. White cane-growers were constantly at odds both with the NAD over labour supplies and the sugar industry over payment schedules and were, therefore, prejudiced against African growers.[71] African cane-growing threatened their monopoly and their efforts to take over the remaining fertile reserve land. In contrast to African growers' schemes in Natal, however, the NAD in Zululand prevented milling companies from setting aside mill-site land for African production. Since the mid-1910s, Zululand officials had been concerned that non-performance clauses for African mill-site contracts would alienate more reserve land to white capital since the millers often stepped in to take over production if Africans had a poor season.[72]

In 1932, Rodseth recounted the difficulties most Zulu growers faced: their plots were too small to provide a sufficient cash return for subsistence, let alone an adequate profit for re-investment; they had no access to trucks to transport cane to the mills; and many whites pressured mills not to accept African cane at all or to buy white growers' consignments first, leaving little scope for African cane in the local production quota. Even when African cane was accepted by the mills, often through official intervention, it was invariably crushed after white growers' cane so that the sucrose content (the basis

of payment) dropped well below freshly cut consignments.[73] It was no wonder then that the NC at Mtunzini reported in 1932 that African growers were `unstable' and suffered from mounting debt.[74]

African endeavours to overcome these obstacles drew a sharp criticism from the Zululand Planters' Union (ZPU). Thus, the Secretary of the ZPU complained to the local NC about the `insolent behaviour' of African growers and that, `These boys are actually seen running with their cane carts in front of members[']' trucks trying to beat them to the rail siding.'[75] As a result of Zulu complaints of the white monopolisation of mill consignments and rail sidings, the NAD built its own segregated rail depot in Eshowe for African-grown cane.[76]

Although Russell Thornton, the Director of Native Agriculture for the NAD, thought that African cane-growers were quite remarkable, for no white cared for his fields better or produced better cane, market constraints and white grower hostility forced African production down.[77] Between 1935 and 1946, African cane production in Natal and Zululand dropped from over 51,000 tons to under 36,000 tons while white production increased by nearly 750,000 tons from 3,869,442 to 4,618,454 tons.[78] African production per capita dropped even more for there were 35 more growers in 1946 than in 1936.[79] In Zululand alone, Africans accounted for less than 1 per cent of the total cane production in 1946 although they constituted 37 per cent of the

growers.[80] Conditions for African growers did not improve in the 1940s.

Despite increased African quotas set in the revised Sugar Industry Act under the Fahey Agreement of 1943 which fixed regional production limits for the Union, Zulu production continued to decline.[81] There was, moreover, a rapid turnover of growers. During periods of drought a number of Zulu growers lost their individual quotas at the mills for failing to deliver the set amount of cane, and their contracts were turned over to other Africans.[82] Nor were they entitled to state relief under the Drought and Relief to Primary Producers Act of 1940 which extended one-year interest free loans to white growers who produced less than 400 tons a year.[83]

In the final analysis, the rapid decline of African agriculture in Zululand was a product of the impact of white settlement, the concomitant over-crowding of the reserves and the rise of white commercial farming. While most Zulu families still produced some of their food requirements by 1930, they increasingly relied on cash to meet subsistence needs. Local white farmers were consistently hostile to African peasant production of food and cash crops. The Zulu, therefore, concentrated their efforts on cattle herding and wage labour. These conditions had significant implications for how the Zulu and the state met the crisis of drought and famine in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, as will be argued below, commoners faced the declining stake they had in crop production in the reserves

by developing a greater reliance on the wider economy and state support.

[1] For a brief discussion of the controversy over periodisation see J. Iliffe, The *African Poor: a history* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 124. Simkins dates the inability of reserve Africans to produce their subsistence requirements from 1918, largely on the basis of available reliable agricultural census data. See C. Simkins, `Agricultural Production in the African Reserves of South Africa, 1918-1969', *JSAS*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1981, pp. 256-283. J. Knight and G. Lenta give a slightly less severe picture, dating rapid decline from the early 1920s in their `Has Capitalism underdeveloped the labour reserves of South Africa?', *Oxford Bulletin of economics and statistics*, No. 42, 1980 pp. 157-210. See also Bundy, *Peasantry*, pp. 221-225. For Natal and Zululand agricultural decline and crises prior to 1910 see J. Lambert, `African Society in Crisis, c. 1880-1910, in Duminy and Guest, *Natal and Zululand*, pp. 345-372, pp. 384-385 and p. 397. For contemporary selective comparisons see U.G. 32-`46 *Report of the SEPC*.

[2] See Hemson, `Class', p. 284.

[3] Simkins, `Agricultural Production', pp. 266-269.

[4] Ibid, p. 265.

[5] Ibid.

[6] For full statistics see appendix.

[7] For approximate comparisons with a population of about 350,000 in 1936, Zululand produced just over 152,000 bags of maize compared with a population of 326,338 and over 500,000 bags of maize produced in Pondoland. See Beinart, *Pondoland*, pp. 166, 173.

[8] Ibid, p. 167 and appendix here.

[9] Simkins, `Agriculture Production', p. 274. NB these estimates do not account for the differential herd size which Simkins estimated. In Zululand, it would appear that by 1951 over 51 per cent of reserve families owned no cattle and close to 70 per cent owned fewer than 10. See also the cattle ch.

[10] See Beinart, *Pondoland*, pp. 161-162.

[11] This is based on figures in the statistical appendix and the Report of the SEPC, p. 14.

[12] The *SEPC* estimated Zululand production at nearer .7 bags per person per year, slightly higher than my estimate, but nevertheless still below the recommended daily requirement. See *SEPC*, p. 49 and statistical appendix.

[13] This was particularly true for of women in Zululand, the

majority of whom sold or bartered small amounts of grain during the harvest season and then re-purchased food when scarcity hit during the late winter. For a discussion of women's agricultural production and market exchange see A. Whitehead, `Rural Women and Food Production in Sub-Saharan Africa', in J. Dreze and A. Sen,*The Political Economy of Hunger Vols. 1-3* (Oxford, 1990-1991) *Vol 1*, pp. 424-473, pp. 435-436 and H. Moore and M. Vaughan, *Cutting Down Trees. Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990* (London, 1994), pp. 46-50, 82-88.

[14] Whitehead, `Women and Food', p.435.

[15] This was already evident in 1906 when the rebellion occurred. See Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp. 88-92.

[16] The figures available for 1938-1939 were: 200 lb. bags

	produced	sold	%	imported by stores
North				
Ingwavuma	8000	100	1	400
Mahlabatini	7000	800	11	na
Nongoma	16,800	1000	5	na
South				
Nkandhla	20,000	3,500	17	10,000
Nquthu	25,000	4,000	16	2,000
Melmoth	9,000	200	2	6,000*

Source: NTS 9386 5/385 2, NCs' replies to CNC circular on maize control, Aug. 1939.

* this was the average number imported. During a good season as few as 1000 bags were imported and in poor seasons as many as 15,000 bags were imported.

NB, these figures are estimates by store-keepers and do not account for any sale or trade to local farmers or speculators. The production and sale estimates are subject to a considerable margin of error, as indeed are any official estimates, often based on approximations of land under tillage, or the potential labour output of an `average' family of one male, 2 females and 4 children. For a discussion of the inaccuracies of crop estimates see Beinart, *Pondoland*, p. 175.

[17] See above statistics and NTS 9386 5/385, 2 NC Melmoth to CNC, 25 Aug 1939.

[18] For crop estimates and the largely insignificant production and cash value of crops (other than sugar-cane) produced by Africans in comparison to whites in Zululand see variously, Agricultural Censuses for the Union, entries for Zululand (for the years in brackets), U.G. 53-1919 (1918) [first full agricultural census for the Union], U.G.

25-1925 (1922-23), U.G. 4-1926 (1924), U.G. 13-1927 (1925), U.G. 37-1928 (1927), U.G. 41-1929 (1928-29), U.G. 35-1930, (1929-30), U.G. 12-1932 (1931), U.G. 44-1935 (1934-35), U.G. 59-1937 (1936), U.G. 31-1940 (1939-40), and Union Department of Agriculture, *Handbook of Agricultural Statistics, 1904-1950*, (Pretoria, 1960). See also the *SEPC*, pp. 12-16. NB there are apparently no crop estimates for sorghum or millet for Zululand. Potatoes and pulses accounted for a limited amount of reserve production in Zululand in 1946 at 4,200 150 lb. bags and 1,800 200 lb. bags repsectively. See *SEPC*, p. 15

[19] See for example NTS 9386, 5/385, part II, NCs' replies to CNC circular on maize control, 16 Aug. 1939.

[20] For a discussion of this problem see J. Guy, `Destruction and Reconstruction', fn. No. 39, p. 192. and J. Ferguson, `The Cultural Topography of Wealth: Commodity Paths and the Structure of Property in Rural Lesotho', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 94, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 55-73, pp. 56-58.

[21] See NTS 10150 22/419, CNC's report on the agricultural and pastoral conditions of the reserves, undated, 1930, and oral interview with Mrs. Tozo Zwane. See also K. Hart, *The Political Economy of West African Agriculture* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 70-71 for the relatively lower labour inputs and land demands for tobacco.

[22] See for example, P. Hayes, `The "Famine of the Dams": gender, labour and politics in Colonial Ovamboland, 1929-1930', paper delivered at the seminar on containment and mobility in Namibia at the ASA conference, Toronto, Nov. 1994, Whitehead, `Women and Food', pp. 434-435, Walker, `Gender and Migrant Labour', pp. 192-195.

[23] See CNC 94A, N7/8/2 (X), minutes of meeting of Zululand traders with CNC, 13 Nov. 1931 and NTS 9836, 5/385, part II G. Moore to NC Ingwavuma, 22 Aug. 1939.

[24] NTS 9836, 5/385, part III, NC Nkandhla to CNC, 22 April 1942.

[25] There are no known local cash values for the sale of these products since trade in *dagga* and *shimeyane* were illegal. Informants suggested that while the sale of these products alone was rarely enough to live on, the income they generated was important to women for both dry goods and food, especially for those without the land and labour needed to produce maize. Oral interviews with Mr. M.S. Shandu and Mr. N. Dube. Mr. Shandu said he believed his mother grew *dagga* in amongst tobacco plants and sold it along the roadside. On the sale of informal rural produce see la Hausse, `Drink', pp. 85-86.

[26] NTS 9387, 5/385 2, part V, NC Ubombo to CNC, 29 May

1944.

[27] See for example 1/NGA, 3/3/2/6, 2/26/6 annual report of the NC for 1932 and 1/ESH 3/3/2/8, 12/54, NC to CNC, 12 March 1935.

[28] The criticisms were widespread, but perhaps the best examples are found within the NEC report and the NEC evidence of F. Rodseth, p. 1935, written evidence of A. Stanford (NC Eshowe), p. 4, C. Wheelwright, p. 1733, and in the Director of Native Agriculture, R.W. Thornton's speech delivered to the Bantu-European Christian Conference at Fort Hare, 27 June 1930, published as an NAD pamphlet, `The Agricultural Position in Native Areas of South Africa' (Pretoria, 1931). For the role of cattle in alleged constraints on land for agriculture see Richards, *Revolution*, pp. 136-37, D. Tapson, `Overstocking and the off-take controversy re-examined for the case of KwaZulu', ODI *Pastoral Development Network Paper*, 31a, 1991, pp. 1-22, pp. 19-20 and cattle ch.

[29] See Richards, *Revolution*, pp. 51-52 and Hart, *Agriculture*, p. 48.

[30] *SEPC*, p. 75.

[31] See chapter on cattle and the following chapter on `betterment' for wooled sheep in Nquthu.

[32] See Kerven, *Customary*, p. 12. For the rare occasions when cattle were slaughtered, mostly by wealthy chiefs, see A.T. Bryant, `A Description of Native Foodstuffs', unpublished pamphlet, MS Bryant, KCAL, p. 8.

[33] See J. Ferguson,`Bovine Mystique', pp. 647-674.

[34] See Bundy, *Peasantry*, pp. 7-10, esp. p.9.

[35] See la Hausse, `Ethnicity', p. 348.

[36] For a discussion of a distinction between `peasants' and capitalists in agriculture see Bundy, *Peasantry*, p. 10 , K. Hart, *The Political Economy of West African Agriculture* (Cambridge, 1982), p. 11, and A. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (New York, 1973) pp. 8-9.

[37] Guy, `Destruction and Reconstruction', pp. 178-179.

[38] See NEC, evidence of A. Lee, pp. 1455-1456 and CNC 63A N8/3/2 (9), CNC to SNA, undated, re `Native Agricultural Societies'.

[39] This number of course does not account for those who worked informally or illegally without licences, although considering the attitude of white traders to African sellers it is unlikely that many managed to trade

successfully without licences. See NEC, Lee's evidence, p. 1456.

[40] Bundy, *Peasantry*, pp. 186-188.

[41] CNC 63A N8/3/2 (9), CNC to SNA, 24 March 1927 and see the programs for the Zululand Native Show Society contained in this file.

[42] Ibid, see for example the annual prize list for the Zululand Native Show, containing a list of patrons and executives, 30 June 1930 and see la Hausse, `Ethnicity' for the role of Mpanza and the Kuzwayos, p. 173, fn. No. 17 and p. 348.

[43] CNC 63A N8/3/2 (9), CNC to NC Eshowe (the centre for the shows), 2 June 1933 and NTS 10150, 22/419, CNC's report on agriculture, 1930, p. 2.

[44] See *Pondoland*, p. 3.

[45] 1/NGA 3/3/2/11, 2/91, NC's annual reports for Nongoma, 1931.

[46] There were remarkably few African peasant accumulaters in Zululand as opposed to commercial farmers such as Zulu sugar-cane planters. For the background to this class elsewhere see Beinart and Delius' `Introduction' to *Putting a Plough to the Ground*, p. 15.

[47] NEC, evidence of Mkwintye, p. 1700.

[48] Ibid, evidence of Khumalo, p. 1716.

[49] Ibid, p. 1719.

[50] Ibid, evidence of Mcwango, p. 1712, and see ch. on cattle for the stigma on African cattle and the ch. on betterment for price limits on `Native' wool.

[51] NEC, evidence of Mkwintye, p. 1719.

[52] See CNC 113A N8/1/5, 108/40, minutes of NC's meeting with Nongoma residents, 4 Jan. 1933, p. 2 and statement of Captain Ngcobo of the Salvation Army and unsigned petition, undated.

[53] Ibid, NC Braatvedt to CNC, 23 Jan. 1933.

[54] Ibid, CNC to NC, 30 Jan. 1933.

[55] Ibid.

[56] CNC 110A N1/15/5, 94/19A II, minutes of meeting between SNA, Smit, CNC, Lugg and Natal and Zululand chiefs, 31 July 1939. See also Packard, *White Plague*, p. 116 for the effect

of the Act on African agriculture.

[57] Ibid, p. 2.

[58] Ibid, p.3.

[59] NTS 9386, 5/385/2 V, Bishop to Min. of Native Affairs, 16 June 1939.

[60] CNC 110A N1/15/5, 94/19A, II, minutes of meeting between SNA, Smit, CNC, Lugg and Natal and Zululand chiefs, 31 July 1939, p.5.

[61] See 1/MTU 3/4/3/2, 2/18/3, NC to CNC, 28 Aug. 1942.

[62] Ibid, Secretary of the Gingindhlovu Health Committee to NC Mtunzini, 18 Feb. 1944 and 25 March 1945. See similar complaints from the Gingindhlovu-Mtunzini Farmers Union and the Melmoth Health Committee to CNC in KCAL, MS MEL, 89/22/1 minute book, resolutions for 1944, KCM 91/15/6 Gingindhlovu-Mtunzini Farmers Association, resolution of 14 Feb. 1937 and MS ESH, Eshowe Health Committee minute book, KCM 88/23/2, 24 Feb. 1940.

[63] 1/MTU 3/4/3/2, 2/18/3. NC to Gingindhlovu Health Committee, 25 Nov. 1948.

[64] Mr. N. Otte described an ambitious pineapple growing cooperative he helped develop in Mapumulo and Eshowe in the late 1940s and early 1950s which sold over £1,000 worth of pineapples a year. Oral interview conducted by the author, 20 Sept. 1993

[65] For this distinction see Bundy, *Peasantry*, pp.92-93.

[66] For the background to African cane growing and cane farmers see Bryant, `Foodstuffs' p. 10 and Etherington, *Preachers*, pp. 180-181 For the rise of leading African political families and cane growing see Bundy, *Peasantry*, p. 180 and S. Marks, *Ambiguities*, pp. 49-51, 59, 65 and fn Nos. 35 and 36, p. 140 and her `Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity', p. 222.

[67] See NTS 10150 22/419, Thornton's report on agriculture in Zululand, 1929, p. 7-9 and the *Natal Witness*, 31 Jan. 1931.

[68] Ibid, SNA Herbst to CNC, 12 Dec. 1929 and the *Natal Witness*, 31 Jan. 1931.

[69] Ibid, CNC to SNA, 25 Oct. 1929.

[70] See a copy of the revised Sugar Industry Act, No. 28. of 1936 and U.G. 51-'50, *NAD Report for 1948-49*, p. 14.

[71] See ch. on labour for the struggle for Zulu labour and

the Zululand planter's intransigence. Zululand planters were also at the forefront of the struggle to shift the basis of payment for their cane from weight to sucrose content since Zululand cane matured faster and had a higher content than much of Natal's cane. See for example *SASJ* Vol. 33, April 1949, article on the opening of Zululand, pp. 157-162, p. 158.

[72] See NEC, evidence of Rodseth, p. 1748.

[73] Ibid, pp. 1945-47.

[74] 1/MTU, 2/1/2/3, 1/336, NC to CNC, 12 Dec. 1932.

[75] Ibid, Secretary of the ZPU to NC, 2 Feb. 1932.

[76] NEC, evidence of Rodseth, p. 1947.

[77] NTS 10150, 22/419, Thornton's comments on Rodseth's scheme in Eshowe in his report on agriculture in Natal and Zululand, 1929, p. 6. For details of Thornton and his role in African agriculture see the following chapter on `betterment'.

[78] Total Production for Natal and Zululand 1935-1945, tons crushed.

	1935/36	1944/45	1945/46	+/-
Africans	51,899	42,253	35,641	-16,258
Whites	3,869,442	NA	4,618,454	+749,011

Source: SASJ, Vol. 31, April 1947, p. 195 and SEPC, p. 15.

[79] See NEC, Lee's evidence and E. Roux, `Land and Agriculture in the Native Reserves' ch. VII in SAIRR, *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1949), pp. 178-198.

[80] Hulett and Sons crushing mills at Felixton and Amatikulu in southern Zululand, where the majority of African producers supplied cane, reported the following figures for cane production at their two mills:

	number of planters	tons produced	per cent
Whites	216	900,876	81.34
Africans	126	9,019	.81
Indians	97	32,033	2.90*
The mill	-	165,595	14.95

Source: *SASJ*, Vol. 30, April 1946, pp. 187-190.

Whites accounted for 1,066,471 of total 1,107,523 tons crushed or 96.29 per cent of total production. Africans produced an average of 71.57 tons each, whites produced

4170.72 tons each, 58 times more cane than Africans.

* NB Indian growers were actually located close to Stanger in Natal proper and only delivered to the Zululand mills across the Thukela.

[81] SASJ Vol. 30 Sept 1946 Under clause 26(b) of the 1943 revised Fahey Agreement on sugar production new `Bantu Growers Schemes' were introduced and quotas set for African producers. Government Notice no. 1286, 16 July 1943.

[82] See *SASJ*, Vol 30, Sept. 1946, p. 439.

[83] *SASJ*, Vol. 31, Feb. 1947, p. 91.

CHAPTER SIX

FAMINE IN ZULULAND

A severe drought hit Zululand in 1931. Less than 2 inches of rain fell in northern Zululand between March and December of that year and officials estimated that less than 50 per cent of the arable land normally cultivated by reserve Africans was being planted.[1] By the time that the planting season arrived, Africans in all districts of Zululand were reported to be facing severe food shortages, and famine threatened.[2] Chief Mtembu of Empangeni reported that his people had turned to eating grass in the fields for want of food and, claiming that `We have exhausted the little land left to us' he asked officials if `... perhaps you can show us a way to climb up to the sky to develop there.'[3] In Hlabisa starving people had to walk for five or six miles to stocked stores `just to buy a tickey's worth of mealie meal'.[4] The most vulnerable sectors of African society, the elderly, children and infants and nursing mothers, suffered untold hardships as they tried to forage for wild foods. Many suffered from poor nutrition, dysentery and malaria.[5]

These tragedies were repeated in Zululand through the early 1930s and again in 1935-36, 1942-43 and 1945-46. By the mid-1930s, even in years of relatively favourable rains, local observers commented on annual seasonal food shortages and African want.[6] The extent of human suffering during these droughts is difficult to gauge. It is significant that, because of state intervention and market mechanisms,

these were not famines which killed outright: few cases of actual starvation were reported.[7] It is clear that for Zululand, as Sen and Watts have argued elsewhere, impoverishment was a crucial component of famine in terms of people's relative ability to acquire food or their `entitlement' to food, but famine did not necessarily result from abject poverty.[8]

Iliffe has shown that modern colonial states could dramatically reduce famine mortality.[9] The corollary of food scarcity, however, was endemic poverty associated with indebtedness and a widening gap between the poor, who were balanced precariously on the brink of deprivation, and the wealthy who, unlike their pre-colonial predecessors who occasionally suffered from drought, no longer suffered from lack of food during famines. This was as true for Zululand as for Southern Rhodesia.[10] Moreover, the impact of under-nutrition on African health was drastic. More importantly for the purposes of this chapter, the threat of famine in twentieth century Zululand accelerated the unequal integration of reserve Africans into the wider capitalist-dominated food market.

It has been surmised by contemporary observers and latter day theorists that Zululand never really recovered from the drought and famine of the early 1930s which coincided with world-wide depression.[11] Moreover, beginning in the early 1930s, colonial officials all over Africa came to believe that intensified state intervention could overcome African impoverishment.[12] Alliances between the African elite and

white merchants accelerated the transformation of well-placed subsistence producers into wealthy peasants. At the same time, congestion on the land combined with the intensified control of the local market for food by white store-keepers, forced increasing numbers of Africans to rely on cash incomes for subsistence.

FAMINE RELIEF AND MARKET MECHANISMS

Until the 1920s, the South African grain market was highly unstable. Seasonal price fluctuations, insufficient transport links, problems with long term storage and a controversy over the balance between export and local consumption hindered the development of efficient delivery systems for grain throughout the Union's non-grain producing areas.[13] The contrast of shortage and glut, rampant speculation and state control were, as Keegan has argued, largely a product of problematic relationships of exchange and inefficient agencies of distribution.[14]

In 1933, drought led to serious shortfalls in the Union's maize crop. Estimates for the year were ten and one half million bags which was nearly one million bags short of the original estimate and close to four million bags short of the low average of normal years. As a result, the Union Maize Control Board, set up in 1931, did not set an export quota for 1933-34. By the later 1930s, however, overall maize production in the Union increased substantially to the point where the Department of Agriculture declared 1939 a year of `over-production' at 14 million bags.[15] The Grain

Marketing Board set a levy of 4s. per bag on all maize sold in the Union which was applied as an export subsidy to enable South African maize to compete on the world market.[16] The Maize Board, however, refused to differentiate between small African producers in the reserves and larger white commercial farmers producing for export. The result was that many Africans, unable to compete with better capitalised whites in the payment of levies, were squeezed out of the market.

In rural Natal and Zululand, maize markets developed unevenly. Scarcity in the reserves was, until the later 1920s, overcome mostly by the local informal market supplied by northern Natal farmers who could easily transport grain surpluses into the adjacent Zululand reserves. Coupled with limited maize supplies from local white store-keepers in the reserves, the sale of grain remained a predominantly barter or credit exchange with whites speculating in African cattle. With the advent of consolidated bulk maize marketing, however, the white commercial farming sector came to dominate the market and changed the way it met African food demands.[17]

THE THREAT OF FAMINE BEFORE 1930

Even before the 1930s, periodic droughts which struck Zululand provided important precedents for later relief measures. In 1913, for example, drought threatened local food supplies in northern Zululand. Recognizing the potential threat to the most vulnerable Africans, the

magistrate at Ubombo advocated ordering out young men to work since he believed

> Only by adopting such a course would it be possible to protect the aged, women, and children from the direst [sic] distress and disaster. As long as the young men, who are not actually responsible for the maintenance of the kraals, remain at their homes, their claims on the resources of the kraals take precedence, to the exclusion of all consideration for the weaker inmates.[18]

From the NAD's point of view, the benefit of the crisis in mobilizing Zulu labour was three-fold. First, it served the interests of white capital both in the urban industries and on commercial farms by pushing out African labour. Secondly, it was hoped that wage labour would provide the cash necessary for rural residents to buy food when famine struck. And thirdly, young men sent out of the reserves to work could be fed at their place of work rather than drain the diminished resources of homesteads. As Beinart has argued for Pondoland, the central government increasingly saw the solution to drought crises primarily in terms of increased rates of labour migrancy.[19]

Local officials appear to have felt little sympathy for the plight of families hit by famine. In 1912, Natal's CNC, R. Addison recorded coldly,

> Whilst it is a matter for regret to learn that the crops in the Ingwavuma District are a total or partial failure this season, I can only repeat what has already been stated that, the Natives concerned should plant such crops as sweet potatoes, beans etc. and thereafter send out all their young men to work.[20]

Moreover, some local officials believed that food scarcity could help them overcome labour shortages. Prompted by the

destruction of crops by floods, the Magistrate at Nkandhla claimed that food shortages would provide `improvident' Africans with `a salutary lesson' for failing to store up food and refusing to respond to the call-up for service in the war effort.[21]

In 1916, the NAD, under a more sympathetic CNC, C. Wheelwright, recommended ways of getting around the restrictions on advances to contracted migrants to ensure that their families had food. Although legally Wheelwright could not allow recruiters to give more than £2 in advances, whether in cash or grain, in fact he arranged for local magistrates to give men seeking passes an additional supply of grain as a form of advance on the condition of repayment.[22] Thus, the precedent for the NAD's involvement in famine relief had its origins in the labour recruiting system. Nevertheless, the NAD did release bags of grain on credit for the needy during periodic food shortages, largely ostensibly because of its concerns for African welfare but also because of fears of possible rural unrest.

Unfortunately these arrangements often led to the financial collapse of African families when repayments were set to coincide with following harvests when taxes were due.[23] In 1914, despite a report that all available men were out working for wages, Africans feared they would be unable to purchase food from the local stores because store-keepers refused to sell grain until old debts were settled. Consequently, many women abandoned their own fields to work on cane farms for a daily food ration.[24]

Although the drought of 1916, considered mild by comparison with later droughts, reduced the amount of food available to Africans, Wheelwright believed it was a product of the Department of Agriculture's export policy. Despite assurances from the government that the quantity of grain exported posed `no danger of reducing supplies [or creating] a shortage', Wheelwright warned of the dire consequences for Africans of high local prices.[25] Again in 1920, the issue was not, as the SNA argued, the question of an actual `shortage' of maize, `but merely of high prices' caused by the high price prevailing in Britain.[26]

Nevertheless, during the 1920 drought, the NAD retreated from providing food and instead relied on market mechanisms to safeguard against shortage. The Senior Inspector of Native Reserves warned all local officials not to imply to the Zulu that the department would `come to their rescue' again; people should go out to work and rely on the local store-keepers to supply maize.[27] The new NAD role was merely to watch the prices at the stores and ensure that they did not rise too high. The CNC argued that the 1920 crisis afforded the NAD the opportunity to rally rural Africans into a more cooperative form of crop production. He believed that by sharing oxen, ploughs and labour resources, along the lines of the best features of pre-colonial African agriculture, the crisis could be overcome and that

> The gospel of self help should be impressed on Natives on every available occasion and the present scarcity serves as an excellent opportunity for impressing this on them.[28]

With increased impoverishment and congestion in the reserves, however, `self-help' fell far short of meeting African needs.

THE `DUMPING' CONTROVERSY

Within the white commercial sector involved in producing and supplying food, farmers and store-keepers had different interests. From the late nineteenth century, white farmers had entered Zululand to trade maize and other foodstuffs for cattle during times of scarcity. After 1904, the practice was then sanctioned by the local administration, and farmers and speculators regularly entered the reserves to `dump' maize at kraals in a highly lucrative trade.[29]

Maize `dumping', the derisory term applied to the practice by the central NAD, occurred when whites, who were legally restricted to limited sojourns in the reserves, obtained NAD licences to leave large consignments of grain at an *induna* or chief's homestead for them to exchange with reserve residents for cash or barter. There were distinct advantages for the chiefly class of Zulu distributors because they invariably controlled the amount of grain allocated to individuals and received payments, part in cash and part in grain, for the work. In contrast to the `regular' supply of grain produced by large commercial farms on the highveld and sold through stores, `dumping' was carried out informally and irregularly by local under-capitalised whites farmers. These local farmers suffered from some of the same constraints on production as many

aspirant African peasants and faced stiff competition from large-scale producers. As white store-keepers were often, though not exclusively, tied to large grain suppliers, and attempted to monopolise the trade in food, however, conflicts between competing suppliers in the reserves were soon evident.[30]

Africans claimed that these farmers were often more responsive to their immediate food needs and moved maize in their wagons to the areas of greatest need more quickly than the stores could.[31] In contrast to the local store-keepers, who demanded cash or labour contract advances for food with increasing frequency in the 1930s, white farmers offered Africans a wide range of alternatives. Thus, they would accept emaciated Zulu cattle for maize since they could fatten them on their better pastures or they would offer Africans food in exchange for daily labour.

During the severe drought of 1931, Africans complained bitterly that the store-keepers with their limited grazing land, would not accept Zulu cattle in exchange for grain and demanded only cash.[32] Until government relief supplies were delivered late in 1931, and at various other times of scarcity, reserve residents with at least some cattle to trade turned to speculators and farmers to meet immediate food needs. In the 1940s this safety valve was no longer available. By the mid-1930s, fixed trading concerns in Zululand constituted a considerable political lobby and, with the support of the Zululand Chamber of Commerce (ZCC), had put the NAD under pressure to limit maize dumping which

undercut their sales.[33] The state rigourously enforced the restrictions on maize trading to control country-wide supplies. Africans engaged in the trade were required to take out licences even if it was only to receive `dumped' maize for distribution for a nominal fee. Chiefs then complained that they could no longer get food because farmers, unprepared to face fines for trading with unlicensed Africans, no longer brought wagon-loads of maize into the reserves.[34]

Even before the 1940s, however, there were strict limits on the dumping practice. The NAD extended the general rule of monopoly over areas of trade granted to white settler store-keepers under the Zululand Trust to restrict dumping in the reserves.[35] It did not allow dumping by white farmers, or their agents, including Africans, or any white representatives of African producers, within five miles of a white-owned store or within two miles of the next nearest chief's kraal where maize was dumped. Local farmers could only sell small lots of mealies in the reserves if they could prove that they grew the produce themselves and had not purchased it from elsewhere, especially from local Africans.[36] Part of the object of this legislation was to limit competition between farmers or with chiefs who managed to make a small profit from the trade and to protect the store-keepers.

The Union government apparently believed it was a fundamental right of settler store-keepers to gain a `decent living, befitting their station in life' from trade

in the reserves.[37] Indeed, a number of Zululand traders managed more than just a decent living. Charles Adams, the renowned Eshowe trader, cattle dealer and financial agent for Solomon owned several cars and trucks, traded vigourously in cattle hides, meat and maize and owned a number of stores in Eshowe, Nongoma and Mahlabatini. By the 1940s, his family home in Eshowe boasted a crystal chandelier.[38] According to Norman Bond, a store-keeper at Nongoma, his father had had a precarious start in the business, but by the time he took over, he had a thriving operation delivering direct to people's kraals using transport riders, wagons and later trucks.[39]

Informal traders and speculators ranged from the more respectable and, on the whole, more honest farmers to men such as Blackhurst, who were notorious for their predacious activities in the cattle trade. Threatened by the NAD's famine relief scheme, Blackhurst set about undermining local agents in order to ensure that his own trade in maize for cattle went unchallenged. In one incident, he attempted to charge NC E. N. Braadvedt with selling underweight bags of maize to Africans. Although nothing ever came of the charge, Blackhurst's agitation certainly served to raise suspicions in the minds of Africans about the NAD's intentions.[40]

Most white farmers struggled unsuccessfully to maintain their barter of grain for African-owned cattle in the face of the NAD's active discouragement. With the advent of the NAD cattle auctions, and high official hopes of reducing

`overstocking', the NAD encouraged people to sell their cattle for cash in the belief that this would realize a greater return.[41] This pressure on Africans to shift into the cash economy intensified in 1935 when the CNC directed that white farmers would only be allowed to dump maize in the reserves for cash sale.[42] The administration hoped this would draw even more Zulu into wage labour. By the later 1930s and into the 1940s, white farmers faced even greater restrictions on their trade as the NAD supported local white store-keepers more fully.

In the same way that the administration tried to monopolise cattle sales by prohibiting speculators from entering the reserves to buy cattle except from their official auctions, the NAD worked to undermine farmers and speculators in the maize trade.[43] Although applications from white farmers to dump maize in the reserves increased as African production fell in the later 1930s, the NAD tightened the restrictions. In 1937, many northern Natal farmers complained that the NAD was artificially depressing their trade by limiting the amount of maize they could trade in the reserves to below 100 bags each and 2s. per bag less than the going market rate.[44] The CNC countered that local stores, which dealt in reduced cost bulk shipments, were able to sell for as little as 15s. a bag and since he received an overwhelming number of complaints from store-keepers about unfair competition he could not increase the limits or profits for farmers to the detriment of Africans and store-keepers alike.[45]

STORES, STATE RELIEF AND THE COURSE OF FAMINES

Tensions between the NAD and local store-keepers over the provision of maize for the Zululand reserves led to a dangerous brinkmanship in which Africans suffered near-starvation. When, in 1931, the NAD announced it would supply maize to Africans at cost (NAD costs were lower than traders partially owing to preferential rail rates) many store-keepers, who normally anticipated increased demand during drier years and the winters when food supplies were low, did not order extra provisions for fear of being unable to sell them.[46] The NAD was, however, unprepared for the enormous demand for food from Africans. Not only did it order insufficient amounts of maize for most districts, its reliance on the slow and inefficient South African Railways, which did not give any priority to relief supplies, meant that what little food was forthcoming often arrived weeks or even months after local officials reported acute demand and cases of starvation.[47]

The *Natal Mercury*, in an article unequivocally supporting white traders, condemned the NAD scheme not only for undermining white commerce but for putting many African transport-riders out of work.[48] It claimed that the `presumptuous' scheme forced store-keepers to retrench the many African transport-riders who delivered maize to rural areas and that in Mtubatuba alone thirty families who relied on this work, especially in times of drought, were left destitute.[49] Similarly, other sectors of African trade were undermined or fluctuated along with white trader

interests. Many Africa store clerks, for example, were left temporarily unemployed during the state relief programme.[50]

White commercial interests in Zululand immediately declared the relief scheme a `threat' and `injustice to the normal operation of commerce' and Heaton Nicholls warned the SNA that the NAD did not have the `necessary intimate knowledge of the economic conditions of Natives' to make it a success.[51] The ZCC called on the NAD to turn over all grain stocks held for famine relief to store-keepers for sale at an agreed upon controlled rate of profit.[52] It claimed that if the state were prepared to waive restrictions on grazing entitlements for white store-keepers in the reserves their members would accept emaciated African cattle in exchange for grain. Store-keepers were previously hampered by grazing limitations around store sites in contrast to neighbouring farmers who could `fatten' African cattle up to the requisite weight for sale (see ch. on cattle). Thus, they saw the crisis as an ideal moment to move into the lucrative reserve cattle trade.

The SNA responded to these criticisms by suggesting that the NAD had no intention of undercutting `fair trading practice' in Zululand; however, the isolation of many stores, inadequate transport facilities, and a lack of organised cooperation among traders had led to a crisis which the department could not ignore. He maintained that many store-keepers were charging exorbitant rates with usurious interest -upwards of 30s. at 25 per cent interest per month per bag of maize supplied on credit- and the NAD

would not countenance the 2s.6d. profit per bag that the ZCC suggested for handling state relief supplies.[53]

In November 1931, the state proclaimed Nongoma, Hlabisa, Mahlabatini, Eshowe, Nkandhla, and Nquthu famine relief districts under the Drought and Famine Relief Act, No. 25 of 1927.[54] Although Union-wide grain supplies were controlled by the central state's marketing board (governed by the Maize Control Act, No. 39 of 1931) the NAD was able to arrange its own relief consignments for the reserves.[55] The treasury authorised an NAD purchase of 40,000 bags of mealies for famine relief in Zululand in late 1931 to last through the whole of 1932. By December of 1931, however, this supply had been exhausted and further supplies were issued.[56] Under the NAD programme, local officials supervised the distribution of maize to the needy on a credit basis.[57] In contrast to Natal proper, where eleven of fourteen state food relief depots were run by local store-keepers and others willingly accepted price controls `through the troublesome time', Zululand store-keepers refused to co-operate with the NAD.[58] As store supplies ran low and the NAD grain shipments were seriously delayed, tensions mounted in the reserves.

The control act undermined the only insurance mechanism that most reserve families had. Effectively, it prohibited store-keepers from purchasing any maize from Africans, even in small amounts, since licensed grain traders were not allowed to buy any amount of maize beyond the quotas set by the board. Africans in Nongoma claimed that, despite the

differential between the selling price and later re-purchase price of maize, sales to store-keepers acted as a form of insurance since they found it difficult to predict drought. If they were struck by drought in a following season they could then buy their food back from the stores where grain appeared to be unaffected by rot or weevils.[59] Store-keepers claimed people were not aware that the maize they sold and what they bought later was not the same.[60] In this way stores could act as a regulating mechanism by evening out the supply of local maize throughout the year even though demand was highest from October to December, and the sale of grain usually occurred at the end of harvests from April to June.

In most districts, officials were flooded with complaints that women and children were starving or had to spend days travelling to and from stores.[61] Missionaries pleaded for state relief for the elderly and for nursing mothers, some of whom were wandering far from their homes in search of food.[62] NCs in Nquthu and Nkandhla reported long lines of women, up to 300 in one day, at magisterial offices, all wanting food.[63] A dramatic rise in the number of `garden' boundary disputes and `faction fights' occurred at the height of the drought as contending communities attempted to gain access to fertile or well-watered land.[64] A number of families under chief Mtshakela Nyawi, for example, pressed claims for land against neighbouring chiefdoms on the Lebombo mountain ridge where perennial springs were located.[65] Although officials rarely linked disputes to congestion or drought and depression, relying instead on

the theory of African `tribal' rivalries, many conflicts appeared to `smoulder' on during relatively better conditions only to flare again in the mid-1930s and again in 1942-43 and 1946 when droughts recurred.[66]

Much of the public criticism for the famine situation in Zululand focussed on the NAD and the alleged inefficiencies of its relief scheme.[67] Store-keepers insisted that the situation in Natal was not nearly as acute as local officials and missionaries made out. Charles Adams claimed that less than 5 per cent of Zulu families were `absolute paupers' deserving relief.[68] The critical difference between the NAD's supply of grain and the standard practice of store-keepers was in the provision of credit for food purchases. Adams and other store-keepers admitted to the NAD that less than 2 per cent of their customers were allowed to purchase on credit, and these were exceptional people who, the store-keepers believed, could assure repayment. Contrary to the views of a number of missionaries and other white observers (see below) Africans did not generally buy or barter non-foodstuffs during times of scarcity. Store-keepers protested that if they were cut out of the grain trade, they would have practically no business at all during droughts.[69]

Sugar planters were equally concerned about the NAD relief scheme. The Zululand Planters Union (ZPU) protested that `free food' was given away too easily.[70] `A little work would go well with these mealies' claimed the sugar lobby.[71] There were, however, differences of opinion

between sectors of Natal's white farming community. In contrast to the sugar planters, the Natal Agricultural Union (NAU), which, while the parent organization for the ZPU also represented struggling maize farmers, believed that the government should ensure a steady supply of maize to the reserves. Emphasising official concerns over urbanisation, the NAU warned that without adequate food Africans would abandon their homes in droves and flock to the cities.[72] Underlying their concern were fears that if rural Africans could not sustain themselves either through their own production or through the market then white farmers would lose a considerable source of potential labour. These same arguments resurfaced in the 1940s as drought-stricken farmers called for preferential access to food supplies in order to feed their African tenant labour (see below).

Although the drought eased during the 1933-34 rainy season and many Africans set about planting new crops, finding food remained a problem.[73] The prolonged severe dearth of subsistence food forced many families to strip their crops as soon as they were edible, often while still green.[74] It was, however, very unlikely that even with more intensive planting than had occurred during the drought Africans could have produced enough to meet their needs throughout the year. Moreover, while many women and children foraged for wild foods, even the few remaining patches of wild berries and edible `weeds' in most districts were struck by drought.[75] Compounding the crisis, vast swarms of locusts descended on northern Zululand in early 1935 wiping out the

remaining maize crops and `severely demoralizing' the people so that `many [were] in despair and [would] not plant even if the rains arrived'.[76]

The decimation of cattle during the drought had an ambiguous effect on food supplies. In the short-term, droughts struck hard at African herds: between 1930 and 1933, over 70,000 cattle were lost in northern Zululand alone.[77] On one hand, the emaciation and death of cattle, drastically reduced milk supplies which were an important source of food especially for infants and children, and undermined long-term survival strategies by reducing the number of available draught animals.

On the other hand, when cattle died they provided meat as an emergency food alternative for many adults, although only temporarily. J. Kaplan of the South African Medical Corps stationed at Nongoma, reported that during the droughts of the 1930s Africans in that district killed off 10,000 head of emaciated cattle each year, which represented about one lb. of meat per adult per day.[78] Similarly, the District Surgeon in Nkandhla reported that Africans had been `feasting on putrefied [cattle] carcases for the past few months, apparently without any ill-effects'.[79] Many destitute families requested the government to provide them with more cattle to supply milk and some district surgeons also recommended that the government buy up and re-distribute cheap `scrub cattle' which, although emaciated, could still provide people with milk.[80] Local officials rejected these suggestions because

of their assumptions about overstocking and their conviction that the Malthusian check of stock numbers would lead to improved herds.[81]

The world-wide depression further affected the supply of food during the drought of the early 1930s. Migrant workers found it particularly difficult to support impoverished families in the reserves at a time when employment was greatly reduced.[82] Late in 1931, the Enyati and Hlobane coal mines retrenched between 3,000 and 4,000 workers, many of whom had been unable to find work elsewhere, especially as the Rand mines were reducing their number of contracts.[83] Despite their constant calls for labour even the local sugar planters, usually the last recourse for the Zulu, were cutting back their work force until more consistent rains arrived. The Umfolozi Co-operative, for example, discharged 323 of its 523 workers in November 1931 and in 1933 Africans in Ingwavuma complained that coastal farms were `overrun' by migrants from Mozambique leaving no work for them.[84] Rural employers everywhere were unable to absorb any more workers despite that a number of Zulu offered four months labour for one bag of maize.[85] As the NC at Nquthu stated:

> ...the problem in this district is not one of food supplies; there are ample supplies at reasonable prices. The distress arises from deeper causes - the restriction of industrial and commercial effort due to the depression, the closing of avenues for Native labour by employment of Europeans in place of Natives ...[all] have led to a diminished Native income.[86]

Nevertheless, prices for bags of maize delivered to the reserves rose substantially from 1933-1935. Production

estimates for the total Union crop dropped in 1934, although this did not necessarily mean a shortfall in actual production.[87] Africans in Zululand faced price increases from 14s.-15s. a bag up to 18s. to 20s. a bag, and some remote stores sold as high as 30s. a bag.[88] Moreover there is evidence to suggest that some farmers were hoarding supplies in early 1934 in the hopes of selling for a higher profit later in the year when African-produced supplies dwindled.[89]

African responses to the food crisis fluctuated with the acuity of the seasonal circumstances.[90] Late in the agricultural season of 1931-32, when NAD grain supplies finally arrived in northern Zululand, people desperate for food flocked to grain trucks and trains to grab maize. At Mahlabatini and Nongoma a large crowd of women who were unsure of the amount of food available mobbed grain trucks and the police were called in to recover the food. Once it was clear to the assembled crowd that sufficient quantities had been sent people `...gained confidence and awaited their turn in an orderly way'.[91] During periods when homestead food supplies were somewhat more abundant immediately after a meagre harvest, Africans were able to exercise slightly more control over the market. In Mahlabatini, Africans instituted a short-lived boycott against store-keepers they considered had maintained an `uncharitable attitude' and extorted exorbitant prices during the crisis.[92] Bill Freund has suggested that such consumer action could signify an important trend in the emergence of `remarkably modern' forms of African

resistance, but the evidence for this in Zululand is tentative.[93]

In many respects, the state relief provided in Zululand was exceptional for South Africa. Between 1931 and 1932, the NAD spent £35,800 for relief of famine and distress in Zululand and Northern Natal alone which was over 80 per cent of the total relief expenditure for the whole of the Union.[94] In the context of African riots in Durban in 1929-1930, the government was, undoubtedly, concerned about another possible Zulu rebellion.[95] Considering the segregationists' attention on Zululand it was, moreover, significant that state relief intervention in Zululand was more developed than in other parts of the Union where the open market and incorporated African political structures were widely used to distribute food. In 1932 the SNA, Maj. Herbst, wrote to Natal's CNC that,

> I am instructed that the Government will not be able [in the case of the Transvaal and Bechuanaland] to go in for bulk feeding as we did in Zululand and that the tribes should, by means of a levy get credit, as a tribe, with the traders. Then also we are not allowed to feed Natives on farms or in town.[96]

While the NAD's emergency relief programme had been reasonably effective in delivering food supplies to rural areas, local officials and the limited infrastructure could not long sustain consistent supplies for a region which was increasingly unable to meet its subsistence food requirements even in favourable years. Magisterial offices had no adequate storage facilities for bulk shipments and weevils and fungus often ruined stores of grain left

outside. Transport costs, even at concessionary rates, were too high.[97]

In the mid-1930s, an even more severe drought than the one at the start of the decade hit Zululand and the NAD again made overtures to store-keepers for support in alleviating food shortages. It attempted to assuage store-keepers by retreating from an overwhelming control of grain supplies, and offered to provide them with government bought maize to sell at a set price of 15s. 1d. plus a commission of 1s. This would have enabled them to overcome the restrictive control board quotas. Under the new programme, however, the NAD intended to restrict the sale of relief maize to cases of `verifiable' need only, to be ascertained by officials who would issue the needy with special purchasing permits.[98] Most store-keepers again steadfastly refused to participate in the scheme. They argued that they had full stocks of grain purchased at higher prices than the NAD supplies, and if they were seen to be selling low-cost grain to some Africans they would not be able sell their existing stocks profitably. Some traders bitterly recalled having taken on extra maize in 1931, only to be left with their stockpiles them when cheaper NAD supplies arrived, and they vowed never to take state grain at cost.[99]

AFRICAN TRADERS

Very few Africans had a foothold in formal commerce in the reserves. Lack of capital and the overwhelming monopoly of white traders worked against them. Although chiefs and

induna traded maize on behalf of white farmers, as noted above, this avenue was restricted and declined after 1935. While there is no way to gauge the number of other Africans in the reserves engaged in trading maize for a living, the evidence suggests that their number in the reserves also declined during the 1930s when store-keepers pressured the state to restrict them.[100] Charles Adams complained to the NEC that African competition with the smaller white trading concerns in Zululand made `just the difference between a payable and unpayable business proposition'.[101] By 1938, Natal's CNC felt he had no choice but to follow the edicts of the Maize Control Act and call upon the police to intensify prosecutions of unlicensed African traders.[102]

African traders relied mainly on maize produced in the reserves. When local grain production dropped in Nquthu, for example, the number of licensed African traders slipped from over twenty in 1920 to three in 1931.[103] Although the number of African traders appears to have re-bounded somewhat by the end of the 1940s, they had a disproportionately small share of trade in the reserves. According to the Tomlinson Commission, while over 45 per cent of the registered traders in all the reserves were African, they controlled only 10 per cent of the total trade.[104] Moreover, while the Native Affairs Commission advocated the grant to Africans of trading site leases in remote areas of the reserves where there were no white-owned stores, it recommended only ten acre lots, whereas white store-keepers were granted 100 acre sites to enable them to graze cattle.[105] It was unlikely that an African

trader could sustain a family on trade and such a small site during depressed times.

THE CRISIS OF THE EARLY 1930S AND RELIEF WORKS

In November of 1931, the NAD embarked upon a new strategy for relief which constituted a major shift from welfarism to `self-help' and `food for work'.[106] The NAD decided to abandon established grain depots at various centres in the drought-stricken districts altogether, and now made `every effort to absorb natives in connection with irrigation schemes, road work and anti-malarial works'.[107] The relief works were to be co-ordinated with the needs of the Natal Provincial Council, and more importantly, white farmers who had been crying out for African labour for twenty years. As the *Natal Witness* claimed,

> It is the duty, indeed the interest, of the white man to succour the natives in this time of exceptional tribulation: it is desirable in the natives own interest that this succour should not take the form of indiscriminate... dole in kind, but should be in return for work.[108]

As the depression deepened, the NAD attempted to find local work for unemployed Africans, largely because they resisted employment on farms, especially in the sugar cane belt. Older men, women and children were employed to build roads, drain swamps, and erect contour banks at the rate of 30s., 15s. and 3d. a month respectively.[109] Although the NAD tried to enforce payment in maize at the rate of 1 lb. a day for men and half rations for women and children, erratic supplies and an African preference for cash payments meant that only about half of the relief works

projects paid labour in grain at any time.[110] Wage and `food for work' labour on relief projects played an important part in relieving distress for some destitute families. For the most part, however, young men avoided the projects where alternative means of procuring cash, such as work on the coal mines, were available. On average, only between 35 and 100 people, mostly elderly men and a few women and children, were employed a month in each district during the famine between 1931 and 1933.[111]

By the mid-1930s, pressure from white rural employers forced the NAD to refine the relief works schemes to ensure that no able-bodied Africans who could work on white farms were escaping private employment through public works. In 1936, the CNC informed all officials that `under no circumstances are you to authorise employment on relief works for Natives for whom work is available on European farms or elsewhere.'[112]

A major problem with relief works for both Africans and the NAD was their lack of continuity. The NAD engineers complained that even during drought, when the ploughing season approached, many men abandoned road works, long before completion, and that absenteeism jumped considerably in years of better rainfall.[113] Moreover, apart from a core group of older and unfit men, the wages offered by the NAD, 1s.3d. a day in the 1930s, did not attract a sufficient supply of labour.[114] Africans were also concerned with problems of employment continuity. While the NAD perceived the road works as a movable feast, providing short-term

relief throughout the reserves, the Zulu were wary of becoming dependent on projects which could rapidly move out of their neighbourhood. A number of my informants suggested that when a section of road was completed and the project moved to another location, it defeated the advantages of the food supplement to low wages as they were no longer able to share out food with family members.[115]

State relief works added to racial tensions during the depression. In 1932, a *Natal Witness* correspondent declared that government relief was `...striking at the roots of white prestige and authority in inter-racial commerce'; while Africans loafed at their homes and received generous `hand-outs' of food, a new road project in Nquthu was being completed by poor white labour.

> A fine sight for the natives, whose greatest worry has been shouldered by the Government, to see Europeans doing pick-axe work near their huts...[116]

he remarked sarcastically.

African nationalists also voiced concern over this perceived misdirection of white labour to the reserves. Thus, councillor William Ndhlovu protested that Africans were far from indolent, and `hordes' of them were seeking work. Referring to the Nquthu works, he argued that it was a harsh policy to allow whites to work in the reserves when plenty of African labour was ready to work. White labour policies throughout the Union were causing undue hardship

for Africans and Ndhlovu claimed that while they were

> pushed out of skilled work and now at our very doors, Europeans are engaged to do unskilled work... there is no place for us either in the town or the country.[117]

Nevertheless, the relief works had difficulties with the local labour market. African objections to the state's structural intervention in the reserves focussed on issues of land control which foreshadowed resistance to betterment schemes (see ch. on betterment). They also resisted state-relief work because of the low wages offered and fears of coercive labour recruitment. Rumours abounded that anyone who undertook relief work would be forced to work on local farms after the projects ended.[118] One informant believed that people refused to work on government roads because, they claimed, the roads were only for the benefit of white farmers.[119] Others from the cattle-owning class, complained that they could not supplement their incomes through relief schemes since there was no grazing for their trek-oxen along the road-works.[120] It would appear, however, that during times of economic crisis and food scarcity, objections to work on relief schemes were temporarily abandoned, especially by the most needy older men.[121] Thus, the state was partially successful in establishing its hegemony in the reserves by appearing to destitute Africans as a purveyor of `largesse and generosity'.[122]

Despite obvious difficulties with mobilizing the desired labour, the NAD maintained relief works through the 1930s and 1940s to provide marginalised members of Zululand's labouring class with some recourse to wages. When drought

and famine struck in 1936, local officials claimed relief works were needed in the reserves for the destitute.[123] The SNA reassured Zululand officials that `development' in the reserves would provide work for the elderly and unfit for years to come.[124] By 1939 with the advent of `betterment' schemes, relief works for food and cash were a permanent fixture in the reserves.

DIFFERENTIATION AND RELIEF SUPPLIES

Famine and food scarcity in Zululand had an uneven impact on African society. As suggested earlier, the most striking feature of famine in twentieth century Zululand was that the handful of wealthier Africans no longer struggled for subsistence although the vast majority did. Even within families and particular classes, especially among those groups who lost employment, there were differences in entitlements for individuals.[125]

The distribution and entitlement of food was unequal even within African communities. In Nquthu, for example, four `tribes' established `provident funds' and drew a combined total of £320 in 1931 against the funds for the purchase of maize. The distribution of the money and the maize was in the hands of the chiefs, however, and many of the worst cases of suffering received no aid since the money or maize was issued as loans and `was practically limited to those who possessed stock'.[126] Clearly this practice sharpened the divide between the poor and the impoverished since

those families without cattle could not even rely on their own insurance mechanisms.

Other later attempts by African communities to make bulk purchases through cooperative funding schemes also proved difficult. In 1941, hoping to avoid the extra costs of the Maize Control Act levy, chief Mqiniseni Zungu's followers attempted to organize a collective bulk order for maize but failed to come up with the necessary 50 per cent down-payment.[127] Part of the problem for the Zungu community was that most people could not estimate their exact needs before reaping their own crops. Many felt unsure of the amount of food needed for a coming season and without proper storage and with limited funds, they were not prepared to risk purchasing beyond their immediate requirements. Thus, when drought struck and crops failed in 1942 those who were already on the borderline of impoverishment were forced to spend a higher percentage of their income buying grain in small amounts, absorbing the costs of bags, levies and the attendant insecurity of price rises. Government rebates were only allowed for amounts greater than five bags and since this was often beyond the need or ability of a family to purchase they never benefited from cost savings.

Regional variations in the impact of famine appear to have related to the way market forces had eroded pre-colonial forms of reciprocity. There is evidence to suggest that the *ukuthekela* custom of `begging for food' was maintained longer in remote Ubombo and Maputaland than in the southern

districts where competition for cultivable land and food was greater.[128] Destitute Africans were often reluctant to rely entirely on *ukuthekela* since there were new underlying expectations to `repay' the charity with work at some future time. Thus, a Lutheran Missionary in Hlabisa reported:

> I have had a number of elderly Native men and women asking for food [and] complaining they can no longer beg for food... all have said they have "worries" that if they take the food they will have to work in someone else's gardens until they die... One old woman complained that she is now the dog and messenger of the headman for only a hand-full of mealies.[129]

To some extent, older social and familial ties did moderate problems of food shortages for those reserve residents still linked to wider kin networks. There were, however, striking contrasts between some chiefdoms in the operation of what has been termed variously the `economy of affection' or the `moral economy'.[130] While chiefs in Hlabisa and Ubombo were reported to be loaning out large numbers of cattle for milk and ploughing, at least during the early parts of the drought, Solomon's *Inkatha* collectors pressed supporters to deliver large numbers of cattle and amounts of cash to ease his debts.[131]

Frustrating government regulations perpetuated supply problems in the drought-stricken north through 1932. Artificially high official crop estimates for Nongoma, Hlabisa and Mahlabatini meant that local traders were unable to apply for further permits to bring in grain. By February of 1932, Ingwavuma and Ubombo were still not declared famine relief districts and thus could not benefit

from reduced rail-fares for grain. Added to their already higher rail costs, Africans in these districts faced paying 5s. to 8s. more per bag of maize than their compatriots in the south.[132] Stores in the towns and villages received a disproportionate supply of grain. In the Lower Umfolozi District, for example, white-owned stores in Empangeni received over half the quota consignment for the whole district. Moreover, urban grain traders tended to supply local employers of labour, who could provide their own truck transport for grain, before supplying stores in the reserves.[133] In addition, northern store-keepers complained that the Zulu had to pay more for grain than their neighbours in Swaziland where the `export' levy was set at 3s. a bag less than in the Union. Africans in the north often made the journey across the Swaziland border to purchase and smuggle cheap maize into Zululand.[134]

Social stratification played an important part in food entitlements. As Vaughan has argued for Malawi, `formal employment' was a critical factor in ensuring entitlement to food.[135] Yet there were differences of entitlement even within the ranks of the formally employed. Wherever it could, the NAD tried to ensure that the hierarchical structures of the local African administration were used for the distribution of grain. Chiefs, *induna*, African constables and dipping assistants often received preferential treatment in grain distribution in amounts according to their rank. During times of extreme shortage, chiefs and *induna* were given credit to buy, in advance, up to four and one bags of maize respectively. Commoners,

however, were limited to daily rations apportioned in paraffin tins, which contained about enough grain for a family of four for one day.[136] At least part of the official rationale for this differential treatment was based on NAD perceptions of differing class lifestyles, expectations and responsibilities. In 1932, the NC at Mahlabatini felt that, although chiefs and NAD employees received better wages and credit terms than commoners, he should issue relief maize to both rich and poor since

> The well-to-do native, including police constables, as a rule, have numerous wives and children and during such times as experienced last year I felt justified in issuing a ration of maize to all and sundry.[137]

Within commoner households, the wives of migrant labourers had more control over food when their husbands were away working than when they were resident or `retired' at home. Thus, one of my informants believed that she had been able to distribute food more evenly to her children and to their elderly grandfather when her migrant husband `abandoned' her for two years to work in Johannesburg in the 1940s, than when he was at home demanding his `father's share'.[138] Similarly, chief Qwazamatole of Empangeni believed that food relief should not be given to young men since they all could be fed at their place of work; it was the women and children of the rural areas who were starving. The Chief added that he encouraged anyone who could to seek work in the urban areas.[139]

Young Zulu migrant workers who remained in the urban areas tended to fare the best among the commoner class of

Zululand. Even with rising unemployment in formal sectors during the depression it was more likely that those who remained in the urban areas had better access to informal employment and food than the majority of those in the reserve. Although Ferguson has argued that on the Zambian copperbelt during the same period, for many workers `a return home' was not a good alternative, the South African state forced many Africans back to the countryside by tightening up the pass laws because of its concern over urban unrest in the 1930s.[140]

African tenants on white farms benefited from the official recognition of their formal employment. Prior to the 1920s when Africans had a more flexible relationship with white farmers in Zululand and neighbouring northern Natal, `indigent' or elderly Africans were often granted refuge on white farms where they had kin during famine.[141] Ostensibly humanitarian this succour usually resulted from their fear that if they did not support reserve dependants during a crisis they might lose all their labour.[142] During the 1930s and 1940s, however, when, after widespread evictions, white farmers were, as Cope has argued, `more thoroughly exploiting the labour they chose to retain', food entitlements were restricted.[143] During the 1946 famine crisis the NAD issued special permits for grain quotas to white farmers in order to ensure a steady supply of food to farm labourers. The extra supply was granted only for those Africans and their immediate family actually engaged in work on the farm, not for rent tenants or squatters.[144] The CNC believed that if farmers could not get their own supply

of grain during droughts their employees would roam the district in a vain search for food because store-keepers with limited supplies were often reluctant to take on new customers who might exhaust their stores. He feared that if the labourers had to leave the farms in search of food, it would lead to a `serious dislocation of the farmer's labour supply at a time when it should be fully occupied in the production of fresh crops.'[145]

Although some officials warned the NAD that there was a danger of abuse if chiefs and *induna* were the sole agents for the local distribution of relief, it appears that African agents were at least as fair as the officials.[146] In an effort to improve relations between the NAD and store-keepers, and to ensure that the opportunity to send out more labour from Zululand was not lost, NCs often relied on store-keepers and labour agents to determine who was entitled to relief. When grain was distributed in northern Zululand in 1932, officials experienced difficulty in `sorting out genuine cases [of need] from shirkers' but they believed that this was overcome when the Labour Bureau and local store-keepers were consulted.[147]

Thus, those who had a stake in controlling African labour and determining credit worthiness were given the power to direct relief to those they felt best able to repay. This was possible because the NAD's stated intention, after pressure from the ZCC, was merely to tide families over until they could purchase grain from the stores.[148] While most Zulu struggled to purchase cattle, officials

repeatedly admonished those receiving state relief to pay their taxes settle their store debts as soon as possible and return to using the stores to purchase food.[149]

Following the early phases of famine relief, only the destitute were to be issued grain by the NAD. Applicants for `pauper relief' had to report to the nearest magistracy and subject themselves to a lengthy interrogation for the purposes of `means testing'.[150] Once satisfied that an applicant was not a `shirker' and could not find formal employment an NC could issue up to one lb. of maize per day for a month in advance.[151] Officials recorded family particulars and Africans were given nine months to repay the cost of the food; no further amounts of maize were issued within the month.[152] Significantly, the NAD recognised only male household heads as responsible for the credit of maize for other family members. Thus, the state reinforced the patriarchal control of food distribution which forced women and children into a greater dependence on men during a time when male authority was under threat, than before the crisis.[153]

By the 1940s, however, in keeping with trends in America and Britain, the state implemented welfare schemes with cash payments to individuals in order to relieve economic hardship for the most vulnerable members of rural society.[154] During the 1930s, Zululand officials had some discretionary funding for cash relief to `identifiable and legitimate paupers'[155] By the mid-1940s, the state began providing some direct relief for the elderly and disabled.

State welfare, old-age pensions and disability grants provided some limited change in entitlements for destitute Zulu on the fringes of society.[156] As with famine relief, however, welfare payments were based on a means test and were woefully inadequate, standing at £6 per annum.[157] Pensions and grants were payable only to the very destitute who could claim no more than three head of cattle or a yearly income below £9 and could prove they had no family to support them.

These restrictions were strictly enforced. In Eshowe, for example two elderly blind Africans had their grants revoked when the NC discovered that one owned four head of cattle and the other had a monthly income of £5 as a dipping assistant.[158] In Nongoma, the NC told Andalini Myeni, an old age pensioner, that she would have to severe ties with her family across the border in Swaziland because no expatriot South Africans were entitled to a pension.[159] Similarly, the state cut a disability grant to a man in Eshowe until he moved out of his son's home because the son owned 23 head of cattle and was expected to care for his father, although he was unemployed.[160]

Zulu applications for state welfare increased following the Second World War despite attempts by local officials to chisel away at both the number of rural Africans who were entitled to receive welfare aid and the amounts that they received.[161] When welfare payments started in 1946, only 48 Africans in Zululand received old age pensions and disability grants. By the end of 1947, over 210 people

received welfare payments and, as Lund has argued, they were to become one of the few consistent forms of cash infusion into the rural areas of South Africa for elderly and disabled poor by the 1970s.[162]

The kholwa generally fared better than other commoners during the famine through their association with white missionaries. Africans directly involved with mission work on stations or hospitals benefited from access to immediate relief supplies, often provided by patron agencies and European metropolitan congregations.[163] Although the money was not intended solely for *kholwa*, the Native Recruiting Corporation also granted £1000 for emergency relief to missionary societies in Zululand in 1933.[164] Certainly the Anglican Church's provision of emergency relief and pension schemes for African catechists and their widows helped to ease their burden of buying food.[165] Mission societies were often able to manipulate state officials for special relief supplies. Despite concern from some officials that if missionaries were granted relief supplies only Christian Africans would benefit, special consignments of powdered milk were made available to most mission stations for wider distribution to nursing mothers and infants.[166]

RELIEF, DEBTS AND DIFFERENTIATION

By the end of the 1930s Africans in the worst drought stricken districts had accumulated a total debt of close to £43,000 for state food relief.[167] The hardest-hit districts, Nongoma and Mahlabatini, owed the NAD £22,000

and £12,000 respectively while Hlabisa owed £3,500. The southern districts, where crops were less severely affected by drought and local stores were more numerous and more regularly supplied, owed less than £1,000.[168] Payments to the NAD through the 1930s accounted for well over half the total debt incurred in most districts, and are a remarkable testimony to the resilience of African communities. Even the NCs at Nquthu and Nongoma commented on the efforts made by families to find cash, predominantly through the sale of their labour, but also, more reluctantly through, cattle-sales and some limited sale of produce.

> It has been a matter of some amazement to all who are interested in the economic powers of the Natives to understand when and how the population had obtained the money it has needed for its maintenance and subsistence....[169]

remarked H. Ashdown of Nquthu. His words were echoed by E. Braatvedt.

> The Nongoma Natives have responded magnificently to the appeals made to them... to discharge their liabilities. To have paid about £17,000 of the debt in four years is a great achievement. This has been done with very little police assistance.[170]

It would seem, however, that the burden of debt was not discharged equally. While there was no official breakdown of who owed what, it appears that the commoners incurred smaller debts but constituted the majority of those receiving relief. In 1939, of the remaining £1000 of debt owed by over 1200 men, £650 was owed by only 65 of Nongoma's `leading men'.[171] The NC commented that `The labourer class has responded very well [to calls for repayment] but some men of standing have made a poor

effort.' He further noted that, since 1932, several affluent individuals, including chiefs Bokwe and Solomon, all with herds in excess of 200 and some in receipt of substantial government stipends, had not paid their debts.[172] This suggests that while poor cattle-less, commoners relied on wage labour to meet at least part of their subsistence requirements, wealthier men with large herds were reluctant to discharge their debts even though they could easily convert their cattle to cash, possibly partly because cattle prices were depressed during the drought.[173]

FOOD SCARCITY AND FAMINE IN THE 1940s

By the 1940s, unresolved problems with the delivery of grain, the quota system for traders under the Maize Control Act and recurring shortfalls in local African production heightened the differentiation of supplies and entitlements. Increased state intervention had profoundly ambiguous effects on Africans. On the one hand, famine relief was effective in almost eradicating cases of absolute starvation. On the other hand, indebtedness, poverty and related health problems were endemic. The fragile nature of reserve agriculture forced Africans into a greater reliance on the wider South African grain market which was, by the 1940s, dominated, from production to point of sale by whites.

The bureaucratic maize control board instituted a rationing system of `mealie product units' for every store-keeper in

Zululand based on levels of average local production, overall Union production and desired levels of export.[174] In order to ensure an equal distribution of grain, store-keepers had to re-apply every month for supplies, and there were chronic delays in approvals and shipments. Official estimates of reserve crops were, almost without exception, below actual production, and consequently the number of units apportioned to each store in Zululand was well below the people's needs. Moreover, during times of drought the control board considered it necessary to drastically reduce rations to `non-working' reserve residents.[175] Effectively, this meant that ration estimates were halved for women and children who were not considered part of the formal work force.

State intervention and restrictions on the areas that whites could trade in worked against both white store-keepers and Africans consumers at this time. In Eshowe, for example, one store-keeper had a control board limit of 16 bags per month to sell to 5,255 people. Not only was he unable to turn a profit; his store was unable to provide enough food for local people. The next closest stores which had an adequate supply were in Eshowe township over 25 miles away, which was much too far for people to walk to.[176] Similarly Nkwaleni Valley store-keeper L. Jenkinson complained that he received less than 10 per cent of his needed supplies and questioned why women and children should have to walk twenty or thirty miles to buy food from stores in areas with higher quotas.[177]

By late 1945, famine again threatened Zululand even though only moderate drought conditions prevailed, partly because of demographic pressure and partly because of inefficient food deliveries.[178] Most districts suffered food shortages and near-starvation conditions even though close to 75 per cent of local crops were harvested.[179] In December of 1945, the NC at Melmoth reported having to turn away 30 women in search of food from his office.[180] Local officials were unanimous that food shortages were a result of the operation of the control act. The NC at Empangeni stated that `Prior to the institution of the Act I never heard the calls of starvation from the people the way I now do.'[181]

The NCs at Empangeni and Ubombo claimed that the control act undermined women's agriculture stating that prior to the its implementation the average woman

> ...planted her fields, and whatever was redundant, she could sell to the trader and purchase her wants without being beholden to her husband, now she has curtailed her plantings and nothing is left when times are tough.

and

> Today the Native girls no longer work on the fields but earn their livings in other ways simply because people cannot use the trader as a means of getting cash.[182]

The act, however, was not the only, or even main reason why women often set out to find wage employment in the urban areas. Employment provided them some freedom from the constraints of patriarchal control in the countryside and a means to sustain themselves independently of fathers and husbands.[183]

By early 1946, store-keepers themselves were protesting about the effect of the act on African grain sales. The ZCC called upon the NAD to exempt all reserve Africans from the act to allow them to sell small surpluses.[184] Strict quota restrictions and delays in deliveries forced many store-keepers to try to augment their supplies with locally produced maize. Despite the protestations of the CNC that

> Its hardly necessary to point out the importance of providing a market for the surplus of maize produced in native areas, in the absence of adequate storage facilities among the Native producers.[185]

The central state and the control board refused to relax the restrictions on the sale of maize in order to protect white grain farmers.[186]

In 1945, the NAD managed to use its political leverage to purchase its own supplies of grain for relief despite the control board claims that the Union was suffering a severe shortage. 76,000 bags of maize were shipped to Zululand in that year and for the remainder of the decade the NAD successfully negotiated for improved monthly quotas of over 26,000 bags.[187] Although local officials continued to protest that grain supplies remained inadequate for the people of Zululand, they were at least fractionally better than other areas of South Africa's reserves, possibly because reserve agriculture there had declined so rapidly, but also probably because of the political significance of the region.[188]

While the drought and depression in the 1930s and 1940s undoubtedly contributed to food shortages in the reserves, famine was largely a structural problem. State relief was crucial for preventing outright starvation for most Zulu, but it was generally inefficient and led to chronic shortages of food in the reserves. The unequal nature of the white-dominated market and the advantages white commercial farmers had over under-capitalised producers, both Africans and white, however, meant that reserve Africans faced increasing debts for food. Moreover, social stratification, gender and employment were significant factors in the differential entitlement of Africans to food.

Equally important was the growing realisation by the state that the reserves could no longer provide Africans with subsistence and that white commercial farming would have to provide food for reserve inhabitants. Thus, officials sought to overcome the deteriorating reserve economy by directing its intensified intervention more towards stock improvement than agriculture. There has not been the scope in this chapter to consider the implications of under-nutrition on the reserves, but it would seem to be an area in need of further research.[189]

[1] Report on `Famine in Zululand', *Natal Mercury*, 22 Dec. 1931.

[2] See for example reports of various NCs for 1931 in NTS 7834, 9/336, Famine in Zululand. For a contemporary understanding of poverty and the threat of famine see U.G. 22-`32, *Report of the Native Economic Commission, 1930-32* (Pretoria, 1932), p. 4.

[3] NEC, evidence of Chief Mtembu, p. 1808.

[4] NTS 7834, 9/336, S.A.P. Commander, Hlabisa to NC, 12 Sept. 1931.

[5] For a detailed analysis of a striking case see Vaughan, *The Story of an African Famine: Gender and Famine in Twentieth Century Malawi* (London, 1987). The insidious progress of deprivation in famine is considered in Sen, *Poverty* various chapters in Dreze and Sen *Hunger;* D. Arnold, *Famine. Social Crisis and Historical Change* (Oxford, 1988); M. Watts, *Silent Violence: food, famine and peasantry in Northern Nigeria* (Berkeley, 1983). For the problems of production and marketing for Africans see Moore and Vaughan, *Cutting Trees*, pp. 43-60. For related health issues and the state of African nutrition see K. Patterson, `Epidemics, Famine and Population in the Cape Verde Islands, 1580-1900', *IJAHS,* Vol. 21 No. 2, 1988, pp. 291-313.

[6] See CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), 68/3, ZCC to CNC, 10 March 1934 and CNC to all NCs, Zululand, 20 March 1934. Recurring want and seasonal shortages are, in Iliffe's view, a key indicator of the extent of African impoverishment in the twentieth century. For the transformation of periodic famine into continued want and malnutrition see J. Iliffe, *Famine in Zimbabwe, 1890-1960* (Gweru, 1990) p. 10-12, and his *African Poor*, p. 123-124, 138. See also, D. Wylie,` The Changing Face of Hunger in Southern African History, 1890-1980', *Past and Present*, Vol. 122, Feb 1989, pp. 159-199.

[7] By contrast, P. Hayes describes famines in Namibia as events that killed for lack of food. See her `"Famine of the Dams"'.

[8] The entitlement theory is presented in, Sen, *Famines*, but see the Introduction here. For further and more detailed explorations of how entitlement worked in an African context see Vaughan, *Famine,* pp. 102-118; Watts, *Violence*, pp. 2-4, 101-103.

[9] Iliffe, *African Poor*, pp. 159-160.

[10] Ibid.

[11] See the *Natal Daily News*, 10 Nov. 1993, which linked the

impact of severe drought of 1993 to the drought of 1931-33 and oral interviews with Mr. Otte, Mr. Ngema and Mr. Zulu.

[12] See Hayes, `"Famine of the Dams"' pp. 1-38, p.4 see C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Africa. Endurance and Change South of the Sahara* (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 30-45. See also Hart, *Agriculture*, p. 45 where he states that the period 1930-1945 was one of unremitting depression for Africa and J. Lewis, `The Colonial Politics of African Welfare, 1939-1952: a Crisis of Paternalism' Ph.D. Cambridge, 1993, esp. pp. 135-150. I am indebted to P. Hayes for drawing this last work to my attention.

[13] See T. Keegan, `Seasonality, Markets and Pricing: The South African Maize Trade in the Early Twentieth Century', ICS *SSA* Seminar, Vol. 10, 1981, pp. 58-64 and his `Crisis and Catharsis in the Development of Capitalism in South African Agriculture', *AA*, Vol. 84, No. 336, July 1985, pp. 371-398, esp. pp. 396-398.

[14] T. Keegan, `Seasonality and Pricing', p. 58

[15] The figures for production are found in NTS 9836, 5/385/2, undated memo on the Maize Control Board, probably 1940.

[16] Ibid, p. 2.

[17] See Keegan's `Seasonality' and his, `Crisis and Catharsis', p. 372.

[18] CNC 106, 86/120, 1913/101 [first series], Magistrate to DNC, 28 Jan. 1913. This statement resonates with the unequal impact of famine in terms of gender and entitlements. See Vaughan, *Famine*, pp. 124-130 and Sen, *Poverty*, pp. 155-165 and for the patterns of dominance in terms of food supplies see Moore and Vaughan, *Cutting Trees*, pp. 3-7 and E. Schmidt, *Peasants, Traders and Wives. Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870-1939* (London, 1992), ch. 3.

[19] Beinart, *Pondoland*, p. 75.

[20] CNC 59, 237/1912, CNC to DNC, 3 Feb. 1912.

[21] CNC 355 1266/19, Magistrate Nkandhla to CNC, 22 Jan. 1918.

[22] CNC 256B, 156/1916 CNC to SNA, 26 Oct. 1916.

[23] Ibid, Magistrate, Ingwavuma to CNC, 27 Oct. 1917.

[24] CNC 186, 1613/14, DNC report on tour through Zululand, 16 Oct. 1914. Alternative sources of food, such as `wild weeds' and game from hunting were limited by the Natal government conservationists. See for example CNC 355,

1299/1919

[25] NTS 7834, 9/336, CNC to SNA, 26 Oct. 1916.

[26] NTS 7834, 9/336, SNA to CNC, 12 Jan. 1920.

[27] NTS 7834, 9/336 Inspector to CNC, 20 Jan. 1920.

[28] Ibid, CNC to Inspector of Locations, 5 Jan. 1920.

[29] Comments on the dumping practice and its origins are made in CNC 49A N2/4/2 (X), correspondence between the NCs at Mahlabatini and Ingwavuma and the CNC, 20 and 28 respectively, June 1935.

[30] For a discussion the correspondence between the capitalist mode of production and market exchange See M. Morris `Capitalism', p. 296-297.

[31] See for example 1/NQU, 3/4/1/1, comments of J. Buthelezi and J. Molife at quarterly meeting, Jan. 1932.

[32] See for example, NTS 7834 9/336, Statement of chief Mtekelezi Hlabisa to NC, 20 Sept. 1931 and NC Nongoma to CNC, 17 Nov. 1931.

[33] See for example, CNC 49A N2/4/2 (X), NC Ingwavuma to CNC, 21 April 1936.

[34] See for example the comments of chief Mpungose and *induna* Mfulele during a meeting with the NC of Mahlabatini, NTS 9387, 5/385 (2) part III, 8 Dec. 1943.

[35] The dumping of mealies for sale or trade in the reserves was later governed by `speculators' licenses under Section 1 of Act 16 of 1927. For the provisions of store-sites in the Zululand Trust see See ch. 1 on the land issue.

[36] CNC 49A, N2/4/2 (X), CNC to All NCs, circular reiterating the terms for traders and speculators, 17 April 1936.

[37] See CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X), SNA to ZCC, copied to CNC, 18 Nov. 1931.

[38] See C. Adams, *The Adams Family Story* (Pietermaritzburg and Eshowe, 1977), p. 10, 23, 58.

[39] Oral interview with Mr. Bond.

[40] See NTS 7834, 9/336, Braadvedt to CNC, 9 Oct. 1931.

[41] See CNC 49A N2/4/2 (X), CNC to all NCs, 12 Nov. 1932

[42] Ibid, NC Mahlabatini to CNC, 27 Sept. 1935.

[43] For the attempted prohibition on cattle purchase by speculators see NTS 7216, 83/326, part III, Chairman of Zululand Cattle Sales to CNC, 23 Dec. 1946.

[44] Ibid, SNA to CNC, 8 Jan. 1937. The farmers claimed that the going market rate was 18s. per bag and the NAD would only allow cash sales at 16s. per bag.

[45] Ibid, CNC to SNA, 9 Jan. 1937.

[46] See CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X), CNC to SNA, 23 Dec. 1931 commenting on an article in the *Natal Mercury*, 22 Dec. 1931.

[47] CNC 95A, N7/8/2 (X), 68/1, part III, NC Hlabisa to CNC, 2 Jan. 1932, NC Ingwavuma to CNC, 18 Nov. 1931 and NTS 3991 363/311 CNC to SNA, 8 Jan. 1932.

[48] *Natal Mercury*, 22 Dec. 1931.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Oral evidence of H. Zulu and N. Bond. For the vulnerability of specific groups of workers during a famine see A. Sen *Poverty and Famines*, pp. 154-156.

[51] NTS 7834, 9/36, 3 Nov. 1931.

[52] CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X), ZCC to CNC, 17 Dec. 1931.

[53] Ibid, SNA to ZCC, 18 Nov. 1931.

[54] CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X), SNA to CNC, 10 Nov. 1931 and NTS 7834, 9/36, SNA to Min. of Native Affairs, 8 Nov. 1931.

[55] For the Act see copies in NTS 7834, 9/36, NTS 9386, 5/385/2,part V, NTS 9388, 5/385/2, and R. Packard, *White Plague, Black Labour: Tuberculosis and the Political Economy of Health and Disease in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg, 1988), p. 116.

[56] Ibid, NAD Engineer Dept. to CNC, 29 Dec. 1931.

[57] Ibid, NAD Engineer Malcolm to CNC, 18 Nov. 1931

[58] Ibid, Malcolm to CNC, 21 Nov. 1931 and see *Natal Witness*, 18 Jan. 1932.

[59] NTS 9388 5/384, part II, NC Nongoma to CNC, 13 Dec. 1945.

[60] Ibid.

[61] CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X) NCs' reports to CNC on local conditions and famine, Jan. 1932.

[62] See for example USPG, M-375, Report of St. Mary's Mission Hospital, Kwamagwaza for 1931 and *The Net*, the Diocese of Zululand's Anglican Missionary magazine, Sept. 1932, pp. 5-6.

[63] CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X), CNC to SNA, 2 March 1932 and see translated copy of article in *Ilanga Lase Natal*, 29 Aug. 1932 in this file.

[64] See files CNC 73A N1/1/7 (31), 9, N1/1/3/3 (32) 3, CNC 76A N1/1/3 (18) and NTS 284 268/53, throughout for reports of land disputes.

[65] CNC 76A N1/1/3 (18), NC Ingwavuma to CNC, 4 Oct. 1929.

[66] *Ibid*, NC Ingwavuma to CNC, 12 Dec. 1943; NTS 284 268/53 re the resurgence of unrest in Ubombo in 1935-36 and 1946 and NC Ubombo to CNC, 17 March 1949; J. Clegg, `"Ukubuyisa Isidumbu"' and W. Beinart, `Conflict in Qumbu. Rural Consciousness, Ethnicity and Violence in the Colonial Transkei', in Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, pp. 106-137, pp. 108-109. Beinart has expanded on the analysis of `faction fighting' in his `Introduction' to a special issue of *JSAS* on violence in Southern Africa, Vol. 18, No. 3 Sept. 1992, pp. 455-486, pp. 457-462.

[67] Opinions were somewhat divided during the early stages of the famine, with the *Natal Witness*, which generally supported white farmers, praising state relief supplies but advocating they be tied to work on white farms for food and the *Natal Mercury* condemning the `food dole' and favouring a reliance on white-owned stores. See for example the *Natal Witness*, article `Narrow Victory for Natal Relief Staff' 14 March 1931 and the *Natal Mercury*, `Zululand Mealie Dole', 22 Jan. 1932; `Merchant Criticism of Maize Dole', 18 Jan. 1932. The leading African paper, *Ilanga Lase Natal*, on 29 Aug. 1932 condemned both the government for a failure to provide relief supplies and the store-keepers for charging exorbitant rates for grain.

[68] CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X), minutes of meeting between deputation of Zululand store-keepers and CNC, 13 Nov. 1931.

[69] Ibid, and see CNC 117A N2/4/2 (X), F. Saunders, Nongoma to NC Braatvedt, 21 March 1933 and NC Braatvedt to CNC, 28 March 1933.

[70] See for example KCAL, KCM 91/15/5, resolutions of the Gingindhlovu-Mtunzini Planters' Association, 4 Nov. 1932.

[71] *SASJ*, Vol. 16, May 1932, p. 61.

[72] See for example KCAL, KCM 30034 resolutions of the NAU forwarded to the CNC, 27 April 1932, pp. 2-5 and KCM 30027, minutes of meeting, 29 April 1936, p. 179. For official concern about the problems of increased African

urbanisation see for example, Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 410-412, Hemson, `Dock Workers of Durban', pp. 266-268 and Marks, `Patriotism', pp. 220-221.

[73] See CNC 95A N7/8/2 (X), 68/1, part II, NC's replies to CNC circular on famine conditions, 21 Sept. 1933 and 12 Jan. 1934.

[74] See 1/ESH, 3/3/2/6, 68, NC to CNC, 21 Dec. 1933 and CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), 68/3, Rev. W. Genheimer of the German Lutheran Mission to NC Hlabisa, 21 March 1933.

[75] Ibid. For edible weeds and famine alternative foods see A. Bryant, `Native Foodstuffs' p. 10 and Krige, *Social System*, pp. 384-387. For the dietary value of wild plants see L. Griveti, `Bush Foods and Edible Weeds of Agriculture: perspectives on dietary use of wild plants in Africa, their role in maintaining human nutritional status and implications for agricultural development', in R. Akhtar (ed.) *Health and Disease in Tropical Africa* (Chur, Switzerland, 1987), pp. 50-68. Zulu wild plants worked to compliment the staple of maize diet. Customary `bush' foods had ascorbic acid, Vitamin A and Calcium, and were commonly used just prior to harvest time and during periods of scarcity. See O. Lewis, `The Leaf Protein Nutritional Value of Four Wild Plants Used as Dietary Supplements by the Zulu', in J. Classens and H. Potgieter, (eds), *Proteins and Food Supply in the Republic of South Africa* (Cape Town, 1971), pp. 95-102.

[76] See CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), NC Ingwavuma to NC, 25 March 1935 and 22 Oct. 1935. See also CNC recommendations that people plant Amadumbe (sweet potato) which were drought and locust resistant in NTS 7836, 9/336, circular of 24 Sept. 1934.

[77] See 1/NGA, 3/3/2/6, 2/26/6, Report of the Agricultural Supervisor for Northern Zululand, 13 Oct. 1936.

[78] NTS 7835 69/363 part III, Kaplan to Natal Command, 24 June 1941.

[79] NTS 7835 9/336, Famine in Zululand, part II, District Surgeon, Nkandhla to NC, 9 Nov. 1931. Apparently, eating the meat of cattle killed by disease, particularly bovine tuberculosis, did not seriously harm people. As Dr. B. Sampson argued, it was better to eat possibly infected meat and milk than not to eat at all. See B. Sampson, `Bovine Tuberculosis in Relation to Man', *SAMJ*, Vol. 8, Nov. 1934, pp. 842-845.

[80] CNC 97A, N7/8/2, 68/3 (X) Dr. G. Wildish to Superintendant of the Reserves, 10 March 1932.

[81] Ibid, Superintendant of Reserves to NC Eshowe, 23 March 1932.

[82] For the struggles during the depression in Durban see D. Hemson, `Dock Workers of Durban', pp. 266-285.

[83] CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), NC Vryheid to CNC, 23 Feb. 1932.

[84] CNC 95A N7/8/2 (X) 68/1 part III, NC Empangeni to CNC, 18 Nov. 1932 and NC Ingwavuma to CNC, 21 Sept. 1933.

[85] CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X) NCs' responses to CNC circular of 12 Dec. 1932.

[86] CNC 95A N7/8/2 (X) 68/1 part III, NC Nquthu to CNC, 25 Sept. 1933.

[87] See CNC 95A N7/8/2 (X) 68/1 part IV, SNA to CNC, 3 Jan. 1934. For the effect of crop estimates on speculation and hoarding see Keegan, `Seasonality'.

[88] 1/NGA 3/3/2/6, 2/21, NC Nongoma to CNC, 11 Jan. 1934.

[89] CNC 95A N7/8/2 (X) 68/1 part IV, NC to CNC, 5 Jan. 1934.

[90] See Griveti, `Bush Foods', p. 52-53 and Lewis, `The Leaf Protein' pp. 95-102. See also, Bryant, `foodstuffs' and KCAL, MS Lav., M. Lavoipierre files, file KCM 89/18/96/5, Nutrition and Malnutrition 1939-1972. Lavoipierre was Secretary of the Durban Bantu Child Welfare Society, 1944-1972.

[91] See CNC 95A N7/8/2 (X), 68/1, NC Nongoma to CNC, 20 March 1932 and the *Natal Witness*, 14 March 1932. This incident is also quoted by S. Marks in *Ambiguities*, pp. 36-37.

[92] CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X) part I, NC Mahlabatini to CNC, 2 Nov. 1932. The boycott in Mahlabatini does not appear to have been nearly as effective or sustained as the well organized efforts of women in the Herschel district which Beinart has analysed in ch. 7 of *Hidden Struggles*.

[93] See Freund, `Rural Struggles' p. 172.

[94] CNC 81A N1/1/3 (32) part I, SNA to CNC, 12 Feb. 1933 and see Cope, `Royal Family' p. 410.

[95] For the background to this in Durban see Hemson, `Dockworkers', pp. 189-195; la Hausse, `The Message' 44-50 and `Cows of Nongoloza', pp. 89-92.

[96] NTS 7835 9/336, SNA to CNC, 28 Feb. 1932.

[97] See CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X), CNC to all NCs, 2 March 1932.

[98] NTS 7834 9/336, part I, CNC to SNA, 1 April 1935 and 1/NGA 3/3/2/6, 2/21, NC Nongoma to all store-keepers, 30

Dec. 1935.

[99] See for example 1/NGA 3/3/2/6, 2/21, NC Nongoma to CNC, 12 Jan. 1936 and CNC 99A N7/8/2 (X), 68/35, NC Eshowe to CNC, 3 Nov. 1935. Mr. N. Otte, a clerk of the court in Ingwavuma in 1937, recalled hostilities between the local officials and store-keepers over `meddling' in the market and that store-keepers claimed the NAD ruined their sales when they needed them most. Oral interview conducted with Mr. Otte.

[100] See for example KCAL, KCM 30027, NAU resolutions for 29 April 1936, p. 179 and KCM 30034, NAU resolutions for 27 April 1939, pp. 2-5.

[101] NEC, evidence, p. 1671.

[102] NTS 9386, 5/385/2, part II, CNC to Deputy Commissioner of the S.A.P., 1 Nov. 1938.

[103] 1/NQU, 3/4/1/2, NC's annual report, 1931.

[104] See the Report of the Tomlinson Commission, p. 4 and J. Nieuwenhuysen, `Economic Policy in the Reserves since the Tomlinson Report' *SAJE*, Vol. 32, No. 1 March 1964, p. 1-23, p. 21.

[105] See U.G. 36-`54, *Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1948-52*, p. 7.

[106] See *Natal Witness*, 22 Jan. 1932 and CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X) file. Food for work schemes hold an important place in the development discourse in Africa and elsewhere. See for example, P. Hayes, `"Famine of the Dams"', pp. 23-26; Watts, *Silent Violence,* pp. 144-46; P. Richards, *Coping With Hunger: Hazard and experiment in an African rice-farming system* (London, 1986), Introduction; J. Dreze, `Famine Prevention in Africa: Some Experiences and Lessons', in Dreze and Sen, *Hunger*, Vol. II, pp. 123-169, p.125-126.

[107] *Natal Witness*, 22 Jan. 1932.

[108] Ibid.

[109] See CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X) Engineer Malcolm to CNC, 18 Nov. 1931. These rates fluctuated over time but when relief works were instituted in 1936 and only 25s. per month offered no labour came forward. See CNC 17A 13/4/2, CNC to SNA 26 March 1936. In the 1940s, the rates of remuneration doubled to 2s., 1s., and 6d. a day for men women and children respectively, or half that rate plus food rations. See 1/NGA 3/2/2/3, 2/5/2, CNC to NC Nongoma, 9 March 1942.

[110] See for example CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), NC Ubombo to CNC, 6 May 1932 and NC Mahlabatini to CNC, 25 April 1932.

[111] As most works projects moved from area to area no exact figures of employment by district are available. The NAD engineer noted that road projects employed between 100 and 150 men as they moved through districts while anti-malarial works employed only 20-35 people depending on the size of the project. There was a regular turnover in employment with projects lasting only about 6-8 weeks. These are estimates only and based on CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X), Engineer's report on relief works, 10 March 1933 and CNC 16A 13/2/6 (9), Rodseth to Park Ross re anti-malarial works, 2 May 1932.

[112] CNC 96A, N7/8/2 (X), CNC circular, 17 March 1936.

[113] 1/NGA 3/3/2/5, 2/19/5, NAD Engineer to CNC, 24 March 1939.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Interviews with H. Zulu, M. Shandu and M. Zulu.

[116] *Natal Witness*, 18 Jan. 1932.

[117] Ibid.

[118] See for example CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), NC Eshowe to CNC, 8 Oct. 1932; 1/NQU 3/4/2/1, quarterly meetings, statement of Klaas Msomi, 1935 and article in *Natal Witness*, 20 Nov. 1932.

[119] Interview with Mr. M. Zulu.

[120] 1/NQU 3/4/1/4, 2/4/6/1, NC to CNC re minutes of district meeting, 17 Feb. 1932.

[121] See for example 1/NGA 3/3/2/5, 2/19/2, soil erosion works in Nongoma, NC to CNC, 3 Sept. 1936

[122] See for example, Godelier, *Perspectives*, p. 10.

[123] CNC 108A N1/15/5, 94/9, comments of NC Braatvedt at NCs' conference at Pietermaritzburg, 18 Nov. 1936, p.10.

[124] Ibid, p. 11.

[125] M. Vaughan has analysed some of these differences in her *African Famine*, chs. 3 and 4.

[126] NTS 7835, 9/336, part II, NC Nquthu to CNC, 27 Oct. 1931.

[127] NTS 9865, 385/2, NC Mahlabatini to NC, 28 Nov. 1941.

[128] See 1/UBO, 33/3/1/10, 2/68, report on famine conditions, NC to CNC, 12 Feb. 1933 and CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X)

report on stores in Zululand, unsigned, 12 Nov. 1932. For the *ukuthekela* custom see Krige, *Social System*, p. 192.

[129] CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), 68/3, Rev. Genheimer to NC Hlabisa, 10 Feb. 1933.

[130] G. Hyden uses the term the `economy of affection' to describe factors contributing to the arrested development of African peasant economies. See his *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Historical Perspective* (Los Angeles, 1983), Introduction and pp. 78-85. R. Shenton sees certain positive features in the persistence of pre-colonial forms of the `moral economy', but maintains that they could not overcome structural inequities in a capitalist context. See his, *The Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria* (London, 1986), Introduction and pp. 28-32, 138-140. D. Arnold argues that the pressures of famine tended to accelerate the erosion of collective action in survival strategies and undermine the `moral economy'. See D. Arnold, *Famine*, pp. 81-86.

[131] See 1/MTB, 3/3/2/10, 68/1, NC to CNC, re chiefly aid to their `tribes', 20 Nov. 1932. For Solomon's collections during the height of the drought and depression see ch on cattle la Hausse, `Ethnicity', pp. 328-330.

[132] NTS 7836 9/336 part III, trader R. Rutherford to NC Ingwavuma, 15 Feb. 1932.

[133] See NTS 9388, 5/385/2, part VII, minutes of Empangeni Mealie Advisory Committee meeting, 24 Sept. 1946.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Vaughan, *Famine*, pp. 102-118.

[136] See for example NTS 9388 5/385/2, part VII, Report of Constable Bhebhe Ndhlovu of Nquthu to CNC, 10 April 1946.

[137] CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X) I, NC Mahlabatini to CNC, 2 Nov. 1932.

[138] Oral interview with Mrs. T. Zwane. The women of Mrs. Zwane's village claimed they did not mind it when their husbands left on migrant contracts since it gave them more freedom. See also Murray, *Families*, p. 78-82.

[139] NTS 9388 5/385 (2), NC Empangeni to Maize Control Board, 25 Oct. 1945.

[140] J. Ferguson, `Modernist Narratives', pp. 397-398 and see Marks, *Ambiguities*, p. 108.

[141] See CNC [first series], Vol. 59, 203/1912, DNC to CNC, 1 Feb. 1912 and CNC 186, 1613/14, DNC report on tour

through Zululand, 16 Oct. 1914.

142 CNC 59 203/1912, DNC to CNC, 1 Feb. 1912.

143 See Cope, `Royal Family', p. 256.

144 NTS 9388, 5/385/2, part VII, CNC to SNA, 17 Feb. 1946.

145 Ibid.

146 See CNC 97A 68/3 N7/8/2 (X), NC Nquthu to CNC, 24 March 1932 and NC Melmoth to CNC, 2 April 1932.

147 *Natal Witness*, 14 March 1932.

148 Ibid, SNA to ZCC, 18 Jan. 1931.

149 NTS 7835, 9/336, CNC to all NCs, 10 Jan. 1932.

150 The procedures for grain distribution are summarised in NTS 7835 9/336, part III.

151 Relief was given at rate of roughly 30lbs of grain per person per month, which did not compare unfavourably with modern estimates necessary for people to survive on. See J. Dreze, `Famine Prevention', p. 148 recounting relief in Zimbabwe during the 1982-84 famine where people received 20 kgs or 44 lbs each per month which Dreze considered `astonishingly large'.

152 Ibid.

153 For other challenges to male authority at this time see Marks, `Patriotism'.

154 For state welfare see D. Duncan, `The Origins of the "Welfare State" in Pre-Apartheid South Africa, ICS SSA, 31 Jan 1991,paper and his `"The Mills of God": State Bureaucracy and African Labour in South Africa, 1918-1948, Ph.D., Queen's University, 1990, ch. 4. For the debates surrounding the extension of welfare pensions to Africans see J. Rheinallt Jones, `Social Work and the Non-European, *Race Relations*, Vol. 3, no. 4, 1936, pp. 84-86 and S.C. 10-'44 *Select Committee Report on Social Security, 1944*, U.G. 14-'44, *Report of the Social Security Committee, 1944*, and NTS 24/349, part II, undated Memo on Social Benefits for Natives (mostly dealing with urban Africans), 1947.

155 From 1936 cash payments were made in up to £10 amounts totalling £2,750 between 1931 and 1937. see CNC 100A N7/8/2 (X) 68/47, report on pauper payments and rations, up to 1938.

156 See the Pensions Laws Amendment Act, No. 48 of 1944 and U.G. 15-'45. NAD review of the Department's activities for 1944-45, p. 26 re old age pensions for Africans, men at age

65, women at age 60.

157 The rates for town and city dwelling Africans were higher at £9 and £21 respectively despite the acknowledged fact that food and goods costs in remote rural areas were often higher than in the cities. See CAD, KOG [Department of the Controller and Auditor General], Vol. 655, 852-C Native Pensions and Disability Grants Eshowe, 1947 and Duncan, `The Mills', p. 223.

158 Ibid, NC to Controller, 8 Oct 1948. For other cases of Africans losing grants because of the means test see for example KOG 656, 885C, pensions Nongoma KOG 656, 881C, Mahlabatini.

159 KOG 656, 885C, NC to Controller, 25 July 1947.

160 KOG 655, 852C, NC ESH. to Controller, 11 Nov. 1947.

161 See files KOG 655 852C, 656 881C and 656 885C for increased applications.

162 See F. Lund, `Social Security in South Africa: The Link Between Welfare and Development', ICS, SSA seminar paper, 26 Nov 1992 and her `Welfare as a catalyst for Development: a case study of a rural welfare programme' (University of Natal, Centre for Community Organization and Development papers, 1992). For specifics of modern welfare in Nkandhla, Zululand, see E. Ardington, `Nkandhla revisited: a longitudinal study of the strategies adopted to alleviate poverty in a rural community', *Rural and Urban Studies Working paper*, No. 26, University of Natal, Centre for Social and Development Studies For the wider implications of social security in developing countries see E. Ahmad, J. Dreze, J. Hills and A. Sen, (ed.s), *Social Security in Developing Countries* (Oxford, 1991).

163 See for example, USPG, D-334 SPG to Archdeacon Lee, 14 July 1930 and D-511 Bishop Wilmot to SPG, 21 Feb. 1939.

164 CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X) 68/3, Secretary of the NRC to CNC, 1 April 1933.

165 USPG, D-511, Bishop to SPG, 24 March 1934.

166 CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), 68/3, NC Nquthu to CNC, 24 March 1932 and Rev. J. Farup of the American Lutheran Mission station at Hlabisa to CNC, 5 April 1933. For the supplies see CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), 68/18, S.A.P. Commander, Mtubatuba to CNC, 5 Jan. 1932 and CNC to Acting NC, 26 Feb. 1932. See also NC Mahlabatini to CNC, 11 Nov. 1931.

167 Figures compiled by the author. See CNC 97A N7/8/2 (X), 68/1 [1932] and 68/35 [1935] record of maize relief statistics. This figure does not include unspecified purchases of grain through store-keepers or the bartering

of cattle for maize with speculators or white farmers.

168 Ibid, and see CNC 94A, N7/8/2 (X), NAD Engineer's report on maize returns. NB this does not account for debts to the stores.

169 1/NQU, 2/4/1/4, annual reports of the NC, 1933.

170 1/NGA, 3/3/2/10, 2/84, CNC to SNA, re report of the NC on the maize debt and `tribal levy' on the Usuthu (see also chapter on cattle), 12 Jan. 1937.

171 The NC had chosen to prosecute these `men of standing' as an example to others. See 1/NGA 3/3/2/6, 2/22/3 NC to CNC, 29 May 1939.

172 Ibid, and see 1/NGA 3/3/2/11, 2/91, annual reports, 1932.

173 See the section on cattle sales in the chapter on the cattle economy and for resistance to the commoditisation of cattle see J. and J. Comaroff. `"How Beasts Lost Their Legs"'.

174 NTS 9388, 5/385 part II, out line of Maize Control Board, SNA to CNC, 30 Oct. 1945.

175 Ibid, CNC to SNA, 14 Nov. 1945.

176 See NTS 9388 5/385 (2), NC Eshowe to Mealie Control Board, 25 Oct. 1945.

177 Ibid. For a similar complaint see NC Mahlabatini to Control Board, 12 Oct. 1945.

178 For annual rainfall statistics in Zululand districts see variously Union of South Africa, Official Year Book for the years of drought, 1931-33, 1935-36, 1941-42, 1945-46, p. xi in each book. In 1931-32 for example the average deviation from normal rainfall was between -31.13 inches (below average) in Eshowe and -7.50 inches in Nquthu. In 1945-46 the greatest deviation was -16.27 inches in Ubombo to +12.25 inches in Nkandhla.

179 NTS 9388 5/384, part II, NC to CNC, 15 Dec. 1945 and NCs' replies to CNC circular of 18 Dec. 1945.

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid, NC Lower Umfolozi to CNC, 2 Jan. 1946.

182 Ibid, NC Lower Umfolozi to CNC, 2 Jan. 1946 and NC Ubombo to CNC, 12 Jan. 1946.

183 See Berger, *Threads*, pp. 50-57, 88-90 and Marks, `Patriarchy'.

[184] See letter from the ZCC to the *Natal Mercury*, 14 Jan. 1946.

[185] NTS 9388, 5/385/2 part VII, CNC to SNA, 29 May 1946.

[186] Ibid, undated memo on maize controls, Jan. 1947.

[187] Ibid.

[188] Ibid, Manager of Control Board to NC Mtunzini, 8 March 1946, stating that according to statistics Africans in Mtunzini were apportioned 1.8 lbs. of maize per day in quotas compared with only 1.5 lbs. in the Transkei.

[189] I have dealt with some of these issues in my `"Weary Workers"' but important considerations for such research are found in M. Worboys, `The discovery of colonial malnutrition between the wars', in D. Arnold, (ed.), *Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies*, (Manchester, 1988), pp. 208-225. and Packard, *White Plague*, esp. pp. 113-116. The literature on nutritional deficiencies is vast and.the most convincing argument seems to me to be one for over-all reduced food supplies as a prime cause of nutrition deficiency. See Cowan and Heap, *Clinical Tropical Medicine*, pp. 260-266; R. Fincham, `The Nutritional Status of Black Communities in the Eastern Cape: South Africa', in T. Rathwell and D. Phillips, (eds.), *Health, Race and Ethnicity* (London, 1986), pp. 236-254, T. Thomas, `The effectiveness of alternative methods of managing malnutrition', in F. Wilson and G. Westcott, (eds.) *Hunger Work and Health: The Economics* of Health Care, Vol. 2 (Cape Town, 1981) pp. 23-46, and P.D. Curtin, `Nutrition in African History', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 371-382. For contemporary understandings of the relationship between poverty and under-nutrition see S. Kark `The Economic Factor in the Health of the Bantu in South Africa', Leech, Vol 5, no 3, 1934 pp.165-171, S. Kark and G. Steuart, *A Practice of Social Medicine* (London, 1962); KCAL, MS Lav., KCM 89/18/96/6, Nutrition and Malnutrition 1939-1972, memo by the University of Natal Faculty of Medicine, undated, probably 1945.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RECLAMATION AND `BETTERMENT' IN THE ZULULAND RESERVES

In September 1944, chief Isaac Molife, the son of the government-appointed chief Hlubi from Basutoland, was suspended from his position as `tribal chief' in Nquthu district. The pretext for Molife's suspension was his supposedly impudent and recalcitrant behaviour towards the NC and his resistance to `progressive' schemes for the `betterment' of his ward.[1] He then retreated to his urban home in the Clermont Township outside Durban. Clermont, a `model' township developed in 1931 by leading members of Natal's African aspiring petty bourgeoisie and Inkatha, and supported by the central NAD, represented a convergence of interests for a practical application of state segregationist thinking.[2]

Although Molife was not an active member of the Natal Native Congress, the ICU *yase* [of] Natal or Inkatha, whose respective founding members J.L. Dube, A.W. Champion, and W. Bhulose, struggled with *Hamba Kahle* (to go well or go safely) opposition politics, he allied himself with them as a fellow land-owner when he purchased land in Clermont. It was probably the fundamental principles of African self-government and of the inviolability of African land under a segregated `Zulu nation', espoused by these organizations, which appealed to Molife when the state intervened in his ward.[3]

For over thirty years Molife had successfully balanced the needs of the densely packed population of his ward against the unremitting pressure from the NAD to manage the ward in conformity with the demands of industrialising South Africa. Despite his staunch support from the central administration, Molife was constantly at odds with local officials and had, on more than one occasion, drawn serious censure for recalcitrant behaviour. Before his suspension he had absented himself from the ward for long periods, ostensibly because of illness, in order to avoid direct confrontation with local officials.[4] His suspension was, however, far from a forgone conclusion to the protracted struggle with the local agents of the white state. As has been shown earlier, he was remarkably effective in resisting the demands of local officials, even apparently precipitating the replacement of one NC.[5] His replacement as acting chief by the `progressive' *kholwa* Wellington Buthelezi, tipped the balance of popular sentiment against the NAD and galvanized local opinion against ward improvement and `betterment'.[6]

`Betterment' in Nquthu was part of Union-wide state efforts in the 1930s to shore up the crumbling reserve economy, and was based on `scientific' trends in conservation and stock control. These efforts were, however, also motivated by the exigencies of segregation in an industrialising society.[7] The pronouncements of the Native Economic Commission in the early 1930s to save the reserves from ruin can be seen as a fuller articulation of policy concerns which were developing at least ten years earlier.[8] This policy was

refined over the next twenty years, most notably as a result of the work of the Social and Economic Planning Council and the Tomlinson Commission, which were both devoted to rural reconstruction. Nevertheless, the maintenance of Africans at a tenuous sub-subsistence level in order to provide white farmers and industrialists with labour remained essential.[9]

The Molife case highlights the tensions and paradoxes of intensified state intervention in the rural areas of South Africa which followed the crisis years of the 1930s.[10] Intervention pitted conservative chiefs and *induna* against ambitious local officials and `modernising' *kholwa*, in a context of dire impoverishment and increasing economic differentiation both between whites and Africans and within African society.

Although state attempts at ward reorganization and agricultural improvement dated back to the late 19th century in Zululand, as has been argued in the previous chapter, the depression and impoverishment of the 1930s provided the NAD with an unprecedented opportunity to re-configure rural African society.[11] It was the contradictions between the drive of the central NAD to maintain conservative chiefly authority, centred as it was on customary control of the land, and the policy of `progressive' reserve reclamation which ultimately led to the failure of `betterment'. Chief Molife had, at best, an ambiguous relationship with the people of his ward. He was often corrupt, and favoured the conservative elite *induna*,

ran rough-shod over commoners and was openly hostile to `progressive' Christian Africans.[12] Nevertheless, intensified NAD activity in ward reclamation, the prevention of soil erosion and stock control precipitated widespread disaffection and led commoners to rally around their chiefs in the hope that they could defend the last vestiges of the reserve economy.

In Zululand, the NAD considered Nquthu, Mahlabatini and Nongoma in greatest need of intensified state intervention for political and structural reasons which will be discussed below. Although historians have tended to focus on the period of more intense and broad-based African opposition to state intervention following the introduction of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, there is ample justification for considering antecedents to the formal political restructuring of the reserves in the 1950s.[13] As Beinart and Bundy have shown, although it was mostly fragmented and lacked substantial links with political organizations, there was localized rural resistance to state intervention even before the 1950s, and it often indicates the issues which Africans were prepared to rally around later.[14]

Reserve reclamation and `betterment' in Zululand before 1950 occurred in roughly three phases. From the 1890s until the 1920s the state attempted to control settlement, define grazing and agricultural land and provide for an increased African population in the reserves despite the loss of Zulu lands.[15] During the 1920s and 1930s, local officials, the

NAD Engineering Department and the NAD Agriculture Department, formed in 1929 under the directorship of R.W. Thornton, made efforts to control human settlement, stock, and erosion, and to improve water supplies and agriculture. From the start, Thornton focused NAD attention on stock management, as he had been the former Director of the Department of Agriculture's Animal and Field Husbandry division and had spent a great deal of time studying the `problems' of African `overstocking' and erosion in the Transkei.[16] From 1939 to 1948, the combined threats of declining agriculture and potential famine prompted a intensified programme of `betterment'. At the heart of the new philosophy behind `betterment' was a shift in emphasis from attempting to manage the reserves alongside existing cattle-keeping practices to active intervention in order to reduce stock numbers and improve breeds. Underlying this was an official acknowledgement that reserve agriculture no longer provided for the subsistence needs of most Africans.

Reserve reclamation in Zululand began in earnest in the mid-1930s when African society was probably at its most vulnerable since the aftermath of conquest. State intervention, therefore, occurred in a context where officials perceived their efforts to be both the greatest hope in saving the people from absolute ruin and the best opportunity of re-configuring a compliant and grateful African society.[17] While much of the story of reclamation and betterment in Zululand is familiar and followed patterns developed elsewhere in South Africa, if not Africa, there were significant differences.[18] First, the

politics in Zululand were perhaps more problematic for state officials. As Beinart has argued, the discourse of conservation and reclamation was bound up with, and I would add, served to underpin the political imperatives of segregation.[19] Certainly the NAD faced a serious challenge over the implementation of its improvement schemes which so threatened chiefly control of the reserve political economy. Moreover, the SNA, Major Herbst, felt that the success of `betterment' in Zululand would reflect positively on state efforts in the Transkei and *visa versa*.[20] Thus, the contrasts and comparison made between Zululand and Natal's other adjoining African areas, so important to the introduction of cattle sales and the local council scheme, were maintained.

INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT

The NAD's drive for the infrastructural development of the reserves highlighted the isolated nature of the African areas of South Africa. Because their aim had always been to serve white farmers and particularly the sugar industry, linkages with the wider Union economy were disjointed and uneven. Rail links with Durban and the Rand supported the rapid development of Zululand's predominantly white-inhabited small towns, and provided points of embarkation for migrant labourers.[21] Until the 1920s, however, the movement of people and supplies to and from the reserves was less of a priority for the railways than moving sugar-cane.[22] Zululand's rail network did not provide the distant reaches of the reserves with the links necessary for

struggling African entrepreneurs and producer-traders to participate in the wider market. More importantly, African consumers, increasingly involved in the money economy, were unable to purchase much-needed cheap food.

When considering the most appropriate ways to spend the limited funds available for improvements in the reserves in 1928, Natal's CNC, T. Norton, recommended that roads be given priority. He argued that, contrary to the tenets of the department which earmarked NAD expenditure for Africans only, more roads be built on the grounds that they not only served white store-keepers, they benefited all the people and `... unless the wants of the Natives are increased, one of the largest markets for South African trade is restricted.'[23] Moreover, local officials and district surgeons complained they were unable to collect taxes or vaccinate effectively without access to the whole of the reserves.[24]

Herbst, however, maintained that `considering the present stage of development of the Native people' the NAD should not countenance the expenditure of funds for roads that appeared to serve whites only.

> What the Department requires from you [he instructed Norton] is a suggestion on which to formulate a policy of agricultural and other development to serve the greatest number for the good of the many- not the dissipation of funds on small schemes for the benefit of the more progressive few.[25]

In the context of repeated threats of famine, however, the essence of this policy was to attempt to keep the local

population at, or below, subsistence level with little hope of improving their position in the commercial economy.[26] Few roads were built in the reserves and most of those that did strike into the distant reaches of rural Zululand ended up, as Herbst predicted, serving white store-owners.

With the advent of the NAD's Department of Native Agriculture in 1929, Natal officials undertook extensive surveys of the reserves and drew up plans for their development.[27] Norton's revised 1929 recommendations took Herbst's admonitions into consideration. The CNC still felt funding should be found for road development, especially since it could provide needed occasional employment for those rejected by the mines' and the `retired'. He did, however, agree to

> ...include only such recommendations as fall within the aim of using the funds at our disposal in promoting the interests of the masses of the people who have for so long been left largely to their own device.[28]

Two local agricultural demonstration centres were planned, one for Eshowe to serve the southern districts and one in Nongoma, close to the Royal Kraal to serve the north. Other over ambitious, and largely unfulfilled, programmes included medical aid schemes, agricultural training scholarships and the development of a series of `Native Agricultural schools'.[29] Norton believed, however, that for any programme designed to improve African agriculture to succeed it had to contend with two physical obstacles in Zululand: the very poor state of land left to Africans in the reserves and the problem of continued drought and

consequent need for irrigation. On balance, however, it would seem that through the 1930s, repeated claims of drought and `abnormaly' low rainfall suggest that problems with water supplies were not merely a product of freak droughts, but the combined effect of normally intermittent and poor rainfalls with the congestion of people and stock on the land.[30] Nevertheless, Norton and many officials subsequently involved with attempts to improve the reserves, stated unequivocally that Zululand could not sustain any further closer settlement or more intensive agriculture unless more land was made available.[31]

Development policy for Zululand was not simply intended to provide for the partial subsistence needs of the existing reserve population in order to maintain a ready supply of migrant labour.[32] When, in 1936, the SNA, Smit outlined plans for overcoming the `present deleterious methods of cultivation and overstocking', in the reserves to `save them from absolute ruin', he implied that a greater concern was the need to provide for their increased population in future.[33] Smit was not, however, only referring to the anticipated natural increase of the African population, but also to the flow of `surplus' urban dwellers and evicted African tenants into the reserves. It would seem, then, that the 19th century Natal arguments for creating a vast labour reservoir in Zululand, had by the 1930s, come full circle.[34]

Smit made recommendations for the definition of arable and grazing areas in the reserves, anti-erosion measures, the

preservation of timber and water supplies and the imposition of any `necessary limits' on African stock.[35] Local officials were quick to counter his concern that a re-definition of chiefs' wards directed by white officials would ruin the last remaining central feature of chiefly authority (ie. their control of land) and `...practically kill the chiefs'.[36] Zululand officials were adamant that there was no question of their undermining chiefly authority by defining arable and grazing lands in conjunction with agricultural officers.

Thus, the NCs E. Braatvedt of Nongoma, H. Ashdown of Nquthu and G. Cunningham of Hlabisa, reassured the SNA that while they would define the wards in accordance with `scientific' principles, the actual public announcement of any changes would be made by the chiefs.[37] Moreover, chiefs would still be allowed to allocate sections of land to individuals within the overall planned areas. In this way the officials ensured that chiefs would not only be an integral part of the reclamation projects; they would also, if they participated, bear the brunt of popular opposition.

AGRICULTURAL `IMPROVEMENT'

Despite the severity of the food crisis of the 1930s, agricultural improvement schemes were extremely limited in Zululand. While the NAD focused on the `problems' of large and increasing cattle herds, it did not give due consideration to differentiation in herd ownership and the problems of cattle-less cultivators. Yet its own officials

were not unaware of these issues. Thus, in Nongoma, for example, the NC noted that many reserve families were without any draught stock at all.[38] He argued, however, that since there were large numbers of oxen in the district it was merely a matter of encouraging cooperation between commoners without cattle and the large herd-owners to ensure that arable land was ploughed for all to use. Braadvedt rejected the introduction of NAD tractor-ploughing schemes for commoners in the belief that,

> Community cultivation is unknown to the Zulu, and we should simply be upsetting them if we brought tractors in and ploughed up large areas. Such a step would probably be suspected of contemplating more land for European farmers.[39]

By contrast, in Mahlabatini, the NC authorised white farmers to enter the reserves with tractors to plough lands for those with cash or cattle to exchange for the service. He noted, however, the `unfortunate' trend in the district was the growing divide between those `very few progressive men' who could afford ploughing and could grow enough crops to sell and those who `lived in the rough, scratching their small stony gardens with hoes and sticks'.[40] By the 1940s, commoner cultivation was in crisis as fewer large herd-owners were prepared to loan or rent out draught stock and increasingly ploughs and wagons were rented for a cash fee rather than loaned.[41]

Following restrictions on petrol and machinery during World War II, the NAD introduced limited tractor ploughing schemes in Nongoma, Mahlabatini and Melmoth. These Zululand districts were the only places in Natal where this was

done.[42] The ultimate paradox was that the schemes were applied to the two districts, Nongoma and Mahlabatini, which were constantly cited as the most badly overstocked. Clearly, differentiation in herd ownership meant that, during periods of crisis, there were not enough cattle rather than too many. Tractor ploughing did not, however, improve commoner agriculture. In contrast to the NAD schemes, the state made loans of up to £600 to white farmers for the purchase of tractors.[43] When the tractors arrived, the NAD charged 10s. per morgen (approximately 4. 12d. per acre) for ploughing which was beyond the means of many poor families.[44] Moreover, NAD agricultural supervisors directed that ploughing be carried out only on land designated by chiefs as arable.[45] It was unlikely that much of the ploughed land would remain for commoners' use after `tribal leaders' had planted their share.[46] The scheme does not appear to have had any substantial impact on reserve food production. Owing to drought, only half the acreage ploughed in 1948 was actually planted by a few *kholwa* who sold the surplus produce to a local hospital.[47]

In keeping with trends elsewhere in Africa, the NAD attempted to develop separate individual tenure farming schemes in Zululand.[48] As with the African sugar-cane farming schemes noted earlier, however, these `progressive' or `master' farming schemes largely failed. Thus, the individual Impapala plot-holders in Eshowe had, by the 1940s, fallen on hard times. Most plot-holders could not sustain the lease and improvement costs of remaining on the

land by trying to grow cane. By 1946, of the original 105 lot holders only 28 had not defaulted on payments.[49]

It would appear that the most successful agricultural improvement programmes in Zululand were small scale projects aimed at helping women.[50] O. Oftebro, the Melmoth NC, reported to the Tomlinson Commission that the most effective work agricultural demonstrators carried out was not in co-ordinating arable and grazing lands among the district men, to which their was always resistance, but simply in showing women how to increase their small plot production.[51] When the demonstrator moved out of Melmoth, however, many women complained that they would not be able to carry on the `improved work'. Although Oftebro attributed this concern to the women's supposed `ignorance' and his belief that they would simply forget what they had been taught, the demonstrator claimed otherwise. He argued that the women's progress was not a function of what they were taught: they `knew perfectly well how to grow food'. It was rather that only with the official presence of the NAD were the women able to alienate larger areas of productive land from male control. Without the demonstrator present, the district men took over the land for grazing again.[52]

DROUGHT AND WATER SUPPLIES

For Africans and the NAD alike water supplies were a central development issue. Although portions of the inland districts and the river valleys which cut across most of

Zululand provided adequate water supplies for nearby communities, much of the coastal lands and the arid plains of the north suffered perennial shortages. Droughts of varying severity, thought to be `abnormal', appeared with alarming frequency during the 1930s and 1940s.[53] From the early 1920s, the state was panic-stricken over the potential impact of drought.[54] Although principally concerned with the needs of expanding white stock-farmers, the Drought Investigation Commission Reports of 1922 and 1923 also suggested, by implication, that water supplies in rural African areas should be improved to make way for white settlement and to improve the condition of South African stock overall.[55] The commission reported that Zululand had a particularly poor potential for irrigation and that its catchment zones were far more limited than Natal's.[56]

In the dry winter of 1930, partly in response to improved technology for bore-hole drilling and the construction of stock dams, numerous requests from northern district officials for the development of water supplies arrived in the CNC's office.[57] NCs in Nongoma, Ubombo and Ingwavuma reported startling stories of misery and hardship due lack of water: of African women, destined to walk ten miles a day for the meagre supplies that they could carry, of most children suffering from dysentery, and of the devastation of cattle herds from drought and disease.[58] Moreover, officials argued that the congestion of stock around the few sources of water was responsible for wide-spread erosion.[59]

In 1931, Thornton laid down plans for the provision of a series of bore-hole and stock dams in the northern `undeveloped' areas of Zululand.[60] Two main objects were to relieve the congestion of cattle around the few existing stock dams and to enable the population to disperse into poorly watered areas in order to make way for proposed white settlement in the Pongola irrigation zone.[61] In consultation with local officials, an ambitious series of 500 bore-holes and half as many dams were planned for the driest districts of Ingwavuma, Ubombo, Mahlabatini, Hlabisa and Nongoma. The stated goal was to provide at least one bore-hole or access to a dam for every 1500 reserve residents.

Initially Africans welcomed the scheme, and chiefs whose people were suffering from the drought even approached officials to apply for dams in their wards. Chief Zombizwe, who complained that the water off-take by white sugar farmers in Swaziland had made the Ingwavuma river run dry applied for twenty dams in his ward.[62] Similarly, chief Msekeni protested that all his people's cattle were dying of thirst since the Mkuzi Falls irrigation works were developed to serve white settlers. Although there is no evidence to *prove* that irrigation for white-owned farms had caused the rivers to dry-up, Africans remained unconvinced.[63]

Considering the large stake that these chiefs had in cattle, however, (they held over 500 head between them) it

is not surprising that their pleas for relief were directed toward the provision of stock dams. In areas where further white settlement was contemplated commoners were deeply suspicious of plans for irrigation schemes. In 1935, irrigation surveys of crown land adjacent to the Pongola river occupied by Africans in Ubombo and Ingwavuma, prompted one elderly man to state that `These [demarcation] flags look red but really they are white. They are for the white man. The white man is coming and we will lose our ground'.[64] The flags disappeared mysteriously over the next few nights.

Dam construction proved difficult for the Engineering Department despite initial chiefly enthusiasm. In early 1933, chief Matole Buthelezi approached the local NC with a request for a series of stock dams in the thorn-veld of his ward. The NAD Engineer for Zululand, S. Malcolm, perhaps overly-sanguine about the chief's enthusiasm, his offer of free labour and his high social standing, boasted that he was sure to get every assistance of his people.[65] He felt, moreover, that the project would be a `valuable lesson' to the Zulu who had endured severe drought the previous year. By the end of the 1933, following a ward meeting at which almost all the men refused to render free service for the project, Matole had apparently lost his enthusiasm, and `placed a number of genuine and imaginary obstacles' in the way of the works.[66] Elsewhere, however, dam construction carried on apace, especially at the height of the depression when, probably owing to extreme impoverishment, some older wage-labourers could be found. As E. Braadvedt

stated in Ingwavuma, `I am considering these works as a means of relieving distress and the Natives are now desperate enough to do it.'[67]

By 1933, the improvement of water supplies had achieved only mixed results. While many bore-holes had proved outright failures, drying up or turning brackish within months, those that did work tended to focus cattle congestion in very circumscribed areas leading to further erosion.[68] At a conference of officials in 1933, although the NC at Nongoma lauded the dams for providing over 900 cattle with water in a previously barren area, senior officials reviewed grave NAD concerns about the problems of over-stocking.[69] Although the two contradictory issues of de-stocking and the provision of improved pasture and water supplies for stock had yet to converge, as they would in the culling programmes of the 1940s, the signs of stress were evident.

If some chiefs and their followers remained guardedly optimistic that stock dams could improve their cattle during the droughts of the 1930s, their view was to be tempered during the Governor-General's visit to Eshowe in July of 1937. In his address to the people of Zululand, Sir Patrick Duncan renewed promises of more boreholes and stock dams for the Zulu.[70] He pointed out, however, that the main aim of the dams would not simply be to alleviate congestion in the reserves, but to provide an `asylum' in Zululand for refugees from other desiccated areas.[71]

RECLAMATION AND EROSION CONTROL

The NAD had been refining its conservation policy for over thirty years by the time that ward reclamation and erosion control projects began in earnest in Nquthu in 1934, and were later extended to the coast and the dry north.[72] In the early years of white encroachment on land defined as African, fences were not always completely rejected by reserve residents. As Hofmeyr has argued for the Transvaal, the NAD often engaged in negotiations and even the accommodation of African interests when conflicts on the ground ensued from the introduction of fences and boundaries.[73] In the context of land segregation and the dominance of white farmers over land outside the reserves, fences may have both protected Africans as well as constrained them.

In the 1930s, tensions between Africans and whites over stray stock increased as white farmers endeavoured to improve their cattle. While most Vryheid farmers complained repeatedly to Zululand officials about the destruction of their crops by African-owned cattle and expressed fears about their cattle breeding with reserve cattle, Africans protested against the exorbitant fines and the pound fees they faced while recovering stock which wandered onto white farms.[74]

The principle of using fences not only to define grazing areas but also to improve stock-breeding contributed to official distinctions between white `progressive' cattle-

owners and `conservative Zulu scrub herders'[75] If external fencing helped differentiate African and white cattle-owners, internal fencing and reclamation schemes served some of the same functions by highlighting tensions between reserve cattle-owners and agriculturalists. The broader pattern which emerged was that those whose life strategies revolved around migrancy and the struggle to maintain subsistence from the land and cattle tended to reject improvements while those who could profit from trade and commerce or were directly tied to the state supported change.[76]

In July 1934, the NAD started anti-erosion works in Nquthu and demarcated a series of 100 acre sites for contour banks and fenced paddocks to allow the pastures to recover from `overgrazing'. The department employed over a hundred local men, predominantly older, impoverished and cattle-less, for £1 2s. 6d. a month, to build up the banks and fence in grazing and arable land on each site.[77] New stock dams were built and close to 10,000 gum trees were planted to conserve the soil. While chief Mdhlalose, who had close ties with the administration and the local Anglican Church, initiated the soil reclamation project in his ward, chief Molife immediately objected.[78]

By 1935, Molife and his *induna* were leading a ward-wide resistance, and the NC, F. Ahrens, was forced to call a special district meeting in order to overcome the people's objections.[79] Ahrens' condescending attitude could not have

helped matters. After some discussion about the importance of curbing soil erosion, Ahrens pronounced:

> No one can expect a herd boy to give wise words in the councils of Chiefs... Therefore, none of you men here today can speak wise words in connection with soil erosion, because as far as soil erosion is concerned, you are all herd boys. Is that quite clear?[80]

Molife and other leaders, however, raised a series of salient issues.[81] *Induna* Mazaba Buthelezi argued that, in the short-term, when planting was crucial to maintain food supplies, the contour banks did not help agriculture since people were unable to plough or plant in the project areas. He added that, in effect, all the land used up for the banks would be forever useless because any seed planted on the exposed tops would either be blown away by wind or washed away by rain. A number of men explained that the banks had been constructed without any understanding of African farming techniques and were too close together to allow oxen and a plough to pass between.[82] Molife protested that his people were not responsible for erosion, since `dongas' [gullies] were the fault of the NAD who allowed roads to be built in the wrong places.

Molife maintained his opposition to rehabilitation over the next few years, and employed a number of different strategies to resist the undermining of his control.[83] He petitioned the NAD to suspend the works which, he claimed, were not only ineffective at containing Zululand's occasional torrential rains, but also hampered grazing and cultivation. He was not mollified by the CNC's reassurances that the programme was for the benefit of the people, and

he requested permission to take his concerns directly to the Union government.[84] Although the CNC refused this and labelled Molife `impertinent' for circumventing local authority, the chief proceeded to Pretoria to confront Smit only to be sternly reprimanded for the `affront'. Smit refused to hear his complaints and more importantly, set the CNC against Molife by condemning the Natal administration for its inept handling of the chief at a `particularly sensitive' time.[85]

For the next two years, Molife suffered constant harassment from local officials. In official correspondence, Ahrens characterised him as `...clearly weak, simple, secretive, suspicious and stubborn', adding that `It has been suggested that these qualities may be inherited: his father died in the Mental Hospital here.'[86] It is not surprising that Molife later brought a civil suit against the government-supporting chief Mdhlalose for alleged defamation when the chief claimed that Molife's rejection of reclamation was `lunacy' and would prevent `progress' in the district.[87] By 1938, the pressure on the chief was too great. Claiming only that he could `... no longer serve [his] people', Molife requested leave, this time to seek treatment for bronchitis in Durban. Again, permission was refused.[88] Nevertheless, in December 1938, Molife disappeared from Nquthu and returned only intermittently over the next few years. Although he never confirmed it, the NC suspected that Molife went to Durban to meet members of the ANC, possibly members of the Youth League who were

to help organize more radical resistance to `betterment' in Nquthu in the 1950s.[89]

That Molife left Nquthu when Foot and Mouth disease struck and the Veterinary Department was forced to cull large numbers of cattle is not surprising.[90] The NC, E. Lowe, considered that the slaughter of diseased stock must finally have sealed Molife's illusion of chiefly control of the land and summed up the context of his departure:

> It is known he took grave exception to anti-soil erosion measures in his ward, and despite many conversations with him, he undoubtedly considers his ward inviolate - however, there being a progressive section of his tribe the whims of Chief Isaac could not be reasonably sufficient cause for retarding progressive measures....[91]

Unlike his father, Molife was openly hostile to Christian Africans and `progressive improvements' in his ward. After the chief's nemesis, NC Ahrens, had moved, possibly due to NAD pressure to relieve tensions in the district between the administration and the chief, Molife selected two new *induna*. These loyal men replaced kholwa *induna* which Ahrens had supported, and the change led the Anglican Archbishop, A. Lee, to claim that Christianity in Nquthu was under attack.[92] In 1943, the chief refused permission for the Church of Sweden Mission to set up a station in his ward.[93] He also defied official directions for the reorganization of his ward, allowing favoured *induna* to `plough indiscriminately' in the reclamation sites.[94]

Elsewhere in Zululand state erosion control and ward reclamation intensified between 1934 and 1940. The NAD

targeted Nongoma and Mahlabatini for improvement schemes, in part because of the large cattle herds and increasing congestion in the area, and in part because the NAD believed that Mshiyeni, whose royal family base was at Mahashini in Nongoma, was malleable and would, as regent, provide leadership crucial in the application of reclamation elsewhere in the country.[95] Solomon had, after all, argued that in order for the chiefly strata of Zululand to contend with `progressive' African farmers and the *kholwa*, they would have to develop a practical knowledge of cultivation.[96]

According to the NAD, the arable and pasture conditions in Nongoma were very poor and production was on the verge of collapse. Between 1921 and 1936, the district population had doubled and stock numbers soared to near 200,000 (small stock included) causing considerable pressure on the land.[97] Officials estimated that 80 per cent of the Usuthu ward, which had attracted substantial numbers of refugee tenants from northern Natal, suffered from erosion while 40 per cent of the less densely populated Mandhlakazi ward was eroded. Moreover, up to 30 per cent of the whole district was considered uninhabitable by both Africans and officials, due to aridity, malaria and *nagana*.[98]

In Nongoma, Both Mshiyeni and chief Matole Buthelezi demonstrated a remarkably detailed understanding of the supposed value of fencing off grazing areas. They also raised relevant objections to each benefit officials claimed.[99] Mshiyeni argued that while paddock areas might

improve pastures, they tended to limit cattle in some areas, causing people who relied on *sisa* cattle for milk to worry about getting access to cattle. Buthelezi pointed out that congestion and erosion were not his people's fault, but rather the fault of refugees, and he could not understand why the government sought to punish them for the misfortune of others. When the NAD Engineer announced that the `tribe' would have to provide free labour for the work since they received free dipping tanks, Buthelezi countered that since the reserve residents were an asset to the country, paying taxes, school fees and licence fees, it was only right that they should receive welfare support and be paid a fair wage.[100] By 1939, after no labour was forthcoming, the Engineering sub-Department initiated a wage payment for reclamation works in Nongoma and then increased it from 1s.3d. a day to 1s.6d. a day.[101]

Partly because of his political standing and, perhaps, partly because of his repeated entreaties and explanations to engineers about local conditions, Mshiyeni was able to win some concessions over reclamation. In 1939, he objected strongly to the introduction of `veld observation plots' on the higher grazing areas of his ward.[102] He argued that no mention of the plots, delimited to check the recovery rate of pastures excluded from grazing, had been made at initial meetings and he had a difficult enough time convincing the people to accept the plans promulgated. The Regent also suggested that it was unfair of the NAD to expect the plots to show that the rest of Nongoma could not sustain cattle.[103] He may have been correct. As some environmental

historians have argued, there is a marked difference between short-term shifting patterns of pasture grasses under recovery and indications of irreversible and spreading deterioration in productive capacity.[104] Once Mshiyeni protested that no further alienation of grazing land should take place on higher ground until malaria had receded from the lower areas, the Engineer reconsidered his policy. Malcolm agreed not to establish any more plots on high grazing ground and, in contrast to the fragmented approach in Nquthu, to formulate a more comprehensive plan for the whole district which would take into consideration seasonal gazing patterns.[105]

Towards the end of the 1930s, official concern about erosion reached a state of panic. Increasingly, the NAD linked the success of ward improvement to a reduction in African-owned stock and the drive both to de-stock wards and improve breeds was central to policy in the 1940s. Natal's CNC was influenced by developments in the Transkei where stock improvement policies had already gained currency.[106] Local officials in Natal and Zululand were given copies of an article by N. King, the Transkei's Conservator of Forests, which placed a heavy emphasis on the evils of `overgrazing' and supposedly `poor' African pasture management.[107] At the root of the problem of soil erosion, according to NAD experts, was congestion of cattle. Although not explicitly stated, most technical officers in the NAD believed that since stock sales had failed to reduce the number of cattle, the best alternative

was to allow natural Malthusian checks to take over. As the NAD Engineer Malcolm stated,

> ...where no dipping facilities exist, the numbers of cattle are comparatively small, the cattle are tick-infested and the country remains intact. On the other hand, in areas which are free of ticks, the herds are large and the country is being torn to pieces.[108]

Malcolm even went so far as to recommend that dipping tanks on the coast of Zululand be destroyed to reduce both the costs of dipping and cattle numbers, though this was never carried out.

White pressure on the NAD to tackle the problem of African-owned cattle in the reserves mounted through the 1930s. Much of the evidence presented by whites was, however, like the NAD programme, contradictory.[109] While an article in the *Natal Witness* claimed that most of Zululand could hold only one head of cattle to ten acres, it acknowledged that many areas held twice the density and numbers of cattle were increasing. As these contradictions played themselves out in practice, many Africans were clearly frustrated by NAD policy. In 1934 for example, J. Reinecke, who replaced Thornton as Director of Native Agriculture, criticised African communities from Mtunzini to Mtubatuba on the Zululand coast both for clearing land in forested areas which led to erosion and for abandoning plots of land under shifting cultivation which allowed thorn trees to encroach and take over pastures.[110]

Finally, in 1939, the NAD undertook a comprehensive aerial photographic survey of erosion in Natal and Zululand.

Although the evidence of serious erosion was ambiguous the NAD directed close to half its development budget for Zululand for erosion control in four districts.[111] The overall impression given by the erosion survey was that surface and sheet erosion of arable land was minimal and was often contained by Zulu through indigenous practices such as leaving select trees on arable land.[112] In many inland areas, however, where people were heavily congested and often forced to cultivate on stony and steep hillsides, many gullies developed. The fact that erosion was reported to be in its early stages in some areas suggests that, as Africans themselves had protested, the problem was exacerbated by the recent influx of refugees. As Beinart and others have argued, official perceptions of the extent and potential impact of erosion in rural areas need to be treated with caution.[113]

The Zululand erosion survey report frequently mentioned problem areas which some local officials and residents disputed. Some Nquthu residents, for example, felt that ploughing up and down hills (a labour saving strategy) was only a short-term problem which would be overcome when more land was apportioned.[114] Some officials claimed, moreover, that *dongas* were limited to dipping tank areas and did not constitute a threat to cultivation.[115] A consistent theme in the report was that everywhere cattle movements caused gully erosion and cattle overgrazing caused sheet erosion. The NAD set priorities for reclamation accordingly. Despite very poor agricultural production reports for the northern districts during most of the 1930s, no improvements were

planned there since cattle-induced erosion was considered limited. Moreover, certain sections of the interior which were considered `badly eroded' were not scheduled for action since they did not threaten `European areas'.[116]

The NAD approved soil improvement works for sections of Mahlabatini, Nquthu, Nongoma and Nkandhla. Measures included fencing, tree-planting to prevent drift sands, and the control of paths to dipping tanks; in extreme cases, people were prevented from moving into areas susceptible to erosion.[117] On the whole, there appeared to be little organized resistance to the works except for a general refusal by young men to work on the projects. In most areas, Africans were able to overcome the restraints on grazing areas by ignoring official directives. Erosion control banks were trampled by cattle or planted upon, and most people simply carried on the struggle to maintain limited cultivation wherever they could.[118] While some peasant producers embraced contour ploughing and agricultural improvement, the majority of reserve dwellers made muted protests about congestion on the land and expressed fears of losing what little ground remained. It was not until the introduction of `betterment schemes' for the rehabilitation of the reserves that widespread disaffection unified commoner and chiefly resistance to stock culling.

`BETTERMENT' SCHEMES

The application of the Livestock Improvement Proclamation No. 31 of 1939 (as provided for by the Natives Trust and Land Act of 1936) to Mahlabatini and Nquthu in the 1940s provoked immediate Zulu resistance and heightened their resentment of state intervention.[119] During the 1930s, chiefs and *induna* had attempted to press their advantage over land control to make the most of opportunities for increasing their herds through reclamation projects. In Mahlabatini for example, chief Buthelezi and his *induna* selected choice hill pastures for paddocks for their own cattle while most commoners were left with the *nagana*-infected lowveld.[120] By the 1940s, however, when commoner agitation undermined paddock schemes and all African stock were threatened, many chiefs supported resistance. By 1942, chief Buthelezi's paddock had been stripped of wire, no labour was forthcoming to repair it and it fell into disuse.[121] Agricultural officers could not understand why the chief and his people, who had initially claimed to understand and approve of the measures designed for their benefit, then demonstrated the `usual innate conservatism' when stock-improvement measures were planned.[122]

By 1948, most of the erosion control measures planned for Mahlabatini were completed and it only remained for the NAD to implement the culling of `scrub stock' and cattle improvement. It was at this point that the magnitude of the problem in the reserves became clear to officials. Although over 2000 acres of land in Mahlabatini had been `reclaimed'

through fencing and contour banks, the agricultural officer for Zululand believed that `only the fringes of the problem [had] been touched' and for long-term improvement to be realised, `betterment would have to carry on for at least 100 [sic] years'.[123] Such long-term policy projections were problematic for two reasons. First, the state's commitment to `betterment' was caught between its objectives and a lack of funds. Second, and perhaps more importantly, long, drawn-out projects could not satisfy Africans' immediate need for arable and pasture land while large stretches of the reserves were removed from effective productivity for a time.

These concerns notwithstanding, the central issue for the Zulu was planned culling. On one hand, cattle-owners were understandably concerned about plans to reduce their large herds and to replace them with fewer `improved' and commercially productive cattle.[124] On the other hand, small stock-owners, and especially impoverished commoners who held only a few goats, sheep or donkeys, feared that they were the ultimate target of culling. Their fears were substantiated. While the NAD believed that cattle should remain the mainstay of the reserves, especially in view of their wider social and economic significance, it had no compunction about trying to wrest small stock from their owners. NAD experts considered that non-wooled sheep, goats and donkeys were a menace to the land. With smaller hooves to break away soil, a tendency to eat grasses almost to the root and no obvious commercial value small stock were seen by officials as the enemy of erosion control.[125]

Resistance in Mahlabatini effectively delayed further work on `betterment' and culling until well into the 1950s. Most of the men refused to present their stock for assessment, and stated that they would not discuss the matter further until chief Mshiyeni was called to represent them.[126] Bekinkosi Mbata, a commoner known to the administration for resistance to dipping, asked,

> Why does the Government want to undertake this scheme. Who has gone to complain about conditions? We live on our goats and donkeys. We use donkeys as draft animals and we sell goats to buy mealies and to pay Inyangas.[127]

The people would not countenance the removal of their stock when they believed the real problem lay with in government's refusal to grant them more land. Chief Mhlolutini, in an attempt to meet the interests of the NC at least part way, agreed that `...the country is being washed away [and] our stock has nothing to eat', but argued that the answer to the problem lay in providing more land for the overcrowded people and not in stripping them of their `wealth in stock'.[128]

WOOLED SHEEP AND `BETTERMENT' IN NQUTHU

As elsewhere in southern Africa, after the ravages of Rinderpest and East Coast Fever, Africans in Nquthu re-built their pastoral holdings with small stock.[129] Goats and especially sheep were readily available in southern Zululand at affordable prices from neighbouring white stock-owners and were an important substitute for poorer families unable to maintain cattle.[130] The development of

wooled sheep in Nquthu and Nkandhla, however owed as much to the industry of the immigrant Hlubi as to local circumstances.[131] While most Africans in the drier northern districts tended to keep indigenous or cross-bred `black' sheep which, they were told repeatedly by white officials, had little value outside the reserve economy, the keen Hlubi sheep pastoralists rapidly extended their flocks of `wooled' merino sheep.[132]

In 1924, Africans in Nquthu and Nkandhla produced over 190,000 lbs. of wool from just over 50,000 wool-bearing merino sheep; over 80 per cent came from the Hlubi in Nquthu. By 1939, their flocks had increased to 63,000 and had produced and 226,000 lbs. of wool to a market value of over £5,600.[133] The importance of the wool industry for Africans in Nquthu, and the impact it had on other non-wooled sheep-owners should not be underestimated. Wooled sheep in Nquthu constituted over half the total of the African-owned sheep for all of Zululand, and more than double the number of white-owned wooled sheep.[134] Moreover, like the NAD's scheme for developing African grown sugar-cane, merino sheep and the sale of wool presented local officials with an important potential basis for an income-generating scheme within the reserves. African wool production, however, was prone to the same sorts of obstacles and pitfalls as agricultural and cattle production. African-owned sheep suffered from the stigma of the `Native Produce' label which meant they received substantially lower prices for their wool than whites, and

from the resistance of fellow reserve residents without commercially viable flocks.

In 1934, the NAD agricultural supervisor from Nongoma, C. Peachy, who had been involved with Braatvedt's development of cattle auctions, introduced state-funded support for wool marketing in Nquthu.[135] The NAD provided a wool-shearing shed and instruments for weighing, sorting and preparing wool for sale, and encouraged the district's `progressive' wool-producers to present their sheep for classification and shearing. Previously, many sheep-owners had struggled to make a fair return on their wool since they relied on local white farmers to shear, collect and sort the wool for a fee or part of the produce. One cooperative of four Africans that relied on a white Babanango farmer realised a total profit of only £46 from the sale of over £55 worth of wool on the Durban market. Still, the NC considered this a far better return than the men could have achieved through local sale, and he hoped to improve on it.[136]

The NAD scheme immediately ran into problems. Africans who sold through the NAD lost the relative benefits, which often outweighed the costs, of funnelling reserve produced-wool through white farmers to overcome the stigma of the label `Native produce' at market.[137] Jack Molife, a mission-educated *induna* and distant relation to chief Molife, complained to the local NC that

> When we consign our wool to Durban we get letters from the buyers on which is written `Native Sheep'. We cannot understand it. We keep European Sheep. I

> bought 120 Sheep from a farmer. I thought my wool would not be termed `Native Wool', because I bought it from an European. It makes us think our efforts are in vain.[138]

Moreover, local officials exacerbated tensions between wool-producing sheep owners and the rest of the reserve residents who kept herds of the popular, and less expensive, `black' sheep. Through his constant entreaties to all sheep-owners to improve their flocks and do away with the non-commercial indigenous sheep, the NC threatened what appeared to be a working balance between the numbers of wooled and non-wooled sheep.[139]

Indigenous sheep played an important role in the local political economy and the social interaction between people and the *inyanga* (herbalist-doctor). Sheep provided meat for families and, more importantly, were a central feature of the *[uku]bethela* custom (to sacrifice a beast for protection from lightning or for spiritual guidance).[140] A number of commoners protested that sheep `stock improvement' would undermine their valuable `black' sheep, which were the only means of securing the services of diviners and herbalists who used the tail-fat and oils of the sheep for various remedies.[141] Moreover, until the advent of district-wide marketing schemes, there was little competition between indigenous and merino sheep-owners for appropriate grazing ground. While the hardier `black' sheep were better suited to the drier low thorn veld, merino sheep thrived on the better grazing available on Nquthu's higher grassy plains.[142]

Tensions increased between the majority commoner class who held small flocks of indigenous sheep and the minority of merino-herders as the NAD pressed for the commercialisation of wooled sheep. The lines of conflict reflected a growing rift between merino-owners, who tended to be Christians, and those who followed the customary accumulation and use of sheep. Merino-owners quickly followed the advice of local agricultural supervisors in condemning the intermingling of `black' and merino sheep which was believed to impair the quality of wool. Jack Molife, for example, claimed that all indigenous sheep were useless and their owners ignorant. Samuel Molife, Jack's brother, added that only merino sheep had any value and that, `I cannot even buy a shirt for a black sheep. We merino sheep owners buy shirts, soap and paraffin.' Job Selepe proudly declared, `I am not going to keep sheep for the purpose of enriching Inyangas but to help myself.'[143]

Commoners who owned indigenous sheep protested sharply when the NAD introduced financial support for the acquisition of merino rams and schemes for fenced grazing areas to isolate merino sheep in 1935. It can be argued however, that commoners were not *a priori* against the improvement and commercialisation of sheep. It was rather that their experience with cattle control had shown them caution was needed. Most commoners were concerned with the closure of communal grazing areas for their own sheep. Some people argued that paddocking for rams would remove valuable grazing land from access by the majority, and believed that chiefs would never allow the land to be so divided by

individuals; Others protested that the district was already over-crowded and the introduction of more sheep would reduce grazing for everyone.[144] Moreover, the regulations governing funding allocations prevented indigenous-sheep owners from getting support. As Naphtalie Nxumalo pointed out, funding for rams was provided on the basis of the amount of quality wool sold so that those aspiring to develop a merino herd could only qualify for support if they had substantial capital.[145] Qoboza Ngobese voiced a more general suspicion of government motives: `I say that if the Government brings in these rams will they not claim the lambs?'[146]

Despite the warning signs that wide-spread commoner disaffection with sheep improvement would ensue, the NAD expanded its programme for wool marketing and the acquisition of merino rams in 1936. An annual allocation of £100 was set for the purchase and distribution of rams to `black' sheep owners to enable them to improve their flocks.[147] In 1938, a full-time agricultural officer was appointed for Nquthu to train African assistants in breeding and sorting wool for the market.[148] A small number of `black' sheep-owners slowly shifted their flock composition to take advantage of cash sales of wool. In 1936, 28 new merino-owners sold wool for profits of between £2 and £24 each. By 1939, 72 new merino-owners were selling wool for profits ranging from as low as 5s.8d. to over £150.[149] Individual flock sizes, however, varied considerably: some men held less than ten sheep by 1940, and others, such as *induna* Nbongolo Ngade, had enormous

flocks of over 500.[150] It appears, then, that the same process of differentiation that held for cattle-ownership also applied to a growing gap between small and large flock-owners.

It was at this time, and using the auspices of NAD intervention in sheep herding, that chief Molife started agitating against the state reclamation of his ward. When additional shearing huts and sorting pens were erected in his ward Molife wrote a bitter letter to the SNA, D. Smit, protesting that he had never been informed of this proposed alienation of his land, nor had he been apprised of state action in regard to erosion control and grazing restrictions.[151] Molife condemned the `anti-Zulu' actions of `progressive' Christians in his ward for their support of reclamation and the eradication of `black' sheep for the sake of merinos. The allegedly `liberal' SNA effectively drew the battle lines in his reply to Molife by stating that the improvements were for the good of all people and that the matter was no longer open for discussion.[152] The greatest paradox of `betterment' schemes for Africans, however, lay in the contradictions of NAD efforts to encourage and improve stock, be it sheep or cattle, while simultaneously planning for the culling of large numbers of `poor' African-owned `scrub' stock.[153]

The NAD, strapped for resources, and reliant on compliant and supportive African labour to carry out the project, was only able to tackle problems in the district on a piecemeal basis. Initially, only one-fifth of Molife's ward was

targeted for fencing and erosion control. Local officials argued that stock-culling should precede fencing, in contrast to the NAD view that culling could only be undertaken once fencing had been erected. The NAD believed that if the culling was undertaken before grazing areas were delimited, people would simply re-stock at will, or take over *sisa* stock from wealthier neighbours. Nquthu could not be completely isolated from other stock-owning communities in the region.[154]

In 1945, the NC made a mockery of even the mostly hollow attempts at gaining consensus from reserve residents. During Molife's suspension he called a ward meeting with acting chief Wellington Buthelezi, the *kholwa induna*, and only 580 of 6500 reserve residents. All those in attendance accepted the `Tribal Resolution' for reclamation.[155] Similarly, chief Mdhlalose oversaw a meeting in which his ward residents were railroaded into accepting `betterment' with only 130 men out of potential 1800 eligible voters agreeing.[156] Having achieved his `consensus' the new NC, V. Leibrandt, objected to the planned re-instatment of Molife arguing that

> ...it would be most unfortunate if Isaac were to return now... with his peculiar mental makeup he will do everything in his power to antagonize the Natives against the reclamation of the Molife ward.[157]

Ironically, the NAD, nevertheless, re-instated Molife, principally in the hopes that he would contain popular resistance, and the chief returned to the ward to carry on the struggle against state intervention.[158]

The parcel of land initially targeted for betterment consisted of 27,000 acres of rolling hills and small stream valleys. The NAD assigned a carrying capacity of eight stock units to one acre of land and recommended that culling take place on a sliding scale according to the number of stock units an individual held.[159] The assessment of the carrying capacity was quite arbitrary, and gave no consideration for varied seasonal grazing needs. The Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, J. Every, admitted that his sub-department was unable to assess the carrying capacity of the undulating veld accurately with due consideration for long-held grazing practices and consequently recommended a more stringent culling scale than was initially planned.[160]

Owners who held more than 36 stock units (a `stock unit' equalled one head of cattle, or one horse, or five goats or four sheep) faced a cull of 66 per cent while owners with less than five units were to lose only 25 per cent in order to achieve an overall reduction of 45 per cent. Smaller stock units, predominantly goats and sheep, which officials believed to be responsible for the worst erosion, were a priority for the culling scheme. A stated aim of the scheme was to attempt to even out the distribution of cattle in the district. Africans who held few or no stock wold be allowed to purchase up to three head of cattle only, and it was estimated that over seventy men would be eligible to buy. Officials gave special consideration to draught stock in order to allow people to carry on ploughing land wherever possible. Although the NAD recommended that

culling take place over five years, the NC counselled against this:

> Whether a Native loses 2 head or 20 head the psychological reaction will be the same and it will be difficult to face the yearly opposition that is bound to occur if culling is carried out in stages.[161]

Owners were, moreover, allowed some time through the rainy season to fatten animals targeted for removal with better grazing.

Despite warnings from senior NAD officials familiar with other attempts at culling not to attempt to do the whole 66 per cent cull at once, the NC and the CNC believed this was the best way to show how quickly improvement could be achieved.[162] The Natal officials pressed ahead with the culling procedures arguing that,

> To stage out the cull would only be a continual irritant to the people and a sign of hesitancy and weakness on the part of Government.[163]

Molife's people were then given from April to the end of November of 1948 either to remove the designated stock from the district through sale or to face an enforced slaughter.[164]

The culling procedure, started in March of 1948, represented all of the ambiguities of state intervention in rural South Africa.[165] Imbued with `scientific' presumptions about poor African pastoral management and firmly convinced that Africans would see the `wisdom' of state officials, the NAD officer in charge of culling

operations described the desired procedure as follows:

> The owner is given the chance to make his own selection of the type and class of animals he wants to get rid of. If the culling officer feels that his selection is not in his own interest, or that of the community, it is then explained to him so as to persuade him to change his selection. Invariably the Native will agree with the culling officer.[166]

Paradoxically, `scientific' assessments of the allowable number of units were abandoned. While in some cases the minimum number of stock to be culled was lowered, the culling officer warned that `The minimum must not be revealed to the natives as that is an arbitrary figure for official use.'[167] Following the assessment all animals designated for the cull were branded and families who were to lose goats and sheep were encouraged to re-stock only with cattle.

The evidence suggests that while the intention of the cull was to have the least impact on owners with fewest stock, the actual impact was more severe. Since goats and sheep were the prime target of the cull, small stock-owners could lose nearly all their accumulated wealth. State concern about the possibly explosive reaction of the majority small stock-owners to a widespread and immediate cull of all their sheep and goats prompted Reinecke to countermand the previous order to eradicate small stock altogether. He recommended instead that the `displacement of sheep and goats in possession of the poor man by cattle must be done circumspectly' to allow them time to accumulate cash for cattle purchases.[168] As he pointed out, this change would be in keeping with culling policy elsewhere in South Africa

and Southern Rhodesia. Given the general constraints on accumulating cash for cattle and the tendency of larger cattle herd-owners to take over and monopolise grazing land, it was unlikely that many poor goat herd-owners would be in a position to develop a viable herd of cattle after the cull.[169] It was probable then, that culling accelerated the division between those people without stock and those with.

RESISTANCE TO `BETTERMENT'

For Africans who wished to do so, out-right confrontation was not always necessary to undermine `improvement'. Over the short-term the tactics of delay -withholding labour, removing survey markers, allowing cattle to stray into works areas, shifting cattle from one area to another, and withholding oxen for draught power- could all slow the pace of change without provoking retaliation from the state. Africans also resisted or provided false information for the agricultural censuses and stock enumerations which officials relied upon to plan `betterment'.[170] Moreover, Africans, on occasion, demonstrated an apparently enthusiastic acceptance and understanding of stated policy at meetings, only to turn around and `neglect to co-operate' later.[171]

At least part of the controversy over `betterment' resulted from the very public nature of `consultations' with the affected people. Official reports of district meetings, required by the Proclamation to gain the `consent of the

people' before `betterment' could start, belied popular sentiment. Thus, at one such meeting in Mahlabatini, chief Buthelezi and his *induna* claimed that `the entire tribe is in favour' of the scheme; yet only 600 out of 6000 members showed up, and of those only a bare majority voted in favour of the programme.[172] On top of this, officials often pressed ahead with plans despite popular opposition. Liebrandt, for example, proceeded with culling operations in one section of Nquthu without the consent of the people because, he believed, `...consultation... does not mean agreement... it means you are going to tell them what you are going to do'.[173] Thus, in contrast to Transkeian officials, the Natal administration often `manufactured consent' in its heavy-handed effort at gaining popular acceptance for intervention.[174]

African objections to the scheme went beyond complaints of impoverishment resulting from the loss of animals to the way the cull was carried out. The Nquthu people asked for the project to be delayed until drought abated and that if they were forced to move that they be paid a cash compensation. They also criticised the intensified bureaucracy relating to cattle-keeping which came with `betterment'.[175] They complained that not only did the branding of cattle destroy hides destined for sale, but that the introduction of strict record-keeping for natural increase and a plethora of new permits for the movement of cattle also meant people no longer owned their cattle and goats since they were `...always in the books of the Native Commissioner'.[176] Moreover, both branding and comprehensive

records undermined the flexibility Africans needed to move cattle to avoid loss.[177]

In the Molife ward stock-owners met the initial calls to produce their cattle for culling with quiet assurances that all would comply. On the day of the cull, however, they refused to show up, and the NC immediately telephoned the local police to call for reinforcements to protect the local officials. He intended to proceed with the cull `...whether the people liked it or not'.[178] In anticipation of fierce resistance the S.A.P. sent 35 men to the magistracy to prepare for a confrontation with the people. Thirty African men were served the first notices to present their cattle for culling and they arrived in a `belligerent mood' at the culling site along with seven hundred followers, both men and women. The culling procedure at this stage was simply to identify the cattle to be removed from the district. It was only after chief Molife intervened and warned his people that they would be heavily fined if they failed to comply with the cull that their unanimous objections to branding were overcome. Officials then felt it prudent to allow stock-owners to oversee the branding of cattle and some men were allowed to brand their own stock, probably to ensure that only minimal damage was done to the hides.[179]

By the end of 1948, the culling process had stalled. Liebrandt had only managed to get the people of Molife Ward A (the first parcel to come under `betterment') to part with 38 per cent of their stock through sale.[180] The people

of Ward B, the next parcel planned out, refused to attend any meetings about culling. R. Moran, an agricultural officer in Nongoma, discussed African resistance:

> Normally at any agricultural meeting the attendance may be a hundred, but if at any time a rumour has been spread throughout the district that stock limitation is to be discussed, we have had up to two thousand natives in [a] fairly arrogant mood come to the court house, and if you force the issue on the people... the policing would have to be terrific in order to enforce your regulations.[181]

Large herd-owners were at the forefront of the opposition to the culling register and the threat of stock removal. They did their utmost to convince fellow members of the `tribe' that the intentions of the NAD were detrimental and that they should resist the schemes and culls. Some chiefs even promised to lend commoners cattle for milk or ploughing in order to win support.[182] Local officials remained convinced that while the `Chiefs and the masses' raised objections to the scheme `the progressive few' wanted the projects to continue. The decreasing number of voices heard in favour of `betterment' was attributed by the NAD to the fear of the `progressives' of the animosity of the chiefs and people.[183] Despairing of any further `betterment' in Nquthu, Leibrandt concluded that,

> It has long been clear to me that no amount of persuasion or argument will convince these people that what we are doing is for their benefit. All claim they will starve without their cattle and that the Government desires to kill them.[184]

Upon reflection, Leibrandt stated before the Tomlinson Commission, which had been set up to consider what strategies were necessary to ensure the `Human welfare, Preservation and Development of Bantu Civilisation', that

it would only be through `diplomacy and perhaps other methods' (ie coercion) that anything further could be achieved.[185] He had already been undermined in prosecuting people who refused to cooperate with the cull because they had hired a white Vryheid lawyer to challenge the writs of prosecution.[186] Other officials noted that many wealthier herd-owners simply viewed the fines associated with culling as an added tax to be incorporated into the overall cost of cattle-keeping.[187] For many poor cattle owners, however, these tactics were not a sustainable option in the face of state determination to force culling. As Leibrandt argued for the future of African resistance to `betterment',

> I think that they will be forced economically to either bring their animals to the culling race or adopt other means of defiance.[188]

Finally, Leibrandt stressed the need for the NAD to achieve a better understanding of the customs, practices and desires of Africans relating to their cattle and the reserves. He recommended ideas that had been mooted over twenty years earlier, including the suggestion that trained anthropologists be employed to advise local officials on Africans and their potential reactions.[189] His hope was to contain resistance at the local level where `tribal leaders' could be employed to bring pressure on the people.[190]

By the end of the 1940s, however, it would appear that the NAD was unable to head off the emerging African national opposition to state intervention in the rural areas of Zululand. Both the African National Congress Youth League

and members of the All African Convention had taken up the rural struggle and had started advising reserve residents in southern Zululand on tactics of resistance.[191] For a time, then, both urban African national leaders and some `conservative' chiefs were united in their opposition to state intervention.

This combination presented the state with a formidable threat of potential mass resistance which it had been working to avoid since the inception of segregation. Thus, the NAD was forced to retreat from culling operations in order to defuse resistance and to restore order and control in the countryside. Moreover, the ruling National party, faced with considerable urban unrest in the late 1940s, implemented the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, partly to encourage chiefs in Zululand and throughout the country to less ambiguously embrace their role in supporting the state, and the common space between chiefs and national African leaders disappeared.[192]

[1] 1/NQU 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/1, Acting NC Martin to CNC, 20 Sept. 1944.

[2] See Ibid, and for the significance of Claremont which was developed in 1931 by the Rev. John Dube, A.W.G. Champion and M. Gumede with the support of the Minister of Native Affairs E.G. Jansen, see N. Cope, `The Zulu Royal Family', pp. 401-403. For comparisons with other urban village schemes around Durban see L. Torr, `Lamontville - Durban's "Model Village": The Realties of Township Life, 1934-1960.' in *JNZH*, Vol 10, 1987, pp. 103-117 and for contrasts with shantytown development see I. Edwards, `Mkumbane', pp. 50-52.

[3] For the background to these devlopments and the brief infomal alliance between leading members of the NNC, ICU and Inkatha which led to Clermont's development see Cope, `Royal Family', pp. 157-161, 301-310 and 398-404 and Bradford, *A Taste*, pp. 98, 252-253.

[4] For the details of Molife's chequered career see 1/NQU 3/4//1/1, 2/7/2.

[5] See ch. 2 on Chiefly Authority.

[6] 1/NQU 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/1, NC to CNC, 10 Oct. 1944.

[7] For the implications of this policy in the Transkei and a useful analysis of the ideological underpinnings see W. Beinart and C. Bundy, `State Intervention and Rural Resistance: The Transkei, 1900-1965', in M. Klein (ed.), *peasants In Africa* (London, 1980), pp. 271-315.

[8] See the Report of the NEC, pp. ii-iv.

[9] See the SEPC report and the Summary of the Report of the Tomlinson Commission on the Socio-Economic Development of Native Areas in the Union of South Africa, U.G. 61 of 1955 and the evidence given before it between 1952-54, CAD, K-56, Report of Evidence of the Tomlinson Commission.

[10] For the wider implications of `Betterment' schemes and African resistance see for example the special issue of *JSAS* edited by W. Beinart, Vol. 15, No. 2, Jan. 1989, T. Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (London, 1983), pp. 261-170, C. Bundy, `Land and Liberation: popular rural protest and the national liberation movements in South Africa, 1920-1960', in Marks and Trapido, *The Politics of Race*, pp. 254-285. Baruch Hirson's insightful account of the local dynamics of resistance to betterment is found in `Rural revolt in South Africa 1937-1951', ICS SSA Seminar Papers, Vol. 8, Oct. 1976 June 1977. See also fn. 12 below for examples of specific case studies.

[11] The South African state was equally confident of the

efficacy of rural intervention following the drought crisis in Namibia; see P. Hayes `Famine of the Dams'.

[12] See 1/NQU 3/4//1/1, 2/7/2, reports of the NC to CNC, 26 Aug. 1929, 24 Sept. 1929, 6 Jan. 1930.

[13] A still classic account of the rural struggle in Pondoland in the later 1950s and 1960s is G. Mbeki, *The Peasants' Revolt* (London, 1964). Other works that focus primarily on the 1950s and later include, J. Yawitch, *Betterment. The Myth of Homeland Agriculture*, SAIRR, (Johannesburg, 1982), P. Delius, `The Tortoise and the Spear. Popular political culture and violence in the Sekhukhuneland Revolt of 1958', paper presented to the CRCSA workshop, Kingston, Ontario, Nov. 1994, and I. Hofmeyr, `"Nterata/ The Wire". Fences, Boundaries and Cultural Resistance in the Potgietersrust District.',Paper presented to the University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop on Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid, Feb. 1990, J. Ferguson, *The Anti-politics Machine* and P. McAllister, `Resistance to `betterment' in the Transkei: a case study from the Willowvale district', *JSAS*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Jan. 1989, pp. 346-368 and A. Mager, `"The People Get Fenced": Gender, Rehabilitation and African Nationalism in the Ciskei and Border Region, 1945-1955', *JSAS*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Dec. 1992, pp. 761-782. For an excellent discussion of the tenuous links between national liberation movements and localised resistance see C. Bundy, `Land and Liberation'. A notable exception to the limited periodisation of reclamation and resistance is Murray, *Black Mountain*.

[14] See Bundy, `Land and Liberation', esp. pp. 268-273, 279-281 and Beinart and Bundy, `State Intervention', Bundy suggests the importance of local rural struggles for national politics in the Conclusions to his *Peasantry*, and these issues are taken up expertly in Beinart and Bundy's *Hidden Struggles*.

[15] See ch. 1 on the land issue and my `The Impact', ch. 2. From 1893 to 1897 Sir Marshal Clarke, British Resident in Zululand had instituted an ambitious scheme, with some success, to reorganize reserve settlement. Following land expropriations, however, chiefs were left largely to their own devices in relation to ward control until the later 1920s. For Clarke's scheme, see my M.A., pp. 80-104 and R. Edgecombe, `Sir Marshall [sic] Clarke and the Abortive Attempt to "Basutolandize" Zululand, 1893-7', *JNZH*, Vol 1, 1978, pp. 43-53, and E. Unterhalter, `Religion', pp. 110-135 408-410.

[16] I have benefited from discussions with Shaun Milton about Russell Thornton and stock control in the Transkei. See Milton's `"The Apocalypse Cow"'; see also Thornton's own view in his `Agricultural Policy'.

[17] For the constraints on African society in the 1930s in the wider southern African context see Beinart, `Soil Erosion', p. 63, 74-75 and Murray, *Black Mountain*, p. 157.

[18] The best starting points for comparison is the special issue of *JSAS* on Colonial Conservation that W. Beinart edited and his `Introduction: The Politics of Colonial Conservation' to that issue: Vol. 15, No. 2 Jan. 1989, pp. 143-162 and his `Soil erosion'

[19] Beinart, `Colonial Conservation', p. 153.

[20] CNC 109A N1/15/5, 94/9, Herbst's comments at an NCs' conference, Pietermaritzburg, 17 Nov. 1933.

[21] For the rapid rise of white village populations in Zululand in the 1920s see Alsop, *Natal Regional Survey*, pp. 90-92 and U.G. 42-`55, *Volume I of the Population Census of 8 May 1951, The Geographical Distribution of the Population of the Union of South Africa*, tables 6 and 9, pp. 31, 63-81.

[22] For a further exploration of the railways in Natal and constraints on Zulu migrant labour see G. Pirie, `Railways and Labour Migration', pp.714-715 and 722.

[23] NTS 8404, 84/359, I, CNC to SNA, 10 Dec. 1928.

[24] Ibid, and see for example See NTS 8404, 83/359, I, Deputy Health Officer to CNC, 26 Jan. 1944 and CNC to SNA, 12 Jan. 1944.

[25] NTS 8404, 84/359 I, SNA to CNC, 29 Dec. 1928.

[26] Similar `development' policies have been repeated elsewhere in Africa with equally poor results. See for example Hart, *Agriculture*, pp. 154-156 and Hyden, *No Shortcuts*, pp. 25-26.

[27] For the NAD Agriculture section and Thornton's role in it see the previous chapter and Thornton's `Agricultural Position', pp. 2-3. Much of the following discussion is drawn from NTS 1760, 54/276, Native Development: Natal and Zululand, CNC to SNA, 14 March 1929.

[28] Ibid.

[29] NTS 8404, 84/359, I, CNC to SNA, 18 Jan. 1930.

[30] This point is explored below. For a discussion of drought and `abnormal' rainfall see for example Anderson, `Depression and Drought', Beinart, `Soil Conservation' and his `The Night of the Jackal: Sheep, pastures and predators in South Africa, 1900-1930', paper presented to the African History Seminar, SOAS, March 1992, T. Driver, `Overgrazing and Land Degradation in the Communal Areas of Zimbabwe',

unpublished paper in the author's possession and A. Warren and C. Agnew, `An assessment of Desertification and Land Degradation in Arid and Semi- Arid Areas', O.D.I, Drylands Development Paper, No. 2 (London, 19880, pp. 1-23.

[31] NTS 8404, 84/359 I, CNC to SNA, 18 Jan. 1930.

[32] This argument is still best put forward in Wolpe, `Capitalism'.

[33] See CNC 42A N2/8/2 (X), 39/1, Smit to CNC, 14 Nov. 1936.

[34] See ch. 1 on the land issue.

[35] CNC 42A N2/8/2 (X), 39/1, Smit to Natal's CNC, 14 Nov. 1936.

[36] See CNC 108A, N1/15/5, 94/9, Smit's comments at NCs' conference, Pietermaritzburg, 18 Nov. 1936.

[37] Ibid, comments of the respective NCs, pp. 7,9 and 11.

[38] CNC 94A N7/8/2 (X), NC to CNC, 29 Oct. 1931.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid, Acting Assistant NC to CNC, 31 Oct. 1931.

[41] See comments of the *SEPC* re the Natal/Zululand reserves, pp. 15-16 and 1/NGA 3/3/2/5, 2/19/3, Senior Agricultural Officer to CNC, 18 Sept. 1946.

[42] 1/NGA 3/3/2/5, 2/19/3, Senior Agricultural Officer to CNC, 18 Sept. 1946 U.G. 14-`48, *Report of the NAD, 1945-47*, report of R. Campbell, CNC Natal, pp. 24-25 and *Farming in South Africa*, Vol. 24, No. 275, Feb. 1949, p. 42.

[43] Ibid, p. 42.

[44] 1/MBT 3/3/2/3, 12/12/3, NC Mahlabatini to CNC 16 Dec. 1945.

[45] See U.G. 35-'49, *NAD Report for 1947-48*, p. 6. and 1/NGA 3/3/2/5, 2/19/3, NC to CNC, 2 Feb. 1947.

[46] Areas ploughed in acres

	1945-46	1946-47
Mahlabatini	70	92
Melmoth	37	59
Nongoma	188	321

Source: U.G. 14-'48 *Report of the NAD, 1945-47*, pp.24-25.

[47] See U.G. 35-'49, *NAD Report for 1947-48*, p. 6 and 1/NGA 3/3/2/5, 2/19/3 Report of the Agricultural Supervisor to

NC, 10 Jan. 1949.The NAD made other efforts to improve African agriculture through the provision of improved grain seed and fertilizers. Most of these improvements, however, were monopolised by official African `demonstraters'. Most Africans, however, held to conventional wisdom that argued there was no point in using these additives when their gardens received no rain and the crops burned up. This is a condensed account of information found in NTS 10158 35/419/2, CNC to SNA, 16 July 1937 and U.G. 41-'37, *NAD Report for 1935-36*, p.37. The amount of fertilizer bought went down to 124 tons in Natal and Zululand from the 1934 total of 214 tons.

[48] Efforts to develop a class of `progressive' African farmers to cope specifically with food production shortfalls were evident in South Africa since 1913 and later in Nyasaland and East Africa. See for example, Bundy, *Peasantry*, pp. 242-243, O. Kalinga, `The Master Farmers Scheme in Nyasaland, 1950-1962, *AA*, Vol. 92, No. 368, July 1993, pp. 367-388. Also on the Nyasaland Master Farmers' Scheme see, Vaughan, *Famine*, pp. 106-107. For East Africa see G. Kitching, *Class and Economic Change in Kenya: the making of an African Petite Bourgeoisie, 1905-1970* (New Haven, 1980), pp. 315-330, 350-370.

[49] NTS 10158 35/419/2, NC Eshowe to CNC, 10 Oct. 1946. For the formation of the Impapala lots see ch. 1 on the land delimitation.

[50] For a discussion of similar developments in women's agriculture in Zambia in the same period see Moore and Vaughan, *Cutting*, pp. 95-96.

[51] Tomlinson, Evidence, p. 4692.

[52] Ibid, pp. 4692-93. For the different strategies that women employed in aligning themselves with men during resistance to `betterment' see Mager, `The People Get Fenced'.

[53] For a more detailed discussion of Zululand geography and water availability see Guy, `Ecological factors', Thorington-Smith, Rosenburg and McCrystal, *Towards a plan for KwaZulu*, pp. 1-6, 30-38, U.G. 20-'22, pp. 143-146 U.G. 49-'23, pp. 18 and 49-''23: *Reports of the Drought Investigation Commission.*

[54] See the Reports of the Drought Investigation Commission noted above and Beinart `Soil Erosion' p.58 and his `Night of the Jackal'.

[55] U.G. 49-`23 *Final Report of the Commission*, pp. 8-10.

[56] Ibid, p 143 of Appendix 18.

[57] See applications for funding in CNC 48A, N8/20/3 (18),

42/13.

[58] This point is elaborated in the chapter on the cattle economy. For the hardships women endured (and still endure) over the provision of water for their families see McAllister, `Resistance to "betterment"', p. 358. During the period of my oral interviews in Zululand, during the height of the drought in 1993, it was abundantly clear that even with KwaZulu government water deliveries, women still suffered difficulty getting water and spent up to a third of their day acquiring it.

[59] CNC 48A N8/20/3 (18), 42/13, NC Ingwavuma to CNC, 4 July 1930 and Assistant Director of Native Agriculture to Director of Native Agriculture, 10 Sept. 1930 and NC Nongoma to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 24 March 1932.

[60] CNC 48A N8/20/3 (18), 42/13, Thornton to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 4 Sept. 1931. For a general assessment of African irrigation systems see J. Sutton, `Irrigation and Soil-Conservation in African Agricultural History With a Reconsideration of the Inyanga Terracing (Zimbabwe) and Engaruka Irrigation Works (Tanzania)', *JAH*, Vol. 25, 1984, pp. 25-41. For an example a case of preferential treatment for irrigation for whites in CNC 50A N8/20/3, 43/12, NC Melmoth to CNC, 8 Nov. 1929.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid, NC to CNC, 8 Oct 1931.

[63] Ibid, 42/17, Superintendent of Native Reserves to NC Ubombo, 14 Sept. 1931 and SNA to CNC 12 Dec. 1931.

[64] NTS 3233, 684/307 SNA memo on notes of interview of NC with chiefs and people of Ingwavuma, 6 June 1935.

[65] CNC 50A N8/20/3/23, Engineer to CNC, 7 Feb. 1933. Chief Matole's grandfather was Mnyamana, the influential Prime Minister to Cetshwayo, and Matole served Chief Mshiyeni in the same capacity.

[66] Ibid, Malcolm to CNC, 11 Nov. 1933.

[67] NTS 7836, 9/336, part IV NC Ingwavuma to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 24 March 1932.

[68] See CNC 109A, N1/15/5, 94/9, NCs' conference in Pietermaritzburg, 17 Nov. 1933.

[69] Ibid, see comments of NC Nongoma, the CNC and Herbst.

[70] See `Water for Native Reserves' *Natal Mercury*, 28 July 1937.

[71] Ibid.

[72] See Beinart, `Soil Erosion' pp. 54-61 and the cattle ch. for a fuller discussion of ths development.

[73] I. Hofmeyr, `"Nterata/The Wire": Fences, Boundaries and Cultural Resistance in the Potgietersrust District', Seminar paper delivered to the History Workshop on Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid, University of the Witwatersrand, 6-10 Feb. 1990, p. 2-3.

[74] For an example of these tensions see 1/NQU, 3/4/1/5, 4/7/38, NCs' reports on stray cattle, 1926-1934, NC NQU to NC Vryheid, 10 June 1933 and 1/NQU, 3/4/1/6, 4/8/38.

[75] For a further discussion of this difference see for example, Ferguson, `Bovine Mystique' and his *Anti-Politics*, pp.176-182, Murray, *Black Mountain*, p. 168 and Tapson, `Biological Sustainability'.

[76] A similar point is made by Delius with regard to `betterment' and Bantu Authorities in Sekhukuneland. See his `The Tortoise', p.9.

[77] 1/NQU, 2/4/1/4, 2/40/2, District Administration Report, July 1934.

[78] Ibid, Minutes of District Meeting, March 1935.

[79] For his otherwise distinguished career in the NAD and some commentary on his time in Nquthu see F. Ahrens, *From Bench to Bench* (Pietermaritzburg, 1948), especially pp. 28-29 and 45.

[80] 1/NQU 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/1, minutes of meeting, 24 Sept. 1935.

[81] Ibid. For an assessment of some of these techniques and their importance to agriculture see Richards, *Indigenous Revolution*.

[82] 1/NQU 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/1, statements of Buthelezi and `other leaders' at meeting, 24 Sept. 1935.

[83] For a discussion of the broad range of tactics and techniques of resistance in the Transkei and Ciskei see Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, `Introduction', esp. pp. 17-18.

[84] 1/NQU, 3/4/1/4, 2/38/3/4, CNC to NC, 27 March 1936.

[85] Ibid, SNA to CNC, 19 June 1936.

[86] See 1/NQU, 3/4/1/1, 2/7/2, NC to CNC, 10 July 1929, for a comment that was picked up on by the following NC, Lowe, in a letter to the CNC on 18 Sept. 1937. In fact Molife's

father, Hlubi, passed away peacefully at his home after a brief stay at the Charles Johnson Memorial Hospital for treatment of complications probably from malaria.

87 Ibid, annual reports for 1936.

88 Ibid, NC to CNC, 8 Dec. 1938.

89 Ibid, NC Nquthu to NC Durban 10 Dec 1938 and see B. Hirson, `Rural Revolt' and his *Yours for the Union*, (Johannesburg, 1990), pp. 10-12 and C. Desmond, *The Discarded People: An account of African resettlement* (Johannesburg, no date), pp. 35-40.

90 See ch. 2 on cattle.

91 1/NQU, 3/4/1/1, 2/7/2, NC to CNC, 8 Dec. 1938.

92 1/NQU, 3/4/1/1, 2/7/2, NC to CNC, 12 Jan. 1931.

93 The NC had to override his refusal and then fined Molife £5 for failing to grant the land. See 1/NQU 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/1, NC to CNC, 23 Dec. 1943.

94 1/NQU, 3/4/1/1, 2/7/2, NC to CNC, 3 May 1935.

95 See for example 1/NGA 3/3/2/5, 2/19/2, NC to CNC, 18 Aug. 1936 and CNC to NC, 20 Aug. 1936.

96 See for example Solomon's evidence before the NEC, pp. 6555-6559 and ch. 2 chiefly authority.

97 1/NGA 3/3/2/5, 2/19/2, Engineer to CNC, 26 Aug. 1936.

98 Ibid, and NC to CNC, 3 Sept. 1936.

99 CNC 110A N1/15/5, 94/19A, part II, conference of chiefs at Pietermaritzburg, 31 July 1939.

100 Ibid, `chiefs conference', 31 July 1939.

101 1/NGA, 3/3/2/5, 2/19/5, Engineer to CNC 24 march 1939.

102 1/NGA, 3/3/2/5, 2/19/13/1, NC to CNC, 31 Aug. 1939.

103 Ibid.

104 See K. Homewood and W. Rodgers, `Pastoralism, conservation and the overgrazing controversy' in Anderson and Grove, *Conservation*, ch. 5 and esp. p. 113. and see Sandford, *Management*, pp. 82-83.

105 1/NGA, 3/3/2/5, 2/19/13/1, SNA to CNC, 24 Oct. 1939 and NC to CNC, 1 Dec. 1939.

106 See Beinart, `Soil Erosion', p. 72 and for earlier

Transkeian policy see his *Pondoland*, `Conclusion'. As Beinart has also pointed out policy development was an international affair and much emphasis was placed on the American West. See Jacks and Whyte, *The Rape of the Earth*.

[107] See CNC 105A N2/11/2, 84/1, CNC to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 23 Jan. 1937 and copy of King's article, `The Menace of Soil Erosion in the Transkei'.

[108] Ibid, Malcolm to CNC, 21 June 1937.

[109] See for example `Too Many Cattle in the Reserves' *Natal Mercury*, 3 and 23 Dec. 1938, the *Natal Witness*, 10 Nov. 1938 and a follow up article on `betterment' 4 Jan. 1939, and `The Scourge of Native Cattle' *Zululand Times*, 7 Jan. 1939. These reports were similar to official Union-wide concern over erosion and the menace of African cattle. See for example H. Curson, `Studies in Native Animal Husbandry', *OJVSAI*, Vol. 5 No. 2, Oct 1935, pp. 531-535 and Editorial, `Erosion and Native Livestock' in *FSA*, Vol. 18, No. 245, p. 24.

[110] CNC 105A, N2/11/2, 84/1A Reinecke to SNA, 24 July 1937.

[111] CNC 105A, N2/11/2, 84/1A, Soil and Veld Conservation: expenditure for Zululand; Mahlabatini, £1450, Nquthu, £8150, Nongoma, £4100, Nkandhla, £2000. See SNA to CNC, 30 Jan. 1939.

[112] Ibid, Engineer to CNC, 15 June 1939. For African techniques of soil management see Richards, *Revolution*, his `Ecological Change and the Politics of African Land Use' *ASR*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1983 and Sutton, `Irrigation'

[113] See Beinart, `Soil Erosion' and `Colonial Conservation; Showers, `Soil Erosion', pp. 264-265; McAllister, `Resistance'. McAllister and Showers argue that erosion control actually contributed to erosion.

[114] Interview with Mr. H.C. Zulu and family member, June 1993.

[115] CNC 105A, N2/11/2, 84/1A, questionnaire returns for Eshowe, 18 Dec. 1939, Hlabisa, 10 Oct. 1939, Mtunzini, 2 Dec. 1939.

[116] Ibid, Engineer to CNC, 15 June 1939.

[117] Ibid, SNA to CNC, 30 Jan. 1939 and Engineer to SNA, 2 Dec. 1939.

[118] See for example reports of Agricultural Supervisors for Eshowe, Nquthu and Nkandhla in Ibid, 3 Jan. 1940, 2 Dec. 1939 and 8 Jan. 1940 and 1/NGA, 3/3/2/5, 2/19/13/1, NC to Director of Native Agriculture, 4 Feb. 1940.

[119] For a further discussion of the Proclamation see Hirson, `Rural Revolt' Lodge, *Black Politics*, pp. 3, 82 and Platzky and Walker, *Surplus People*, pp. 45-46, 93-94, Davenport and Hunt, *The Right*, pp. 10, 44-46, Yawitch, *Betterment*, and for the official policy formulation see the *Report of the NEC*, pp. 10-13.

[120] See NTS 10212, 7/423, NC to Director of Native Agriculture, 17 Dec. 1936 and CNC to SNA, 31 Dec. 1936.

[121] Ibid, Assistant Agricultural Supervisor to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 13 Oct. 1942.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Ibid, Senior Agricultural Supervisor to CNC, 7 Jan. 1949.

[124] See ch. 1 on cattle and Ferguson, `Bovine Mystique' and *Anti Politics*, pp. 80-85 and the Comaroffs', `How beasts lost their legs'.

[125] NTS 10212, 7/423, Agricultural Supervisor to NC, 10 Sept. 1948.

[126] Ibid, minutes of meeting on `betterment', 23 Feb, no year cited, probably 1949, statement of Mpiyose Ndlela, and `shouts of approval from all present'.

[127] Ibid and note by the NC on the margin that `This Native has a long history of objecting to stock dipping and improvement'.

[128] Ibid.

[129] See NTS 10212, 7/423, NC NQU to CNC, 16 Dec. 1942. This was not an unusual phenomenon. See for example Murray, `High Bridewealth', pp. 82-83 and A. Kuper, *Cattle for Wives*, p. 12.

[130] See the comments of the Agricultural Supervisor for Zululand to CNC, 12 Dec. 1934 in NTS 10195, 78/419, Bundy, `Reactions to Rinderpest' and Beinart, *Pondoland*, pp. 101-102.

[131] For the background to the Hlubi, who had a reputation for being excellent farmers and herders, see J. Wright and A. Manson, *The Hlubi chiefdom in Zululand-Natal: a history* (Ladysmith, 1983).

[132] For the official view of African `black' sheep versus various wooled varieties see for example, P. Rose, `Merino-wool Classing', Department of Agriculture *Bulletins*, No. 71, 24 June 1930 (Pretoria, 1930) pp. 1-14; `Is the Merino Sheep Losing?', *FSA*, Vol 24, No. 274, 1949, pp. 5-9. For relations between the State and white sheep farmers see

Beinart, `Night of the Jackal'.

133 For these figures see U.G. 4-`26, U.G. 35-`30 and U.G. 31-`40; *Agricultural and Pastoral Censuses for the Union for 1924, 1929 and 1939*, pp. 28, 31 and 38 respectively. See also the SEPC, report on the total number of wooled and non-wooled sheep in Zululand, p. 21.

134 See NTS 10212, 7/423, NC to Director of Native Agriculture, 31 Dec. 1936.

135 NTS 10195, 78/419, NC's report on `Native' wool marketing, Sept. 1934.

136 Ibid, NC Lowe to CNC, 27 Dec. 1934.

137 See for example 1/NQU, 1/1/5/30, 3/4/2/2, Agricultural Officer to CNC, 6 May 1934 and 1/MEL, 3/2/1/3, 2/3/21/1, NC Melmoth to NC Nquthu, 12 Jan. 1935.

138 Ibid, Minutes of meeting between NC Ashdown and sheep owners of Nquthu, 25 Sept. 1935.

139 Ibid, NC to CNC, 20 March 1935

140 See A. Bryant, *A Zulu-English Dictionary* (Mariannhill, 1905 and Pietermaritzburg, 1907), p. 10 and Krige, *Social System*, ch. 5.

141 NTS 10195, 78/419, statement of Mhlope Ngobese at meeting of chiefs and people about sheep, 25 Sept. 1935 and see NC to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 7 Dec. 1935. The use of `black' sheep for various religious ceremonies and as a form of payment for *izinyanga* was discussed with the author by Simon Ngema in an interview.

142 NTS 10195, 78/419, statement of Qoboza Ngobese at meeting, 25 Sept. 1935.

143 Ibid.

144 Similar issues faced commoners in conflict with government supporting headmen in the Ciskei over cattle improvement. See Mager, `"Get Fenced"', pp. 764-767.

145 NTS 10195, 78/419, minutes of meeting, 25 Sept. 1935.

146 1/NQU, 1/1/5/30, 3/4/2/2, statement at district quarterly meeting, 2 April 1937.

147 NTS 10195, 78/419, NC to Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, 9 March 1937.

148 Ibid, CNC to SNA, 2 Dec. 1938.

149 Ibid, returns for Nquthu `Native Wool' sold to Shaw

Brothers of Durban, 1936-37 and 1939-40.

150 Ibid, NC to CNC, 10 Feb. 1940.

151 1/NQU, 1/1/5/30, 3/4/2/4, copy of Molife's letter to the SNA, 21 Dec. 1937.

152 Ibid, SNA to CNC, 16 Jan. 1938. For Smit's alleged `liberal' stance ch. 1 here on chiefs.

153 Stock improvement is discussed in ch. 3.

154 See NTS 7568, 880/327 I, NC to CNC, 25 Nov. 1946.

155 NTS 7568 88/327 I, NC to CNC, 15 Nov. 1945, including copy of `Tribal Leaders' Agreement'. The programmes were promulgated under Proclamation No. 31 of 1939 for the Molife and Madhlalose wards made on 22 Feb. 1946 and 13 Sept. 1946 respectively.

156 Ibid, NC, Addison to CNC, 7 Dec. 1945.

157 1/NQU, 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/1, NC to CNC, 25 Sept. 1947.

158 Ibid, SNA to CNC, 10 Oct. 1947 and CNC to NC, 2 Dec. 1947.

159 NTS 7568 88/327 I. The programme is outlined in a memo from the NC to the Director of Native Agriculture, 11 Feb. 1948.

160 Ibid, see undated memo on the amended culling guide in this file. The failure to consider the entireity of indigenous grazing practices doomed many improvement schemes to failure throughout Africa. See for example Homewood and Rodgers, `Overgrazing Controversy', pp. 115-117, Sandford, `Management' p. 80, and the essays in Behnke, Scoones and Kerven, *Range Ecology*.

161 Sandford, `Management', p. 2.

162 NTS 7568 88/327 I, SNA to CNC ,re report of Director of Native Agriculture on `betterment' in the Transkei, 20 April 1948 and CNC to SNA, 6 May 1948.

163 Ibid, CNC to SNA, 6 May 1948.

164 The 1948 Cull

	cattle	sheep	goats	horses	donkeys
Animals presented:	4,333	3,827	1,177	160	490
Culled:	1,079	2,508	980	59	429

Remaining:	3,286	1.345	197	101	61
% culled:	23	65	83	37	88

Source: NTS 7568, 880/327, NC to CNC 26 May 1948

165 The analysis of rural resistance to `betterment' has recently been taken up in earnest, due mostly to the important work of W. Beinart and C. Bundy. For a wider comparison of the impact of state intervention and betterment with the Transkei, Ciskei, Lesotho, the Free State and the Transvaal see variously McAllister, `Resistance', Bundy, `Land and Liberation', the essays in Beinart and Bundy's *Hidden Struggles,* Murray, *Black Mountain*, pp. 155-189, Mager, `"Get Fenced"', Ferguson, *Anti-politics* pp. 165-193, Evans, `Native Affairs', pp. 34-37 and Delius, `The Tortoise and the Spear.', pp. 6-10.

166 NTS 7568, 880/327 I, J. Duvenage to Director of Native Agriculture, 13 March 1948.

167 Ibid.

168 NTS 7568, 880/327, Reinecke to Controller of Native Settlements, 24 March 1948.

169 These suggestions were made at a number of district meetings. See for example the comments of Malisela Kanya 1/NQU 3/4/2/3, 2/11/1, 18 April 1948.

170 Interview with Mr. N. Otte.

171 See for example NTS 7836, 9/336 IV, Engineer Malcolm to CNC, 31 Oct. 1935.

172 NTS 10212, 7/423, NC's report, 7 Sept. 1948.

173 CAD, K-20, Evidence before the Tomlinson Commission on the Socio-Economic Development of Native Areas in the Union of South Africa], Vol. 56, p 4650.

174 See NTS 7568, 880/327 I, SNA to CNC, re report of Director of Native Agriculture on `betterment' in the Transkei, 20 April 1948. Other examples of this are approach are given in Marks, *Ambiguities*.

175 NTS 10212, 7/423, minutes of meeting, 10 June 1948.

176 NTS 7568, 880/327 I, Controller of Native Settlements to the Director of Native Agriculture, 18 June 1948.

177 Ibid, See SNA to CNC, 23 April 1948.

178 Ibid, Inspector of S.A.P., Vryheid District to Deputy Commissioner, 27 April 1948.

[179] Ibid, S.A.P. Inspector's Report and see NC to CNC, 3 May 1948.

[180] Tomlinson, Evidence, p. 4664.

[181] Ibid, Evidence of Moran, p. 5117.

[182] NTS 7568, 880/327, NC to CNC, 12 Dec. 1948.

[183] Tomlinson, Evidence of Liebrandt, p. 4669.

[184] NTS 7568, 880/327, NC to CNC, 7 Dec. 1948.

[185] Ibid, p. 4664 and for the quote see U.G. 61-`55 *Summary of the Report of the Commission for the socio-economic development of the Bantu areas within the Union of South Africa* (Pretoria, 1955), pp. 2-3. For a discussion of the implications of the Tomlinson Commission see for example, Platzky and Walker, *The Surplus People*, pp. 37-38, 111-116, and J. and E. Krige, `The Tomlinson Report and the Lovedu', *Race Relations Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, Dec. 1956, pp. 12-25.

[186] Tomlinson Evidence, Vol. 56, p. 4665.

[187] Ibid, Evidence of Moran, p. 7117.

[188] Ibid, p. 4665.

[189] See H. Curson, A. Thomas and W. Neitz, `Studies in Native Animal Husbandry, *OJVSAI*, Vol. 2, 1931, pp. 138-145.

[190] Ibid, pp 4649-4650.

[191] Ibid, Evidence of NC at Melmoth, p. 4657. For the background to the All African Convention see Bundy, `Land and Liberation', T. Karis and G. Gerhart, *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 3 (Stanford, 1978), pp. 100-118, Hirson, `Rural Revolt'.

[192] For the wider implications of these developments see for example Lodge, *Black Politics*, pp. 18-21, 110-112 Hemson, `Dockworkers', pp. 110-121 and Nuttall, `Class', pp. 128-132. The role of Bantu Authorities and new programs of state intervention in the reserves in the 1950s and 1960s is, I believe, the way forward for research on Zululand and R. McIntosh of SOAS is currently undertaking this for Natal.

CONCLUSION

In the concluding pages of his seminal work Colin Bundy commented:

> Connections and conclusions are most usefully introduced by restating the arguments [of the thesis], reduced to their bare essentials. Thus filtered out, the arguments stand free of the fleshy surrounds of qualifications and details: skeleton-like, they are starker than, yet are the essential core to, the body of the whole.[1]

These words have guided my own following conclusions.

This thesis has argued that, by 1950, the forces of state and capital had fundamentally re-moulded the political economy of Zululand through a policy of segregation. This policy had ambiguous effects. On the one hand, in different ways it served the various interests of commercial farmers, urban industry and white society in general to control African labour, remove the threat of African competition and contain the possibly explosive forces of African society. On the other hand, segregation supported the development of members a small rural Zulu elite who exploited the limited resources available to them and struggled to gain a secure political footing, caught as they were between the demands of the state and Africans.

Class interests crystalised during the period studied and those Zulu who could accumulate in the reserves stood in increasingly stark contrast to impoverished commoners. How these interests were consolidated in the 1950s and 1960s is an area in need of further study, but Shula Marks has pointed the way forward, in part by looking back from the

position of the KwaZulu leader M. Buthelezi.[2] The patterns of labour migration and social differentiation, which were evident in the early 1900s, intensified with the crisis and acute rural impoverishment of 1930-1950. The Zulu ruling patriarchy sought enhanced power through state recognition and support in an effort to control the processes of proletarianisation and individualisation which threatened its rule in the reserves. Thus, an uneasy and often shifting alliance developed between Zulu chiefly authorities and the state as they sought to dominate the reserves. Thus, this thesis has attempted to provide a picture which captures the complexities of differentiation in the reserves and leave an impression which differs from Bill Freund's view of similar developments in the Transkei which he argues was one of a

> remarkably effective administration secured through African allies that enjoyed wide acceptance, required little coercion, and experienced little challenge.[3]

There was however, some limited room for African mobility within the ranks of the dominated classes. The state's often contradictory administration left scope for a few appointed African officials and enterprising community leaders to take advantage of productive possibilities in the reserves to enhance their wealth.

The government's implementation of a reserve system had profound implications for the way in which the political economy developed in Zululand. White land expropriations exacerbated the rapid decline of subsistence agricultural production, which forced the vast majority of commoners

into a deeper reliance on wage labour, and especially on oscillating labour migrancy to the urban areas. Underlying the decline in household agriculture were different gender interests in Zulu aims for household production. While women struggled to maintain agricultural production in the reserves, men increasingly turned to earning wages which they invested in cattle, thereby reducing their contribution to cultivation.

On top of this, white settlement constrained commoner Zulu homestead production, cattle-keeping and peasant cultivation while the chiefly elite monopolised the limited resources available for herd accumulation. Soon after the delimitation, white sugar-cane planters moved into the coastal belt to farm intensively, and forced thousands of Africans into the already congested reserves. Further state support, in the form of favourable land-leases and financial grants enabled whites to entrench their control of land and win an advantage over African agriculturalists.

The reserves were the foundation of the state's segregation policy. Although land expropriations undermined chiefly authority by subsequently removing their principal resource in ensuring their people's loyalty, and by setting them at odds with the Zulu living on white farms, the state also intervened to shore up chiefly rule. The Zululand trust was based on Natal precedents where communal land tenure and the recognition of `tribal' authority pre-dated later national legislation. Africans who struggled to escape these controls were subordinated by the exactions of white

farmers who sought to undermine competitive African producers, or by the state which sought to contain potentially threatening opposition movements.

Paradoxically, as chiefs were embraced by state power, they became less effective for the administration. There were inherent contradictions in the state's use of reconstructed chiefly authority, as chiefs simultaneously attempted to maintain popular support while intensifying their control over commoners. The self-aggrandising tendencies of chiefs, and their accumulation through the extraction of cattle and cash from commoners, pitted them against the state on the one hand, and their followers on the other. Both conservative chiefs and the leaders of mass political movements re-invented Zulu `traditions' as they vied for popular support. While neither group was able to overcome the constraints imposed by the demands of industrialising South Africa, they both developed significant ideologies with which to mobilise commoners in their struggles with the state and agrarian capital.[4]

Although pre-colonial forms of authority provided significant legacies for Zulu rulers in the twentieth century, the wider capitalist economy re-shaped local African leadership and accelerated the processes of social stratification. Segregation did not necessarily transform the political authority of hereditary rulers, and this was true of the Zulu royal family.[5] Hereditary rulers who represented an idealised past had enormous symbolic

importance for rural Africans struggling to defend themselves against the pernicious effects of capitalism.

Chiefs still exerted some control over their followers, especially through the collection of `tribute' in urban and rural areas. This was possible largely because the Zulu continued to rely on chiefly patronage to secure themselves in the reserves. It was not necessarily contradictory that chiefs and headmen sought material benefits by supporting popular rural struggles against the forces of state and capital. Although chiefs were careful to justify their material aggrandizement on the basis of `pre-colonial' practices and to couch their activities in a reconstructed Zulu ethnicity, commoners also embraced these symbolic institutions as a means of defending their interests in a racially and class divided society.[6]

Nevertheless, the widening gulf between chiefs and commoners left a vacuum in local leadership. Many white officials relied on *induna* who were more efficient, and initially less corrupt than many of the chiefs, to implement policy. Often through an alliance with these officials, *induna* took advantage of the state's new recognition of their importance to control `tribal' wards in the absence of chiefs and to expand their agricultural and pastoral production for profit. At the same time, *abanumzana*, who were far more responsive to popular sentiment than chiefs or the NAD, challenged chiefly rule by mobilising support from disaffected commoners. Administration in Zululand then fell into disarray as a

growing number of `unofficial' leaders competed with the state and chiefs for control.

Nowhere was accumulation by the Zulu more starkly evident than in the cattle economy. Following the ravages of disease, cattle herds made a remarkable recovery. Despite settler disparagement of indigenous herding practices, shrewd Zulu herdsmen were largely responsible, for the recovery of their cattle, although it was also due, in part, to veterinary advances. These were not an unmixed blessing. Dipping imposed by the state had a double cost in the economy in terms of cash fees and in terms of increased stratification because the poor subsidised wealthier cattle-owners. Veterinary disease control was principally aimed at supporting white stock-keeping. It was only because of the intermingling of white- and African-owned cattle, predominantly through trade and cash exchange, that the state was forced to safeguard African herds. Nevertheless, Africans were deeply suspicious of state motives to further its control in the reserves through intervention in the cattle economy.

By the 1930s, there was a trend towards an uneven distribution of cattle despite the `explosion' of the herds. The chiefs transformed social practices and institutions such as *lobola* and *sisa* by maintaining a continuity of form while changing their redistributive functions. The Zulu patriarchy, chiefs and especially the royal family re-directed cattle, and migrant earnings (used to purchase more cattle) into their own hands by demanding

high rates for bridewealth. Moreover, they introduced cash considerations to the loaning of cattle. They were able to maintain their rapidly expanding herds through their largely unchecked control of grazing land. In contrast, fewer and fewer commoner families had control of sufficient grazing land for large herds, and some could not afford the cost of establishing a reproductive herd of their own. Nevertheless, a significant feature of cattle distribution in Zululand was that the majority of commoners were able to keep some cattle, or they at least had access to cattle through *sisa*. Although wealthy cattle-owners were among those Zulu best able to resist a reliance on migrant wage labour, they did require cash and labour to maintain their herds, albeit probably less of both than was required for accumulation through agriculture.

Although chiefs sought to concentrate the accumulation of cattle in their own hands, the fact that most commoners had cattle probably played an important part in their continued support of chiefly authority. The accumulation of cattle by the Zulu was not, however, simply a defence against capitalist assaults on a remaining element of the pre-capitalist economy. By 1930, African-owned cattle were already an important commodity on the wider South African stock market.[7] While many Zulu with small herds traded and sold a few cattle to meet subsistence requirements, large herd-owners exploited a ready and growing cash market for their stock.

More importantly, despite negative white perceptions of `emaciated' Zulu cattle and an industry-wide effort to improve the condition of cattle for export, Solomon's cattle collections precipitated the widespread rise of white cattle-traders and speculators in Zululand's reserves. These often unscrupulous men, nevertheless, helped Africans negotiate the complexities of a market divided between the Zulu offerings of `scrub' cattle and the demands of the white urban buyers of heavy slaughter stock. The sale of cattle was important not only because it meant the commoditisation of a product central to the social relations of production in the reserves, but also because it accelerated social differentiation. It has been argued that the off-take of cattle through sales and mortality did not threaten the size or reproductive capacity of the herds.[8] By the 1930s, however, there were relatively few wealthy Zulu who `owned' cattle, as opposed to simply caring for them, and who could, therefore, depend on sales to meet cash demands.

In an effort to reduce the perceived overstocking of the reserves, by the 1930s, the NAD was attempting to exploit cattle sales. Local officials believed they could alleviate pressure on the land, improve subsistence agriculture and `rationalize' African cattle-keeping through cattle auctions. Yet, the state's intervention in the market served to further polarise African society by heightening suspicions that whites wished to alienate more land. Moreover, the sales exacerbated tensions between the hereditary chiefs who held the largest herds and preferred

to support speculators on the one hand, and the government-supporting chiefs, *induna*, and lesser African officials who held smaller herds and supported the NAD auctions on the other. Although the state failed to reduce cattle numbers through these auctions, the NAD considered the Zululand sales a model for their expansion throughout South Africa.

Labour migrancy and the availability of cheap food were crucial for the subsistence of the majority of Zulu commoners. Without access to sufficient arable land, pastures for cattle or enough cash to invest in rural production, they could not make a living off the land. Zulu workers, however, created ethnic identities to defend themselves in a rightless, coercive labour environment. The Zulu used their `superior' status as industrial labourers, which the state was largely responsible for developing and reinforcing, in order to resist their diversion into poorly-paid and unhealthy employment. Moreover, Zulu men rejected appeals by chiefs to apply their alleged martial skills, and therefore gain state recognition, during recruitment drives for the war, in part because of the low wages offered in contrast to the money they already earned in urban industry, and in part because the white state lay behind the effort.

The refusal of most young Zulu men to work on the sugar plantations was important for the way that fraction of agrarian capital developed. While established planters were able to attract some people from the reserves into employment for short periods, new under-capitalised sugar-

farmers could not compete with urban industry for Zulu workers, despite the considerable state support they received. It is significant that the sugar industry in Zululand developed and prospered without a reliable supply of local adult male labour.[9] Few young men in the reserves would take rural employment unless it could compete with the better wages and conditions in the urban areas. Women, children and to a lesser extant older men, however, comprised a significant and severely exploited part of the Zululand sugar industry's workforce. Whether these same patterns were evident in the development of the wattle and forestry industry in Zululand during the 1950s and 1960s remains to be seen.

Zulu in the reserves experienced similar pressures to those faced by Africans in industrial centres. When sugar planters imported migrant labour, however, the sugar industry was far less successful in overcoming the problems associated with migrant labour than the mines and the arrival of large numbers of Transkeian and Mozambiquan men and women on plantations adjacent to the reserves led to tensions between established Zulu residents and migrants. In the event the state forced planters to phase out the `non-immune' Transkeian workers because they suffered the worst effects of appalling working conditions and malaria. The planters then pressed the state to regularise the clandestine immigration of replacement Mozambiquan labour.

`Foreign' workers re-configured African society as they attempted to find a niche in Zululand. Both the state and

the Zulu patriarchy, however, had an interest in preventing Mozambiquan settlement. On the one hand, the state perceived migrant workers and their compatriots as a threat to social stability and did not want to incur the cost of supporting them. On the other hand, Zulu men felt threatened by the migrants who were prepared to accept low wages and who established relationships with Zulu women. In the long-term, however, Mozambiquans did not settle in the region, partly because they sought the same types of urban employment the Zulu did, and partly because the state refused `informal' migrants the right to settle in South Africa. It is probable that further research would show that more concrete and widespread ethnic differentiation and tension developed between migrants and residents in Zululand during the 1950s and 1960s.[10]

Although most reserve families still produced some of their food requirements, by the 1930s African agricultural production in Zululand had declined to such a low point that it led to a crisis when drought struck. Relegated to the over-crowded reserves, the Zulu could not compete with state-supported white agriculture. Although some well-placed *induna* were able to produce crops for the market, the majority of impoverished commoners sold grain under duress on a limited seasonal basis. While some women developed alternative cash-crops, this did not undermine the availability of food in the reserves since large-scale white grain farming ensured that South Africa had ample maize supplies.[11] In contrast to commercialising white agriculture, African peasants generally and would-be Zulu

sugar-farmers in particular, faced insurmountable obstacles to agrarian accumulation. Only a few men with privileged access to land could make a living in the reserves. This small group could certainly not produce enough to feed their fellow Zulu.

The `myth' of reserve agriculture became abundantly clear when drought struck in the 1930s and 1940s. The threat of famine led to acute problems as the NAD and store-keepers competed for control of food supplies. While local officials were successful in fulfilling the welfare obligation they felt to ensure that Africans did not starve, the central state preferred the white-dominated market and private enterprise to alleviate food shortages. It provided neither the funds nor the infrastructure necessary to ensure that Africans had consistent food supplies. The government was, therefore, predisposed to rely on limited infusions of cash, initially through work-relief schemes and later through welfare payments, to provide Africans with some means of purchasing food and, not coincidentally, white store-keepers with a captive market.

Differentiation in Zulu society had significant implications for relative food entitlements. The most striking feature of famines in Zululand was that the wealthy no longer struggled for subsistence along with the poor as they had during past droughts. Moreover, employees of the state, such as chiefs and *induna*, could inevitably count on a fairly regular supply of food from the local

administration. Commoners, however, had limited and irregular access to food supplies, and this varied even within families. While regularly employed male migrants were usually provided with adequate rations at their place of work because their white employers could bring pressure to bear on the state to ensure regular supplies of food, elderly retired men, women and especially children, often suffered from reduced supplies.

Famine had an ambiguous effect in Zululand. While few, if any, Zulu actually died from starvation, largely because the state and store-keepers provided sufficient, albeit erratic, supplies, most commoner families faced mounting debts from the increased cost of food. The picture that emerges, then, was not of outright catastrophe for the majority of the Zulu, but of pervasive and deepening want, and this stood in harsh contrast to the circumstances for wealthy chiefs and whites living in the same region.

The crisis of the 1930s highlighted the fragile nature of rural African society for the NAD and precipitated its intensive intervention to shore up the crumbling reserve economy. Government schemes for the `betterment' of Zululand, like those elsewhere in South Africa, had two ideological bases. First, from the late 1920s, the NAD shared world-wide concerns about soil degradation and espoused the use of `progressive scientific' measures to halt and reverse decline in the reserves. Secondly, the imperatives of the state's segregation policy meant that

the NAD had to find some viable means of providing subsistence for Africans in the reserves.

The South African government, which faced considerable pressure from capitalising white grain and stock farmers, provided little support for African agriculturalists. Thus, individual-plot farming and `master farmers' schemes failed to provide even a few reserve residents with a living, let alone to feed the masses of hungry Africans in Zululand. Although the NAD attempted to improve infrastructural support for African cultivators, it could not surmount the constraints on production from overcrowding and chiefly control of land. Nevertheless, NAD agricultural officers believed they could resolve the problem by controlling erosion and reducing `overstocking'. They claimed that, since `primitive' pastoralism had replaced cultivation on large areas of reserve land, they could re-establish at least subsistence production for commoners by removing most of the Zulu-owned `scrub' cattle.

The NAD's stock improvement measures, however, ran into staunch African resistance. While some `progressive' *kholwa* and wooled sheep-owners supported `betterment', chiefs and commoners perceived the state's intrusion into cattle-keeping as a threat to Zulu society. Indeed, it appeared to the Zulu that the NAD's proposed stock-culling plans, ostensibly designed to improve African cattle and the chance for cattle-less commoners to acquire `good' stock, were simply intended to release more land for whites.

Tensions between the state and Africans in the reserves heightened as commoners resisted the NAD culling programme.

The controversy over `betterment' intensified during the 1940s as the state insisted on convincing the Zulu of the benefits of stock improvement and called for a popular consensus. The NAD's repeated efforts to explain the value of its `scientific' proposals not only fell on deaf ears among the experienced Zulu herdsmen, they also tended to exacerbate tensions between the *kholwa* `progressives' and chiefs. These tensions allowed chiefs to regain some of the popular support that they had lost as they challenged the state over culling.

In the final analysis, this thesis has argued that the penetration of capitalism into rural South Africa during the first half of the twentieth century fundamentally changed three major components of the reserve political economy in Zululand: land, labour and cattle. If one effect of capitalist penetration into rural areas was to accelerate fissiparous tendencies within the reserves, then the effort of segregationists to entrench chiefly authority was, in essence, also hostile to African development, and this was certainly true in Zululand.

While there was undoubtedly a dominant racial cleavage in South Africa between Africans and whites, social stratification was crucial in shaping relations between the component parts of Zulu society and the white state, and between chiefs and commoners, men and women, and old and

young. The historical processes of change provided the Zulu with both a view of the past, and resurrected forms of a `traditional' African society, and of their future in a racially and class-divided society where created ethnicity and re-invented social practices served, simultaneously, to protect and subordinate them. These were woven into a complex ideology of Zulu ethnic nationalism which still exists today. These processes had significant implications for the way in which the state perceived the Zulu and how the Zulu related to Africans in the wider segregated South African society. The important question of how Zulu `ethnic' nationalism became a far more militant form of mobilization for the rural and urban underclass in Natal and Zululand remains.[12]

Some of the current predicaments that South Africa faces in relation to the modern quasi-state of KwaZulu under the leadership of chief Buthelezi are rooted in the earlier processes considered here. In order to fully understand the present situation in Natal-Zululand we need to look to the intervening years when state intervention in rural South Africa intensified and the lines of conflict between the conservative chiefly class and the majority of Africans became clear.

[1] See his *Peasantry*, p. 237

[2] See her *Ambiguities*, pp. 114-125.

[3] See Freund, `Rural Struggles' p. 172

[4] For how these ideological elements were shaped and pointed the way to future struggles see la Hausse, `Ethnicity', p. 285-288 and Bradford, *A Taste*, p. 277.

[5] Beinart reached the same conclusion in *Pondoland*, p. 131.

[6] Similar patterns were evident for chiefs elsewhere in South Africa. See Beinart, `Chieftancy and Articulation', p. 187.

[7] S. Milton is now completing a study of the South African cattle industry for a Ph.D. at ICS, University of London and his work has greatly helped my understanding of the Zulu cattle economy.

[8] See Dahl and Hjort, *Having Herds*, p. 12.

[9] For the demographic implications of this see Fair, *Distribution of the Population of Natal*, p.64-65.

[10] M. Murray is working on some of these issues for the north-eastern Transvaal. Some indications of these developments for a later period are found in D. Webster, `"Abafazi Bathonga Bafihlakala" Ethnicity and Gender in a KwaZulu Border Community', *African Studies*, Vol. 30, 1991, pp. 243-271. R. McIntosh of SOAS is currently undertaking research on policy formulations for a Ph.D. which may shed light on this. See his `State policies in rural South Africa, c. 1948-c.1960: policy formation and local responses', project paper delivered to the AHS, SOAS, 3 May 1995.

[11] Further research is needed on the role of African women in reserve households during this period.

[12] Marks has considered some important features of this in `Patriotism', pp. 215-216, 233-234. There is a wide scope for further research on issues related to Zululand during this period. Although C. Ballard has done some important work on them, the position of the so-called `coloured' community in Zululand should be considered in relation to their fellow reserve residents and the state. Moreover, the nature of rural retirement and the place of older generations in the reserves deserves more attention. Questions relating to, welfare and work-relief schemes, generational differences and what `retired' workers actually faced in the rural areas could throw more light on the actual subsistence base of the reserves. Other areas of possible enquiry have been noted in the text and include an

examination of the under-researched role of white store-keepers in rural areas and possible comparative work on Namibia which exhibits a number of features of change which resonate with the Zululand case, -and probably with the rest of the South African countryside- especially because South African state intervention played a major role in re-configuring both areas.

APPENDIX

1. POPULATION, LAND AREAS AND LABOUR STATISTICS

A. Population of Zululand

year:	African	White
1911:	214,969	3,000
1921:	250,829	4,000
1936:	352,839	6,200
1946:	387,197	NA
1951:	409,788	14,000

compiled by the author from Union of South Africa, Bureau of Census and Statistics, *Union Statistics for Fifty Years* (Pretoria, 1960)

B. Zululand Land Areas 1916-1939

	reserves areas (sq. miles) 1916	1936	1939	
North sub-total	2,589	3,486	3,486	*
Ingwavuma	1,405	1,609	-	
Ubombo	618	1,065	-	
Hlabisa	566	812	-	
Inland sub-total	3,236	3,558	3,573	#
Nongoma	692	868	868	
Mahlabatini	458	606	606	
Emtonjaneni	329	311	311	&
Eshowe	557	557	572	^
Nkandhla	627	626	626	$
Nquthu	573	590	590	
Coastal sub-total	715	617	617	@
Lr. Umfolozi	459	358	-	
Mtunzini	256	259	-	
Zululand Total	6,540	7,661	7,676	

* This did not constitute an addition of land, but rather that land thrown open was not occupied and then turned back over to the Trust

Much of this additional land can be accounted for by the re-drawing of the Nongoma/Hlabisa/Ubombo districts.

& Loss of a wattle farm

^ confirmation of mission station site in the Trust

$ Land included in white township

@ Loss of land to sugar farmers, most traded off for poor land in inland districts

C. Population and Densities, 1916-1936

	African Population		pop./sq. mile	
	1916	1936	1916	1936
North sub-total	68,700	80,600	26.5	23.1
Ingwavuma	32,200	39,200	-	-
Ubombo	17,500	21,200	-	-
Hlabisa	18,000	20,000	-	-
Inland sub-total	134,900	193,200	41.6	54.3
Nongoma	16,300	29,400	-	- *
Mahlabatini	14,000	20,000	-	- *
Emtonjaneni	10,000	16,000	-	-
Eshowe	36,700	47,300	-	-
Nkandhla	30,900	42,800	-	- *
Nquthu	27,000	36,100	-	-
Coastal sub-total	37,600	44,500	-	-
Lr. Umfolozi	14,900	17,000	-	-
Mtunzini	22,700	27,400	-	-
Zululand Total	241,100	318,300	36.8	41.6

* large increase accounted for partially by influx of refugees from northern Natal districts

Source: SEPC Report, No. 9, p. 8

D. Population Growth/ per centage increase/decrease for Africans and whites in Zululand

	Population			% change	% change
	1921	1936	1946	1921-36	1936-46
Ingwavuma	26,588	39,707	40,134	+ 39	+ 1
Ubombo	15,747	22,608	21,931	+ 44	- 3
Hlabisa	18,226	24,312	29,513	+ 33	+ 21
Nongoma	16,885	30,048	37,875	+ 78	+ 26
Mahlabatini	15,570	21,206	28,121	+ 36	+ 33
Emtonjaneni	18,451	24,850	26,850	+ 34	+ 9
Eshowe	38,803	50,707	54,151	+ 31	+ 7
Nkandhla	33,056	44,680	42,431	+ 35	- 5
Nquthu	29,609	36,955	38,278	+ 25	+ 4
L. Umfolozi	18,223	26,842	33,771	+ 47	+ 26
Mtunzini	25,827	34,989	37,789	+ 36	+ 8
Total	256,985	356,769	390,844	+ 39	+ 10

NB the highest rates of increase are found in either the sugar farming districts or districts adjacent to white farms in northern Natal. The net decreases for Nkandhla and

Ubombo between 1936 and 1946 can partially be accounted for by increased rates of migrant labour to other districts of Zululand, predominantly in the coastal sugar belt or the upland wattle plantations in Emtonjaneni.

Source: compiled by the author from T.D. Fair, *Natal Regional Survey No. 3: The Distribution of Population in Natal* (Oxford, 1955)

E. Labour migration from Zululand, 1904

Estimates of African male migration from Zululand Districts and their ranking for all 29 Natal Districts

	migrants	population*	rank
Eshowe	4100	40,000	3
Nkandhla	3015	26,000	6
Nquthu	2716	24,420	9
Ingwavuma	1968	26,160	11
Mahlabatini	1595	14,058	12
Emtonjaneni	1289	12,257	16
Ubombo	1025	12,750	19
Hlabisa	1012	15,000	20
Lr. Umfolozi	868	14,000	23
Nongoma	414	13,450	28
Totals	18,002	198,095	

The Natal districts of Vryheid(4769) and Mapumulo (4234) ranked numbers one and two respectively.

source: Based on NAP, Natal Colonial Papers, Vol 8/1/13/2/11, Blue Books on Native Affairs for 1902-1905 and rankings given in D. Hemson, `Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers', p. 54

F. Labour migration from Zululand for 1919.

	workers	non-workers	pop.	in: Natal	: Union
Emtonjaneni	2400	1000	10,000	2300	100
Eshowe	4280	720	44,006	1650	2630
Nkandhla	3946	6517	31,200	3946	nil
Mahlabatini	1900	1100	14,100	1900	nil
Mtunzini	2783	1855	26,000*	2783	nil
Hlabisa	3000	450	19,000	3000	nil
Nquthu	7300	3350	30,340	2700	4600
Ingwavuma	2650	3750	33,200	2650	nil
Lr.Umfolozi	4400	600	7,000*	4100	900
Nongoma	4100	400	24,000	2000	1400
Ubombo	4400	3600	17,000	4000	400
Totals:	41,259	23,342	295,846	31,029	10,030

NB population figures are for the reserves only.

* indicates reserve figures only and division of the district into two; Lower Umfolozi and Mtunzini.

Location of Employment for Africans in Zululand, 1919:

	Industrial	sugar	farm work	domestic	misc.
Emtonjaneni:	20	nil	1200	200	-
Eshowe :	nil	400	500	500	250
Nkandhla :	172	693	970	1000	-
Mahlabatini:	-	-	-	48	56
Mtunzini :	nil	2360	229	187	-
Hlabisa :	nil	-	-	150	-
Nquthu :	-	-	-	200	-
Ingwavuma :	-	-	30	100	50
Lr.Umfolozi:	450	3250	450	550	150
Nongoma :	-	-	-	150	550
Ubombo :	-	-	-	50	-
Totals:	642	6703	3379	3135	1100

Only 16 per cent of the Zululand workers worked in the sugar industry.

G. Employment for Africans from Zululand, 1932

	workers	non-workers	pop.	in: Natal	Union
Emtonjaneni:	3300	1800	16,600	2800	500
Eshowe :	5250	1230	36,700	2220	3030
Nkandhla :	4475	5440	30,900	4150	325
Mahlabatini:	2430	1450	14,000	2200	230
Mtunzini :	3980	1855	22,700	3675	305
Hlabisa :	3650	650	18,000	3450	200
Nquthu :	7980	3050	27,000	2400	5580
Ingwavuma :	3050	3150	33,200	2750	300
Lr.Umfolozi:	5280	760	14,900	4180	1100
Nongoma :	4750	800	16,300	2750	2000
Ubombo :	4900	2800	17,500	4200	700
Totals:	49,045	22,625	318,300	34,775	14,270

NB. these figures are not entirely reliable. The dramatic increase in workers, however, compared to 1946, can be attributed to the effects of the drought and depression.

Employment for Africans from Zululand, 1946:

	workers	non-workers	pop.	in: Natal	Union
Emtonjaneni:	3120	1200	26,850	2700	420
Eshowe :	4280	865	54,151	2800	1480
Nkandhla :	4410	4240	42,431	4025	385
Mahlabatini:	2200	912	28,121	2200	-
Mtunzini :	3470	899	37,789	3275	195
Hlabisa :	3100	750	29,513	3000	100
Nquthu :	7250	2850	38,278	3110	4140
Ingwavuma :	2825	3200	40,134	2525	300
Lr.Umfolozi:	4630	800	33,771	4180	450
Nongoma :	4125	500	37,875	2755	1370
Ubombo :	4023	1900	21,931	3780	243

Totals:	43,433	18,625	390,844	34,345	9,093

Based on CNC 359, 1667/1919

H. Absentees from the reserves 1936:

	M/F	total	% of pop.	male % of pop.
North :	9417/424	9841	12.2	49.0
Inland:	23,782/1876	25,658	13.3	51.2
Coast :	4540/610	5150	11.6	41.6
Total :	37,739/2,910	40,649	12.8	49.0

Masculinity Ratios (aged 21 years and over) number of males per 100 females.

North : 57.7
Inland: 54.4
Coast : 139.1 *
Source: SEPC, p.36

* this high rate is due to employment of migrant males in the sugar industry.

Compared with and average masculinity ratio of 74 per 100 in 1901 based on Colony of Natal, Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1899-1901, NCP, 8/1/13/2/9 and in 1919 an average masculinity ratio of 66 per 100, based on averages from Union of S.A. Report of the Native Affairs Department for 1919, U.G. 7-19.

I. African workers in the Sugar growing and milling industry in Z-land, 1938

District	PEA workers	Union Workers
Empangeni	1,988	4,857
Eshowe	399	1,872
Hlabisa	389	1,583
Mtunzini	1,444	2,305
Total:	4,220	10,617

NB, most of the Union workers would be normally resident in the northern Zululand districts of Ubombo, Mahlabatini, Hlabisa and Ingwavuma, areas considered to hold populations with high malaria tolerance.

Based on: CNC 121A N3/13/4 (X)

J. Labour on White Farms in Zululand 1930

	Whites M/F	Indian M/F	African M/F	Totals M/F
Emtonjaneni:	79/10	1/-	916/132	986/142
Eshowe :	123/10	31/9	1875/67	2029/88
Nkandhla :	52/ 2	-/-	290/80	242/82
Mahlabatini:	NA			
Mtunzini :	120/150	221/43	4487/52	4607/95
Hlabisa :	112/30	11/1	1623/14	1745/45
Nquthu :	33/4	-/-	22/50	55/54
Ingwavuma :	4/-	-/-	6/-	10/-
Lr.Umfolozi:	195/18	280/72	5927/190	6402/280
Nongoma :	23/4	-/-	17/4	40/8
Ubombo :	45/3	-/-	186/17	231/20
Totals:	M/F 784/231	M/F 544/125	M/F 15,329/816	M/F 16,657/1172

compiled by the author from Union of South Africa, Department of Census and Statistics, Agricultural Census of the Union for 1931, no 13, U.G. 12-'32, Table 17.

2. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS FOR ZULULAND

A. Production for 1923: Maize/200 lb.bags

	White Farms	Africans on White farms	Reserves	
Emt:	4,924	2,960	1,983	
Esh	4,523	303	9,274	
Hla	-	-	-	
Ing	-	-	-	
Lum	1,893	88	4,146	
Mtu	1,372	42	5,208	
Nka	2,782	1,069	49,565	
Non	3,139	72	113,203	
Nqu	1,658	152	38,228	
Ubo	-	-	20,000	[approx.]
Totals	20,291	5,296	241,600	

Source: Union of South Africa Report on Agricultutral and Pastoral Production for 1923, Agricultural Census No. 6, 1923, U.G. 25-25.

B. Production for 1927: Maize/200 lb. bags

	White Farms	Africans on White farms	Reserves	corn\resevres 200 lb. bags
Emt:	6,737	3,496	5,186	2,072
Esh	4,979	316	9,497	-
Hla	1,822	11	4,200	-
Ing	40	-	11,000	-
Lum	4,995	120	11,236	3,674
Mtu	1,172	66	15,192	-
Non	1,625	84	76,918	46,201
Nka	2,307	1,354	24,868	-
Nqu	2,241	155	13,555	-
Ubo	-	-	15,000	[approx.]
Total	25,918	5,602	195,652	[est.]

C. African Maize and Corn Production 1934-39 (200 lb. bags)

Maize

Region	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
Zululand total	278,500	169,400	152,300	118,800	133,600	127,500
North	35,100	19,300	56,600	17,800	17,500	24,400
Inland	213,000	119,500	79,100	89,300	98,600	84,600
Coastal	30,400	30,600	16,600	11,600	17,500	18,500

Corn

Region	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
Zululand total	117,200	74,600	57,600	33,100	38,700	55,000
North	30,900	22,300	28,500	6,100	6,400	19,400
Inland	73,100	42,500	22,500	23,300	27,100	29,400
Coastal	13,200	9,800	6,600	3,700	5,300	6,000

D. Average Annual Production per person (200 lb. bags), 1934-39

Region	Maize	Corn
Zululand total	.51	.19
North	.35	.23
Inland	.59	.19
Coastal	.50	.17

NB according to the Mine Wages Commission, the average annual minimum requirement of grain per worker was 2.75 bags, (or roughly 1.5 lbs. per man per day) and this was only considered adequate if taken with other foods. In Zululand, people were producing only enough for less than .70 of a bag per person per year,(or .38 of a lb. per

person per day) a shortfall of over 2 bags per person. See SEPC, p. 49

E. Other food crops grown: Average Annual Production 1934-39

Region	Wheat	Potatoes (150 lb bags)	Peas and Beans (200 lb. bags)
Zululand total	-	4,200	1,800
North	-	600	200
Inland	-	1,300	1,200
Coastal	-	2,300	400

Other Cash Crops grown

Region	Tobacco (lb.s)	Groundnuts (lb.s)
Zululand total	14,000	201,700
North	6,600	120,700
Inland	3,700	63,400
Coastal	3,700	17,500

Other cash crops not accounted for: Dagga, beer and palm wine, hides and skins

Source SEPC: p.14

F. Cash Value of Animal Products in £, 1937

	wool	hides	skins	total
Zululand total	5,200	15,000	1,000	21,200
North	-	4,400	300	4,700
Inland	5,200	8,600	600	14,500
Coastal	-	2,000	40	2,040

G. Maize Production in 200 lb bags, 1941-1948

Region	1941	1944	1945	1946	1948
Zululand total	230,200	242,300	253,200	108,600	167,100
North	29,800	33,800	44,100	13,600	19,700
Inland	181,000	167,800	182,300	83,800	131,100
Coastal	25,840	30,763	26,800	11,800	16,800

Average annual production of maize per person:
1946: .27 bags per person
1948: .42 bags per person

Based on SEPC, p. 16, U.G. 34-`50, *Agricutural and Pastoral Census of the Union*, 1950 and estimates by author

3. AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLE POPULATION, 1921-1948

District	1921	1948	% change
Ing	25,400	85,000	+ 225
Ubo	12,400	22,800	+ 80
Mtub	28,000	72,500	+ 156
Nga	56,000	98,800	+ 74
Mhla	n.a	64,000	n.a.
Mel	24,200	44,000	+ 70
Esh	45,000	85,200	+ 86
Nka	30,000	85,400	+ 186
Nqu	34,000	65,000	+ 87
Lr. Umf	16,200	47,500	+ 187
Mtu	15,300	44,800	+ 183
Totals:	285,500	710,000	+ 148

Based on U.G. 25-`25, *Agricultural and Pastoral Census of the Union, No. 6*, CNC 97A, 112/110, and some estimates of district herd growth of nine per cent per year.

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A. Official Records

B. Newspapers and Periodicals

III. INTERVIEWS

IV. SECONDARY SOURCES

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B. Select Articles
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(ii) Mr. N.R. Bond, Store-owner and trader, Kwa Mnqandi, Nongoma. Born 1927. Lived all his life in Nongoma. interview conducted 10-11 Sept. 1993 and 25 Oct. 1993.

(iii) Mr. Nkonjane Dube, labourer, Kwa Zulu Monuments Council, Ondini, Mahlabatini. Born 1915, interviewed 5 July 1993.

(iv) Sister Mary Fidelia, Benedictine missionary, St Francis, Mahlabatini. Born 1910, interviewed 9 July 1993.

(v) Sister Friegard, Benedictine missionary, St. Alban's, Nongoma. Born 1908, interviewed 15 Sept. 1993.

(vi) Mr. Bayekana Masuku, retired labourer and former volunteer member of the Native Military Contingent Corps, Maqwakaze, Eshowe. Born 1 Jan. 1926, interviewed 17 Sept. 1993.

(vii) Mr. Bhebhedlana Tobias Masuku, retired labourer and cousin to Bayekana Masuku, Maqwakaze, Eshowe. born 1932, interviewed 17-18 Sept. 1993.

(viii) Mr. Simon Ngema, Induna to Chief Khwabi Mdhlalose and former farm labourer, Mamosho, Eshowe. Born 1922, interviewed 13-15 Sept. 1993.

(ix) Mr. N.A Otte, Clerk of the Court, Nongoma, 1937-42, Acting Magistrate; Ubombo, 1946-48, Springs, 1948-51, Mapumalo, 1951-56, Eshowe 1959-61, Mahlabatini, 1961-65, Nongoma, 1965-77. Born 17 May 1919 at Hlabisa. Son of the Revd. H. Otte of the Lutheran Mission at Hlabisa. Interviewed 16, 19-20 Sept. 1993 at Eshowe.

(x) Mr. Jonathan Muntukaphathwa Shandu, former textile worker in Durban, Mabedlana, Mahlabatini. Born 1933, interviewed 9 July 1993.

(xi) Mr. Mkoko S'guda Shandu, labourer, Kwa Zulu Monuments Council, Ondini, Mahlabatini. Born 24 Nov. 1920, interviewed 5-7 July 1993.

(xii) Mr. Tamuza S'gwili Qwabe, sugar cane farm labourer, Kwa Bulawayo, Eshowe. Born c. 1922, interviewed 14-15 Sept. 1993.

(xiii) Mr. Henry Charles Nkomo Mpimiseni Zulu, retired migrant construction worker, Isandlwana, Nquthu. Born 1918,

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